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AGENDA

I. **The idea of popular participation in the 19th and 20th centuries (the heritage of Rousseau and Mill).**
*General rapportear*: Prof. I. FETSCHER, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main.

II. **Recent research on typologies of political regimes and political development.**
*General rapporteur*: Prof. H. DAALDER, University of Leyden, and Prof. N. PASIC, Director, Higher School of Political Sciences, Belgrade.

III. **Consensus and dissent, with special reference to the developing countries.**
*General rapporteurs*: Prof. G. SARTORI, University of Florence, and Prof. E. SHILS, University of Chicago.

IV. **Theory and practice of representation.**
*General rapporteurs*: Prof. A.H. BIRCH, University of Hull, and Mr. M.A. KRUTOGOLOV, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Moscow.

V. **Administrative law and public administration.**
*General rapporteur*: Prof. A. MOLITOR, Catholic University of Louvain.

VI. **The government and politics of economic organizations.**
*General rapporteurs*: Prof. C.E. LINDBLOM, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, and Prof. Z. RYBICKI, Pro-Rector, University of Warsaw.

VII. **The political role of international economic organizations.**
*General rapporteurs*: Mr. R.W. COX, Director, International Institute of Labour Studies, Geneva, and Prof. A.B. OVERSTREET, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, and Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

VIII. **Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment.**
*General rapporteur*: Prof. J. LALOY, Institute of Political Studies, University of Paris.

IX. **The political scientist's problems of scientific information.**
*General rapporteur*: Prof. J. MEYRYIAT, Institute of Political Studies, University of Paris, Secretary General, International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation.

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# PUBLIC OPINION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM*

SIDNEY VERBA[a], RICHARD A. BRODY[a], EDWIN B. PARKER[a], NORMAN H. NIE[a], NELSON W. POLSBY[b], PAUL EKMAN[c], AND GORDON S. BLACK[d]

## I. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy seems to command more public attention than domestic policy and yet—insofar as it has been researched—public opinion on foreign policy seems to have less impact on governmental decisions than does opinion in most other issue areas.[1] There are at least two reasons, one normative and one empirical, why public opinion can be regarded as pertinent to some foreign policy questions—especially those associated with "life and death." Normatively, it is desirable for political leaders in a democracy to commit national resources in ways generally approved by the populace. Large scale military commitments should, if at all possible, meet with the approval of public opinion. Empirically, if they do not, experience has shown there are circumstances in which public disapproval of the course of foreign policy may be registered in national elections. Specifically, our one recent experience with a situation of partial mobilization and a limited but large-scale and indefinite commitment to military action in Korea did in time produce a distribution of opinion that suggested the war was very unpopular. And though its precise impact on the 1952 presidential election is difficult to assess there is little doubt that the Korean issue contributed significantly to the Eisenhower landslide.[2]

Among the questions raised by the Korean experience is whether the American public will easily tolerate the prosecution of long drawn-out wars of partial mobilization. Therefore, it is not surprising that another such war, in Vietnam, has stimulated a concern with public opinion.

This paper reports the results of a survey study of American attitudes towards the war in Vietnam which attempted to probe somewhat more deeply into public attitudes on the war than have newspaper surveys and commercial polls.[3] The data help us clarify the role

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* The data reported in this article were collected by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. We are indebted to the Center and to Peter H. Rossi, its Director, for collaboration in designing and conducting the study as well as for financial support. We are also grateful to G. Ray Funkhouser, Barry Greenberg, Douglas Johnson and Peter Lyman for assistance in data gathering and processing. The survey was also supported by contributions from 250 individuals—mostly faculty members at Stanford University and other universities in the San Francisco area.

[a] *Stanford University*
[b] *Wesleyan University*
[c] *University of California Medical Center*
[d] *University of Rochester*

[1] See, for example, Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress" this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963) 45–56; and Miller, "Voting and Foreign Policy" in James Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (forthcoming).

[2] See Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 527. For summaries of poll data on public support of World War II and the Korean War, see: J. T. Campbell and L. S. Cain, "Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (1965), 318–328.

[3] This survey was conducted in late February and early March, 1966, by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) with a questionnaire

played by public opinion in such limited wars, and will also, hopefully, shed some light on a question of growing importance: the nature of the emerging relationship of public opinion polling itself to foreign policy making.

At the time the present study was planned, the press was full of reports as to the importance to the President of public support. We were told that the President avidly followed the polls on the war. Furthermore, it was generally argued that the polls showed the American public firmly behind the President's policy. If he was under any pressure, it was from a growing group of opponents of his policy who wanted him to escalate the war.[4]

As students of public opinion familiar with the limitations of polling data, we were unsatisfied with these reports. Most recent academic studies of public attitudes have demonstrated that the public has little information on most issues and that most people do not have thought-out, consistent, and firmly-held positions on most matters of public policy; and this is especially the case the more "distant" the issue from the individual: e.g., attitudes on civil rights have more structure and consistency than those on foreign policy. In addition, these studies indicate differences between the political attitudes of elite groups and attitudes reflected in mass samples.[5] All this suggests that the marginal distributions of answers to simple issue-oriented questions asked of a cross-section sample of the population tell us relatively little.

Yet this is the "public opinion" that enters the public debate through the press and the commercial polls. The data on public opinion and the war in Vietnam were of this sort. A good example of this problem are the commercial poll reports of the support for the administration's policy in Vietnam which were based on questions as to whether one "approved or disapproved of the way in which the President was handling the situation in Vietnam." Such a question, we felt, was inadequate. Rather than being a question on support for the Vietnamese position of the administration, it seemed likely it was tapping generalized support for the Presidency, partisan affiliation, and/or attachment to the incumbent President for whom the bulk of the population had voted. We felt that a simple "approve" or "disapprove" answer told us very little and that there might be a more complex phenomenon behind that simple finding. In addition, evidence for the nature of the opposition to the President was both fragmentary and ambiguous,[6] so we felt that fuller information was needed.

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designed and pre-tested at Stanford. The respondents were 1495 adults. To obtain the sample NORC drew probability samples of blocks within each of its seventy-five sampling points throughout the country and sent its interviewers to select men and women within those blocks (or comparable areal units) to correspond to the nation in age, sex, and employment status.

[4] *New York Times*, March 10, 1966, p. 10; see also C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, March 7, 1966, Section IV; and *Newsweek*, March 7, 1966. These reports have references both to the "Harris Survey" (*Washington Post*, Feb. 28, 1966) and "private" polls.

[5] See, among others, Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideologies and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 44 (June, 1960), 406–427; V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, (New York; Knopf, 1961); S. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); and Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

[6] For example, the thrust of the February Harris Survey (*op.cit.*) was that the increasing disaffection with the "job President Johnson is doing in handling the war in Vietnam," was from those who favored increasing our military effort. This was interpreted in the White House (*New York Times*, March 10, 1966) as indicating that a majority of those opposing the President were "Hawks." But an analysis of the Harris report does not support this interpretation. If we examine the Harris data to ascertain whether those who had an opinion on escalation (8% were "not sure") approve or disapprove of the President's handling of the war we find the following:

| | Jan. 1966 Attitude toward President's handling of the war | | Feb. 1966 Attitude toward President's handling of the war | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | "good-excellent" | "fair-poor" | "good-excellent" | "fair-poor" |
| pro-escalation | 50% | 37% | 63% | 49% |
| anti-escalation | 50% | 63% | 37% | 51% |
| Total | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Compared with the January data, the February poll results show a trend in the direction of the interpretation but not majority support. The

## II. THE PRESENT STUDY

Our approach was to ask some of the standard questions about the support of the President, but to go further by asking opinions on a wide range of policy alternatives as well as about the possible costs of such alternatives. In addition, we asked some questions about the extent of our respondents' information, their general concern about the war, their political activity, and the usual background demographic variables. Thus, we could look across a large number of policy alternatives and see how opinions on them were distributed, and relate these opinions to a variety of social, political and personal background factors. Our resources did not allow us to ask as many questions as we would have liked, but enabled us to go well beyond the usual commercial poll.

Thus, the study was "academic" in form because of our concern for a range of issue questions and the patterns among them as well as in our concern for background explanatory variables. But it was non-academic in that the purpose was to contribute to public understanding at a time of heated political debate. The results received national publicity and extensive editorial comment. In addition, our report was inserted in the *Congressional Record*—as was a blistering attack on it.[7]

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE WHO APPROVE JOHNSON VIETNAM POLICY* BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTE IN 1964

| | | Political Affiliation | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Republican | Democratic |
| Vote Last Election | Johnson | 67%<br>(N = 80) | 71%<br>(N = 608) |
| | Goldwater | 45%<br>(N = 225) | 39%<br>(N = 56) |

* The exact question wording was, "In general, do you approve or disapprove the way the Johnson administration is handling the situation in Vietnam?"

The percentages in the above table are the percentages of the respondents who said they approved.

Our original report made, we believe, an important contribution to the public debate on the nature of foreign policy attitudes by indicating that they were not as had been assumed; and that the phenomenon under study was not as simple as previous reports had suggested. This article reports further analysis of the nature of American foreign policy attitudes.

*Overview of Results*: Our general substantive findings can be briefly summarized.[8] We found that the war in Vietnam was a salient problem. More respondents (61%) reported "worrying" about it than about four other public issues—crime and juvenile delinquency (51%), Negro-White relations (32%), inflation and the cost of living (46%), and air and water pollution (27%). And we found relatively high levels of information on the issue.[9] Our study confirmed

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trend, moreover, was apparently temporary; by late April, according to Harris (*Washington Post*, May 9, 1966), support for the President had dropped to 47% "good-excellent," 53% "fair-poor" and anti-escalation sentiment had increased:

| | April | Feb. | Jan. |
|---|---|---|---|
| pro-escalation | 43% | 49% | 45% |
| anti-escalation | 48% | 43% | 48% |
| not sure | 9% | 8% | 7% |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Since the May press release does not report the cross-tabulation of support and escalation sentiment, it is not certain that Johnson opposers were anti-escalation but it is a reasonable surmise.

[7] *Congressional Record*, March 17, 1966, p. 5863 and April 28, 1966, p. A2320. For editorial comment on the poll, see, for instance, *New York Times*, March 17, 1966; *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, March 16, 1966; and *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 1966. See *The Washington Post*, April 7, 1966, p. A25 for the original attack on our survey and *ibid.* April 16, 1966, Letters to the Editor Column, for our reply. For an account of press reaction to our initial report, see: Nelson W. Polsby, "Doves, Hawks, and the Press," *Trans-action* (April, 1967).

[8] For a full report on all questions and all marginal results, consult *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam* (March 15, 1966, Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, California).

This report has been published, in Spanish: "La opinión publica en Estados Unidos de América sobre la guerra de Vietnam," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 28 (Abril–Junio, 1966) 357–76.

[9] For instance, 86% of our respondents knew that Congress had not declared war, 68% knew we were bombing targets in the North at the time of the survey, 47% could name the capital of South Vietnam and 41% could name the cap-

the findings of others that the President had strong support at that time: 61% approved of his handling of the situation in Vietnam, while 29% disapproved.[10] But the data also supported our suspicion that the standard question used to tap support for the President's "handling of the situation" in Vietnam reflected in good part general support for the President rather than support for his particular policies. As Table 1 indicates, those who voted for Johnson in 1964 are much more likely to support his policy in Vietnam than are those who voted against him. And the fact (to be discussed below) that there is little relationship between party affiliation or previous party vote and specific policy preferences on Vietnam supports this interpretation. (See below, Table 6.)

We also found a greater openness to various moves to negotiate a settlement of the war than had been previously suggested. Majorities were willing to negotiate with the Vietcong (88%), to hold free elections even if the Vietcong might win (54%), and to allow a coalition government including the Vietcong (52%).[11]

At the same time however, majorities rejected alternatives that implied a sudden withdrawal from Vietnam or a complete abandonment of our commitments there. Thus, 55% rejected the alternative of "withdrawing our troops and letting the Vietnamese work out their own problems," and 81% said they would disapprove "if President Johnson were to announce tomorrow that we were going to withdraw from Vietnam and let the Communists take over." In addition to the above, we found a considerable reluctance to pay the domestic costs of the war, (among both doves and hawks) and a growing opposition as the escalation steps presented to the respondents became more severe.

Furthermore, contrary to previous press reports, we found strong evidence that those opposed to the President were more likely to be "doves" than "hawks."[12] On all policy issues those who reported being opposed to the President were more likely to take the "dove" response than were those who favored him. This point is made clearer when we compare those who "approve" of the President's handling of the situation with those who "disapprove" in terms of their scores on "escalation" and "de-escalation" scales.[13]

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ital of North Vietnam. It is hard to be certain whether to consider these figures "high" or "low." It is our impression that they represent fairly high levels of information on an issue of foreign policy.

[10] The Gallup Polls, covering the period in which we were in the field, show results on the same question somewhat at variance with our results. AIPO reported lower levels of "approval" than we found although the level of "disapproval" was about the same:

> "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way President Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam?"

| | Approve | Disapprove | DK (no opinion) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 12/65 AIPO[a] | 56% | 26% | 18% |
| 1/66 AIPO | 57% | 27% | 15% |
| 2/66 AIPO | 50% | 33% | 17% |
| Stanford/NORC Poll | 61% | 29% | 10% |
| 3/66 AIPO | 56% | 26% | 18% |

a. AIPO data are from press releases carried in the San Francisco *Chronicle*, March 9, and April 6, 1966.

[11] Since these results might be affected by who it was that the respondent perceived the Vietcong to be—their identification as North Vietnamese-dominated or indigenous South Vietnamese rebels being a matter of debate—we cross-tabulated these results against identification of the Vietcong. Attitudes toward negotiations with them is not dependent upon the way in which they are identified or mis-identified.

[12] See footnote 4 above.

[13] Guttman scaling procedures were used to test whether sets of items which seemed intuitively to measure the same underlying attitude were in fact related in a unidimensional pattern. An eight-item 'escalation' scale and an eight-item 'de-escalation' or peace-initiative scale met the criteria for satisfactory Guttman scales in two separate random subsamples of the total. Coefficients of reproducibility were in excess of .90. Coefficients of scalability were in excess of .60 (see Herbert Menzel, "A new coefficient for scalogram analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17, 1953, 268–280). The distribution of scale scores was significantly different from chance by chi square test at the $p<.001$ levels.

The escalation scale included questions asking approval or disapproval of the level of military involvement at the time of the survey. The respondents were asked whether they would be willing to continue the fight in Vietnam if it meant: bombing of military targets in North Vietnam (77% approved), 200,000 troops in Vietnam (61% approved); questions asking about increases in manpower involvement: 500,000

Table 2 shows the distribution of supporters and opponents of the President's policy on the escalation and de-escalation scales. Johnson's supporters are much more likely to be found in the upper-right corner of the table indicating support for escalation and opposition to de-escalation, while Johnson's opponents are more likely to be in the lower left corner of the table indicating support for de-escalation and opposition to escalation. If we consider, for instance, cells b, c, and f which represent moderate or extreme "hawklike" positions, we find 43% of Johnson's supporters in these boxes and only 24% of his opponents. And in cells d, g, and h representing moderate or extreme "dovelike" positions we find 23% of Johnson's supporters, but 51% of his opponents. In sum, those who approved of the President's position scored higher on the escalation scale ($\bar{x}=4.4$) than those who disapproved ($\bar{x}=2.8$) ($t=8.7$, $p<.001$). And Johnson supporters scored lower on the de-escalation scale ($\bar{x}=4.0$), than his opponents ($\bar{x}=4.8$) ($t=5.8$, $p<.001$).

In general our study found that few respondents took consistent "dove" or "hawk" positions. The opinions of most tended to be moderate.[14] Our findings showed a relatively permissive majority behind the President, suggesting that the public would support him in some escalation of the war, but would oppose extreme escalation. There seemed to be more willingness to see a reduction of the war but, symmetrical with the opposition to major escalation, was an opposition to precipitous withdrawal. We did not find, as much writing suggests we should have found, a populace that wanted some quick and precipitate resolution of the situation. We concluded our original report as follows:

> "The American public is clearly concerned about Vietnam. . . . But their opinions appear to be moderate and responsible. They do not want to pay the domestic costs of commitment in Vietnam, but this is consistent with their desire for a negotiated settlement. And though the settlement they prefer involves a willingness to deal with the Vietcong that goes beyond present administration policy, they reject those solutions that require irresponsible abandonment of our commitments."

An editorial in the New York *Times* on March 17 interpreted these results as follows:

> "There is little support in the country—as a recent Stanford University poll showed—for the extreme alternatives of withdrawal or all-out war. But there is substantial support for a

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troops (45%), all-out mobilization (40%); and escalation questions involving China and Russia: fighting the Chinese in Vietnam (56%), fighting the Chinese in China (32%), fighting an atomic war with China (29%), and fighting an atomic war with Russia (22%).

The de-escalation scale included items ranging from approval of withdrawal from Vietnam even if it meant a Communist takeover in Laos and Thailand as well as Vietnam (13% approve) to approval of negotiations with the Vietcong (88% approve). Items in between included: immediate withdrawal (15%), letting Vietcong eventually gain control (28%), gradual withdrawal while letting Vietnamese work out their own problems (39%), letting the Vietcong participate in a coalition government (52%), permitting free elections (54%), and agreeing to a UN-supervised truce (69%). That both sets of items—those on escalation and those on de-escalation—can be ordered on Guttman scales and that these orderings parallel the ordering of items that a politically sophisticated observer would arrive at as being more or less extreme escalation or de-escalation measures (atomic war with Russia being a more extreme move than atomic war with China, for instance) lends support to the argument that attitudes on the war form a meaningful pattern.

We asked respondents several questions concerning their willingness to pay possible domestic economic and welfare costs "if we are to continue the fighting." Approval for "increasing taxes at home" was 31% and disapproval 66%. "Putting government controls over wages and prices" got 41% approval and 53% disapproval. "Reducing aid to education" got 19% approval and 79% disapproval. "Spending less money for the War on Poverty" recived approval from 46% and disapproval from 51%. "Reducing the Medicare program" received 28% approval and 65% disapproval. For correlational analysis we combined the three welfare costs items into a single index and the two economic items into another index. (Guttman scaling analysis indicated that the two kinds of items were not sufficiently correlated to justify a combined scale).

[14] See our original report (cited in footnote 8) for a full report of these data. Consistent "hawks" took the following positions on four items: they favored increasing our commitment to 500,000 men and favored bombing North Vietnam cities; they opposed a coalition government that included the Vietcong and opposed elections if there were a chance the Vietcong might win. Consistent "doves" took the opposite four positions. We found 6% of our sample to be consistent "hawks" and 14% to be consistent "doves."

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF JOHNSON APPROVERS AND DISAPPROVERS IN VARIOUS SCALE CATEGORIES ON THE ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION SCALES

| | | Escalate Scale | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | ← Low | | High → | |
| | | 0–2 | 3–5 | 6–8 | |
| De-escalate Scale | Low ↑ 0–2 | a<br>3%<br>4% | b<br>11%<br>6% | c<br>13%<br>8% | 27%<br>18% |
| | 3–5 | d<br>14%<br>20% | e<br>28%<br>20% | f<br>19%<br>10% | 61%<br>50% |
| | High ↓ 6–8 | g<br>6%<br>20% | h<br>3%<br>11% | i<br>2%<br>1% | 11%<br>32% |
| | | 44% 23% | 37% 42% | 19% 34% | |

upper diagonal = Johnson Approvers, N = 855
lower diagonal = Johnson Disapprovers, N = 436

policy of holding military operations at their present level while taking new initiatives to seek peace. The Stanford poll demonstrated that the country is far ahead of the Administration in its willingness to take such initiatives, even if they should entail serious risks."

*A Closer Look at These Attitudes:* The data reported above told us more, we believe, about the nature of opinion on the war in Vietnam than earlier polls had told us. But there are still many unanswered questions as to the internal structure and sources of these attitudes. We will here explore these questions more fully than was possible in our original report.

The findings we report below are somewhat paradoxical. Our original findings were that there was more pattern and consistency in public attitudes on the war in Vietnam than we had originally expected. The war is an issue in foreign policy; foreign policy issues do not tend to generate coherent structures because individuals have little in the way of a concrete frame of reference such as that which often underpins attitudes on domestic policies. But, though we found many inconsistencies and much confusion, we also found more information about the war than one might have expected and in general the responses formed meaningful patterns. This is not to argue that we found sophistication among the public or attitudes that would provide a guide for the decision maker. Far from it. The differences in responses to similar questions worded differently indicates a lack of clear crystallization of opinion among many,[15] and there was much

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[15] See S. M. Lipset, "The President, the Polls, and Vietnam," *Trans-action* (Sept.-Oct. 1966), p. 20.

TABLE 3. PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS* (UPPER HALF OF MATRIX) AND ETA** COEFFICIENTS (LOWER HALF OF MATRIX) FOR 8 DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

| | Education | Income | Information | Escalation | De-escalation | Costs | Welfare Costs | Race |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Education | | .42 | .37 | −.05 | −.06 | −.01 | .06 | .15 |
| Income | .43 | | .29 | .00 | −.03 | .04 | .05 | .24 |
| Information | .37 | .30 | | .12 | −.19 | .12 | .10 | .22 |
| Escalation | −.07 | .08 | .14 | | −.37 | .37 | .30 | .13 |
| De-escalation | −.10 | −.07 | −.19 | −.40 | | −.10 | −.18 | −.15 |
| Econ. Costs | −.03 | .11 | .14 | .37 | −.12 | | .20 | .02 |
| Welfare Costs | .11 | .07 | .11 | .32 | −.20 | .23† | | .14 |
| Race | .17 | .26 | .24 | .16 | −.19 | .08 | .17 | |

* N = 1209, $p < .05$ when $r > .06$, $p < .01$ when $r > .08$, $p < .001$ when $r > .11$ (N is less than 1495 because cases with missing data were excluded from this analysis.)

** Curvilinear correlation coefficient calculated for each pair with the variable higher (or further left) in the matrix as the independent variable. Sign of the eta coefficient is the same as the corresponding Pearson product-moment correlation.

† Curvilinear correlation is significantly different from the linear relationship, $< .001$.

inconsistency and much confusion. But the pattern of responses suggested to us that we were not dealing with a mere random phenomenon.

The results reported above thus have somewhat more of an internal structure than we might have expected. But paradoxically, as we shall report below, the preferences have little of the kind of external order we might have expected. Unlike candidate preference in an election, or opinions on domestic policies, attitudes on the war in Vietnam do not pattern along the standard dimensions of social structure. The respondent's social characteristics—class, party, place of residence—have little relationship to preference (with the partial and important exception of race, to be discussed below). Thus we seem to have a major political issue about which large numbers of ordinary citizens express opinions, claim to be concerned, and on which they seem relatively well informed. Yet their opinions on this issue are almost totally uncorrelated with the major dimensions of social structure that usually pattern political attitudes.

*Patterns of Consistency.* Correlation among various scales of attitudes toward the war suggest that there is consistency in public attitudes. As the data in Table 3 indicate, those who favor increasing the war are more likely to

TABLE 4. MEAN SCORES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

| Attitude | Level of Education | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No High School | Some High School | Completed High School | Some College | Completed College | Total |
| Escalation | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.9 |
| De-escalation* | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.8 |
| Information** | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 4.5 |
| Sample size | 267 | 264 | 367 | 166 | 145 | 1209 |

* $p < .05$
** $p < .001$

be willing to pay the costs of that increase. The correlations between the escalation scale and the economic costs and welfare costs indices were .37 and .30, respectively.[16] Conversely, there is a tendency (though less marked) for those who favor de-escalation to oppose the payment of these costs. The correlation between the de-escalation scale and willingness to pay economic and welfare costs was −.10 and −.18, respectively. In addition, the escalation and de-escalation scales were negatively correlated −.37. In general, the attitudes form a meaningful pattern with all coefficients significant beyond the .001 level in the expected direction.[17]

*Social group and policy preferences*: Are there different patterns of policy preference among different strata of the society? Our evidence suggests not. There is little relationship between such standard status variables as income or occupation and policy preferences on the war in Vietnam (Table 3). Similarly, we find little differences among sub-groups with different levels of education. The highly educated are little different from the less highly educated in their policy preferences (Tables 3 and 4). And neither religion nor strength of religious belief was correlated with preferences on the war. An analysis of attitude scales by region indicates that the Southwest and Western states were more in favor of escalation while the South was most in favor of de-escalation (Table 5).

The lack of clear relationship between social status and preferences on the war in Vietnam is not unexpected. The conflict, after all, does not involve domestic status politics. In the same way, one would not expect partisan affiliation to structure preferences very much—particularly in a country with a long tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy. Other literature also suggests that party affiliation is not closely related to preferences on foreign policy[18] and the crossing of positions by the President—who in 1964 attacked Goldwater for various schemes to increase the war that the President himself later introduced—ought to have dulled the edge of any division based on vote in 1964. This is confirmed in Table 6.

There is some tendency for Democrats to have higher mean escalation scores than Republicans; and for those who voted for Goldwater in 1964 to have higher escalation scores than those who voted for Johnson. But neither of these differences achieve statistical significance (by analysis of variance). When we com-

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[16] See footnote 13 for a description of these scales.

[17] The pattern of consistency can also be observed if we look at the mean escalation scores in relation to willingness to see taxes raised and aid to education cut "if needed to continue the war." Those who approve of reducing aid to education and raising taxes have the highest mean escalation score, while those who oppose raising taxes and reducing education aid have the lowest.

MEAN ESCALATION SCORES BY OPINIONS ON TAX INCREASE AND REDUCED AID TO EDUCATION

| Increase Taxes (if needed to continue war) | *Reduce Aid to Education* (if needed to continue war) | |
|---|---|---|
| | Approve | Disapprove |
| Approve | Mean: 5.89<br>(N = 129) | Mean: 4.92<br>(N = 313) |
| Disapprove | Mean: 3.94<br>(N = 138) | Mean: 3.04<br>(N = 771) |

(Variable N due to missing data cases; DK, etc., omitted.)

[18] See Warren Miller, "Voting and Foreign Policy," in Rosenau, *op. cit.*

TABLE 5. MEAN SCORES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY REGION

| Attitude | Region | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | East | North Central | South | Southwest | West | Total |
| Escalation** | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 3.9 |
| De-escalation* | 3.9 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 3.8 |
| Information* | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Sample Size | 305 | 322 | 216 | 156 | 210 | 1209 |

* p < .05
** p < .01

bine party affiliation and party vote we find that those who crossed party lines to vote for the candidate of the opposite party have the more extreme positions on the escalation scale. The lowest escalation score is found among the Republicans who voted for Johnson. Those who voted consistently with their party affiliation—Johnson Democrats or Goldwater Republicans—have similar scores on the escalation scale.

It is tempting to interpret these data to suggest that party affiliation is not related to preferences in relation to the war in Vietnam, but that those who left their partisan affiliation to vote for the candidate of the opposite party did so (in part) because of the perceived foreign policy positions of the candidates—Goldwater having been perceived as more in favor of escalation. However, the variations within each of the groups is such that the overall differences are quite likely to be the result of chance variation in the sample: none achieve statistical significance. And similar non-significant results are found using the de-escalation scale. Perhaps the safest interpretation is that there is no relationship between party affiliation and vote, and preferences on this policy issue.

In contrast with the above findings, two demographic characteristics are related to preference on Vietnam. As Table 7 indicates, men are more likely than women to support escalation policies and women are more likely than men to support de-escalation policies. The mean escalation score for men is 4.4 compared with 3.7 for women. The mean de-escalation score is 4.1 for men and 4.5 for women. (In addition, men are more likely to be better informed, as measured by our information test. The average number correct among men was 5.0 and among women was 3.7.)

A stronger predictor of attitudes toward Vietnam policy was race (Table 8). Negroes were significantly more opposed to escalation than whites (they have a mean escalation score of 3.4 in contrast to 4.1 among white), and they are more willing to support de-escalation policies (Negroes have a 5.5 de-escalation versus a 4.1 score for whites). Since Negroes are significantly less well-informed than whites, we tested to see whether the difference is due to information level. But the relationship is even stronger when the level of information is controlled. The partial correlation between race and escalation with information level controlled is .16, and between race and de-escalation with information level controlled is −.20.

To sum up our findings thus far: There is little group difference in position on the war in Vietnam. Social status shows little relation to policy position and neither does party affilia-

TABLE 6. MEAN ESCALATION SCORES BY PARTY PREFERENCE AND VOTE IN LAST ELECTION

| Party Preference | Vote in Last Election | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Johnson ↓ | Goldwater ↓ | Didn't Vote ↓ |
| Republican | 3.3 (71)* | 4.0 (194) | 3.9 (64) |
| Democrat | 3.9 (440) | 4.1 (44) | 3.8 (147) |
| Independent | 4.2 (75) | 4.0 (29) | 3.9 (95) |

* Sample sizes in parentheses. Neither the effect of party preference or vote, nor the interaction between the two reached statistical significance (by analysis of variance). (F values for rows, columns, and interaction are 0.7, 0.5 and 1.6, respectively.)

TABLE 7. MEANS AND VARIANCES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY SEX

| Attitude | *Male* (N = 486) | | *Female* (N = 554) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | Variance | Mean | Variance |
| Escalation*** | 4.4 | 6.46 | 3.7 | 8.45 |
| De-escalation** | 4.1 | 4.56 | 4.5 | 4.86 |
| Information*** | 5.0 | 4.27 | 3.7 | 3.83 |

** p < .01
*** p < .001

TABLE 8. MEANS AND VARIANCES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY RACE

| Attitude | *White* (N = 856) | | *Non-White* (N = 162) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean | Variance | Mean | Variance |
| Escalation** | 4.1 | 7.31 | 3.4 | 9.04 |
| De-escalation*** | 4.1 | 4.41 | 5.5 | 5.08 |
| Information*** | 4.5 | 4.29 | 3.1 | 3.56 |

** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

tion and vote. On the other hand, women are more likely to oppose escalation and favor de-escalation and—more strongly—Negroes oppose escalation and favor de-escalation.

*Non-Demographic Correlates of Policy Preference.* The social characteristics of our respondents (with the important exceptions of sex and race) did not relate to policy preferences. What about measures deriving from the individual's cognitive and affective position vis-à-vis the war in Vietnam? One such measure is the extent to which respondents were worried about the war in Vietnam. There is a slight tendency for those who were worried about the war to favor de-escalation. When we compare those who report that they are worried about the war in Vietnam (n = 829) with those who report they are not worried (n = 526), we find a mean escalation score of 3.8 among the worriers and a mean score of 4.1 among the non-worriers. And the worriers have a mean de-escalation score of 3.9 in contrast with a score of 3.7 among the non-worriers. (Both differences are significant at the .01 level.)

*The Informed Public.* Of more interest from a theoretical as well as a policy point of view are differences in policy preference based on level of information.[19] Many have argued that the informed public should be attended to when it comes to policy guidance. How do the informed differ from the less-well-informed on their attitudes toward the Vietnam war? Those who expect the informed citizen to be more in favor of negotiations and de-escalation will find little comfort in our data, while those who expect the informed to favor a more militant policy will receive some—but not much—support for their position.[20] Respondents with high information scores were more likely to favor escalation and less likely to favor de-escalation. The correlations are small—a correlation of .12 between information and escalation and −.19 between information and de-escalation. Although significance tests show that both are reliable relationships that could happen as a result of sampling variation less than once in a thousand samples (see Table 3), it should be noted that the amounts of shared variance between information and policy preferences are about one and four percent respectively. Mean escalation and de-escalation scores in each of the levels on the information test are presented in Table 9.

The relationship between sex and race and policy preferences and between information and policy preferences led us to look further into the relation among all these variables. Men and whites have significantly more information than women or Negroes, and perhaps the explanation of these information differences lies in the interrelationship among sex,

TABLE 9. MEAN SCORES ON ATTITUDE SCALES BY LEVEL OF INFORMATION

| Attitude | 0–1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Escalation* | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 3.9 |
| De-escalation* | 4.4 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.8 |
| Sample Size | 74 | 122 | 186 | 232 | 184 | 180 | 152 | 79 | 1209 |

* $p < .001$

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[19] The eight information items in the questionnaire failed to fit the Guttman scale pattern, and were combined into an arbitrary index ranging from 0 to 8, with the higher score indicating more correct answers. Questions included identification of the capitals of North and South Vietnam, knowledge of number of U.S. troops in Vietnam and number of U.S. casualties at the time of the survey, whether Congress had declared war, whether North Vietnam was then being bombed, and identification of the Vietcong. For the last item, both North Vietnamese or South Vietnamese communists were accepted as "correct" answers.

[20] For an exploration of three models of the relation of information and opinion, see: W. A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (1966), 187–199.

race and information, and policy position. If the differences between men and women in policy opinions are merely the result of men being, on the average, better informed than women, then better informed persons in both sexes should be more likely to support escalation policies than less well-informed people in the same sex. On the other hand, if sex is a primary causal factor, then the correlation between information and policy opinion should decrease or disappear when the analysis is run separately for men and for women. The same argument applies to the relationship between race and information.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10. The positive correlation between information and willingness to escalate disappears when controlled by race and sex. The .20 correlation in the Negro female group approaches the .05 level of significance, but in none of the four groups can the results be accepted as reliably different from a zero correlation. The correlations between information and support for de-escalation policies are not so dramatically reduced. In fact, the negative correlation between information and de-escalation policies becomes slightly stronger (to −.22) among white males. But, in general, this analysis suggests that there is little explanatory value in the information variable as far as policy preferences are concerned.[21]

We might, however, expect the informed to differ from the ill-informed in the structure of their preferences if not in the direction. For one thing, we would expect them to be more consistent in their policy positions. Much evidence from surveys suggests that uninformed respondents will have incompatible preferences—they will express approval for contrary policies, or prefer policies but be unwilling to pay the costs of these policies. Table 11 compares the "informed" and the "less well-informed" in terms of the consistency of their policy positions. (The informed are here defined as those who score in the upper half of our information scale, the less well-informed as those who score in the lower half.) As the table shows, the informed are more consistent in policy preference than the less well-informed. The negative correlation between scores on the escalation scale and scores on the de-escalation scale was −.47 for the informed and −.25 for the less well-informed. Thus the informed respondent who favors escalation is less likely to favor de-escalation at the same time. On the other hand, the informed differ little from the less well-informed in terms of their willingness to pay the costs of their policy preferences. Thus, among the informed, there is a correlation of .38 between scores on the escalation scale and scores on the scale of willingness to bear economic costs of the involvement in the war and a correlation of .26 between escalation scores and willingness to pay welfare costs. This is not significantly different from the correlations of .35 and .22, respectively, for the less well-informed group. Thus our hypothesis of greater

TABLE 11. CORRELATION MATRIX: ESCALATION, DE-ESCALATION, ECONOMIC COSTS, WELFARE COSTS

(High information groups: upper triangle. Low information groups: lower triangle)

| | Escalation | De-esc. | Econ. Costs | Welfare Costs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Escalation | | −.47 | .38 | .26 |
| De-escalation | −.25 | | −.13 | −.19 |
| Economic Cost | .35 | −.03 | | .24 |
| Welfare | .22 | −.03 | .15 | |

N = 599 for high information group
N = 625 for low information group

TABLE 10. CORRELATIONS OF INFORMATION SCORES WITH ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION SCALES, CONTROLLING FOR RACE AND SEX

| Race and Sex | Escalation | De-escalation | (N) |
|---|---|---|---|
| White Males | .00 | −.22* | (588) |
| White Females | .03 | −.07 | (583) |
| Negro Males | .05 | −.11 | ( 94) |
| Negro Females | .20 | −.17 | ( 90) |

* $p < .001$

[21] To keep these conclusions in perspective it might be useful to point out that, even though the correlations are significantly different from zero, the approximately −.20 correlation between information and support for de-escalation policies means that less than 5 percent of the variation in policy scores can be accounted for by differences in information level.

consistency among the informed receives only partial confirmation.

There is a further way in which the structure of the opinions of the informed might be expected to differ from that of the less well-informed. Though they might on the average have the same policy preferences—i.e., not be more "hawk" or "dove"—one might expect them to differ in the degree of polarization of their attitudes. But on the latter point, it is hard to say in which way they might differ. One might argue that the more one knows about the war in Vietnam, the more one is likely to want *some* solution—either by increasing the war or decreasing it. On this assumption, we should expect to find that the informed would take more extreme positions, while the less well-informed would take more moderate ones. On the other hand, one could argue that the war is so confusing, that the more one knows, the more ambivalent his position. The less well-informed, on this argument, would be more likely to take extreme positions.

Our data support neither position. The standard deviation of the scores on the escalation scale was 2.52 for the less well-informed and 2.39 for the informed—a slight tendency (if any) for the less well-informed to have more polarized opinions (f = 1.1 and is not significant). On the de-escalation scale the standard deviations for the less well-informed and the informed are 1.82 and 1.80, respectively, indicating that the groups do not differ in their likelihood to take extreme positions. This is further reflected in Table 12 where we compare the informed and the less well-informed in their response to a question that offered three unpleasant alternatives. The question read, "Suppose you had to choose among continuing the present situation indefinitely, fighting a major war with hundreds of thousands of casualties, or a withdrawal of American troops leading to an eventual Communist takeover. Which would you choose?" If we compare the two groups we find little difference between them. (Compare especially the two groups with those who answered "don't know" removed. This controls for the greater tendency of those who are less well-informed to give a "don't know" answer.) The informed are slightly more likely to prefer the present situation and slightly less likely to prefer withdrawal. But the shape of the opinion of the two groups is remarkably similar.

The informed, in summary, cannot be said to form a particularly distinct policy public. Their preferences differ, but not substantially, from those of the less well-informed; they are a bit more consistent, but the evidence is mixed on this; and in terms of their degree of polarization they are little different from the rest of the populace.

*The Articulate Public.* There is one further special public that deserves attention: the group that volunteers its position on public matters, in this case by writing letters to public officials or newspapers. The survey research respondent has to be sought out by the interviewer. The letter writer puts forth his views without the stimulus of the interview and, in this way, demonstrates his involvement. It has been argued that the letter writer differs from those who do not write letters substantially in his preferences, and this in part explains the mistakes politicians make in attempting to predict elections on the basis of opinion as they perceive it—i.e., form the mail they receive, the letters they see in newspapers and so forth.[22]

Converse, Clausen and Miller found that

TABLE 12. CHOICE AMONG CONTINUANCE OF PRESENT SITUATION, MAJOR WAR, OR WITHDRAWAL

| Preference | High Information | Low Information | Total | High Information | Low Information | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | (Don't know's removed) | | |
| Present situation | 53% | 46% | 43% | 56% | 52% | 54% |
| Major War | 24 | 22 | 23 | 26 | 25 | 26 |
| Withdrawal | 17 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 22 | 20 |
| Don't Know | 5 | 12 | 9 | — | — | — |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 99% | 99% | 99% |
| Number of Cases | 678 | 817 | 1495 | 643 | 717 | 1360 |

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[22] See Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," this REVIEW, 59 (June, 1965), 321–323.

TABLE 13. ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION SCALE SCORES BY LETTER WRITING

| | Escalation Scale Score | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ← Low | | | | | | → High | | | | |
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |
| Letter Written | 13% | 9% | 10% | 12% | 14% | 12% | 11% | 4% | 12% | 3% | ......100%<br>(n =239) |
| Not Written | 9% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 11% | 6% | 10% | 6% | ......100%<br>(n = 1251) |

Mean: Letter written 3.9; not written 3.9.
Standard deviation: Letter written 2.52; not written 2.46.

| | De-escalation Scale Score | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ← Low | | | | | | → High | | | | |
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | |
| Letter Written | 3% | 6% | 16% | 21% | 21% | 13% | 7% | 3% | 6% | 3% | ......100%<br>(n =239) |
| Not Written | 2% | 6% | 14% | 20% | 22% | 13% | 9% | 3% | 5% | 6% | ......100%<br>(n = 1251) |

Mean: Letter written 3.8; not written 3.8.
Standard deviation: Letter written 1.93; not written 1.83.

letter writers were much more likely to take positions on the extreme right than non-writers (and a bit more likely to take them on the left as well). Is the articulate public that writes letters a "hawk" public? In Table 13 we compare the letter writers with those who have never sent a letter on a public issue to a government official or to the newspapers.[23] We find no difference in direction of preference. The scores on the escalation scale and de-escalation scale are the same for the two groups: the letter writers have a mean score of 3.9 on the escalation scale as do the non-writers; and they both have the same mean score of 3.8 on the de-escalation scale.

It is more interesting to compare the letter writers and the non-writers in terms of the polarization of their opinions. Converse, Clausen and Miller[24] found sharp differences between the public that had never written letters to public officials and the public that had written letters. The articulate public, they found, is more ideologically oriented and more likely to take a position on either end of a policy continuum. And this is quite understandable, given the fact that they have volunteered their opinions—their greater motivation to express themselves would, we would expect, come from stronger policy preferences. This would lead us to expect that letter writers are more likely to be either "hawk" or "dove" with the non-writers taking the more mild middle positions. The data in Table 13 indicate this is not the case; letter writers are *not* more likely to take extreme positions. The standard deviation of their scores on the escalation scale is 2.52 compared with one of 2.46 for the non-writers; and for the de-escalation scale, the scores are 1.93 and 1.83, respectively. Neither difference is significant by the F-test.

Table 14 shows that responses to the "three-alternative" question—present situation, major war, or withdrawal—which also yields little difference in the response patterns of writers

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[23] It must be pointed out that we are not talking of letter writers specifically on the Vietnamese war. We found only 17% of our respondents had ever written a letter on any subject, and any attempt to isolate a specific group that had written on the Vietnamese war would have given us too few cases to analyze. This limits the meaning of the following analysis, but not completely. The Converse, Clausen and Miller article uses a similar general measure of letter writing. But this illustrates the limitation of the cross-section survey in obtaining enough cases of significant policy groups.

[24] *Op. cit.*, pp. 332–336.

TABLE 14. CHOICE OF PRESENT SITUATION OR WITHDRAWAL BY LETTER WRITING

| Preference | Letter Written | Not written | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Present situation | 52% | 49% | 49% |
| Major War | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Withdrawal | 20 | 18 | 19 |
| Don't Know | 5 | 10 | 9 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Number of cases | 239 | 1251 | 1495 |

and non-writers. Writers are a shade more likely to prefer the present situation and slightly more likely to prefer withdrawal; while the non-writers are somewhat more likely to have no opinion. But the differences are not significant (basically, letter writers are not different from non-writers.)[25]

These results must stand as significant negative findings. Our expectations—reinforced by the Converse, Clausen and Miller findings—had been that the letter writers would tend to take more extreme positions. Indeed, the fact that they are so similar to the inarticulate population leaves us puzzled.[26] It might be that the key lies in the fact that the measure of letter writing is not specific to the Vietnam situation. If we had a sample of letter writers on Vietnam we would be more likely to find the expected polarization. On the other hand, the results parallel those for the information items—and those were information items specific to Vietnam. We shall return to this point.

When we compare the articulate and informed publics with the less articulate and less well-informed publics we find differences, but not as substantial as we might have expected. Their policy preferences differ little. They are no more likely to take extreme positions than the rest of the public—a finding more striking for the articulate public than for the informed public. And though they are somewhat more consistent in their preferences, even this pattern is less than clear.

## III. CONCLUSIONS

The data reported in this article bring us a little closer to an understanding of the nature of public attitudes on the war in Vietnam—though they leave many questions unanswered. It becomes clear why public opinion—though it is often invoked—is not an effective guide to policy and does not represent a major constraint on the administration.

1. Our first finding is that public opinion is relatively orderly. The public expressed concern about the war and was relatively informed about it. The correlational analysis among scales shows patterns of consistency among the population; and many of the inconsistencies can be interpreted as more apparent than real. An overwhelming majority (88%) expressed willingness to negotiate with the Vietcong and a similar majority (81%) would oppose withdrawal of our troops "tomorrow." One can argue that many respondents are taking positions at the opposite ends of the spectrum at the same time; but this is not necessarily the case since the two policies are not in conflict. Negotiations do not necessarily imply precipitous withdrawal.

But though the preferences we found among the population were patterned, they were patterned in a more complex way than would be suggested by the summaries of public attitudes found in the standard surveys based upon one, two or three questions. Despite the consistency found, few respondents could be called "hawks" or "doves"; rather, they took more moderate positions somewhere nearer the center of the spectrum.

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[25] They differ, however, from the non-writers in terms of consistency roughly as do the informed from the less-well-informed. They are somewhat more likely to be consistent in that the negative correlations between escalation and de-escalation scales are larger, (−.52 for the letter writers and −.34 for the non-writers), the correlation between escalation scores and willingness to pay welfare costs is higher, (.39 for the letter writers and .21 for the non-writers.) But, as with the information items, the distinction is not clear. They are no more likely than the non-writers to be willing to pay the economic costs of escalation. The correlation between escalation scores and willingness to pay economic costs is .37 for both writers and non-writers.

[26] Actually, a closer look at the findings in the Converse, Clausen and Miller article suggests that their findings are similar to ours in one important respect. Though they find a sharp difference between the mass public and the letter writers on most issues, they find much greater similarity on the one foreign policy issue that is reported, "negotiation with the communists." The discrepancies on this issue are so slight in comparison with the discrepancies discovered on the domestic issue (*op. cit.*, figures 2a–e, p. 334), that the analysis of opinion on this issue via letters could have served as a reasonable estimate of the shape of the distribution of public opinion. On the four domestic issues, in contrast, expression through letters was a highly inaccurate guide to public opinion. See below for a further discussion.

2. A major finding is that though the preferences of respondents have internal structure, they are not related to the broad social groupings around which political and social attitudes often cluster. Variables of social status—occupation, income, or education—do not relate to policy preferences on the Vietnamese war; nor do such variables as religion or region. (The latter makes some difference though not much.) In addition, party affiliation does not relate to policy preferences; a fact that illustrates why it is difficult to make foreign policy the subject of political campaigns.[27]

When it comes to policy preference on the Vietnamese war, the average citizen can receive relatively little guidance from the ordinary reference groups that help him pattern his attitudes. And perhaps the most significant lack is in the relation to party affiliation—the citizen looking for guidance among his fellow partisans will find little. In turn, of course, this means that the pattern of preferences is such that political leaders have a harder time taking them into account. Aside from the gross marginal distributions—"is the President more popular today than yesterday?"—the political leader may have trouble calculating the consequences of patterns of attitudes of the war since they cannot be assigned to the ordinary group categories of political structure.

3. Two differences among social groups do stand out, however. One is the difference between men and women, with women more in favor of de-escalation; and the other between whites and Negroes with the Negroes more in favor of de-escalation. Both findings need further study for adequate explanation, though it is easy enough to suggest some reasons. The male-female difference is consistent with other findings that women differ from men in their political behavior in being somewhat more opposed to policies that could be considered "aggressive"—whether these be capital punishment or universal military service.[28]

The racial patterns are particularly interesting. This does not appear to be a social class phenomenon in disguise, but a difference patterned by the racial distinction. The *ad hoc* explanation is obvious; at the present moment the American Negro is alienated from American society and unimpressed by arguments that our commitment is necessary to preserve freedom and justice for ourselves and others in Southeast Asia.[29] In addition, he may be aware of criticisms of the draft that suggest a disproportionate Negro contribution to the war effort. All this is speculation. But if true, it suggests a relatively high level of self-consciousness among the Negro population that allows the connections to be made between their social position and the war; and it also means that we have found an instance in which the preferences on the war are closely related to one of the major dimensions of social grouping that often pattern political attitudes.

4. If social position (with the exception of sex and race) fails to organize policy preference on this issue, what succeeds? One possible answer is that they are patterned by the respondent's cognitive and affective relationship to the war itself—i.e., that it is not a group-related set of attitudes but a set of attitudes related to the object of the attitude. Some evidence for this is found in the differences in policy preferences between the "worriers" and the "non-worriers" and weaker evidence is found in the differences between the "informed" and the "less well-informed." One would need more data on perceptions of the war, estimates of likely outcomes, and the like, to see whether this type of patterning is significant.[30] The point is that in the absence of the ordinary guidelines of group position that would allow the citizen to adopt the position of those like him or the guideline of group-relatedness that would allow the citizen to adopt a position he perceives as relevant for the groups with which he identifies, cognitive and affective relationship to the events themselves may structure attitudes.

5. One striking finding is the similarity between the informed and articulate population on the one hand, and the rest of the population on the other. All writing on foreign policy attitudes makes a sharp distinction between

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[27] See Miller, *op. cit.*, and John Corry's news story on Vietnam as an issue in the 1966 Congressional election (*New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1966, p. 1).

[28] See Fred Greenstein, "Sex-Related Political Differences in Childhood," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (May, 1961), 353–371; Robert E. Lane, *Political Life*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 209–216; and Maurice Duverger, *The Political Role of Women* (Paris, 1955).

[29] Gamson and Modigliani (*op. cit.*, p. 189) hypothesize and demonstrate that "the greater the attachment to the mainstream, the greater the degree of conformity of one's foreign policy opinions to official policy."

[30] cf. P. Ekman, E. Tufte, K. Archibald and R. Brody, "Coping with Cuba; Divergent Policy Preferences of State Political Leaders," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), 180–197.

"elite opinion" and the rest. The distinction is still important; but our findings indicate that on this particular issue the shape of opinion differs little between these levels of society. The informed and articulate differ little from others in the direction of their preferences. They are somewhat more likely to have consistent positions (but less so than we would expect). But their positions are not consistently more extreme or consistently more moderate and middle-of-the-road. Commentators have often suggested that if the public "only understood the situation better" they would take positions quite different from the uninformed masses. Or they have believed that visible public opinion (as revealed in letters-to-the-editor columns, for instance) gives an inaccurate picture of the opinion among the populace. It is perhaps a token of the complexity and ambiguity of the war in Vietnam that the informed and articulate (on our simple measures) do not differ from the rest of the population in their preferences or in the likelihood that they take either extreme or moderate positions. As one gets closer to the situation (as one gets more information, for instance) the problem remains unclear. This phenomenon may be true of many political situations, but it appears at any rate truer about the war in Vietnam. Indeed, the similarity among the informed and articulate groups and the mass of the population in their distribution of policy preferences—similar proportions in both groups want escalation or de-escalation, while the bulk lie somewhere in between—continues up the ladder to political leaders and activists in and out of the government. There is no position found by us among the mass public that does not have its advocates in Washington.

In the light of this argument, it is intriguing to compare a poll of members of Congress conducted by the *Congressional Quarterly* with our survey. Congressmen were divided into those who indicated support for present policy, those who wanted to increase the war and those who wanted to see it diminished. The results (as indicated on Table 15) are remarkably close to the results we obtained from a similar choice presented to our national sample. The very close parallel in results must be considered fortuitous since the question asked of the Congressmen, though it offered a similar set of alternatives to the question we asked of our respondents, was phrased quite differently and

TABLE 15. CONGRESSIONAL AND MASS OPINION COMPARED

| *Congressional Opinion, October, 1966** Policy Choice | | Stanford Survey, February 1966 Policy Choice | |
|---|---|---|---|
| "Basic course U.S. is following" | 48.5% | Present Situation | 49% |
| "More decisive military action by the United States to meet communist aggression and achieve victory in the war" | 26.4% | Major War | 23% |
| "More emphasis on peace talks, increased steps toward de-emphasis of the conflict and eventual accommodation with the Vietcong" | 15.1% | Withdrawal | 19% |
| Unascertained | 10.0% | Don't Know | 9% |
| | 100% | | 100% |
| Number of cases | 535 | | 1495 |

* These data are based on a mail poll conducted by the *Congressional Quarterly* and reported in the *New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1966. The mail questionnaires were followed-up by telephone queries in cases of no response. Those who did not reply were assigned to a position based on previous public statements.

The *Congressional Quarterly* reported 58.5% as backing the basic position of the administration. But, according to the *New York Times* this figure was arrived at by placing most of the 10% who did not respond and who could not be placed on the basis of public statements in the category indicating basic approval of the administration. According to the *New York Times*, the theory used was that "silence indicated acquiescence." We have taken the more cautious position of leaving this 10% in an "unascertained" category.

The data are by no means directly comparable with our survey, since the question was different and the time nine months later. See Table 12 and the relevant text for our question wording.

the time of the Congressional survey was nine months later. But the Congressional poll confirms our point that the general shape and distribution of policy preference is parallel between the mass public and elite groups such as the informed and articulate.

The lack of difference between the "elite" and "mass" opinions may be related, furthermore, to the lack of "group structure" of the issues. On various domestic issues the more informed and the more involved can pick up cues as to the group or party relevance of the policy issue. Thus the more informed and involved are more likely to take positions on one side of the issue or the other. But in connection with the war in Vietnam, the informed and the involved receive few cues of this sort. Thus, they differ little from the rest of the population.

6. The public opinion we have been discussing does not seem to possess much potential for controlling or limiting the alternatives of the administration. If anything, it mirrors the complexities of the debate in Washington and probably reflects a permissiveness in either direction. Our data suggest a higher permissiveness for reduction of the war, but evidence from other polls since then suggests that the President's support increases no matter what he does—increase the war or talk of negotiations—as long as he does something. The increase in support, however, tends to be temporary. But above all, the lack of structure of preferences along party or class lines means that attitudes toward the war are not likely to affect electoral outcome and are less likely to be taken into account in making policy calculations.

Indeed, if we are right in suggesting that the range of preferences among the populace as a whole and among the articulate and informed subsections of the populace mirrors the range of preferences found in elite groups, we can see what kind of relation public opinion polling data have to policy making. The relation is probably circular. A leader—be it the President or someone opposed to his policies—adopts a position. He then finds support for that position among the public—support easier to find if one asks the type of survey question that highlights one part of the range of preferences and obscures the others. He then uses this finding to justify and legitimize his position. This may not be an inaccurate summary of the use of the polls by the President. But it suggests that the careful student of public opinion will want to look at a more complex and variegated picture of public attitudes before coming to conclusions as to what the public wants, or what it will or will not accept.

# THE POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Over the last few decades political scientists have shown an understandable interest in material brought into relief by neighboring disciplines. A concern with enriching the field of political science by drawing on sociological, economic, and psychological data has led to efforts to accommodate findings derived from study in areas in which men are subjected to non-political pressures—the constraints of society, the economy, and ultimately their own physical and psychological nature. As the conventional academic boundaries are crossed, knowledge of distinctively political matters, it has been hoped, will become richer as well as more precise. This essay seeks to clarify the promise and limits of two non-political approaches to an understanding of politics, namely those which are represented by two types of psychology, and to take account of their bearings on normative political thought.

Traditionally, normative political thought has been concerned with the analysis and understanding of the ends of political action: it has been an attempt to present and elucidate them. Setting specific points of view in a larger context, it has tended to be discursive and utopian, speculatively enlarging the realm of public possibilities and common choices. More recently, it has been concerned with presenting models designed to assimilate empirically validated propositions about political behavior. To these concerns, various forms of non-political thought have always made their distinctive contributions.

As non-political approaches revealed their relevance, it has been repeatedly asserted that political philosophy was being quietly preempted by non-political thinkers.[1] To be sure, there have been a great many sources of preemption, and as many explanations for the readiness of contemporary political scientists to respond to the challenge of new methods and new kinds of data. But in any case, insofar as their own discipline has not adequately sustained them because of its imprecise methods or its unduly limited subject matter, political scientists have understandably turned elsewhere, whether to art, sociology, or psychology. They have felt justified in utilizing whatever approach might help them (1) specify the conditions for social survival and individual autonomy, (2) draft the blueprints for just action, and (3) articulate, in the words of Jacob Bronowski, "those deeper illuminations in whose light justice and injustice, good and evil, means and ends are seen in fearful sharpness of outline."[2]

If psychology in particular has tended to absorb political thought, this may be because of an acceptance of Herbert Marcuse's proposition that today psychological issues and categories have turned into political ones, that individual disease has become a function of the sickness of the body politic.[3] Moreover, psychological studies, especially those dealing with motivation, perception, and small-group behavior, have become attractive to students of politics because they may be studied with scientific rigor.

What, then, might be of relevance to political thought in the recent work of psychology? To what extent does current psychology enrich our appreciation of the complexities of human nature, and thus make us aware of possibilities which political theory must take into account? Does it alert us to a reality which a relevant political theory must recognize? Can it bring its generalizations to bear on actual or possible configurations of power in society? These questions may be addressed to two complementary persuasions in the field of psychology. Both are identifiable trends though neither presents anything like a unified doctrine. One, a behavioral persuasion, may usefully be regarded as positivist; the other, an existentialist persuasion, may usefully be regarded as negativist.

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[1] That traditional political philosophy is in retreat is by now a tired proposition. It merely remains to relate the decline of the study of political philosophy and the rise of the study of political attitudes to the increasing visibility of inarticulate groups.

[2] *Science and Human Values* (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 94.

[3] *Eros and Civilization* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. xi. T. W. Adorno and his associates simply affirm that "ideology regarding each social area must be regarded as a facet of the total person and an expression of more central ('subideological') psychological dispositions": *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 207.

## I. BEHAVIORAL-POSITIVIST PSYCHOLOGY

When theory is defined as a logically ordered scheme of empirically validated and functionally related propositions, there would seem to be good reason for asking positivistic psychological studies what kind of contributions they may be making. Contemporary psychological research should certainly engage us insofar as it advances knowledge, as Murray Horwitz has written, "by experimental manipulation of environmental conditions in order to determine the types of psychological needs to be expected in particular situations."[4] We are entitled to returns from investigations in which man is postulated to be a determined creature, explicable in terms of his instincts, drives, needs, and motives. Psychological research, when undeviatingly empirical, is bound to reveal the extent to which an autonomous environment, partially built into man himself, acts on him. Measuring the force of the prevailing forms of conditioning, it should make us realize that some of our ideals are less indeterminate than we like to believe. As part of a descriptive theory of political behavior, it should inform us how to act economically under varying conditions. It should tell us how to reconcile ourselves to given causal sequences and how to adapt to given environmental systems. It should no less inform us what factors to vary so as to produce desired results.

To provide such knowledge, an experimental psychology postulates a society whose constituent elements are seen as functionally related. All particular cases and incidents, it is assumed for analytical purposes, are exemplifications of a natural order of social relations. When this methodological postulate is adopted by empirical psychologists, indeed by behavioral scientists generally, they help delineate non-political situations. That is, they identify situations within which men are not free to pursue alternative goals, within which they are driven by nature, by their needs, or by others with the power to command obedience. They thereby provide the kind of information that can keep normative political thought in touch with reality. They inform prospective political actors about the practicality of their ideals and the extent of their power. But because the conditions they define are necessarily non-political, to act exclusively on the basis of their findings, remaining "realistic" and practical, is to delimit politics: it is to adjust ideals to "reality," to the models of man and society authenticated by a natural science of psychology.

Although there is as yet no general theory of human behavior comprehensive enough to justify direct public implementation, the desire for such a policy science is surely evident.[5] Moreover, the charge that what we do know is trivial is refuted by the literature.[6] We know how politically engaged individuals perceive their environments and, in general terms, what sort of psychological patterns underlie their political participation.[7] We have confirmation of various kinds of propositions about the function of leaders and followers when groups reach a consensus. We know how to make alternative scales of values acceptable within stable societies. Those who wield power may now choose more effectively among various consensus-creating techniques, such as getting individuals to play specified roles so that they will ratify predetermined policies.[8]

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[4] "Psychological Needs as a Function of Social Environments," in Leonard D. White (ed.), *The State of the Social Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 161–183, 181.

[5] It was modestly expressed at the 1922 meeting of the American Political Science Association by Harold F. Gosnell; see his "Some Practical Applications of Psychology in Government," *American Journal of Sociology*, 28 (May, 1923), 735–743.

[6] See Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964); and James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior* (New York: John Wiley, 1963).

[7] See Seymour M. Lipset *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. II, 1124–1175; and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). That this knowledge may mislead us when we rely on it exclusively to understand the politics of a relatively unregimented society has been noted by V. O. Key, Jr., "The Practically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Spring, 1960), 54–61 (reviewing *The American Voter* by Angus Campbell *et al.*); and Leslie A. Fiedler, "Voting and Voting Studies," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 184–196.

[8] See J. L. Moreno, *Psychodrama* (New York: Beacon House, 1946), and the work in the field of group dynamics. For a specific case in point, see Robert T. Golembiewski, "O & M and the Small Group," *Public Administration Review*, 20 (Autumn, 1960), 205–212.

However modest these findings, the ultimate expectation is to create a scientific foundation enabling human relations specialists to solve prevailing social problems.[9] Reasonably enough, the practitioners of a positivistic psychology will seek to put their hypotheses to the test, hoping to overcome social conflict and create a more orderly regime.

The ideal that controls their work, however much it may conflict with intervening preferences, constitutes one possible and wholly coherent conception of society. It thereby constitutes an unintended contribution to normative political thought; it provides a vision of possibilities, a model which should sensitize us to the consequences of still unidentified impulses and still incomplete policies.

Probably the most complete and least embarrassed expression of this ideal is to be found in B. F. Skinner's *Science and Human Behavior*. But it is his earlier utopian fiction, *Walden Two*, which reveals more directly how determinacy, initially a mere hypothetical postulate, becomes the very foundation of an operating social order. The psychologist-manager of Skinner's model community concedes that it might never be possible to *prove* that man is not free. "But," he says, "the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and more plausible."[10] The methodological convention of determinacy, consistently acted upon, is vindicated: the notion that man is not free, though he may well retain a subjective feeling of freedom, is progressively established as fact. Having the power to act on the basis of his belief in determinacy, the psychologist actually institutes it. In the process, he views himself not as arbitrary ruler but instead as a law-abiding governor obedient to nature's own pre-existing code, to man's true nature.

It should be apparent in what ways experimental psychology is here providing us with a theory for the distribution of power in society. We are led to recognize that we need no institutions to mediate between the findings of a positive science of psychology and the imperatives of the natural order of man, for both ultimately come to the same thing. We require no authority above social technicians: the success of their action will itself testify to its soundness. Because they are checked by the irresistible power of nature, the traditional devices for distributing, sharing, and legitimating power in society, though they may remain atmospherically useful for creating agreement, are irrelevant. We can dispense with the rhetoric and institutions of citizenship and representation. The good society will function without politics, without assuming either the autonomy of the rational individual or the consequent need for political power to restrain him.[11] Nor are individual interests sacrificed in the process. On the contrary, men are guided toward the fulfillment of their authentic, natural needs. They are presumed to agree on the ends of life, ultimately sheer survival. There is no question, as Skinner has disarmingly intoned, that "health is better than illness, wisdom better than ignorance, love better than hate, and productive energy better than neurotic sloth."[12] A commitment to "healthy, happy, secure, productive, and creative people" makes it superfluous to sustain institutions balancing conflicting ends. Men may at last be made "happy, informed, skillful, well behaved and productive," first by acknowledging "that action is initiated by forces impinging upon the individual" and then by providing for the control of these forces through a behavioral technology.[13]

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[9] See James G. Miller, "Psychological Approaches to the Prevention of War," in Wayne Dennis *et al.*, *Current Trends in Social Psychology* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1948), 274–299; James G. Miller *et al.*, "Social Psychology and the Atomic Bomb: A Round-Table Discussion," in *Experiments in Social Process* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 171–194; Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), especially pp. 202–203. I have discussed this scientific activism in "Society as Crucible," in Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins (eds.), *Psychiatry and Responsibility* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), 135–156.

[10] *Walden Two* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 257. The empirical relevance of Skinner's novel has been pointed out by Andrew Hacker in "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (November, 1955), 590–613. Hacker does not note how the benign conditioning apparatus of *Walden Two* was anticipated by Nicolai G. Chernyshevsky's *What Is to Be Done?* (1863). Chernyshevsky's rationalist utopia was parodied so thoroughly by Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground* that Dostoevsky remains Skinner's most incisive critic. It may also be worth noting that the very weakness of Skinner's novel as a work of art (its lack of tension and movement, the flatness of its characters, its tendency to make assertions about experience rather than to display it dramatically) also makes his work unconvincing political theory. It fails to take account of possibilities which are radically different; it fails to comprehend how one man's health may be another's misery, or how one man's misery may be another's entertainment. Had Skinner's style enabled him to reveal the complexity and ambiguity of the arrangements he describes, the cause his work defends would have been implicitly challenged. But perhaps the artist simply cannot successfully depict a closed order; works of art, like the paradigms of science, necessarily expose alternatives, and thus unsettle whatever they presume to establish.

[11] Skinner's fictional psychologist, quite consistently, is hostile to politics on the ground that it impedes direct action: see *Walden Two*, 8, 193–197.

Thus Skinner's vision is frankly anti-political. If those who share it do not have the actual power to establish a unified society emancipated from philosophical speculation and ideological conflict, their theory is at least appropriate to such a society. Skinner makes clear that as experimental psychology becomes the exclusive basis for policy decisions, it must threaten a political order designed to keep conflicting interests alive. He fully faces the fact that a positive science of man is not a value-neutral means for serving *all* alternative ends, for one end it cannot serve is the preservation of politics. To be sure, if individuals should persist in their perverse affection for politics, science could arrange matters to suit them. It could lay out a social order so variegated as to require politicians to deal with the ensuing conflict. But this would negate the very assumption it operates on: the underlying existence of a functioning apolitical system that is progressively disclosed by experimental science.

Such a science will create healthy, productive, well-behaved individuals wherever it is free to extend its enterprises, wherever it is permitted to treat those whose cravings for community, status, fame, and power are such a problem in non-utopian regimes. It does not, therefore, seek to illuminate the character of the human condition—man's irreconcilable interests— but to attack it directly as a "problem" to be overcome. Eminently practical, it literally converts obviously dysfunctional factors into functional ones. It exposes the presumed wastefulness of political institutions which, because they preserve the interests of even outvoted groups, do not demand the conversion of their members. And its solutions, unlike political ones, are durable. If it is not widely argued that they be imposed on the body politic, this is only because most of the practitioners of experimental psychology are less thoroughgoing than Skinner. There is actually no reason, Skinner has pointed out, for restricting experimental science: "It is not a matter of bringing the world into the laboratory, but of extending the practices of an experimental science to the world at large. We can do this as soon as we wish to do it. At the moment psychologists are curiously diffident. . . ."[14]

As it displaces the traditional political order, experimental psychology displaces traditional political thought as well. One of the tasks of political thought—to challenge what is "given" and to reorder it creatively in the light of reason—becomes pointless. It becomes imperative to cease thinking, to commence acting. "We all know what's good," Skinner's benevolent psychologist affirms, adding without irony, "until we stop to think about it."[15] As the findings of experimental psychology become the rational ground for political action, alternative grounds must come to seem merely subjective and willful. If the truth to which a positivistic science of man guides us is deemed objective, if we clearly know what constitutes lawful behavior and have a full inventory of human needs, we must be irrational to question such knowledge and to sustain the institution of politics.

Combining a romantic reaction against the infinite complexities of life, a distrust of *political* power, and an elitist view of the masses as naturally desiring to escape responsibility for choice, Skinner bluntly spells out the abbreviations of the small-scale work of others. This itself may be redeeming in times when much is mumbled, repressed, or said in irony.

### II. EXISTENTIALIST-NEGATIVIST PSYCHOLOGY

We are impelled toward a self-contained, self-replenishing regime insofar as we act exclusively on the postulate that human action, in Skinner's words, "is a lawful datum, that it is undisturbed by the capricious acts of any free agent—in other words, that it is completely determined."[16] We are impelled toward a diametrically opposed regime insofar as we are persuaded to take an approach to human nature which seeks to save the specific pitch and texture of distinctively human experiences by aligning itself against all forms of determinism. What is the character of this alternative persuasion, and what kind of community does it imply?

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[12] B. F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men," *American Scholar*, 25 (Winter, 1955–56), 47–65, at p. 51; also see *Walden Two*, p. 159. Skinner's ultimate value is group survival; see his *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 430–436, 443–446.

[13] "Freedom and the Control of Men," pp. 47, 53; *Cumulative Record* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), p. 34. Also see *Walden Two*, 175-197.

[14] *Cumulative Record*, p. 227.

[15] *Walden Two*, p. 159.

In contrast to experimental psychology, this alternative persuasion assumes that human conduct is ineradicably colored by freedom. No explanations of human action, it holds, can be telling unless we understand it as the result of free choices. By nature, man is obstinately in rebellion against social constraints. He is therefore to be comprehended as an irreducible phenomenon, as existing ultimately independent of all circumscribing systems, classifications, or blueprints. He is a being in process, always unfinished, a being of only partially expressed potentialities. His mental health consequently is to be defined in the infinitely varied terms of the individual himself—that is, in reference to his own possibilities. His ego is to be understood as creatively integrating internal needs and external demands.[17] Man is to be recognized as an autonomous actor whose role is to limit his renunciations and conquer his environment.

To regard human freedom as the scientifically and therapeutically most effective postulate is to provide the conditions for the self-directed actualization of the individual. It is to act so as to enable men to do what their own nature dictates, not what some external code demands. Refraining from all manipulative practice, the psychologist will guide individuals to discover their identity, to experience it, and then to proceed in response to their discovery and experience. This calls not for the psychologist's objectivity and detachment but for his compassionate participation.[18] More precisely, it demands a posture of simultaneous involvement and detachment characteristic of the actor who plays his part without surrendering himself in the process.[19]

Recognizing all human relationships as encounters between unique persons, an existentialist psychology questions the norm (as well as the fiction) of the altogether aloof, disengaged analyst. Only a method enabling the observer, too, to play a part, it asserts, yields understanding and mastery of specifically human situations, situations in which men experience rage, horror, shame, joy, resentment, grief, love, and hate in all their specificity. As Leonard C. Feldstein has said,

> To be genuinely empirical, we must, when we inquire into the constitutive properties of an object, attend to every aspect and subtlety of that object. So a glance at a person, the "object" of

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[16] *Cumulative Record*, p. 227, "A proper theory," Skinner adds, "must . . . abolish the conception of the individual as a doer, as an originator of action"; *ibid.*, p. 236.

[17] Thus Heinz Hartmann and Erik H. Erikson refuse to reduce ego functions to the id. See Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (New York: International Universities Press, 1958); "Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego," *Psychonanalytic Study of the Child*, 5 (1950), 74–96; Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 4 (October, 1956), 56–121; "Ego Development and Historical Change," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 2 (1946), 359–396.

[18] For a therapeutic approach expressing this view, see Carl R. Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951). See also J. H. van den Berg, *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry* (Springfield: Thomas, 1955), p. 102; Rollo May, Ernest Angel, Henri F. Ellenberger (eds.), *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1958); and Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships," in Sigmund Koch (ed.), *Psychology; A Study of a Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), Vol. III, 184–256.

[19] Thus Carl R. Rogers asks the analyst to feel *as if* he were the other person—"without ever losing the 'as if' condition" (in Koch, *loc. cit.*). It may be pertinent to note the origins of existentialist psychology in the formulations of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911): see H. A. Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (New York: Humanities Press, 1952), ch. 5. See also Eric Heller's analysis of Goethe's idea of scientific truth in *The Disinherited Mind* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cuday, 1957), ch. 1; and Alan Gewirth, "Subjectivism and Objectivism in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science*, 21 (April, 1954), 157–163. An entire sociological and anthropological school finds its vindication (and limits) in this approach. Consider the methodology not only of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim but no less that of Oscar Lewis's *Children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family* (1961) and Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences* (1965)—all enlarging understanding while raising the problem of verifiability and veracity.

psychoanalytic inquiry, discloses not a mind and a body, mysteriously conjoined as independent structures, but a gesture, an expression, a gait, a sign of his intellectual acuity, his physique, his physiognomy. We experience that person as an integrated agency—a living, breathing, moving, joyous and sorrowing whole. Whether in dignity, defiance or wretchedness, he declares himself before us to be himself. When he acts and when he thinks, he expresses a single dynamic of existence.[20]

This formulation supports the familiar existentialist directive for both a proper science of man and a just human community: (1) to understand man he must be viewed sympathetically from within and (2) to establish the just state all men must be brought to realize that moral decisions, to be authentic, are theirs alone. In a world which puts men on trial whenever they seek to assert themselves, they are asked not to despair—and this despite the utter absence of some transcendent reason for bearing up. In the face of an oppressively organized environment which threatens man's very existence as self-directed actor, an existentialist psychology asks him to be himself. There is no further advice, no circumscription of possibilities, no definition of virtuous conduct.

The general prescriptions embodied in existentialist literature find their most concentrated expression in psychiatric practice. Ideally, the physician will follow the very procedures for therapy which accord with existentialist assumptions. It becomes his task to help the patient dominated by needless abstractions to identify them. He "treats" patients by encouraging them to articulate their needs, and thus to recognize the blocks to their self-development, the given formulas which tend to freeze their lives. Since he consistently reacts against all theories,[21] he will offer no new moral codes, no positive ways of structuring human life. He will merely legitimate opposition to myths, stereotypes, and ideologies—all in the name of an undefined freedom.

The term "freedom" cannot, of course, describe any specific situation in which man finds himself: every existing situation necessarily has coercive features. Thus the insistence on defining human reality in terms of freedom is in fact a form of exhortation, a plea to enlarge the sphere of freedom. To give point to this plea, the existentialist psychologist is impelled to make us aware of prevailing coercions and of the intricate ways we disguise them from ourselves. His moral posture is consistently liberal; he resists whatever threatens to make objects of us.

This determination to save man from humiliation inspires analyses which adumbrate the subtle degradations imposed by language and ritual. It gives thrust to the arresting elucidations of inauthentic behavior provided by Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus.[22] It supports Fromm's account of loneliness, insecurity, and alienation under contemporary industrial conditions. It supports Erik Erikson's picture of how pathetically we cope with the anxieties generated by modern life;[23] Ernest Schachtel's study of the way our potential experiences are devitalized by the barren clichés we have for anticipating them; Harry Stack Sullivan's definition of the rigidities which characterize our social relations; Marcuse's stress on "the liberating function of negation in philosophical thought," on the need "to break the power of facts over the world and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish, enforce, and benefit from the facts";[24] Norman O. Brown's stunningly perceptive diagnosis of the institution of money.[25] These accounts—and the harvest is rich—derive from an acute sensitivity to all types of coercion. They consequently lead to descriptions of coercive institutions and practices.[26]

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[20] Mimeographed manuscript, September 1960, p. 6.

[21] For an account of the recent shift away from "the psychological Age of Theory," see Sigmund Koch's epilogue to vol. 3 of Koch (ed.), *Psychology*; for a discussion of the present range of existentialist psychology, including an extensive bibliography, see Adrian van Kaam, *The Third Force in European Psychology* (Greenville, Del.: Psychosynthesis Research Foundation, 1960).

[22] See especially Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), ch. 2.

[23] Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950); see also Allan Wheelis, *The Quest for Identity* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958). Erikson has been particularly concerned with showing that, as we mature in modern society, we are unprepared to meet successive crises. Our education fails to tell us to what to adjust and against what to rebel. We are made anxious by our inability to find out where we belong and who we are: child or parent, boy or girl, man or woman, entrepreneur or coordinator. And since we can gain self-knowledge only in specific encounters, our identity becomes diffuse, we lose it, and cannot get to know ourselves.

[24] Herbert Marcuse, "Actuality of Dialectic," *Diogenes*, No. 31 (Fall, 1960), 80–88, 83, 84.

[25] See Norman O. Brown, "Filthy Lucre," in *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), ch. 15.

Yet do they lead to scientific knowledge of human behavior? A humanistic existentialism clearly affirms that there is always more to man than a naturalistic, experimental psychology can comprehend. But how valid is its claim that it alone can provide psychological knowledge, that *its* empiricism is uniquely qualified to provide understanding of the individual?

It is Ludwig Binswanger who has most persistently maintained that the existentialist approach alone will provide adequate understanding of individual transactions. As early as 1926 he urged reliance on empathy as part of psychoanalysis. There are aspects of human existence, he claimed, which no positivistic science of psychoanalysis can uncover. What is required is the conception of man provided by an existentialist perspective, preeminently that of Heidegger. From Heidegger's point of view, Binswanger wrote, "man is no longer understood in terms of some theory—be it a mechanistic, a biologic, or a psychological one—but in terms of a purely phenomenologic elucidation of the total structure or total articulation of existence as 'being-in-the-world.' "[27]

It remains unclear, however, just how such understanding may be conveyed to others, and what others, when they have grasped it, should make of it. What begins as scientific claim moves easily toward obscurity. Where the idiom of experimental psychology is necessarily abstract, that of existentialist psychology tends to be subjective, precious, and esoteric. No doubt, we are presented with an uplifting reaffirmation of the inviolability of the individual, a respect for him as an infinitely creative force. But while this may invigorate the subject matter of the behavioral sciences, making their practitioners aware that they deal with human actors, politically it cannot buttress anything else. Lacking a theory of power, it raises the question of its practical relevance. The only political ethic of existentialist psychology is negative, a prohibition against treating men as objects. But a generalized reverence for human life, the directive not to interfere with its growth, simply cannot give practical guidance when men must act against some manifestations of life and in favor of others. It provides no theory for discriminating between competing forms of restraint, no scale for weighing the consequences of alternative decisions. The belief in the absolute incommensurability and discontinuity of data is bound to frustrate all theory building. The sympathetic immersion in pure human material, in sum, cannot provide anything positive, be it science or ethics.[28]

### III. CONCLUSION

Yet despite the nihilistic purity of their aim, writers of an existentialist persuasion have recurrently searched for formulations which might help express their view and implement their commitment. Various artificial constructions have seemed expedient—the theoretical constructions of phenomenology (Binswanger), the idiom of theology (Tillich), the symbols of myth and conventions of drama (Sartre). What remains noteworthy is that the approach of a natural science of human behavior has not been regarded as effective and useful.[29] Existentialist psychologists have consistently raised empirical questions about the practical conditions for personal autonomy; yet they have remained hostile to the behavioral, experimental methods required for trustworthy responses. Thus, while a behavioral science is indispensable for moving men most economically and painlessly toward personal autonomy, literally toward self-government, those sharing an existentialist approach have denied its relevance.

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[26] One need merely reflect on the fate of the "existentialist" component of political thinkers from Augustine to Marx to realize that in fact they may lead to a great deal more. Sartre's idealization of the Communist Party, Brown's of a state of "polymorphic perversity," Fromm's of a fraternal "communitarianism"—all these constitute a jumping to conclusions, an acceptance of finalities which links them with Skinner. Yet in their case, unlike Skinner's, such conclusiveness compromises their principles. In other words, existentialist psychologists may inconsistently defend the very regime which Skinner's behaviorism consistently seeks to establish.

[27] Ludwig Binswanger, "Erfahren, Verstehen, Deuten in der Psychoanalyse," *Imago,* 12 (May 6, 1926), 223–237; "Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy," in Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and J. L. Moreno (eds.), *Progress in Psychotherapy* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1956), p. 144. See also Ulrich Sonnemann, *Existence and Therapy* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954); May *et al.* (eds.), *Existence*; and Avery D. Weisman, *The Existential Core of Psychoanalysis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).

[28] Thus Heinz Hartmann notes that the psychological analysis of morality will not direct human conduct and that, moreover, the psychologically healthy person is by no means necessarily "moral": *Psychoanalysis and Moral Values* (New York: International Universities Press 1960).

[29] An exception is Carl R. Rogers, perhaps because he has wanted to come to terms with Skinner (the text of their actual debate is in *Science,* November 20, 1956, 1057–1066): see Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), Part VII. However, Rogers' acceptance of behavioral methods is less than thoroughgoing: he still insists that the phenomenological approach

This is understandable enough. When the findings of behavioral science are regarded as the *sufficient* ground for public policy, as they are by Skinner and others who see determinism as "real" rather than as a methodological postulate, the range of human possibilities is restricted. Such scientism has naturally inspired concern, and has led existentialists and humanists of all persuasions to assail behavioral approaches indiscriminately.[30] Thereby, however, it has deprived itself of a foundation based on empirical theory. The rejection of a natural science of human behavior leaves only a do-it-yourself psychology as alternative. It may be that once the utopian society has been created, such a psychology would be sufficient: men might then be radically various, beyond all reduction, unknowable to one another, totally free to design their own projects. But until this post-historical era has been ushered in, the authors of accounts celebrating man's incredible promise should welcome methods of formal deduction and empirical fact-finding that seek to specify the practical prerequisites for personal autonomy. They should accept some policies as at least relatively final, recognizing that adjustment to them is not invariably undesirable. At times, as Allison Davis has noted, man's anxieties may be reduced by his "identification with his 'superiors,' and also by his acceptance of the controls, ego-ideals, and identity of his own status-group." Man may find it expedient to be simultaneously self-directed and compliant, acting on his own and yet accepting the limits imposed by "the objective social sanctions of age-status, sex-status, and the other basic types of social status."[31] To make this position square with the existentialist ideal of maximizing freedom, the strategy associated with constitutional proceduralism becomes appropriate.[32] If men are in fact limited by others, and these limitations cannot be overcome without self-destruction, it becomes necessary to uphold procedures designed to assure the possibility of the continued change of public policies. Furthermore, support for institutions that underwrite such change need not be derived from a timeless order of moral absolutes; it is sufficient to uphold a commitment to freedom as the highest public value.

This commitment, of course, is one to which those of an existentialist persuasion fully subscribe. But subscribing to nothing else, they evade the political problem of reconciling conflicting claims to power and the empirical problem of weighing the force of these claims. Failing in this, they become politically impotent and practically irrelevant.[33]

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itself can use "objective measures, whose results are publicly replicable," that it can lead to the "development of clearly operational steps and operational tools for the measurement of the behaviors which represent . . . inner variables," and that it can (and should) lead to the discovery of "function-process relationships which hold for the inner world of personal meanings and to formulate these with sufficient precision that they may be put to empirical test": "Toward a Science of the Person," in T. W. Wann (ed.), *Behaviorism and Phenomenology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 109–133, 120, 131.

[30] See Joseph Wood Krutch's obscurantist attack on Skinner in *The Measure of Man* (New York: Charter Books, 1962), sensibly put in its place by George Kateb, *Utopia and Its Enemies* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). See also Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image: Man, Science and Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1964); and Jacques Barzun, *Science: The Glorious Entertainment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), both polemics lashing scientism as if it were science.

[31] Allison Davis, "The Ego and Status-Anxiety," in White (ed.), *The State of the Social Sciences*, pp. 212–228, 228.

[32] For an attempt to show how this proposition applies to Nietzsche's work, see my "Nietzsche's Preface to Constitutionalism," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 211–225.

[33] This is implicitly recognized by Christian Bay's *The Structure of Freedom* (1958), a work which has made the most of empirical findings tending to support a view of man which relies on no transcending absolutes and postulates man's irreducible, "existential" nature. Similarly, it has been possible to use the normative constructs of existentialist psychology (especially those provided by Gordon W. Allport, Henry A. Murray, and Abraham H. Maslow) to give direction to empirical analysis: see Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962), 88–95; and Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Perso-*

Yet whatever the practical evasions of an existentialist psychology, it has recurrently succeeded in breaking the spell of convention. It arouses our sense of injustice, and thereby provides the ground for considering alternative possibilities. By making vivid the partisan nature of our intellectual preoccupations, it stimulates the political imagination. Moreover, it summons the policy scientist interested in social engineering to face up to the kind of tortured world existentialist accounts reveal as ours. And as he is responsible to his scientific vocation, he may well respond to their testimony—indeed, to the testimony of whoever expresses our dilemmas without resolving them, whoever reacts creatively against disorder, be they poets or sociologists. Reminded of the fallacy of closure, of regarding his findings as the whole of possible reality, he should feel encouraged to expand the dimensions of manifest experience, fastening less on the human condition than the human promise, defining not only what we are but also what with luck and action-oriented research we have it within ourselves to become.

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*nality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). A useful synthesis of the literature dealing with basic needs is provided by Paul Kurtz, *Decision and the Condition of Man* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), ch. 9.

# THE DERADICALIZATION OF MARXIST MOVEMENTS*

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## I. INTERPRETATIONS OF POST-STALIN IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE

Marxism-Leninism, as the Soviet Marxist ideology is called, has never been wholly static; it has evolved over the years by a process of accretion, elimination and redefinition of dogma. But in the first post-Stalin decade, there were changes of unusual scope and significance in this sphere, accompanying and in some ways mirroring the general processes of systemic change which Stalin's death precipitated in Soviet society. This paper seeks to interpret the post-Stalin Soviet ideological changes, especially as they bear upon the politics of world revolution. In doing so, it attacks the broader theoretical problem of what goes on in radical political movements and their ideologies as these movements settle down and accommodate themselves to the existing world. For some such tendency appears to be involved in the Soviet case.

The year 1956 was the watershed of post-Stalin ideological change in the U.S.S.R. In the Central Committee's report to the Twentieth Party Congress—the first congress held after Stalin's death—Nikita Khrushchev announced a series of doctrinal innovations affecting particularly the line of Communist Marxism on international relations and the further development of the world Communist revolution. One was the revision of the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of periodic wars under imperialism. On the ground that the world-wide forces for peace were now unprecedentedly strong, it was proclaimed that wars, while still possible, were no longer fatally inevitable even though "imperialism" continued to exist in large areas. Not only could the antagonistic socio-economic systems peacefully coexist; they could and should actively cooperate in the maintenance of peaceful relations. At the same time, coexistence was a competitive process, economics being the principal arena of competition. In the long-range non-military contest for influence, the Communist countries would strive to show the superiority of their socialist mode of production over the capitalist mode and would thereby make the Communist socio-economic model compellingly attractive, particularly to the developing countries. Communism would spread, then, not by force but by force of example. And even as a strictly internal process in the countries concerned, the Communist revolution no longer need necessarily be accomplished through large-scale armed violence. New non-violent forms of "transition to socialism" (i.e., to Communism) might be found, especially in countries where capitalism was not yet very strong. Notwithstanding the Leninist tenet that ruling classes do not voluntarily surrender their power, it might now be possible for socialism to come to power in various places by a parliamentary path. The revolutionary forces would strive to "win a firm majority in parliament and to turn the parliament from an agency of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of genuinely popular will."[1]

Such was a large part of what came to be known in the Communist world as the "Twentieth Congress line." There were other elements as well. One was the proposal for *rapprochement* and cooperation between Communist parties and their historic Marxist enemies, the Social Democratic parties. Another was the formal recognition of Yugoslavia as a member of the family of Communist states, and therewith the recognition of diversity in Communist methods and institutions as legitimate within certain limits. The Twentieth Congress line was, moreover, accentuated and further elaborated in a series of important Soviet pronouncements in the ensuing years. In elaborating the new thesis on the non-inevitability of wars in the present era, Soviet leaders argued that the rulers of the non-Communist powers, or the more moderate and sober elements among them, could perceive the unprecedented dangers implicit in the rise of nuclear weapons and were inclined to take account of these dangers by pursuing a foreign policy designed to avoid another major war. Accentuating the optimistic idea that competitive coexistence could remain peaceful, the Twenty-First Soviet Party Congress in 1959 declared in its resolution that "even before the complete triumph of socialism on earth, while capitalism

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[1] *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

still exists on a part of the globe, a genuine possibility will arise of excluding world war from the life of human society."[2] To be sure, "national-liberation wars" were proclaimed to be legitimate and deserving of assistance from Communist states. But at the same time, Soviet leaders warned against the dangers of escalation inherent even in small local armed conflicts, and advocated that independence be granted to peoples still under alien rule so that armed struggle would not be needed to attain this goal. And the idea of the desirability of peace-keeping cooperation between competitors, particularly the Soviet Union and United States as the military superpowers of the two coalitions, was elaborated at length in Soviet writings.[3]

The Twentieth Congress line also gave strong endorsement to a new Soviet policy of *rapprochement* with non-Communist nationalist revolutionary regimes and movements in newly independent nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Governments of countries outside the Communist bloc were invited to join an expanding world-wide "peace zone" by adopting the policy of non-alignment with existing military blocs. Neutralism, the very possibility of which had been denied in Moscow in Stalin's final years, was thus given Soviet support; and what has come to be called the "third world" was recognized as such in a new tripartite world-view which contrasted sharply with the Stalinist bifurcation of the contemporary political universe into two warring camps. That the developing countries would eventually develop into Communist states was postulated, but it came to be recognized that nations choosing the "non-capitalist path" of development might inaugurate socialist economic practices in various different ways and not not necessarily under Communist Party auspices. Moreover, a political way-station on the long journey to Communism was envisaged in the concept of a "national democracy," which was defined as a non-Communist regime committed to internal developmental goals, tolerant of its own Communist movement, and friendly to the Soviet Union and associated states. Soviet writings meanwhile continued to emphasize the possibility of a peaceful parliamentary path of transition to Communism. And the association of Communism with the idea of dictatorship and violence was further softened with the introduction in 1961 of the notion that the contemporary Soviet state had ceased to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and become a "state of the whole people" in continual process of democratization.

All these doctrinal modifications were formally incorporated into the new C.P.S.U. Program adopted by the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961. Taken in their interrelated entirety, they marked the passage of Soviet Marxist ideology into a new stage of its history. In the decade since the Nineteenth Party Congress of 1952, which met in Stalin's presence and under his aegis, orthodox Leninism-Stalinism had been supplanted with a new Soviet ideological amalgam which might be called "neo-Communist Marxism." Needless to say, it showed continuity with the past, as in the reaffirmation of the ultimate goal of a world Communist society. On the other hand, there were definite breaks with the Communist ideological past. The doctrines of the non-inevitability of wars and the parliamentary path to Communism were deviations from Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy as derived from from such fundamental works of Lenin as *Imperialism* and *The State and Revolution*. The idea of a non-class all-people's state deviated not only from Leninism-Stalinism but from its classical Marxist premises, one of which held that the state *qua* state is a class agency of repression. And old ideological concepts had in some cases been infused with new content. The most notable example is the altered conception of coexistence, which had once been pictured as a condition of unremitting political warfare and was now seen as a long-range peaceful competition of socio-economic systems for predominant world influence. True, the peacefully coexisting systems were envisaged as remaining adversaries between which no "ideological coexistence" would be possible.

The rise of neo-Communist Marxism in the Soviet Union has stimulated a world-wide debate over the meaning of the ideological changes. Three broad lines of interpretation have emerged. One is the official Soviet position, which holds that the ideological changes of the post-Stalin period are simply a new stage in a regular process of adaptation and development of Marxism-Leninism to keep it in tune with changing historical realities. Soviet ideology, according to this view, is a "creative Marxism-Leninism" that does not and cannot go unchanged in various particulars although it always remains true to its foundation principles. In particular, such profoundly important developments of the middle twentieth century as the spread of the Communist system and the rise of nuclear weapons necessarily affect the validity of such an ideological thesis as that concerning the inevitability of wars under imperialism. In Khrushchev's words, "one cannot mechanically repeat now what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said many decades ago regarding imperialism, or continue asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism triumphs throughout the world." And he went on: "We live in a time when we have neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin with us. If we act like children who study the alphabet by compiling words from letters, we shall not go very far."[4]

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[2] Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies III* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 214.

[3] For details, see "Dialectics of Coexistence," in the writer's *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

The dominant Western interpretation of the post-Stalin ideological changes is not wholly dissimilar to the Soviet view. Impressed by the vigor of Soviet reaffirmations of commitment to the ultimate goals of world Communism, many Western students of Soviet affairs have tended to interpret the ideological innovations as essentially tactical. What has changed to some extent, according to this conception, is the Soviet doctrine on the ways and means of achieving the world Communist society that remains the cherished end of Soviet Communists. Moreover, the tactical changes represent to a very large extent a forced adjustment of doctrine (and practice) to the necessities of the nuclear age. Because of the enormity of the dangers posed by general war in the present era, the Soviet leadership has been compelled to reconsider its working assumptions concerning the feasible methods of spreading Communism. The modified Communist credo, with its emphasis upon peaceful competition of systems and its discovery of a peaceful path to Communist revolution, has resulted.

A third interpretation, which has been advanced by the Maoist leadership of Communist China in the course of the Sino-Soviet controversy of recent years, finds a much deeper significance in the Soviet ideological changes after Stalin. It holds that they are symptoms of a degenerative process, a decline of revolutionary commitment on the part of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership or the dominant element of it that found in Khrushchev a natural leader and spokesman. Between the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Party congresses, it maintains, these Soviet leaders developed a complete and rounded system of revisionist views: "They put forward a revisionist line which contravenes the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a line which consists of 'peaceful coexistence,' 'peaceful competition,' 'peaceful transition,' 'a state of the whole people' and 'a party of the entire people.'"[5] Hence the Soviet Union's "creative Marxism-Leninism" is in fact a species of revisionism—"Khrushchev revisionism." It expresses, and at the same time endeavors to conceal, the surreptitious departure of the Soviet ruling group from the spirit and practice of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism as taught primarily by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. And Chinese Communist writings have suggested that this phenomenon of Soviet deradicalization (to introduce a term of our own) goes along with, if indeed it does not grow out of, a process of *embourgeoisement* that is taking place in contemporary Soviet society, in which a new middle class has come into being with typical middle-class aspirations for material ease and stability.

"Revisionism" is a highly charged term, signifying in the Marxist context something similar to what various religions have meant by "heresy." For descriptive and analytical purposes, we may refer to the modified Soviet ideology simply as "neo-Communist Marxism." But with this reservation, and leaving aside for the moment the question of causation, I wish to suggest that the Maoist interpretation of the Soviet ideological changes may be close to the mark. The other two views unquestionably have some merit, for Soviet ideology *has* been creatively adapted to new historical circumstances and this adaptation *does* chiefly affect matters of strategy and tactics. Yet neither the Soviet official interpretation nor the dominant Western trend of thought does full justice to the phenomenon before us. The thesis of the present paper, at any rate, is that the changes in question reflect a deradicalization of Soviet Communism.

Here the methodological question arises of how such a judgment might be validated. How, in other words, would one *know* whether the Soviet Communist movement—or any other radical movement, Communist or non-Communist—was in the stage of deradicalization? To raise this question is to focus attention upon an apparent deficiency in our theoretical apparatus. We lack a general conception of deradicalization and, in particular, of the typical symptoms of the process, the characteristic behavior of radical socio-political movements, including those of the Marxist persuasion, in the phase when their radicalism has subsided or is subsiding. In general, our scholarship has shown a greater interest in the rise of radical movements than in their decline. Well known titles like *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and *The Origin of Totalitarian Democracy* reflect this bias. There is no disputing the legitimacy and fruitfulness of studying radical movements in their origins and vigorous youth. On the other hand, reflection shows that deradicalization must be the eventual fate of all radical movements, whether or not they achieve political power, and that this process too is well worth systematic analysis. Indeed, it may be that the study of such movements in the phase of deradicalization may be one avenue of deeper insight into the psychology and politics of radicalism as such.

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[4] Speech to the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, June 22, 1960 (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960), pp. 27, 28.

[5] "The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (VII)," *People's Daily*, February 4, 1964.

The present paper is as much or more concerned with this theoretical problem as with the particular case at hand. It seeks to conceptualize the process of deradicalization in terms of its symptoms, and thereby to suggest certain possible guidelines for analysis of recent phenomena in the development of Soviet Communism. These theoretical formulations will necessarily be quite tentative and provisional since they are derived from the study of a single historical instance of the phenomenon in question. The European Social Democracy around the turn of the century provides an example of a Marxist movement that was indubitably in the phase of deradicalization and therefore may be a profitable case to analyze from this point of view. First, however, a few general remarks on the nature of radical movements, and on deradicalization as a stage in their development.

### II. RADICALISM: A GENERAL VIEW

There are various ways of viewing radical politics and political movements. Some, for example, may think of radical politics as extremist politics and radical movements as those which rely upon extreme or violent methods of action. The difficulty with definitions turning on the mode of action is that extremist means are no monopoly of radical politics but are used on occasion by groups that no one would call radical.

A more promising way of arriving at a working conception of radicalism is to consider the attributes of the type of mind or outlook in which radical politics generally has its source and inspiration. Let us postulate that (1) radical social doctrines arise from time to time as expressions of the radical mind in individuals of outstanding creative power, and (2) under propitious circumstances such doctrines attract followers in significant numbers and become the ideologies of organized socio-political movements which may be described as radical by virtue of their being dedicated to the realization of a radical social doctrine. What, then, are the attributes of the radical mind as reflected in the type of doctrines it creates?

There is, to begin with, an intense element of negation in it. The radical is first of all someone who says "No!" to the surrounding society. He mentally and emotionally rebels against the existing order, repudiates the world as it stands, or as he perceives it to stand. For example, Marx—a quintessential example of the modern radical mind—started with a total uncompromising denial and rejection of existing reality. Already in notes to his doctoral dissertation of 1841 he propounded this fundamental theme in the notion that "philosophy," in the persons of Hegel's disciples, was in revolt against the world. What was needed, he wrote somewhat later to his friend Arnold Ruge, was "*a merciless criticism of everything existing*, merciless in two senses: this criticism must not take fright at its own conclusions and must not shrink from a collision with the powers that be." And in his original formulation of Marxism in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, he foretold the revolutionary transformation of this "alienated world" in which man was everywhere estranged from his own nature and being. Subsequently, his terminology changed somewhat, but his *Weltanschauung* did not. World-denial is a theme running through the writings of his mature and later years as well as the early works. In a speech of 1856, for example, he pronounced sentence of capital punishment upon the bourgeois social order in the name of what he called the *Vehmgericht* or court of history, appointing the proletarian as "executioner." And for all its tortuous elaboration of abstract concepts, *Capital*, his supreme achievement, was in its way a nine-hundred-page cry of pain and outrage against bourgeois civilization as Marx perceived it.

But the radical is not adequately described as one who rejects existing reality. To understand the radical mind as found in modern Western history, we must penetrate the inner springs of its rebellion. The radical is not simply a rebel but a visionary. What inspires his rebellion against the world as it stands is his vision of an alternative universe, a perfect social order. His negation of what exists proceeds from an underlying affirmation, an idealized image of the world as it ought to be. Indeed, it is the very perfection of his alternative universe that explains the depth and totality, i.e., the *radicalness*, of his act of world-repudiation. And here again, though somewhat less obviously, Marx provides an illustration. He initially rebelled against the world in the name of the "realization of philosophy," meaning the Hegelian philosophy of man's apotheosis in history. A vision of mankind in a state of perfection was thus his starting point. As his thought developed further, realization of philosophy was redefined to mean transcendence of human self-alienation or "humanism." And humanism in this special Marxian sense was conceived as the essence of future communism, which Marx thought would come about through the socialization of private property in a world-wide proletarian revolution.

This visionary aspect of Marx's radicalism was more clearly apparent in his early writings than later on. It was superficially obscured by the attack that he and Engels made on their socialist predecessors as "utopians." In the *Communist Manifesto* and elsewhere, they derided attempts to design ideal socialist communities (such as Fourier's phalansteries) and set socialist theoreticians the task of demonstrating the necessity of capitalist society's revolutionary self-destruction. But notwithstanding their own preoccupation with this task, the founders of Marxism never lost sight of their communist utopia. The vision of a perfect communist order of the future remained integral to the Marxist social doctrine. The present bourgeois epoch represented the closing chapter of man's "prehistory," declared Marx in millenarian tones in 1859. Beyond it lay the true life of the species, when man would become fully man—a freely productive being developing his talents in all directions—in communist society. That would be humanity's great leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, wrote Engels in *Anti-Dühring*. Society, they foresaw, would become classless and conflictless with the abolition of the division of labor in all its manifold enslaving forms, and the state would disappear for lack of repressive function. Man would finally realize his own nature in a society based upon distribution according to need. Such, in broad outline, was classical Marxism's image of the ideal communist order.

One other general attribute of the radical mind remains to be mentioned: its activism. The radical not only rejects existing reality; he wants and seeks to transform it. He not only has a vision of an ideal order but a belief in the possibility of realizing it, of moving from the world as it is to the world as it ought to be. "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways," as Marx put it in the last of his eleven theses on Feuerbach. "*The point is, to change it.*" And the radical mind, at its most creative, has a prescription for action towards this goal, a conception of revolutionary politics. In classical Marxism the prescription for action was class struggle leading to a dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx had only scorn for a socialism that would renounce the "revolutionizing of the old world" and seek, like the early Christian communities, to "achieve its salvation behind society's back."[6] He informed the proletarians that they had "a world to win," and unfurled the banner of a "revolutionary socialism" that stood for "the class dictatorship of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the inevitable transit point to the abolition of class differences generally, to the abolition of all the productive relations that correspond to these relations, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social connections."[7]

A full statement of the conditions under which radical movements arise in society is more than can be attempted here. But paraphrasing Lenin in *What Is To Be Done?*, we can say without much exaggeration that there can be no radical movement without a radical social doctrine to serve as its inspiration and ideology. The movement develops as an institutionalization of the radical doctrine, as the organized activity of a group (party, association, etc.) dedicated to the realization of the vision of a new society. By the nature of the self-selective process of initial recruitment, the movement's leadership, which may originally include the author or authors of the radical creed, will consist in large part of persons attracted to the doctrine by their own radical tendency of mind. On the other hand, some may be persons chiefly gifted in practical organizing ability. If conditions are propitious, as in a time of widespread misery and discontent, the movement may attract followers in large enough numbers to turn into a genuine mass movement. But many in the mass following may join the movement for motives other than zeal for the radical cause. Cases in point would be radical socialist movements with a mass membership arising out of their association with trade unions.

It appears to be the fate of radical movements that survive and flourish for long *with-*

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[6] *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 21.

[7] *The Class Struggles in France (1848–1850)* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 126.

*out* remaking the world that they undergo eventually a process of deradicalization. A loss of *élan* is not necessarily involved, for this process can go on in a movement at a time of significant growth and advance. Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's relation to the social milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts itself to existence within the very order that it officially desires to overthrow and transform. This is not to say that the movement turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system and its institutionalized procedures as the framework for further efforts in the direction of social change. A resolution adopted by the Congress of Parties of the Second International at Amsterdam in August, 1904, conveys a vivid sense of this process in a passage warning against it:

> The Congress condemns in the most decisive fashion revisionist efforts to change the victorious tactics we have hitherto followed based on the class struggle, in such a way that instead of conquering political power by defeating our opponents, a policy of coming to terms with the existing order is followed. The result of such revisionist tactics would be that instead of being a party which works for the most rapid transformation possible of existing bourgeois society into the socialist social order, i.e., revolutionary in the best sense of the word, the party would become one which is content with reforming bourgeois society.

The phrase "coming to terms with the existing order" best indicates what deradicalization means. In the stage of deradicalization, the movement loses its revolutionary other-worldliness, the alienation from existing conditions arising out of its commitment to a future perfect order, and makes an accommodation to the world as it stands.

Among the numerous and complex causal factors in deradicalization, two are particularly noteworthy: leadership change and worldly success. So far as the first is concerned, it is clear that mere continued official adherence to a radical social doctrine cannot preserve radicalism in a movement if the leadership, through aging or change of leaders, ceases to be radical in its outlook. The radical tendency of mind, as suggested above, is likely to be dominant among the original generation of the movement's leaders. In the normal course of events, however, this situation will eventually change. Not only may some among the original generation of leaders mellow as they grow older. Younger persons who rise through the movement into leadership positions are less likely than the original leaders to be radical types. Ambition, organizing ability and concern for the interests of the organization and its social constituency are likely to be their predominant characteristics. Successive generations of leaders will show less and less of the alienation from the existing order that characterized the radical founders of the movement and their associates.

Turning to the second factor, there seems to be an inverse relation between a radical movement's organizational strength and the preservation of its radicalism. Radical movements that remain small sectarian groups on the fringe of society are relatively impervious to deradicalization; the history of twentieth-century Trotskyism furnishes numerous illustrations. But when a radical movement grows large and strong, acquires a big organizational structure, a mass social constituency and a recognized place in society, this very worldly success fosters deradicalization. The acquisition of a mass membership inevitably dilutes the movement's radicalism, and the influence of the relatively less radical rank-and-file will make itself felt in various ways at the leadership level. Moreover, when society begins to accord a measure of acceptance to a radical movement, this may tend to weaken, if not eventually dissipate, the sharp sense of alienation from this world and the commitment to a future order which characterized the movement in its earlier phases. Above all, a movement that grows strong and influential and has prospects of further growth acquires a definite stake in the stability of the order in which this success has been won—a stake that is no less real for the fact that it goes unacknowledged. Robert Michels stressed this point in his study of socialist parties. Observing that the revolutionary political party is at first a state within the state, pursuing the avowed aim of supplanting the present social order with a new one, Michels argued that the growth of the party as an organization weakens the commitment to the revolutionary aim. For revolutionary action can only endanger the position of a party that has achieved a mass membership, a bureaucracy, a full treasury, and a network of financial and moral interests extending all over the country. So it is that "from a means, organization becomes an end" and that "the party grows increasingly inert as the strength of its organization grows; it loses its revolutionary impetus, becomes sluggish. . . ."[8]

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[8] *Political Parties* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), pp. 370, 371, 372–373.

### III. DERADICALIZATION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Michels' thoughts on the deradicalization of revolutionary political parties were generalizations from the observed experience of European Marxist parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in particular. The 1880's had witnessed the emergence in various West European countries of mass working-class parties professing revolutionary Marxism as their ideology. The largest and most influential was the SPD, which in 1875 had become a united body under the leadership of Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel and with Marx and Engels as its mentors and advisers. Notwithstanding the harassment and repression endured under Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Law of 1878–1890, the SPD waxed strong in late nineteenth-century Germany. In the elections of 1890, it received nearly a million and a half votes—about a fifth of those cast—and thirty-five seats in the Reichstag. Thirteen years later, a remarkable electoral victory gave the party over three million votes and eighty-one Reichstag seats. And by the elections of 1912, its membership totalled nearly a million and its electoral strength exceeded four million votes, making the SPD both the largest party in Germany and the largest socialist party in the world.

In the aftermath of persecution under the Anti-Socialist Law, the party firmly restated its radical goals and principles in the new program adopted at its Erfurt Congress in 1891. Yet by the turn of the century if not earlier, this formidable mass Marxist party and the movement over which it presided were far along in the process of deradicalization. Marx and Engels were now both dead, and a second generation of leaders, typified by Eduard Bernstein and the party theorist Karl Kautsky, had come to the fore. The party's radical orientation was tempered by its association with a decidedly unradical trade-union movement whose whole tendency was to work toward piecemeal economic reform. And deradicalization was fostered by the great growth of the movement—its wealth, organizational strength, widespread influence, and seeming prospects for further gradual increase of power under the prevailing social system.

It is beyond question that around the turn of the century the German and other European Social Democratic movements were settling down and coming to terms with the existing order. But what were the symptoms of this process? In what ways did the movements reflect and react to it? The principal manifestations of deradicalization were of four different kinds, having to do with the action-pattern of the movement, its relation to its ideological goals, the development of its strategy and tactics, and, finally, its inner conflicts. Taking the German Marxist movement as a classic case in point, let us now examine these points in order.

The accommodation with the existing system was shown first of all in the emergence of a reformist, as distinguished from a revolutionary, pattern of action. The movement's political action lost all meaningful orientation toward the coming great upheaval foretold in the Marxist ideology, and concentrated more and more on what was called the *Gegenwartrarbeit,* or everyday work of the party. The electoral activity of the party expanded with its electoral success. "Everywhere there is action for reform, action for social progress, action for the victory of democracy," wrote Eduard Bernstein in the famous articles in *Neue Zeit* that proved the manifesto of Marxist revisionism. "People study the details of the problems of the day and seek for levers and starting points to carry on the development of society in the direction of socialism." It would therefore be better, he argued, if the Social Democracy "could find the courage to emancipate itself from a phraseology which is actually outworn and if it would make up its mind to appear what it is in reality today: a democratic socialistic party of reform."[9]

But that is precisely what the party, or rather its dominant, so-called "orthodox" faction, refused to do. It reasserted its ideological revolutionism at the very time when its practical reformism was becoming most pronounced. In the Erfurt Program, as mentioned above, the party had reaffirmed its radical mission as a revolutionary anti-capitalist organization destined to unite and lead the working class in what was described as an ever more bitter class war between bourgeoisie and proletariat. And this in essence remained the party's line in the aftermath of appeals by von Vollmar, Bernstein and others for abandonment of the Marxist theory of catastrophe and the gospel of revolution through class war. Not only did Kautsky at the turn of the century defend the radical goals and principles of the movement in response to Bernstein's critique. The party formally condemned the latter at its Hanover Congress in 1899 and again at the Dresden Congress of 1903. Furthermore, the Dresden Congress' resolution on this point was adopted by the Socialist International at its Amsterdam Congress the following year and thus was made binding upon all member parties. And right up to the eve of 1914, when the German party's support for war credits in the Reichstag demonstrated conclusively how far it had gone in deradicalization, it officially continued to regard itself as utterly alienated from bourgeois society. "Social Democracy differs from all other parties through its fundamental opposition to the social and governmental system of capitalism," declared the report of the Parliamentary Party to the SPD Congress in 1912.[10]

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[9] *Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), pp. 197, 199.

So it was that a deradicalized Social Democratic movement pledged its allegiance anew to ideological orthodoxy while adhering in practice to a reformist policy line. Instead of abandoning its radical principles and aims in accordance with the revisionist program, the party renewed and even intensified its formal commitment to these aims and principles. Why the dominant element of the leadership moved in this direction was hinted in a letter from an elder German Socialist, Ignaz Auer, to Bernstein. "Do you think it is really possible that a party which has a literature going back fifty years, an organization going back forty years and a still older tradition, can change its direction like this in the twinkling of an eye," he inquired. "For the most influential members of the party to behave as you demand would simply mean splitting the party and throwing decades of work to the winds. My dear Ede, one doesn't formally decide to do what you ask, one doesn't say it, one *does* it."[11] This was to say that the party's interests militated against any tampering with its ideological *raison d'être*. To preserve the unity and stability of the movement, its leaders had to show great care and restraint in their capacity as custodians of its revolutionary ideology. Similar reasoning underlay the resistance of Austrian Social Democratic leaders like Victor Adler to demands raised in the movement in the 1890's for a theoretical reappraisal of some fundamental concepts of orthodox Marxism which were not being vindicated by contemporary economic development. Such demands, we are told, were "strenuously resisted by Adler, not so much on ideological grounds, for he was anything but a doctrinaire Marxist, but rather for fear of provoking dissensions which might once more endanger party unity."[12]

All this suggests that the process of deradicalization has a certain inner "dialectic." For deep-seated reasons, theory and practice diverge. The movement intensifies its theoretical adherence to revolutionary goals at the very time when in practice it moves down the path of reformism. The dominant leadership resists the counsel of the Bernsteins who want the radical theory to be revised to accord with the reformist practice and follows the contrary counsel of those who argue that "one doesn't say it, one *does* it." Far from succumbing to doctrinal revisionism, it resoundingly reaffirms its official revolutionism and pledges its allegiance anew to its original radical outlook. And it does so, at least in part, in an effort to preserve the movement's integrity, to prevent or lessen the demoralization and disunity that open avowal of reformism would tend to provoke. As we shall note presently, it may also be impelled in this direction by accusations from strongly radical elements within the movement that it is betraying the revolutionary cause.

The appearance of a serious discrepancy between revolutionism in theory and reformism in practice is thus one of the hallmarks of deradicalization. But for subjective reasons as well as vulnerability to accusations of hypocrisy from within the movement, the leadership is uncomfortable in the presence of this discrepancy and does what it can to lessen or blur it. While rejecting the formal revisionism that would disavow the radical principles or eschatological elements of the movement's ideology, the orthodox leaders modify the *tactical* part of the ideology by stressing immediate short-term objectives and nonradical means of attaining them. And in their exegeses of the authoritative writings and pronouncements of the founders, they highlight those statements that give (or seem to give) sanction to such a development of the tactical doctrine. This, at any rate, was the road taken by the Social Democratic leaders.

What had come to be called the "minimum program" of the movement, embracing lesser goals attainable without revolutionizing the existing order, was emphasized at the expense of the truly revolutionary "maximum program," but on the official assumption that every step in fulfillment of the movement's minimal program would likewise bring closer the realization of the maximal program. The democratic electoral road to power was increasingly treated as the highroad, and a doctrine of socialist "parliamentarianism" arose. Thus in his commentary on the Erfurt Program, Kautsky reproved the early "proletarian utopians" like Wilhelm Weitling for having viewed as a betrayal of the movement "every form of the class struggle which was not aimed at the immediate overthrow of the existing order, that is, every serious, efficient sort of effort . . ."[13] Again, in lectures delivered before an Amsterdam socialist group in 1902, he extolled democracy as "light and air to the proletariat." Elections were "a means to count ourselves and the enemy," and further: "They prevent premature outbreaks and they guard against defeats. They also grant the possibility that the opponents will themselves recognize the untenability of many positions and freely surrender them when their maintenance is no life-and-death question for them." He foresaw that parliamentarianism, in decline under capitalism, would be "reawakened to new youth and strength when it, together with the total governmental power, is conquered by the rising proletariat and turned to serve its purposes." And how would the governmental power be conquered by the proletariat? Not by an armed uprising, Kautsky cautioned, save possibly in Russia. Unlike some past revolutions, the coming revolution would be a long-drawn-out political "civil war" without battles, barricades and blood, i.e., a figurative civil war. It would not, moreover, be a "battle of mobs," but rather: "It is a battle of organized, intelligent masses, full of stability and prudence, that do not follow every impulse or explode over every insult, or collapse under every misfortune."[14]

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[10] Quoted by James Joll, *The Second International 1889–1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), p. 90.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94.

[12] Norbert Leser, "Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1966), at p. 118.

In keeping with this concept of a well-behaved class struggle, orthodox Marxism gave an exegesis of the Marxist scriptures which laid particular emphasis upon everything that pointed in its own tactical direction. It is questionable whether Marx and Engels (particularly Marx) ever wavered in their commitment ment to the radical *Weltanschauung* that they formulated as young men. But in their later years, owing in part to involvement in the intricate politics of the revolutionary movement, they made various statements that seemed to sanction gradualism, an electoral orientation, and a belief in a peaceful path of socialist revolution. Thus Marx's inaugural address to the International Workingmen's Association in 1864 welcomed the ten-hour day as a victory for the "political economy of labor," suggesting that more such reforms within the capitalist order represented a real path of progress to socialism. In a speech at the Hague in 1872, after a congress of the International, he allowed that in countries like England and America, and possibly Holland as well, the worker might be able to attain his goal by peaceful means. Engels too referred to the possibility of a peaceful revolution in his critique of the Erfurt Program. More important still, in his 1895 preface to a new edition of Marx's *Class Struggles in France,* Engels gave his blessing to the parliamentary mode of struggle by hailing the German Social Democracy's two million voters as the decisive "shock force" of the international proletarian army. "The irony of world history turns everything upside down," he went on. "We, the 'revolutionaries,' the 'rebels'—we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and revolt. The parties of order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves."[15]

These and like texts proved of great importance to the leadership of a movement in which all policy had to be legitimated by reference to authoritative pronouncements of the founders of the ideology. Having undertaken to paper over the discrepancy between its theoretical revolutionism and practical reformism by prescribing gradualist and peaceful *tactics* of revolutionary struggle, Social Democratic Marxism naturally gave special attention and emphasis to such statements by Marx and Engels as those just cited. By the same token, it tended to de-emphasize the many Marx-Engels texts which visualized the socialist revolution as the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions by "illegal methods and revolt" and which visualized the regime of the revolution as a violent dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus a definite line in the exegesis of classical Marxism was part of the general process of deradicalization of the Social Democratic Marxist movement. A sort of retrospective deradicalization of the radical godfathers of the movement, Marx and Engels, was one of its manifestations.

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[13] *The Class Struggle* (*Erfurt Program*) (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1910), pp. 196, 197.

[14] Karl Kautsky, *The Social Revolution* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1913), pp. 79–82, 88. All this bears out the comment of Alfred Meyer that "Kautsky still spoke about the proletarian revolution but demanded that it be a tame and civilized revolution." *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 135. A detailed and useful discussion of trends in Social Democratic Marxism at the end of the nineteenth century is contained in chapters 5 and 6 of this book.

[15] Marx, *The Class Struggle in France,* pp. 27, 28. Michels suggests that this influential endorsement by Engels of parliamentary methods for attaining socialism did not give expression to his true opinions. In this connection he quotes from a letter that Engels wrote to Kautsky saying, with reference to the preface: "My text had to suffer from the timid legalism of our friends in Berlin, who dreaded a second edition of the anti-socialist laws—a dread to which I was forced to pay attention at the existing political juncture." Michels concludes on this basis that "Engels would seem to have been the victim of an opportunist sacrifice of principles to the needs of organization, a sacrifice made for love of the party and in opposition to his known theoretical convictions": *Political Parties,* p. 370 n.

So, finally, was conflict in the movement between the orthodox leadership and elements whose radical alienation from the existing order and commitment to the revolutionary vision of a new world remained unimpaired by the movement's worldly success. Reflection shows that such conflict is virtually inescapable when a movement is in the stage of deradicalization, so much so that the absence of it may be treated as a sure sign that no fundamental deradicalization is taking place. What explains this fact is that the leadership (not to mention the rank-and-file) of a radical movement is never homogeneous in outlook. There are bound to be differences of temperament, of relationship to the ideology, of position in the movement. For reasons touched on above, some of the more adaptable leaders will preside over the movement's deradicalization. But other, more consistently radical-minded elements will rebel against this process, and here lie the seeds of inner conflict or even schism in the movement.

Seeing the discrepancy between the officially-avowed revolutionary theory and the unrevolutionary day-to-day practice, the genuine radicals will be profoundly worried by the direction the movement is taking. What is happening?, they will ask. Are we not giving up in practice our cherished goals, our effort to transform society totally? Is not the movement drifting into opportunism? Are we not, then, betraying the founders of the doctrine in whose name we continue to speak? Among the prominent figures in the Social Democratic movement who raised such troubled and troublesome questions were Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, and Wilhelm Liebknecht's son Karl, of whom it has been said that he inherited his father's political romanticism without his common sense.[16] Like revisionists of the Bernsteinian persuasion, the genuine radicals craved consistency. But the two groups moved in opposite directions in search of it. Whereas the revisionists wanted to revise the revolutionary theory to accord with reformist practice, the radicals wanted to abandon reformist practice out of fidelity to the revolutionary world-image; they took the movement's eschatology seriously.

The inner conflict attendant upon a movement's deradicalization may be all the more deep and disruptive if it is an international movement, as Marxist Social Democracy was in the early years of this century. For heterogeneity of outlook among the leaders is even more to be expected on an international scale than within a given national branch of the movement. One reason for this is that at any given time the movement may be in different stages of development in various countries. This may result in the ascendancy of a group of one outlook in one branch of the international movement, and of a group of opposed outlook in another. In that event, a schism may occur, as it did in the international Marxist movement in 1917 and after. German orthodox Marxism had a counterpart in the Menshevik wing of the younger Russian Social Democracy. But the Marxism that came to power in Russia in the October Revolution of 1917 was the radical Bolshevik Marxism of Lenin and his associates. The international Marxist movement was consequently split in two, and soon a deradicalized Social Democracy with its center of gravity in Western Europe found itself in hostile confrontation with a radical Marxist movement of Leninist persuasion centering in Soviet Russia and laying undivided claim to the Marxist heritage.

## IV. RADICALISM AND DERADICALIZATION UNDER LENIN AND STALIN

It is always risky to interpret a massive historical event in terms of a single cause or issue. But it seems undeniable that rebellious protest against the deradicalization of Social Democracy was a central motif in the great Marxist schism and in the rise of Communist Marxism as a new world-wide movement. The younger Lenin had venerated Kautsky as a Marxist teacher and adversary of revisionism. But during the World War, in which Kautsky and many other European Social Democratic leaders failed to oppose the warring governments in the name of the previously espoused principle of international working-class solidarity, Lenin turned against them. In a pamphlet published in Geneva in 1915, he accused Kautsky of paying mere "lip service" to Marxism. Speaking of the Kautskys of the international Social Democratic movement, he went on:

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[16] Joll, *op. cit.*, p. 100. On the radicals' rebellion against the tendency of deradicalization, see Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–139. He writes of Rosa Luxumburg, in particular, that "her entire political life was one momentous attempt to reunite the theory and practice of Marxian socialism in the radical spirit of its founders" (p. 137).

"Those people castrate Marxism; they purge it, by means of obvious sophisms, of its revolutionary living soul; they recognize in Marxism *everything except* revolutionary means of struggle, except the advocacy of, and the preparation for, such struggle, and the education of the masses in this direction."[17] In 1917, on the eve of taking power, Lenin insisted on changing the name of his party from "Social Democratic" to "Communist" in order to sharpen symbolically his break with Social Democratic Marxism. The subsequent creation of the Third International was a logical outgrowth of this step.

Leninist or Communist Marxism emerged as a kind of Marxist fundamentalism, a revival of the radical essence of Marx's thought. On the opening page of *The State and Revolution*—one of the great documents of Marxist radicalism—Lenin declared that the pressing need was to restore to Marxism its revolutionary soul and thus combat the efforts of vulgarizers like Kautsky to omit, obliterate and distort the revolutionary side of the doctrine. Here and in other writings of this period, he hammered out the foundations of Communist Marxism in a savage polemic against Kautskyan Social Democracy and its interpretation of Marx and Engels. Kautsky, he contended, was guilty of "petty-bourgeois distortion of Marxism and base renunciation of it *in practice*, while hypocritically recognizing it *in words*."[18] The essence of Kautskyism, as Lenin saw it, was, in our terms, the discrepancy between revolutionary theory and non-revolutionary practice which shows up when a movement undergoes deradicalization.

Kautsky's exegesis of the Marx-Engels texts was a particular target of Lenin's polemic. "How Kautsky Transformed Marx into a Common or Garden Liberal" was the title of the opening section of *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. And Lenin argued in this and other writings of the period for a fundamentalist reading of the views of Marx and Engels on revolution and dictatorship. To be a true Marxist, one had not only to accept the class struggle but also the proletarian dictatorship as its culmination and the necessary way-station to the new world of communist society. A proletarian revolution meant the taking of power by an armed uprising; and Marx, were he alive now, would no longer allow for the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism in Britain and America, since the exceptional conditions that might have made peaceful revolution possible there in the nineteenth century no longer obtained. And the dictatorship of the proletariat—the theory of which constituted the very essence of Marxist teaching—was a revolutionary regime relying upon force and violence to suppress its class enemies.

Thus Communist Marxism took shape as the political doctrine of a new anti-Social Democratic Marxist radicalism. Now, nearly a half-century after Lenin, the Soviet Communist movement still claims to be authentically "Marxist-Leninist." But if deradicalization, as suggested above, is the general fate of radical movements, the question arises whether this fate has been overtaking Soviet Communism in the recent past. One way of approaching it may be to inquire whether Soviet Communism has begun to show such symptoms of deradicalization as those displayed in its time by the Social Democratic movement. Such comparative treatment seems logically feasible despite the fact that in the one case we are dealing with a radical movement that came to power, while the other movement remained out of power.

It could be argued that Soviet Communism entered upon the phase of deradicalization long before Stalin's death. There were, for example, indications of deradicalization as early as the period of the New Economic Policy in the 1920's, most notably in the regime's action-pattern in both international and domestic affairs. True, the revival of revolutionary militance at the close of the 1920's, both internally and to some extent externally, points to the inconclusiveness of those earlier signs. Soviet foreign policy in the Popular Front period of the middle 1930's, however, could again be seen as symptomatic of deradicalization—and some in the West so saw it. Moreover, two of the factors in deradicalization that have been emphasized in these pages—change in the composition of the leadership and the worldly success that gives a one-time radical movement a stake in the existing order—were evident, or becoming so, as the Bolshevik old guard began to be replaced by a new generation of Soviet leaders. It might be mentioned, too, that the charge of deradicalization—couched in such terms as "bureaucratic degeneration" and "Thermidor"—bulked large in the Trotskyist polemic against Stalinist Soviet Communism. It was, in particular, Trotsky's fundamental thesis in *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937) that Soviet Communism, despite continued lip-service to revolutionary Marxism, had undergone a far-reaching deradicalization under the aegis of a basically conservative bureaucracy of which Stalin himself was the personification. The Great Purge of the middle 1930's and Stalin's super-cautious foreign policy of that time appeared to Trotsky, along with much else, as evidence in support of this thesis. The Great Purge, in which most of the still-surviving old Bolshevik revolutionaries perished or were sent once more to Siberia, was seen as a counter-revolution of conservatism.

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[17] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), Vol. II, p. 359.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

There is no denying that Stalinist Soviet Communism showed conservative features, particularly in its later years. But apart from the fact (or in connection with it) that Stalin himself was fundamentally misconstrued as a mere personification of the Soviet bureaucracy, there were deep flaws in the Trotskyist analysis. Although the Soviet Communist movement undoubtedly underwent very considerable deradicalization during the Stalin era, Stalin himself, a man of the original revolutionary generation, represented in his peculiar way a link with the radical Leninist past and a bar to *full-scale* development of the deradicalizing tendencies that had become strong in Soviet Communism. In internal policy, for example, he espoused in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (1952) the idea that the Soviet agrarian economy should soon begin to be based not on monetary relationships but on direct "product-exchange"; and this radical prescription, along with his projection of a policy of economic austerity for the Soviet Union in its further advance towards "full communism," may help to explain why, in subsequent years of Soviet de-Stalinization, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung has defended Stalin as a great Marxist-Leninist mentor for Communist movements.

In foreign policy, moreover, Stalin demonstrated his surviving—or reviving—commitment to Marxist revolutionism by presiding over a largely forcible expansion of the Communist system to other countries after the end of the Second World War. And whatever the mixture of motives actuating him, it is notable that an analysis of his action widely accepted in the West saw it as deriving from continued commitment to radical Marxist-Leninist goals.[19] It is true that Stalin's postwar revolutionism had its limits. Possibly fearing great-power competition from within the international Communist movement, he did not, for example, show initial enthusiasm for a Communist takeover of China. It is likewise true that Stalin acted with a certain circumspection and caution in the process of exporting Communism to other countries. This is understandable when we consider that the age of atomic weapons had dawned and that Russia was not only without them but also weakened by the ordeal of war. But caution in the pursuit of radical ends is no derogation of radicalism itself. To this it should be added that so long as Stalin lived, there was no serious departure from the strategic and tactical fundamentals of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world revolution as codified in the 1920's and 1930's under Stalin's aegis. This fact is all the more significant in the light of available evidence, to which I shall refer presently, that Stalin in the last years of his life was strenuously resisting some doctrinal changes which were being advocated by other Soviet political leaders and which would have been indicative of Soviet deradicalization.

### V. DERADICALIZATION SINCE STALIN

The real question, then, is not whether Soviet Communism began to deradicalize before Stalin died, although there are strong indications that it did. Rather, the question is whether the deradicalizing tendency already apparent in earlier years but always held in check may have come to much fuller fruition in the post-Stalin period, whether the passing of Stalin and the consequent emergence of a new generation of Soviet leaders has brought the Soviet Communist movement into a highly advanced or even final phase of deradicalization. In short, is Soviet Communism of the late 1950's and early 1960's to be seen as a basically deradicalized Marxist movement? If we can take the symptoms that were shown by the Social Democratic Marxist movement in its phase of deradicalization as criteria for judgment, an affirmative answer is indicated.

We see, to begin with, a coming to terms with the existing order, both internationally and internally, in the action-pattern of the Soviet Communist leadership. In Soviet foreign relations there have, it is true, been episodes in which force was egregiously employed or serious risks incurred; the Hungarian intervention of 1956 and the Cuban missiles venture of 1962 are, respectively, the obvious cases in point. Yet neither of these Soviet actions is necessarily to be interpreted as the action of a revolutionary power intent upon altering the international socio-political *status quo*.[20] And the general pattern of Soviet international behavior in the post-Stalin period has been distinctly unrevolutionary. The Soviet regime has sought a *rapprochement* with non-Communist nationalist regimes in the underdeveloped areas of the world. In certain critical junctures in international affairs, it has found it possible to support a non-Communist India engaged in conflict with Communist China. It has attempted to mediate a dispute between non-Communist India and non-Communist Pakistan. It has shown a desire to settle the war in Vietnam, even at the expense of full (or early) realization of Communist aims in South Vietnam. In addition to all this, it has intermittently sought to improve relations and institutionalize a measure of cooperation with the leading non-Communist power of the West. In internal policy, moreover, the Soviet regime has increasingly turned away from doctrinaire schemes toward a more pragmatic policy line in the economic and other spheres. The recent experimentation with market principles in the economy is only one of many expressions of this.

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[19] I refer to the analysis by George Kennan in his article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1947).

[20] In the Hungarian intervention, the Soviet motivation was probably mainly defensive, since the preservation of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe was threatened by Hungarian departure from the Warsaw Pact. In the Cuban missiles

But the "dialectic" of deradicalization seems to have been operative too in the post-Stalin period. The tendency of the regime to adjust its conduct at home and abroad to existing situations and realities has been accompanied by no diminution of ideological rhetoric. On the contrary, verbal protestations of fidelity to Communist ideas have intensified, and there has been something of a Leninist revival in Soviet propaganda. Frequently and in the strongest terms the leadership has reaffirmed its dedication to the final goals of Communism as laid down by Marx, Engels and Lenin. It has insisted, as mentioned earlier, that peaceful coexistence can never embrace "ideological coexistence," i.e., that the ideological gulf between Communist and non-Communist societies remains unbridged and unbridgeable. It was, moreover, in this very period that a Soviet leader issued the warning that Soviet Communists would not renounce their Communist principles until "the shrimps whistle" and flung down the gauntlet to capitalist America in the famous phrase: "We will bury you!" The image of the future Communist social order reappeared in shining form in Khrushchev's address to the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 and again in the new Party Program in 1961; and never in Soviet history was so much official public attention bestowed upon the utopian vision of the Communist future. It is symptomatic that the new Party Program envisages, with the advent of a full Communist society in Russia some time after 1980, the radical transformation of Soviet man himself into "a new man who will . . . combine spiritual wealth, moral purity and a perfect physique."[21]

The pledging of allegiance anew to Communism's eschatology has, however, been accompanied by the third symptom of deradicalization—revision of the tactical doctrine, changes in the official conception of the *means* by which the ultimate goals may be achieved. As noted earlier, these changes center in the general idea that Communism can spread in the world by peaceful means, without "export of revolution" (i.e., the use of armed force to impose Communist revolutions from without) or internal civil war. In elaborating the programmatic notion of a peaceful path to Communism, Soviet sources have put forward a new doctrine of parliamentarianism which strikingly parallels the above-mentioned Kautskyan picture of a takeover of power through the winning of a parliamentary majority by the working class. In keeping with this same trend of thought, Soviet official writings have endorsed the essentially gradualist tactic (originally developed by the Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti) of Communist advocacy of economic "structural reforms" within the frame of the existing order. And on the broader plane of general strategy, Soviet doctrine has broken with the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of wars and espoused, as we saw, the view that the Soviet Union can best contribute to the further spread of Communism by winning the battle of economic development in peaceful competitive coexistence.

These doctrinal developments have been accompanied by appropriate adjustments in the official Soviet image of the movement's founders. To some extent, in fact, we see a retrospective "deradicalization" of the Marxist-Leninist classics. Thus the 1961 Party Program, in elaborating upon the theme of parliamentary transition to socialism, ascribes to Marx and Lenin the view that it may prove

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episode, the Soviet aim may have been to redress an adverse balance of nuclear power inexpensively.

[21] Arthur Mendel (ed.), *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 468. It may be noted that Khrushchev's phrase, "We will bury you!," was widely misunderstood abroad. In colloquial Russian, the words carry the meaning: "We will be present at your funeral," i.e., we will outlive you. The flamboyant statement was not, then, a threat to destroy but rather a boast that Soviet Communism would outlive the non-Communist system in the long-range competition of systems that Khrushchev called "peaceful coexistence."

possible to buy out the bourgeoisie: "It may well be that . . . there will arise in certain countries a situation in which it will be preferable for the bourgeoisie, as Marx and Lenin foresaw it, to agree to the means of production being purchased from it and for the proletariat to 'pay off' the bourgeoisie."[22] Lenin is said to have granted (and by implication to have preferred) the possibility that the Russian revolution would develop peacefully.[23] And great emphasis is placed upon an obscure Lenin statement to the effect that "We exert our chief influence upon the international revolution through our economic policy."[24] Thus, neo-Communist Marxism is projected back upon the radical founders of the movement, including Lenin.

The fourth mark of deradicalization—conflict in the movement between those who take the lead in this process and those who resist it—has also been present. The rise of neo-Communist Marxism in the Soviet Union was not a smooth and painless development reflecting a consensus of the Communist leadership. These doctrinal changes were the subject of an intense and bitter debate that began while Stalin was still alive. Irrefutable evidence on this point is contained in his final published work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, which is a record of Stalin's interventions in a discussion carried on inside the Soviet regime in 1951–1952 in preparation for the Nineteenth Party Congress. There he took issue with unnamed "comrades" who were contending that Lenin's thesis on the inevitability of wars under imperialism was obsolete and in need of revision, and that such wars had ceased to be inevitable. In other words, the new doctrine on non-inevitability which was first promulgated at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 *had been advocated behind the scenes in Stalin's final years*. But Stalin would have none of it.

"These comrades are mistaken," he declared. "To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism."[25] Since, in other words, wars would remain inevitable so long as the world Communist revolution remained basically incomplete, the only road to peace was the round-about road of forcible Communist revolution, with all that this implied for further growth of international tension. The call to moderate Communist tactics implicit in the thesis on the non-inevitability of wars in our time was thus rejected. This obdurate defense by Stalin of Marxist-Leninist ideological orthodoxy was indirectly a demand for indefinite prolongation of the cold war pending the spread of Communist revolution to other countries. It was of a piece, moreover, with his concluding speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952. In what was to prove his valedictory, Stalin applauded the continuing progress of the world Communist revolution and set the course of the movement towards its further advance in the coming years. In the light of this and other evidence, it is impossible to accept the view of some Western scholars that Stalin in the final period of his life was preparing the realignment of Soviet foreign policy which took place after his death.[26] On the contrary, he was engaged in a determined struggle against change, against forces within his own regime that were pressing for an international *détente* and realignment of policy.

Stalin's death removed the most formidable opponent of the revision of the Leninist thesis on inevitability of wars and related doctrinal as well as policy changes. But "heirs of Stalin" remained strong within the Soviet leadership, and post-Stalin ideological change was contested. As late as October, 1961, on the eve of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Vyacheslav Molotov addressed a letter to the Party Central Committee protesting against the doctrinal revisions in the draft Party Program scheduled for adoption by the Congress; and the storm of abuse he thereby brought down upon himself at the Congress suggests that his message struck a sensitive chord in many Soviet Communist minds. By this time, however, the conflict over the post-Stalin trend of development in Soviet Communism had been internationalized. Resistance to this trend from within the international Communist movement had found a powerful and vigorous champion in the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Soviet sources have asserted that the great Sino-Soviet ideological dispute began in April,

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[22] Mendel, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

[23] See, for example, Khrushchev's public speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

[24] I. Inozemtsev, "Leninizm—nauchnaia osnova sovetskoi vneshnei politiki," *Kommunist* (No. 7, 1966), p. 23.

[25] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: International Publishers, 1952), pp. 27–28, 30.

[26] See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). For a fuller presentation of the evidence against the view that Stalin was preparing a realignment of foreign policy, see this writer's *The Soviet Political Mind*, ch. 2.

1960, when the Chinese Communist press published, on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth, a series of implicitly polemical articles entitled "Long Live Leninism!" Chinese Communist sources have contested this, pointing out that "It takes more than a cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep." The real starting point, according to the Chinese view, was the Twentieth Party Congress: "Ever since the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., we have watched with concern as the C.P.S.U. leadership took the road of revisionism." To substantiate this claim, the Chinese have revealed that in April, 1956, shortly after the adoption of an anti-Stalin line by the Twentieth Congress, Mao Tse-tung emphasized to Mikoyan and the Soviet Ambassador in China that Stalin's "merits outweigh his faults." Repeatedly in subsequent months, the Chinese leaders, in private conversations with Soviet officials, opposed the anti-Stalin line. And in November, 1957, when a conference of Communist leaders from all over the world took place in Moscow to formulate the international Communist line, conflict broke out over the issue of peaceful parliamentary transition to socialism. In an "Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition" which was submitted to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, the Chinese maintained that it would be inadvisable to lay much stress on the possibility of peaceful transition, and especially on the possibility of seizing state power by winning a majority in parliament, for "it is liable to weaken the revolutionary will of the proletariat, the working people and the Communist Party and disarm them ideologically." The Chinese document went on to express doubt whether there was a single country where the possibility of peaceful transition was of any practical significance. And recalling Lenin's insistence that in a Communist revolution the old state apparatus must not simply be taken over but destroyed, the Chinese warned that peaceful transition should not be interpreted in such a way as solely to mean transition through a parliamentary majority. That, the document concluded, would be a Social Democratic view, and: "On the question of socialist revolution, our position is fundamentally different from that of the Social Democratic parties. This distinction must not be obscured."[27]

Soviet sources have furnished no evidence to refute this account of the early development of the conflict that in our time has shaken and threatened to disrupt and even split in two the international Communist movement. In the subsequent stages of the dispute, Chinese warnings against obscuring the distinction between the Social Democratic and Communist positions on socialist revolution have given way to the charge that the Soviet leadership has gone the deradicalizing way of the Social Democratic leadership in Lenin's time. Khrushchevism has been seen as a new version of the Kautskyism that took over European Marxism a generation ago, and Lenin's writings of that time have been studied anew in search of insight into contemporary Soviet development. "As Lenin pointed out, the 'orthodox' Marxists headed by Kautsky were virtually hidden opportunists," declared a Chinese Communist study of "Kautskyism" published in 1962. "Under their leadership the Second International adopted some revolutionary manifestos and declarations, but their aim was not to put them into effect but to win the trust of the masses by fraud and to continue to manipulate the workers' movement."[28] Four years later, all pretence of merely historical reference was thrown aside, and the Chinese Communist leadership was saying: "After Stalin's death, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. headed by Khrushchev gradually revealed their true features as betrayers of Lenin and Leninism and embarked on the old path of the German Social Democrats Bernstein and Kautsky, who betrayed Marx and Engels and Marxism."[29]

## VI. CHINA AND DERADICALIZATION

Detailed treatment of the Sino-Soviet conflict is beyond the scope of the present paper. The point I wish to make in conclusion is simply that in its inception, development and basic content, this inner conflict in international Communism shows a deeply significant similarity to (as well as significant differences from) the inner conflict that split the international Social Democratic Marxist movement a generation ago. Once again we see the leadership of some parts of the movement showing in their conduct and ideological pronouncements the symptoms of deradicalization. And once again we see rebellion against this trend on the part of radical elements of the movement in whom the need for integrity of theory and practice is still strong. Once again, moreover, the predominance of one element or the other is connected with the difference between the stages of development of the movement in one country and the other.

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[27] *The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 11, 12, 59, 61. Soviet sources have asserted that the possibility of a parliamentary path of transition was mentioned in the 1952 new program of the British Communist Party on the suggestion of Stalin. It should be observed, however, that he did not at that time make a corresponding general revision in *Soviet* Marxist doctrine.

[28] Li Fu, Li Ssu-Wen and Wang Fu-ju, "On Kautskyism," *Hung-ch'i*, Nos. 8/9, April 25, 1962. Quoted in Alexander Dallin (ed.), *Diversity in International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 277–278.

[29] "Chinese Communist Party Cannot Send Delegation to C.P.S.U. Twenty-Third Congress," *Peking Review*, March 25, 1966, no. 13, p. 5.

All this bears emphasizing in part because of a tendency of the Western mind to view the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy as a mere smokescreen for clashing national ambitions or great-power rivalry between Russia and China. To ignore the national, imperial and personal factors in the conflict would be wrong. But it would be no less an error, and perhaps a greater one, to fail to perceive that ideological and political fundamentals of Communism really are at stake in this dispute.

As recent events have clearly shown, moreover, the concern about Soviet deradicalization is accompanied in the mind of the Maoist leadership in China by a fear of deradicalizing tendencies in Chinese Communism itself, and the conflict now in progress in the Chinese Communist movement turns in large measure on this issue. To combat deradicalizing tendencies in the higher leadership as well as in the party and state apparatus throughout the country is an avowed main aim of the great Maoist "cultural revolution" that has convulsed the internal life of Communist China in 1966 and early 1967. This aim—and in general the radical mentality—is epitomized in the slogan that has been given the youthful Maoist Red Guards: "Let us destroy the old world, and build a new world!" Mao and his closest adherents appear to realize more clearly than radical leaders of the past that the changing of the generations is always a threat to the radical mentality. "Imperialism pins its hopes of 'peaceful evolution' on the third and fourth generations," runs their reasoning as expressed in the Maoist press. "China's young people must remember class hatred and carry the proletarian revolutionary cause through to the end." To inoculate Communist China's young in advance against the bacilla of "revisionism" appears to be the purpose of the frenzied campaign of indoctrination. But it is not by indoctrination that genuine radical minds are created. The history of radical movements, Marxist ones included, suggests that Mao's fear of the coming deradicalization of Chinese Communism is well founded.

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Not often does a theoretical problem have such immediate relevance to the practical concerns of political leaders as in the present instance. Since statesmen in our time have had to deal with radical movements that have come to power and may have repeated occasion to do so in the future, an understanding of the dynamics of the behavior of such movements at various stages of their development is of great importance. Both the lack of such understanding and the need for it find illustration in the recent history of our thinking about Soviet Communism. The Western mind has tended to anticipate a mellowing of the Soviet Communist movement in terms of what has been called "ideological erosion." A decline or softening of official commitment to the final goals of the movement has, in other words, been taken as the prime criterion for judging whether Soviet Communism is undergoing genuine change away from its radical foundations. The analysis presented in this paper leads to a very different view. Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in process of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final goals of the movement; it would, by virtue of the dialectic of the process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done. For intensified *verbal* allegiance to ultimate ideological goals belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.

What a sociologist has written of religious change seems to be applicable also to ideological movements of radical persuasion: "Religious change is usually a latent process, carried on beneath symbols of nonchange."[30] Not the end of ideology but rather the growth of a stable discrepancy between ideological symbols and political deeds is the true mark of deradicalizing change in once-radical movements.

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[30] J. Milton Yinger, *Sociology Looks at Religion* (New York: Macmillan 1963), p. 70. See also John H. Kautsky, "Myth, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (March, 1965), at pp. 11–12. Of particular relevance to my argument is Kautsky's statement: "One may expect that the more the Soviet government changes its policies from those that were once associated with the goal of World Communism, the less can it afford to stop insisting that it continues to stand for this goal."

# REGISTRATION AND VOTING: PUTTING FIRST THINGS FIRST[1]

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In their book *Non-Voting*, published in 1924, Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell reported that many persons otherwise eligible to vote had been disfranchised by Chicago's registration requirements. Their data showed that "there were three times as many adult citizens who could not vote because they had failed to register as there were registered voters who had failed to vote in the particular election"[2] and that "entirely different reasons [for not voting] were emphasized by those who were not registered than by those who were registered but did not vote . . ."[3] Their observation can hardly be said to have been influential. Until very recently most students of voting have paid little attention to the temporally prior act of registration.[4]

Failure to do so has had important consequences. It has made it easy to discount unduly the significance of *political* influences on the size and composition of electorates; easy to argue unrealistically about the value of efforts to increase the turnout of voters; and easy to be puzzled about some aspects of the behavior of voters.

## I. THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The study out of which this article grows was undertaken in an effort to find answers to two questions: To what extent can differences from place to place in the turnout of voters in elections be accounted for by differences in the number of those registered to vote? What factors are most strongly associated with variations in the percentage of those of voting age who do register to vote in different localities? We tried to find answers to these question by analyzing registration and voting in 1960 in 104 of the nation's largest cities.[5]

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[1] We are indebted to a great many people for help given us in the course of this study. The staff of the project included Mr. Paul Corcoran, Duke University; Mrs. Ronald Gebhardt; Mr. Charles J. Peischl, University of Pennsylvania Law School; and Mr. Lawrence C. Petrowksi, Columbia University Law School. We were given valuable information, suggestions, and other forms of assistance by Dr. George Graham, The Brookings Institution; Mrs. Alice Hamm, League of Women Voters of the United States; Messrs. Lloyd Bentsen and Jonathan Holman, Stanford Business School; Professor John Kessel, Allegheny College; Mr. Michael McClister, Democratic National Committee; Mr. Thomas G. McHale, U. S. Bureau of the Census; Professors Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, University of Michigan; Professor Ralph Miwa, University of Hawaii; Professor John Strange, Duke University; Mr. Michael Traugott, University of Michigan; Mrs. Rosalie Feltenstein, Princeton University; and Representative Frank Thompson, Fourth District, New Jersey. The aid of local Leagues of Women Voters and Boards of Election was indispensable to the success of the project, and so, too, was that of the Roger W. Straus Council of Human Relations of Princeton University, which provided the financial support for our research. In the course of our work substantial use was made of computer facilities supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant, NSF-GP579.

[2] Charles E. Merriam and Harold G. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 251.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[4] Angus Campbell and his associates at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan discuss the relation of voting to certain of the legal arrangements governing suffrage in *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 276–286, and Warren Miller has reported additional findings on the subject in a memorandum to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation. V. O. Key examined the effect of poll taxes on voting in his *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 599–618, and Howard Freeman, Arnold Simmel, and Murray Gendell discuss the turnout of registered voters in William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser, *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), 240–250. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro report findings about rates of registration among Negroes in the South in two articles: "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 24–44, and "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," *ibid.* (June 1963), 355–367.

Much earlier, Gosnell presented some interesting information on the relation of registration procedures to turnout in elections in *Getting Out the Vote* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927) and *Why Europe Votes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), as did Joseph P. Harris at about the same time in his *Registration of Voters in the United States* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1929), 106–108. There are of course comments on the relation of registration to voting in works not cited here, but very few additional sources of systematic information about that relationship.

Our analysis was guided by Anthony Downs' discussion of voting in his *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Downs assumes that "every rational man decides to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the returns outweigh the costs, he votes; it not, he abstains";[6] and that assumption enables him to make a number of interesting deductions about which voters are likely to vote and which are not. We decided to assume that both the voter's decision to register and decisions made by party organizations about efforts to induce citizens to register are made after a similar rational calculation of benefits and costs. If one makes that assumption, it follows that variations in rates of registration among cities are the consequence of differences among them in the way voters assess the value of registering, in the interest politicians have in adding new names to the registration rolls, in costs voters perceive to be associated with the act of registering, and in costs of mounting registration drives. About such assessments, interests, and perceptions we had no direct information, but they could reasonably be supposed to be affected by several factors about which information was available.

The value that voters attach to the act of registering and that politicians put on registration drives should vary, for instance, with the competitiveness of a state's party politics and with the offices that are at stake in an election. As the probable division of the vote for the major parties in a state approaches 50–50, presidential candidates and all candidates for state-wide office have an increasingly strong incentive to induce their partisans to register, and the voter has an increasingly large (if still very small) chance to cast a ballot that will decide the outcome of a contest. As the number of officials to be elected in any given election rises, or, perhaps more accurately, as the scope of governmental power at stake in any election increases, so should the voter's estimate of the importance of the election. We therefore decided to examine the relationship of registration to both these variables.

There are three rather different sorts of costs that voters may see as involved in the act of registering to vote. In the first instance there are *monetary* costs. In 1960 some southern cities literally charged a fee, the poll tax, for putting one's name on the list of eligible voters; but in other places registering might also mean a loss of income through loss of time on the job or time away from a business.[7] Perhaps a more important cost is simple *inconvenience.* To get their names on a registration roll almost all voters must go out of their way to a greater or lesser extent and in some places the bother involved is very considerable indeed. Finally, there are costs of *obtaining information* about registering to vote. A voter must find out where and when he can register and if he is eligible to do so, and acquiring this information may take an appreciable amount of time and effort. We postulated that the magnitude of one or more of these sorts of costs would be greater, and would be seen as greater, in cities where citizens must take a literacy test;[8] where all voters must re-register at frequent intervals; where it is necessary to register considerably in advance of election day; and where the hours during which, and places at which, one can register are restricted.

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[5] For a list of the cities included in our sample, see p. 373 below. Originally we planned to study factors affecting rates of registration in all cities in the United States with populations above 100,000; we were unable to proceed as planned, however, because we were unable to secure information about registration or registration procedures in some of these cities. Most commonly we could not secure accurate data regarding the percentage of the population of voting age registered to vote or verify the accuracy of such data as we could get. This was the case for 16 cities: Mobile, Montgomery, Tucson, Savannah, Chicago, Evansville, Indianapolis, Shreveport, Jackson, Albuquerque, Knoxville, Amarillo, Beaumont, El Paso, Lubbock, and Wichita Falls. We could not get accurate information regarding times and physical arrangements for registration in eight additional cities: Phoenix, Anaheim, Long Beach, San Jose, Denver, Providence, Madison, and Milwaukee. A figure for the percentage of recent migrants from out of state was missing for Yonkers, New York. Washington, D. C. had no procedures for registering voters in 1960, since, at that time, it had no voters.

[6] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), p. 260.

[7] Merriam and Gosnell reported that a substantial number of the non-voters they studied had given fear of loss of income through loss of time away from work as an important reason for not voting; see *Non-Voting*, 86–95.

[8] Literacy tests tend to lower registration, of course, not only because they are a bother but also because they disqualify a certain number of voters.

The findings of the major studies of voting were a second important influence on our early speculation about factors that might account for differences among cities in rates of registration. Registration is hardly ever represented as anything but a purely instrumental act: one registers in order to vote. One would suppose, therefore, that most of the factors that encourage or discourage voting also encourage or discourage registering to vote. Proceeding on that supposition, we posited a strong relationship between registration and those socio-economic and psychological factors that have figured prominently in explanations of the turnout of voters in elections.[9] We could not, of course, hope to discover whether a relationship actually existed between registration and each such factor; no data were available to us on the psychological states or personal traits of persons of voting age in the cities we studied.[10] We could and did, however, try to find out if the proportion of citizens of voting age who were registered to vote in a city was associated with the median income and average educational attainment of the city's residents and with the numbers of recent migrants, young people, males, and Negroes in its population.

There has been less agreement on why various socio-economic factors are related to turnout in elections than on the fact that they are related, but such is the present state of the literature on voting. Downs attributes differences in the turnout rates of various classes of citizens to their varying abilities to bear the costs of voting or variations in what voting costs them. Thus, to make sense of the choices an election offers him, the educated man needs less additional information than someone who is poorly educated, and higher income groups are in a better position to pay the costs of finding out how their interests are affected by alternatives (and to pay other costs of voting) than are low income groups.[11] S. M. Lipset offers very similar explanations for the relationship of income and education to turnout, and both Downs and Lipset note also that the turnout rates of low-income groups may be lowered by confusion resulting from exposure to a largely conservative press.[12] Campbell and his colleagues argue that "The educated person is distinct from the less educated not only in the number of facts about politics at this command, but also in the sophistication of the concepts he employs to maintain a sense of order and meaning amid the flood of information";[13] the educated man is therefore less likely to abstain from voting out of a feeling that politics is too complicated to understand. Low rates of participation in elections among young voters have been explained by reference to their fluid occupational interests, greater mobility, lack of firm attachments to political parties, and absence of clear positions in the social life of their communities.[14] The low turnout of women relative to men is usually attributed to the cultural definition of politics as the concern of men, and that of Negroes relative to whites is attributed to deliberate efforts to discourage Negro voting and to the status of Negroes as a low-income group. It has been argued that newcomers to a community are less likely to vote than old residents because they have less contact with locally dominant groups, because their mobility is likely to have exposed them to politically relevant cross-pressures, and because they are likely to be disqualified for voting by local residence requirements.[15]

Certain common sense considerations were a third influence on our guesses about the factors that might make for higher or lower levels of registration. States require varying periods of residence in the state, and in the county and voting district, before a person is eligible to register even if he is otherwise qualified to do so. All states also require voters to be citizens of the United States. One would therefore expect that variations from place to place in residence requirements and any local variations in numbers of resident aliens would make a difference in the proportion of persons of voting age who are registered to vote in different cities. Further, rates of registration are known to vary regionally. This relationship might reflect differences in the culture of regions rather than regional differences in the values of the variables so far discussed. Finally, those cities having systems of permanent registration employ methods of differing efficiency to remove from registration rolls the names of voters who have died, moved away, or failed to vote for a specified period, a fact which could also account for some of the variation in registration rates from city to city.

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[9] The most important have been race, place of residence, education, age, income, marital status, sex, ethnic group affiliation, occupation, geographical mobility, intensity of partisan preferences, perceived closeness of the election, interest in the campaign, concern with the outcome of the election, sense of the efficacy of voting, sense of civic duty, attitudes with respect to issues of public policy, attitudes toward candidates, and level of political information.

[10] Nor could we study the relationship of urban and rural residence to rates of registration, since we limited ourselves to the study of registration in large cities.

[11] See Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*, 232–236, 260–273.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 235, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 205.

[13] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter*, p. 476.

[14] See particularly Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, 202, 209–211; Robert Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 48–49; Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, 496–497; and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 135.

[15] See Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, 202–208

It should be apparent that testing some of the hypotheses of interest to us entailed formidable problems in gathering data. We chose to study registration in 1960 because we were able to secure data on registration for a number of jurisdictions from the national committees of the two major parties; moreover, the presidential election of 1960 coincided with a decennial census year. We chose the nation's large cities as units of observation because there were a sufficient number of them to make statistical analysis fruitful and because we could secure data for them that was unavailable either for states or counties. Several of the states, for instance, collect no information on the numbers of their citizens registered to vote. Registration, voting, and census data are reported by counties, but the hours, days of the week, and kinds of places where citizens can register are frequently determined at lower levels of government, and so may vary considerably within counties.

Cities are units of observation well suited to examining the effects on registration of differences among localities in the extent of inter-party competition, residence requirements, closing dates for registration, and the availability of places to register. Inter-city analysis is less appropriate for an examination of the effects on registration of individual characteristics such as sex, age, education, and income, which can be better studied by treating the individual as the unit of observation. For instance, it is obviously better to draw inferences about the effects of sex on registration from a direct comparison of registration rates between males and females (after allowing for the effects of other variables) than from a comparison of inter-city differences in registration associated with inter-city differences in sex-ratios. The main reason for including variables which measure individual characteristics in our inter-city analysis was to guard against the possibility that substantial differences among cities in, for example, the proportion of men in the population, might obscure the true effects on registration of variations in such factors as the degree of inter-party competition, residence requirements, and so on. It was also of interest of course, to see if the variables which measure individual characteristics were sufficiently powerful to cause differences among cities in registration rates.

In analyzing differences among cities in the percentage of the voting-age population registered to vote, we used ordinary multiple-regression techniques, and we assumed that linear fits could be used to approximate the true relationships among our variables. Other aspects of our procedures can be explained most conveniently as we present our findings.

## II. FINDINGS

*Registration Related to Turnout.* Our findings with respect to the first of the two major questions in which we were interested—that concerning the relationship of registration to the turnout of voters in elections—can be reported in a few sentences. In the full sample of cities, 78 percent of the variation in the percentage of the population of voting age that voted could be accounted for by variations in the percentage of the population of voting age that was registered to vote.[16] As one would expect, the relationship was almost one-to-one; that is, if the percentage of the population of voting age registered to vote in city *A* was one percent higher than in city *B*, then the percentage of the population of voting age actually voting in city *A* was, on the average, almost exactly one percent higher than in city *B*.[17] Moreover, it seems clear that registration requirements are a more effective deterrent to voting than anything that normally operates to deter citizens from voting once they have registered, at least in presidential elections. The mean percentage of *those of voting age who were registered to vote* in the full sample of cities was 73.3 percent and the standard deviation was 14.3 percent. In contrast, the mean percentage of *those registered to vote who voted* was 81.6 percent with a standard deviation of 11.7 percent. Thus the latter was not only higher but also varied within a narrower range.

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[16] The F-ratio for the regression was 361.39.

[17] The regression coefficient of the rate of registration in this regression was .96, its standard error was .05, and its "t" value was 19.01.

*Variations in Proportion Registered.* What factors account for the wide range of differences among cities in the proportion of the population of voting age that is registered to vote? Discussion of our findings with respect to this second question must be considerably more extensive. To begin with, we will report what we found to be the most important influences on rates of registration in our full sample of cities. We will then present additional information obtained by examining registration only in those cities with systems of permanent registration (the reason for this separate analysis of cities with systems of permanent registration will be apparent later), by controlling for regional influences, and by analyzing the pattern of residual variance.

### *Findings With Respect to the Full Sample of Cities*

Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of the registration of voters in the full sample of cities.[18] It seems clear that we included among our explanatory factors a number of highly significant ones: Together, the twelve independent variables in Regression I.1 "explain" (in the sense usual when interpreting multiple regression equations) nearly 80 percent of the variation among cities in percent-

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[18] The results in all of our text tables are reported in terms of partial regression coefficients, standard errors of these coefficients, and t-values. Appendix III contains partial correlation coefficients and Beta-weights.

TABLE 1. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES AMONG CITIES IN PERCENTAGES OF THE POPULATION OF VOTING AGE REGISTERED TO VOTE (104 CITIES, 1960)

| Variables[a] | Expected Sign | Regression I.1[b] b | Regression I.1[b] (s) | Regression I.1[b] t | Regression I.2[c] b | Regression I.2[c] (s) | Regression I.2[c] t |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Independent Variables:* | | | | | | | |
| *Socio-Economic Factors:* | | | | | | | |
| Age (% 20–34) | − | −0.47 | (0.20) | 2.33* | −0.50 | (0.18) | 2.79** |
| Sex (% Male) | + | −0.18 | (0.63) | 0.28 | | | |
| Race (% Non-white) | − | −0.14 | (0.07) | 2.05* | −0.17 | (0.07) | 2.46* |
| Education (Median Yrs. Completed) | + | 2.13 | (0.99) | 2.16* | 2.88 | (0.72) | 4.02* |
| Income ($100/Yr.) | + | 0.23 | (0.16) | 1.43 | | | |
| Length of Residence (% From Out of State) | − | −0.20 | (0.15) | 1.33 | | | |
| *Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote:* | | | | | | | |
| Inter-Party Competition (%) | − | −0.30 | (0.10) | 3.02** | −0.41 | (0.07) | 5.60** |
| *Factors Affecting the Costs of Registration:*[d] | | | | | | | |
| Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests | + | 0.09 | (0.04) | 2.17* | 0.12 | (0.04) | 3.29** |
| Closing Date for Registration | + | 0.13 | (0.04) | 3.45** | 0.15 | (0.03) | 4.28** |
| Times and Places of Registration | + | 2.20 | (2.00) | 1.10 | | | |
| Registration System (Permanent or Periodic) | + | 0.06 | (0.04) | 1.52 | | | |
| *Other Factors:*[d] | | | | | | | |
| Residence Requirements | + | 0.04 | (0.04) | 0.96 | | | |
| Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population of Voting Age Registered to Vote | | | | | | | |
| Mean | | | 73.3 | | | 73.3 | |
| Standard Deviation | | | (14.3) | | | (14.3) | |
| F-Ratio | | | 28.05 | | | 52.20 | |
| Standard Error of Estimate | | | 7.0 | | | 7.2 | |
| Number of Cities | | | 104 | | | 104 | |
| $R^2$ | | | .79** | | | .76** | |

Notation: b = Net (partial) regression coefficient;
(s) = Standard error of regression coefficient;
t = t-value of regression coefficient (t-values may differ from b/(s) ratios in table because of rounding);
** = Significant at 99%;
* = Significant at 95%.

[a] Defined in Appendix I.

[b] Includes all variables.

[c] Includes only variables significant at 95% level in Regression I.1.

[d] As we indicate in Appendix I, these sets of variables are measured by indices whose scales are arbitrary. Thus, no units of measurement are shown in parentheses, and no meaning can be attached to the absolute values of the regression coefficients of these variables without bearing in mind how each index was scaled. The "t" values can, however, be interpreted in the usual way as indicators of statistical significance.

ages of the population of voting age registered to vote. Only one of these twelve variables (the percentage of males in the population of voting age) failed to have the expected sign, and six had "t" values large enough to imply that their regression coefficients were significantly different from zero at a level of confidence of 95 percent or better. In a second regression (I.2 in Table 1) that included only these six variables, the value of $R^2$ fell just three percentage points, and all six continued to show statistically significant relationships to the dependent variable.[19]

*Socio-Economic Factors*

Regression I.1 included six socio-economic variables—age, race, education, income, sex, and length of residence.[20] Only three—age, education, and race—were significantly related to variations among cities in rates of registration. The implications of the regression coefficients of these variables may be stated as follows:

A. If the number of persons in the age-group 20 to 34 relative to the number of persons of voting age in a city was larger than the average of all cities in the sample by one percent, the city's rate of registration tended to be one-half of one percent below the average of all cities in the sample.

B. If the residents over 25 years of age in a city had a median educational attainment one year above the average of all cities in the sample, the city tended to have a rate of registration that was two to three percent above the average of all cities in the sample.

C. If the percentage of non-whites in a city's population was greater by one percent than the average in all cities of the sample, the city tended to have a rate of registration that was a little less than one-fifth of one per cent below the average of all cities in the sample.

The relationship described in (C) is of particular interest, since it held even when allowances had been made for the use of literacy tests in some cities and even when our race variable was included in the same regression with variables that reflected differences between whites and non-whites in average income, average educational attainment, and ratios of younger to older persons of voting age.

That we did not find variations in the median income of the populations of cities to be significantly related to rates of registration is also of some interest. Although higher median incomes for the populations of the cities of our sample were associated with higher rates of registration in our multiple regression, the regression coefficient for the income variable was not quite significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. We did find that we could easily push the "t" value for the income variable high enough to indicate a relationship significant at the 99 percent level of confidence if we dropped our race and education variables from the analysis, since both of these had fairly high correlations with the income variable.[21] But various experiments of this kind showed that the income variable, by itself, had less explanatory power than either of the other two. Where intercorrelations of this kind exist, it is impossible on the basis of the statistical techniques we used to sort out the "independent" effect of any of the variables in a precise way. Nevertheless, our results do give some further support to the conclusion of the authors of *The American Voter* that a voter's education has more directly important consequences for his participation in elections than does his income.[22]

We found that differences in the relative numbers of men and women of voting age in the populations of the cities of our sample had no observable effect on rates of registration in our cities. There were, we think, several reasons for this result. In the first place, differences in the ratios of men to women in the population of voting age in the cities of our sample were relatively slight: The standard deviation of the variable was only 1.49 percent around the mean percentage of males in the population of voting age. Secondly, our data concerned registration in large cities, and the differences between men and women in turnout in elections have been found to be smaller in metropolitan areas than elsewhere.[23] Finally, colinearity of our sex variable with other variables tended to obscure any relationship it might otherwise have shown to rates of registration; those cities in the sample with the largest percentages of males in their population of voting age, it turned out, also tended to have unusually large concentrations of young voters and recent migrants from out of state.

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[19] The $R^2$'s reported in Table I are not corrected for degrees of freedom; the $R^2$'s for Regression I.1 must therefore be larger than the $R^2$ for Regression I.2, since the latter contains only six of the twelve independent variables included in the former. Actually, as the F-ratios indicate, Regression I.2 gets higher marks on the statistical significance scale than does Regression I.1, although it is important to remember that we already knew something about the behavior of the variables included in Regression I.2 before it was run. A "t" value significant at the 95 percent level in Regression I.1 was the criterion for the inclusion of variables in Regression I.2, and in such circumstances the meaningfulness of standard significance tests is open to some question.

[20] Precise definitions of these and other variables are given in Appendix I in order of which the variables are discussed below.

[21] See Appendix II for the matrix of simple correlations.

[22] Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, 475–476.

The last of the socio-economic variables included in Regression I.1, length of residence, was positively related to rates of registration, but the relationship was not statistically significant. The authority of this finding is compromised somewhat, however, by our reliance on a rather imprecise measure of length of residence, and it is entirely possible that we would have obtained a significant result if we had been able to use a better one.

*Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote.* From our efforts to detect any effects on rates of registration of factors affecting the value of the vote, we can report two findings. The first, made at an early point in our study, is that differences from city to city in the offices that were at stake in the election of 1960 had very little, if any, impact on registration; the correlation between rates of registration and an index we constructed to reflect such differences was small and not significant. What this result suggests is what the marked differences in turnout for presidential or other elections would also seem to indicate: That the interest of voters in presidential races in the United States is so great that few additional voters are attracted to the polls by an interest in the outcome of other contests.

Rates of registration in our sample of cities were, however, very strongly related to another factor affecting the value of the vote: The normal degree of competitiveness of partisan politics in statewide contests. As Table 1 indicates, the regression coefficient of our index of inter-party competition was easily significant at the 99 percent level of confidence in both regressions.[24] This result is consistent with evidence bearing on the relationship of turnout in elections to party competition that has been presented by a number of students of voting[25] and with our own expectation that a high level of competition between parties would increase the incentive for people to register and for politicans to get them to register. It is somewhat at variance, however, with conclusions that Robert Lane and that Angus Campbell and his associates have reached about the relationship between turnout and party competition.

Lane has argued that "although closeness of contest tends to enlist certain politicizing motives and, where habitual, to create stronger parties, the relationship between closeness of contest and turnout in the United States and Britain is small."[26] His conclusion with respect to Great Britain is hardly compelling, since Gosnell has offered equally good evidence for the contrary view.[27] With respect to the United States, Lane acknowledges the closeness of elections in states to be related to turnout but makes much of the fact that variations among *counties* in rates of non-voting did not appear to be associated with variations among *counties* in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote in the 1952 presidential election.[28] That fact is quite consistent with our own hypothesis about the relationship of party competition to participation in elections, however, since we expected the relative closeness of contests to affect rates of participation only when the former had relevance to the value of voting; and the level of partisan competition in counties has no meaning for the value of voting in presidential elections.[29]

Angus Campbell and his colleagues found that voters in the election of 1956 with only a weak preference for one party or the other were no more likely to go to the polls whether they saw the election to be one-sided or close. Voters with strong partisan preferences were more likely to vote if they expected the election to be close, but, according to the authors of *The American Voter*, "The question we have used to classify respondents according to their expectations about the election have referred to the contest *in the nation as a whole* . . . the analysis of answers to a question referring to the presidential race within the respondent's state indicates that it is the election *as a whole* that has cognitive and motivational significance, despite the existence of the electoral college."[30]

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

[24] Because of the way this variable was measured (See Appendix I), low values imply a high level of competition in a state's party politics; hence, the correlation between the variable and rates of registration is negative.

[25] See especially Harold F. Gosnell, *Why Europe Votes*, 182–183, 199–203; Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," p. 43 in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965); and Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behaviour* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1937), p. 216.

[26] Robert Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

[27] Lane's data for the election of 1950 are as reported in H. G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950* (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 318; Gosnell's data were for the election of 1924.

[28] Robert Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

[29] It does have meaning for the value of the vote in county elections, of course; and if county elections were held in years when major state and national offices were not at stake, one would expect to find a relationship between the competitiveness of a county's politics and the turnout of voters.

These findings are not easy to reconcile with our own. It could be that differences in the behavior of highly motivated voters from place to place are indeed an important source of local variations in rates of registration, but it does not seem likely that this is true, and it would not account for our result in any case if such voters do not pay attention to the closeness of the presidential race in their states. It could also be, and this seems more probable, that the factor intervening between the greater competitiveness of a state's party politics and higher turnout is not, for most voters, any conscious assessment of the likely outcome of the current election (such as is assumed by the analysis of *The American Voter*) but rather generalized feelings about how much votes have counted in the past; these generalized feelings may in turn be shaped by campaigning as this typically varies from state to state. Such an hypothesis would be consistent with data which show that Southern voters attribute less efficacy to voting than do Northerners,[31] and not inconsistent with either our own findings or those of Campbell and his co-authors. Finally, it could be that differences in rates of registration between cities of competitive and non-competitive states should be attributed largely to the actions of party activists; they undoubtedly are quite aware both of the level of party competition in a state and of its significance for the value of efforts to entice voters to register.

*Factors Affecting Costs of Registration.* The four variables we inserted in Regression I.1 in order to examine the relationship between rates of registration and practices or procedures affecting the costs of registering were indices especially constructed for that purpose.[32] All were so scaled as to lead us to predict positive correlations of each variable with the percentage of the population of voting age registered to vote. While all showed the predicted relationship, it was statistically significant in two cases only.

The use of literacy tests was associated with lower rates of registration, as those who put provisions for such tests into election codes doubtless intended it to be.[33] In William Riker's words, "Eighteen states have adopted the [lit-

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[30] Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, p. 100 *f.n.*

[31] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), p. 193.

A re-arrangement of data presented in *The American Voter*, Table 17.4, p. 479, yields the following results:

| *Sense of Political Efficacy* | *Non-South* | *South* |
|---|---|---|
| High | 43% | 32% |
| Medium | 28 | 24 |
| Low | 30 | 44 |

[32] The assignment of values in these indices was arbitrary, as has been indicated in the notes to Table 1, but a few words about the kind of arbitrariness involved are in order here. This can best be done, perhaps, by indicating how we arrive at the scale of values for one of these indices, that for the variable we have called "registration system." The four positions on that index were assigned values of 10, 25, 34, and 100. This set of values was chosen because it was our guess that a system of permanent registration (valued at 100) was ten times less demanding on voters than a system which combines a cumulative poll tax with annual registration (valued at 10), four times less demanding than a system of annual registration coupled with a non-cumulative poll tax (valued at 25), and three times less demanding than a system of annual personal registration (valued at 34).

In a moment of less boldness, we eschewed estimates of how much more restrictive one system was than another and constructed a simple ordinal scale which involved only guesses as to which systems had a greater, and which had a lesser, tendency to restrict registration. The substitution of the ordinal indices had little effect on our results. The cardinal indices showed somewhat stronger relationships to registration than those with ordinal scales, but if one of our cardinal indices was significantly related to registration, so was its ordinal equivalent, and if one of our cardinal indices was not significantly related to registration, neither was its ordinal equivalent.

[33] *Cf.* Lester Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," p. 48 in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, and Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Regis-

eracy test], seven to disfranchise Negroes, five to disfranchise Indians and Mexicans and Orientals, and six to disfranchise European immigrants."[34] The disfranchising effect of literacy tests appears to have been considerably less severe in cities outside the South, however, than in Southern cities. In one regression involving data from non-Southern cities only, literacy tests continued to be correlated with lower rates of registration, but the relationship was no longer significant even at a level of confidence of 90 percent.

A more striking finding is the extremely strong relationship between the date at which registration rolls are closed and the percentage of the population of voting age that is registered.[35] This variable had the largest "t" value of any of the twelve in Regression I.1, and the second largest "t" value in Regression I.2. Its regression coefficient of .15 in Regression I.2 implies that extending the closing date for registration from, say, one month to one week prior to election day would tend to increase the percentage of the population registered by about 3.6 per cent. For politicians, varying the closing date for registration would thus appear to be a very effective way in which to manipulate the size of the potential electorate.

Why this should be so can be suggested here, if not demonstrated. A longer period in which one may register increases considerably the convenience of doing so, of course, but we doubt that that is all there is to the matter. A late closing date for registration also probably tends to increase rates of registration because it allows the campaign to serve as a reminder to weakly motivated voters that they need to register and as a stimulus to find out from others how they can do so. Such an interpretation of our finding would be consistent with the results of Gosnell's experimental efforts to stimulate registration in Chicago, and with his observation that "... if all the adult citizens in the city had been properly informed regarding registration dates, 10 percent more of them would have registered."[36]

Even though the index we constructed in an effort to assess the effect on rates of registration of differences in systems of registration (permanent or periodic) failed to show a statistically significant relationship to variations in percentages of the population of voting age registered to vote, we are unwilling to deprecate the importance of such differences. Though it is by no means wholly persuasive, there is other evidence that systems of permanent registration are associated with higher rates of registration than are systems of periodic registration.[37] Moreover, our examination of these relationships could not in the nature of the case be very conclusive. For one thing, only fifteen of the cities in our sample had a system of periodic registration or its equivalent. For another, variations in systems of registration were highly correlated with variations in closing dates for registration (+.64). With both these factors working to obscure any relationship that our registration-systems variable might have to rates of registration, that relationship nonetheless just missed significance at a level of confidence of 90 percent.

The variable labelled "times and places of registration" failed to correlate significantly with rates of registration in the full sample of cities. Our index was constructed to reflect the relative difficulty that the average citizen in each city would face in finding a registration place open at hours convenient to him. In constructing it, however, we did not take into account the fact that cities face different tasks in registering voters, depending on whether they use systems of permanent, or periodic, registration. In cities with periodic registration, about one-half of the adult population succeeds in registering, on the average. Cities with permanent registration, again on the average, do not have to deal with anything like this many people; in such cities, at any given time, most potential registrants are already registered. Thus, the convenience of equal facilities in

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tration in the South," this Review, 57 (June, 1963), at p. 358.

[34] William H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 66.

[35] To the best of our knowledge only Warren Miller has previously presented systematic evidence tending to show non-voting to be related to an early closing date for registration. In his memorandum to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation, Miller reported that "One out of every four or five citizens lives in a state where registration closes in September, before an election campaign is well under way. . . . Non-voting by two or three percent of the population is associated with the September closing dates, both North and South."

[36] Harold F. Gosnell, *Getting Out the Vote*, p. 104.

[37] See Joseph P. Harris, *op cit.*, 106–108, and Robert Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 315. Warren Miller reported to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation that "The absence of any prevoting registration requirement and the provision for permanent registration are clearly associated with higher turnout at the polls." V. O. Key has shown the poll tax to depress turnout in *Southern Politics*, 599–618.

cities having registration systems of the two different sorts cannot be equated. We therefore decided to analyze the effect of variations in the times and facilities for registration in cities using systems of permanent registration—that is, in a set of cities facing really comparable problems in registering voters. The results of that analysis are reported below.

We found that differences among cities in rates of registration were not significantly related to differences in the length of residence in states and localities required of voters. This finding is surprising. No other aspect of the legal provisions relevant to voting has received nearly so much attention from students of voting as residence requirements; indeed, some writers have seemed to regard residence requirements as proto-typical of requirements of registration.[38] We may have obtained these results because differences from place to place in requirements of residence were not sufficiently great to make any great difference in the relative percentages of the population of voting age qualified to vote; or it may have been that the differences in the proportion of recent migrants in the populations of our sample of cities were not great enough to affect rates of registration.

It seems to us, however, that some aspects of the reasoning that leads one to expect residence requirements to make a difference in registration rates may be faulty. It is a fact that, in any given year in the United States, many people change residence and are therefore disqualified for voting in many localities. It is true also that respondents to opinion surveys will frequently cite an inability to meet local requirements of residence in explanation of their failure to vote or register,[39] and that survey data show recency of residential change to be negatively correlated with turnout in elections. It does not follow from these facts that residence requirements keep large numbers of adults from voting who would vote if such requirements did not exist. Residence requirements may disqualify recent migrants as voters, but there are other reasons why they might not vote, some peculiar to their status as recent migrants and some not. Moreover, their own explanations of their conduct can hardly be taken at face value; inability to meet legal qualifications is a "good" reason for not voting and one that is therefore likely to be invoked frequently. Thus, we may have exaggerated the significance of residence requirements not only for differences among cities in rates of registration but also as a cause of non-voting and non-registration.

*Findings With Respect to Cities With Systems of Permanent Registration.* The results of our analysis of registration in the 89 cities of our sample having systems of permanent registration are given in Table 2. The twelve independent variables included in Regression II.1 account for 70 percent of the variation in rates of registration among these cities; the five variables retained in Regression II.2 account for 65 percent of the variation.

For reasons already cited, we included in this analysis a variable not included in Regression I.1: methods of purging registration rolls. To "purge" a registration roll is to remove from it the names of voters no longer qualified to vote. State laws usually specify the circumstances in which a voter's name is to be purged; in most states it will be purged when a voter dies, moves away, or fails to vote within a certain period of time. Both the reasons for purging a voter's name and the procedures for discovering whether there is cause for purging the name of any particular voter, however, vary considerably from city to city. We expected such variations to be related to differences among cities in rates of registration, but they were not significantly related, as Table 2 indicates.[40]

Variations in our index of the convenience of the times and places of registration were significantly related to variations in rates of registration. The relationship was significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in Regression II.1 and at the 99 percent level of confidence in Regression II.2. This finding is important, for it suggests that local officials, by varying the convenience of registration procedures, may be able to affect appreciably not only the size, but also the composition, of local electorates.

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[38] This seems to be the sense of Lipset's statement that he does not wish to consider the effects of "legal and technical restrictions like residence requirements, poll taxes and property qualifications, literacy tests (often used as a cover for racial discrimination) and burdensome registration requirements" on the ground that his interest is in *voluntary* (his emphasis) non-voting. (See Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 181 *f.n.*) But for the greatest numbers of those who fail to register, non-registration is just as voluntary or non-voluntary as is failure to vote.

[39] See Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The Voter Decides*, p. 37; Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *op. cit.*, 79–86; and Phillips Bradley and Alfred H. Cope, "A Community Registration Survey," this REVIEW, 45 (September, 1951), at p. 777.

[40] It is possible, of course, that the index we constructed did not reflect with sufficient exactness the actual differences in purging practices that exist from city to city. The procedures for purging were difficult to document.

The education variable explained much less of the variation in rates of registration among cities with systems of permanent registration than it did among the cities in our full sample. In our analysis of registration in cities with systems of permanent registration, the regression coefficient of this variable was not significant even at the 90 percent level of confidence. Moreover, changes in its value were associated with changes in rates of registration only about half as great as in Regression I.1.

These last two findings—together with analyses of registration of Northern cities, in cities with rates of registration above 78 percent, and in cities with late closing dates for registration—lead us to propose the following generalization: When the costs of registering are generally high, differences from place to place in the value of variables affecting the motivation to vote—education, for example—will account for a considerable part of the variation in rates of registration; when the costs of registering are generally low, differences from place to place in the value of such variables will be relatively less important, and differences in the convenience of arrangements for registration relatively more important, in their effects on rates of registration.

*Controlling for the Effects of Region.* A classification by region of the 104 cities of our sample reveals a considerable difference among the cities of the various regions in average rates of

TABLE 2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN RATES OF REGISTRATION AMONG CITIES WITH SYSTEMS OF PERMANENT REGISTRATION (89 CITIES, 1960)

| Variables[a] | Expected Sign | Regression II.1[b] | | | Regression II.2[c] | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | b | (s) | t | b | (s) | t |
| *Independent Variables:* | | | | | | | |
| *Socio-Economic Factors:* | | | | | | | |
| Age (% 20–34) | − | −0.42 | (0.22) | 1.94* | −0.19 | (0.18) | 1.05 |
| Sex (% Male) | + | −0.13 | (0.71) | 0.18 | | | |
| Race (% Non-white) | − | −0.17 | (0.08) | 2.26* | −0.25 | (0.07) | 3.74** |
| Education (Median Years Completed) | + | 1.11 | (1.10) | 1.01 | | | |
| Income ($100/Yr.) | + | 0.26 | (0.18) | 1.46 | | | |
| Length of Residence (% from out of state) | − | −0.19 | (0.16) | 1.23 | | | |
| *Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote:* | | | | | | | |
| Inter-Party Competition (%) | − | −0.28 | (0.14) | 2.05* | −0.51 | (0.09) | 5.54** |
| *Factors Affecting the Costs of Registration:*[d] | | | | | | | |
| Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests | + | 0.07 | (0.06) | 1.21 | | | |
| Closing Date for Registration | + | 0.15 | (0.05) | 3.43** | 0.17 | (0.04) | 4.09** |
| Times and Places of Registration | + | 7.86 | (3.67) | 2.14* | 9.71 | (3.31) | 2.93** |
| *Other Factors:*[d] | | | | | | | |
| Methods of Purging Registration Rolls | + | 0.004 | (0.05) | 0.08 | | | |
| Residence Requirements | + | 0.05 | (0.05) | 1.01 | | | |
| Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population of Voting Age Registered to Vote | | | | | | | |
| Mean | | | 76.3 | | | 76.3 | |
| Standard Deviation | | | (11.6) | | | (11.6) | |
| F-Ratio | | | 14.80 | | | 31.00 | |
| Standard Error of Estimate | | | 6.8 | | | 7.0 | |
| Number of Cities | | | 89 | | | 89 | |
| $R^2$ | | | .70** | | | .65** | |

Notation: b = Net (partial) regression coefficient;
(s) = Standard error of regression coefficient;
t = t-value of regression coefficient (t-value may differ from b/(s) ratios in table because of rounding);
** = Significant at 99%;
* = Significant at 95%;

[a] Defined in Appendix I.

[b] Included all variables listed.

[c] Includes only variables significant at 95% level in Regression II.1.

[d] As we indicate in Appendix I, these sets of variables are measured by indices whose scales are arbitrary. Thus, no units of measurement are shown in parentheses, and no meaning can be attached to the absolute values of the regression coefficients of these variables without bearing in mind how each index was scaled. The "t" values can, however, be interpreted in the usual way as indicators of statistical significance.

registration. Those averages were as follows:

| Region | Average Rate of Registration |
|---|---|
| Midwest | 82.5 |
| West | 80.7 |
| Northeast | 76.1 |
| Border | 70.7 |
| South | 55.9 |

In order to discover if these differences might stem from some difference in the culture of regions rather than from regional variations in the values of the variables discussed so far, we re-computed Regressions I.1 and I.2 with a set of regional dummy variables included. (That is, we re-computed these regressions after having denoted whether a city was in, or not in, each of the five regions by assigning a "1" in the first case and a "0" in the second.) Following is the matrix of t-values needed to show in which instances the regional dummies were significantly different from each other:[41]

| | West | Northeast | Border | South | Midwest |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *West* | — | 1.63 | 2.23* | 0.81 | 0.07 |
| *Northeast* | 1.63 | — | 0.99 | 0.43 | 1.53 |
| *Border* | 2.23* | 0.99 | — | 1.25 | 1.97* |
| *South* | 0.81 | 0.43 | 1.25 | — | 0.37 |
| *Midwest* | 0.70 | 1.53 | 1.97* | 0.37 | — |

* Significant at the 95% level of confidence.

Two findings revealed by this matrix warrant comment. First of all, the relationship of the South dummy to registration was not significantly different from that of any of the other four regional dummies. This result is important, because it implies that the low rates of registration characteristic of Southern cities (on the average, 17.4 percent below the mean registration rate for all 104 cities) can be explained mainly in terms of the variables included in Regression I.1.

Secondly, only two pairs of regional dummies did differ significantly from each other in their relationship to registration, Border-West and Border-Midwest. The regression coefficients for the regional dummies shown in Table 3 (Regression III.1) indicate that our regression equation over-predicts the rate of registration in the cities of the Border states by about seven percentage points relative to that in Midwestern cities and by about 10.5 percentage points relative to that of Western cities. The equation also tends to under-predict registration in Western cities relative to registration in the rest of the country. We have no ready explanation. It may be that statutes which on their face are not particularly discouraging to registration are administered in a way that does discourage registration in the cities of the Border states. It may also be that voters in the West are more likely than those elsewhere to regard voting as a civic duty. These are mere conjectures, however, which cannot be tested with the data available to us.

Comparisons of the regressions reported in Tables 1 and 3 indicate one additional fact of importance: When regional dummies are included in the regression, the explanatory value of the age and education variables is appreciably lessened. A part of the apparent effect on registration of these two variables thus seems to be associated with factors varying by region that were not taken into account in Regressions I.1 and I.2. For the rest, however, findings already reported can stand without further qualification.

*Results for Particular Cities and the Pattern of Residual Variance.* Figure 1 shows the relationship between the actual rates of registration for the cities of our full sample and the rates of registration predicted on the basis of Regression I.2. If the predictions had been perfect, all of the 104 observations would lie on the 45 degree line. They do not, but it is encouraging that the regression equation predicts about equally well over the whole range of values for the dependent variable.

Table 4 reports actual and predicted rates of registration for each of the cities of the full sample. Cities are listed according to the size of their residuals, starting with Memphis, which had the largest positive residual, and ending with Wichita, which had the largest negative one. The reader may use this table, as we did, as a starting point for efforts to think of variables that will account for the pattern of residual variance.

We found two variables that seem to account for a very small part of it. The regression equation led us to under-predict registration in cities with large percentages of Catholics in their populations.[42] It also led us to over-pre-

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[41] These "t" values were obtained by running five versions of Regression III.1, dropping a different regional dummy each time, and using the t's for the other dummies to find whether or not they are significantly different from the omitted dummy.

[42] Actually, for cities in *counties* with large percentages of Catholics in their populations. Our source was National Council of the Churches of

FIG. 1. Relationship of Actual Rates of Registration to Predicted Rates (104 cities 1960).



dict registration in the relatively few cities where there were substantial number of resident aliens.[43]

By far the most important statement we can make about our effort to explain the pattern of residual variance, however, is simply this: Not much came of it. The size or sign of a city's residual had little if any relation to the size of the city,[44] the state in which it was located, its provisions for absentee registration,[45] the percentage of its population that was foreign born,[46] or whether or not it had less stringent residence requirements for voting in presidential elections than it did for voting in state and local elections. There were no substantial dif-

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Christ in the United State of America, *Churches and Church Membership in the United States*, New York, 1956–1958.

[43] Our source for percentages of aliens in the population of our cities was U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population 1960: Characteristics of the Population*, Table 55.

[44] To avoid forcing a linear pattern on this variable, we used a set of dummy variables; however, none had a "t" value as high as 1.00.

[45] *Cf.* Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," p. 47 in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*

[46] This variable had the expected negative sign, but the "t" value of its regression coefficient was only 1.19.

TABLE 3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES AMONG CITIES IN PERCENTAGES OF THE POPULATION OF VOTING AGE REGISTERED TO VOTE, WITH REGIONAL VARIABLES (104 CITIES, 1960)

| Variables[a] | Expected Sign | Regression III.1[b] | | | Regression III.2[c] | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | b | (s) | t | b | (s) | t |
| *Independent Variables:* | | | | | | | |
| *Socio-Economic Factors:* | | | | | | | |
| Age (% 20–34) | − | −0.39 | (0.21) | 1.89 | −0.43 | (0.18) | 2.36* |
| Sex (% Male) | + | −0.38 | (0.66) | 0.57 | | | |
| Race (% Non-white) | − | −0.17 | (0.08) | 2.25* | −0.18 | (0.07) | 2.52* |
| Education (Median Years Completed) | + | 1.07 | (1.16) | 0.92 | 2.13 | (0.91) | 2.36* |
| Income ($100/Year) | + | 0.19 | (0.18) | 1.08 | | | |
| Length of Residence (% from out of State) | − | −0.25 | (0.16) | 1.58 | | | |
| *Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote:* | | | | | | | |
| Inter-Party Competition (%) | − | −0.29 | (0.12) | 2.37* | −0.37 | (0.08) | 4.68** |
| *Factors Affecting the Costs of Registration:*[d] | | | | | | | |
| Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests | + | 0.10 | (0.04) | 2.39* | 0.14 | (0.04) | 3.73** |
| Closing Date for Registration | + | 0.15 | (0.04) | 3.83** | 0.16 | (0.04) | 4.62** |
| Times and Places of Registration | + | 1.50 | (2.12) | 0.71 | | | |
| Registration System (Permanent or Periodic) | + | 0.04 | (0.04) | 0.93 | | | |
| *Other Factors:*[d] | | | | | | | |
| Residence Requirements | + | 0.02 | (0.05) | 0.38 | | | |
| *Regions:* | | | | | | | |
| West | | 2.20 | (3.15) | 0.70 | 3.06 | (2.53) | 1.21 |
| Northeast | | −3.56 | (2.32) | 1.53* | | | |
| Border | | −7.05 | (3.58) | 1.97* | −5.50 | (3.04) | 1.81 |
| South | | −1.66 | (4.48) | 0.37 | | | |
| Dependent Variable: Percentage of the Population of Voting Age Registered to Vote | | | | | | | |
| Mean | | | 73.3 | | | 73.3 | |
| Standard Deviation | | | (14.3) | | | (14.3) | |
| F-Ratio | | | 22.09 | | | 40.99 | |
| Intercept | | | 67.5 | | | 48.2 | |
| Standard Error of Estimate | | | 6.9 | | | 7.0 | |
| Number of Cities | | | 104 | | | 104 | |
| $R^2$ | | | .80** | | | .78** | |

Notation: b = Net (partial) regression coefficient; (s) = standard error of regression coefficient; t = t-value of regression coefficient; ** = significant at 99%; * = significant at 95%.

[a] Defined in Appendix I.

[b] Includes all variables listed.

[c] Includes only variables significant at 95% level in Regression I.1, plus the two regional dummies whose coefficients were significantly different from each other.

[d] As we indicate in Appendix I, these sets of variables are measured by indices whose scales are arbitrary. Thus, no units of measurement are shown in parentheses, and no meaning can be attached to the absolute values of the regression coefficients of these variables without bearing in mind how each index was scaled. The "t" values can be interpreted in the usual way as indicators of statistical significance.

ferences in the residuals of Southern cities as between those with larger or smaller concentrations of Negroes.[47] Our predictions were neither markedly better nor markedly worse for cities that used roving deputy registrars or mobile registration units and those that did not, for cities with high and low percentages of college graduates in their populations,[48] and cities with the most and the least stable populations.[49] Finally, cities with unusually small or unusually

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[47] *Cf.* Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 28–32.

[48] Our source for this variable (actually the percentage of those over 25 years of age who are college graduates) was U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.

[49] Stability of population was measured by the percentage of persons in a city's population over five years of age that were living in the same house in 1960 as they had in 1955. The source for these figures was U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.

TABLE 4. ACTUAL AND PREDICTED[a] REGISTRATION RATES, AND RESIDUALS (104 CITIES, 1960)

| City | Actual | Predicted | Residual |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Memphis | 84.7 | 69.3 | 15.4 |
| 2. Berkeley | 90.5 | 75.2 | 15.3 |
| 3. Gary | 87.3 | 72.4 | 14.9 |
| 4. Detroit | 92.0 | 78.2 | 13.8 |
| 5. South Bend | 96.4 | 83.5 | 12.9 |
| 6. Baton Rouge | 64.7 | 52.4 | 12.3 |
| 7. Torrance | 87.7 | 76.9 | 10.8 |
| 8. Camden | 81.3 | 70.8 | 10.5 |
| 9. Dallas | 65.0 | 55.1 | 9.9 |
| 10. Seattle | 92.0 | 82.5 | 9.5 |
| 11. New Orleans | 55.6 | 46.4 | 9.2 |
| 12. Corpus Christi | 61.8 | 52.8 | 9.0 |
| 13. Houston | 60.0 | 57.3 | 8.7 |
| 14. Scranton | 90.4 | 81.7 | 8.7 |
| 15. Lansing | 91.9 | 84.6 | 7.3 |
| 16. New Bedford | 82.4 | 75.6 | 6.8 |
| 17. Tacoma | 87.3 | 80.6 | 6.7 |
| 18. Des Moines | 92.6 | 86.0 | 6.6 |
| 19. Jersey City | 81.1 | 74.7 | 6.4 |
| 20. Buffalo | 83.0 | 76.7 | 6.3 |
| 21. Albany | 88.4 | 82.2 | 6.2 |
| 22. Spokane | 89.4 | 83.4 | 6.0 |
| 23. Cincinnati | 79.4 | 73.8 | 5.6 |
| 24. Peoria | 87.4 | 81.8 | 5.6 |
| 25. Minneapolis | 92.5 | 87.2 | 5.3 |
| 26. Winston-Salem | 71.2 | 65.9 | 5.3 |
| 27. Youngstown | 81.0 | 76.0 | 5.0 |
| 28. Fresno | 81.1 | 76.8 | 4.3 |
| 29. St. Paul | 91.2 | 86.9 | 4.3 |
| 30. Philadelphia | 77.6 | 73.6 | 4.0 |
| 31. Canton | 80.9 | 77.0 | 3.9 |
| 32. New Haven | 79.2 | 75.8 | 3.4 |
| 33. Trenton | 75.8 | 72.4 | 3.4 |
| 34. Hammond | 84.0 | 80.7 | 3.3 |
| 35. Chattanooga | 70.7 | 68.1 | 2.6 |
| 36. Birmingham | 39.1 | 36.8 | 2.3 |
| 37. Waterbury | 81.4 | 79.2 | 2.2 |
| 38. Kansas City (Kans.) | 78.9 | 76.7 | 2.2 |
| 39. Pasadena | 83.2 | 81.5 | 1.7 |
| 40. Pittsburgh | 81.2 | 79.6 | 1.6 |
| 41. Flint | 79.6 | 78.6 | 1.0 |
| 42. Glendale | 84.9 | 84.2 | 0.7 |
| 43. Grand Rapids | 83.2 | 82.9 | 0.3 |
| 44. Cleveland | 71.5 | 71.6 | −0.1 |
| 45. Baltimore | 68.1 | 68.7 | −0.6 |
| 46. Tulsa | 82.4 | 83.0 | −0.6 |
| 47. Columbus (Ga.) | 32.1 | 32.7 | −0.6 |
| 48. Worcester | 81.0 | 81.6 | −0.6 |
| 49. Los Angeles | 77.0 | 77.7 | −0.7 |
| 50. San Diego | 73.9 | 74.7 | −0.8 |
| 51. Charlotte | 69.9 | 70.9 | −1.0 |
| 52. Dearborn | 89.3 | 90.3 | −1.0 |
| 53. Portland (Ore.) | 85.8 | 86.9 | −1.1 |
| 54. Salt Lake City | 87.0 | 88.2 | −1.2 |
| 55. Fort Wayne | 81.7 | 82.9 | −1.2 |
| 56. Oklahoma City | 80.4 | 81.7 | −1.3 |
| 57. Topeka | 81.9 | 83.3 | −1.4 |
| 58. Tampa | 68.8 | 70.2 | −1.4 |
| 59. Elizabeth | 75.6 | 77.1 | −1.5 |
| 60. Dayton | 73.6 | 75.1 | −1.5 |
| 61. Rockford | 82.0 | 83.5 | −1.5 |
| 62. Syracuse | 79.3 | 81.0 | −1.7 |
| 63. Akron | 77.0 | 78.7 | −1.7 |
| 64. Sacramento | 77.3 | 79.1 | −1.8 |
| 65. Toledo | 76.9 | 78.7 | −1.8 |
| 66. Richmond | 46.5 | 48.5 | −2.0 |
| 67. Atlanta | 33.8 | 35.8 | −2.0 |
| 68. Norfolk | 43.6 | 45.8 | −2.2 |
| 69. Santa Ana | 75.1 | 77.3 | −2.2 |
| 70. Erie | 78.8 | 81.2 | −2.4 |
| 71. Utica | 77.1 | 79.8 | −2.7 |
| 72. Columbus (O.) | 72.4 | 75.2 | −2.8 |
| 73. Springfield | 77.1 | 80.1 | −3.0 |
| 74. Duluth | 85.1 | 88.8 | −3.7 |
| 75. Greensboro | 66.6 | 70.4 | −3.8 |
| 76. Patterson | 68.4 | 72.2 | −3.8 |
| 77. Cambridge (Mass.) | 73.8 | 77.8 | −4.0 |
| 78. Oakland | 71.9 | 76.0 | −4.1 |
| 79. Louisville | 59.0 | 63.2 | −4.2 |
| 80. Little Rock | 61.2 | 65.5 | −4.3 |
| 81. Hartford | 70.7 | 75.0 | −4.3 |
| 82. Lincoln | 79.4 | 83.7 | −4.3 |
| 83. Rochester | 74.9 | 79.3 | −4.4 |
| 84. Austin | 48.3 | 52.8 | −4.5 |
| 85. Bridgeport | 70.6 | 75.6 | −5.0 |
| 86. Boston | 74.0 | 79.2 | −5.2 |
| 87. St. Louis | 68.5 | 74.7 | −6.2 |
| 88. Portsmouth | 38.0 | 44.3 | −6.3 |
| 89. Fort Worth | 48.4 | 54.7 | −6.3 |
| 90. Honolulu | 60.0 | 66.9 | −6.9 |
| 91. Newark | 61.4 | 68.6 | −7.2 |
| 92. Omaha | 79.8 | 87.1 | −7.3 |
| 93. San Antonio | 42.6 | 50.1 | −7.5 |
| 94. Nashville | 55.9 | 64.0 | −8.1 |
| 95. Jacksonville | 54.9 | 63.5 | −8.6 |
| 96. St. Petersburg | 69.7 | 79.4 | −9.7 |
| 97. San Francisco | 68.0 | 78.4 | −10.4 |
| 98. Newport News | 35.0 | 45.5 | −10.5 |
| 99. Niagara Falls | 67.7 | 78.6 | −10.9 |
| 100. Miami | 59.2 | 71.1 | −11.9 |
| 101. New York | 65.7 | 77.7 | −12.0 |
| 102. Allentown | 67.7 | 80.6 | −13.0 |
| 103. Kansas City (Mo.) | 65.8 | 83.8 | −18.0 |
| 104. Wichita | 62.2 | 82.7 | −20.5 |

[a] Based on Table 1, Regression I.2.

large concentrations of young voters, males, and non-white residents showed no common tendency, and neither did cities whose populations had an unusually high or low median educational attainment. Thus, it seems that our simplifying assumption of linear relationships between these variables and the rate of registration did not lead to serious error.

## III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

One conclusion to be drawn from our study of registration can be put as follows: Local differences in the turnout for elections are to a large extent related to local differences in rates of registration, and these in turn reflect to a considerable degree local differences in the rules governing, and arrangements for handling, the registering of voters. Some of our other conclusions may be of greater interest to practicing politicans, but this one contributes most to a better understanding of the electoral process.

This conclusion lends support, first of all, to Gosnell's explanation for the difference in the normal rates of turnout of voters in the United States, on the one hand, and in other democracies, on the other. This difference, one that has produced considerable commentary on the civic virtues of Americans relative to those of other peoples, was thought by Gosnell to be due in large measure to differing practices in the registration of voters:

> In the European countries studied, a citizen who is entitled to vote does not, as a rule, have to make any effort to see that his name is on the list of eligible voters. The inconvenience of registering for voting in this country has caused many citizens to become non-voters.[50]

The probable accuracy of this observation is strongly suggested not only by findings that we have already reported but also by a comparison of turnout rates in Canada, France, and Great Britain (all of which have systems of automatic registration) with those in the cities of our sample where more than 90 percent of those of voting age were registered to vote. In 1960 the rate of turnout of registered voters in such cities was, on the average, 78.5 percent. In post-war elections in Canada, France, and Great Britain it has been, again on the average, 74.3, 77.4, and 77.6 percent, respectively.[51]

Secondly, our findings regarding the interrelation of turnout, registration, and registration procedures suggest the solution to a problem discussed by V. O. Key:

> A major question posed by the trend of voting [in U.S. presidential elections] is why the decline in electoral interest since the 1890's. The blunt truth is that nobody knows the answer. A frequent explanation has been that the enfranchisement of women in 1920 brought into the electorate large numbers of persons not in the habit of voting. Yet popular interest began to shrink before the adoption of the women suffrage amendment.[52]

We suspect that a major part of the explanation for the trend of voting in presidential elections lies in the following facts: In the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the turnout of eligible voters was between 75 and 85 percent, voters were not required to register in many parts of the country, and in many places where they were, there were systems of automatic registration. In the period from 1896 to 1924, when the turnout declined almost steadily, state after state enacted registration laws which typically required registration annually and in person of all voters in the nation's large cities; the registration procedures of this era have been described by one student of registration practices as "expensive, cumbersome, and inconvenient to the voter."[53] In the period from 1924 until the present, during which time the turnout has gradually risen, more and more states have been liberalizing their registration laws, particularly as these apply to the larger cities. In short, turnout in presidential elections in the United States may have declined and then risen again, not because of changes in the *interest* of voters in elections, but because of changes in the *interest demanded* of them.

Thirdly, our findings suggest a quite different view of the electorate from that implicit or explicit in many discussions of voting. It is fair to say that the electorate is treated by many students of voting, especially Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and their co-authors, as if it were the product of socio-economic forces. In *The People's Choice* they conclude that " . . . three-quarters of the non-voters stayed away from the polls deliberately because they were thoroughly unconcerned with the election. . . . A long range program of civic education would be needed to draw such people into the orbit of political life. . . . "[54] In *Voting* they observe that "It is often a mistake to give purely political explanations for non-participation. . . . Non-voting is related to persistent social conditions having little to do with the candidates or the issues of the moment."[55]

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[50] Harold F. Gosnell, *Why Europe Votes*, p. 185. That differences in turnout for elections in Europe and America may be largely a function of differences in systems of registration has also been suggested by Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 181 *f.n.*, and Philip E. Converse and George Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring, 1962), 8–9 *f.n.*

[51] These averages were for six post-war Canadian elections (1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1963), five post-war elections for the French National Assembly (1946, 1951, 1956, 1958, 1962), and six post-war elections in Great Britain (1945, 1950, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1964). The average rate of turnout of registered voters in the cities of our full sample was 81.6 percent, and in Northern cities only it was 84.6 percent.

[52] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), fifth edition, p. 578.

[53] Joseph P. Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[54] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 47. This

While no one could quarrel with the above statement if enough weight were put on the "purely," our study indicates, not only that electorates are much more the product of political forces than many have appreciated, but also that, to a considerable extent, they can be *political artifacts*. Within limits, they can be constructed to a size and composition deemed desirable by those in power. Our matrix of simple correlations (Appendix II), for instance, shows a definite association between restrictive rules and procedures for registration and limited competition between major parties in the states in which the cities of our sample are located. Presumably, it is easier for a party in power to pursue a restrictive policy toward registration if its opposition is weak. Conversely, success in restricting registration presumably indicates some success in influencing the composition of the population of registered voters, which in turn makes it easier for the party in power to stay in power. While the abilities of Southern politicians to construct electorates have long been appreciated, relatively little curiosity has been shown about any similar endeavors on the part of their Northern colleagues. It seems unlikely that the latter, any more than the former, have always acted without design in establishing rules for registration.[56]

Finally, the findings of this study have a bearing on the continuing debate between those who favor and those who oppose efforts to get out the vote. A frequent objection to such efforts is that voters not interested enough to vote are not apt to vote wisely and so should be left alone. This view recalls the statement of a New York voter regarding the adequacy of the facilities for registering in New York City in 1964: "I sure do want to vote against that man [Senator Barry Goldwater], but I don't think I hate him enough to stand on that line all day long."[57] How much interest should a voter have to qualify him for voting? Enough to stand in line all day? For half a day? For two days? We cannot say, but those who think voting should be limited to the "interested" ought to be prepared to do so.

## APPENDIX I

### Definitions of Variables and Sources of Data

1. *Age:* the number of persons in the age group 20 to 34 divided by the number of persons over 21 years of age. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population.* Table 20.
2. *Education:* median school years completed by persons over 25 years of age. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.
3. *Race:* percentage of non-whites in the population. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.
4. *Income:* dollars received per year per family unit divided by 100. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.
5. *Sex:* percentage of males in the population over 21 years of age. Source: U. S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population*, Table 20.
6. *Length of Residence:* the number of persons over five years of age in the state economic area in which a city is located who resided in another state in 1955, divided by the total number of persons over five years of age in the state economic area in which that city is located. "State economic areas" are as defined in our source for these data: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population 1960: Selected Area Reports, State Economic Areas*, Table 2.
7. *Offices at Stake:* the number of contests for the offices of President, U. S. Senator, U. S. Representative, Governor, and Mayor in which any one voter might vote. Source: Richard M. Scammon, *ed., America Votes 4* (Pitts-

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conclusion is not well supported even by the data adduced as evidence for it. Some 27 percent of the voters who said they had no interest at all in the campaign nonetheless voted. See *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[55] Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 32.

[56] One of the authors of the present study found, for instance, that there was a very high positive correlation between an index of the convenience of registering in Chicago wards and differences among wards in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote, a fact which suggests that Mayor Richard J. Daley's organization is alert to the possibilities of manipulating the composition of Chicago's registered voters: See Richard E. Ayres, *Registration 1960: Key to Democratic Victory?* (Princeton University senior thesis, 1964), 34–35.

[57] New York *Times*, September 6, 1964.

burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962).

8. *Inter-Party Competition:* the difference between 50 and the average percentage of the two-party vote received by Democratic candidates in elections for Governor from 1956 to 1960 inclusive and for President in 1956 and 1960. Source: Richard M. Scammon, *ed.*, *America Votes 4* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962).
9. *Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests:* values of this variable were assigned as follows: test of literacy lending itself to discriminatory administration, 20; simple and straightforward test of literacy, 80; no test of literacy, 100. Where a "20" was assigned, the test required a registrant to show "understanding" or give a "reasonable interpretation" of sections of the U. S. Constitution or state constitutions or to make application without "aid, suggestions or memorandum"; or a registrant might qualify without showing literacy provided he was of "good character" or owned a stated amount and kind of property. Where an "80" was assigned, registrants were not required to interpret passages from the Constitution, and members of minority groups were not at a disadvantage in qualifying for any exemptions to the requirements of literacy. Source: Constance E. Smith, *Voting and Election Laws* (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1960), and the election codes of the relevant states.
10. *Closing Date for Registration:* in all cases in which registration (or period in which the poll tax could be paid) closed 100 or fewer days before the election, the value assigned was the number of days before the election at which registration was closed subtracted from 100. In all other cases, the value assigned was zero. Source: Constance E. Smith, *op. cit.*, election codes of relevant states, and answers to questionnaires sent to local boards of elections.
11. *Registration System:* values for this variable were assigned as follows: annual payment of cumulative poll tax required, 10; annual payment of a non-cumulative poll tax required, 25; annual personal registration required (with no requirement for the payment of a poll tax), 34; system of permanent registration, 100. Source: Constance E. Smith, *op. cit.*, election codes of the relevant states, and answers to questionnaires sent to local boards of election.
12. *Times and Places of Registration:* assignment of values for this variable involved calculating an index of convenience for each *kind* of registration place open in 1960 and summing the values of such indices to arrive at a convenience score for the registration facilities of the city as a whole. For example, a value for the index of convenience for precinct registration places alone was arrived at by adding the number of hours that precinct registration places were open in 1960 during working hours to two times the number of hours that they were open during the non-working hours, multiplying this number by the number of precinct registration places, and dividing the whole by the number of persons of voting age. Other kinds of registration places for which we calculated indices of convenience were central (e.g. County Court House or City Hall); branch; ward; hospital, plant, or other institutions; mobile units; and roving deputy registrars. "Non-working" hours were defined as hours before 8 a.m. or after 6 p.m. on week days and all hours on Saturday and Sunday. We also treated all hours during which mobile units were in service, all hours put in by roving deputies, and all hours in hospitals, plants, and other institutions as "non-working hours." Sources: Constance Smith, *op. cit.*, election codes of relevant states, answers to questionnaires sent to local Leagues of Women Voters and local Boards of Elections, and telephone interviews with officials of local Boards of Elections.
13. *Residence Requirements:* the values of this variable were assigned as follows: residence of two years or more required in the state, 20; residence of one year required in the state and of more than three months in the county or city, 56; residence of one year required in the state and of three months or less in the county or city, 60; residence of six months required in the state and of more than thirty days in the county or city, 96; residence of six months required in the state and of thirty days or less in the county or city, 100. Source: Constance E. Smith, *op. cit.*, and the election codes of the relevant states.
14. *Methods of Purging Registration Rolls:* high values of this variable were assigned to cities where it is easy for a voter to keep his name on the registration rolls, low values to cities where it is not. Two steps were involved in assigning values. An initial score was assigned as follows: provision is made for a mandatory general canvass *or* for a mandatory canvass by mail *or* for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths and changes of residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 15; provisions as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more, 25; provision is

made for an optional general canvass *or* for an optional canvass by mail *and/or* for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths but not of changes of residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 45; provisions are as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more, 55; provision is made for an optional general canvass *or* for an optional canvass by mail *and/or* there is no provision for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths or changes or residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 65; provisions are as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more, 75; no provision is made for a canvass, either general or selective, optional or mandatory, *and* there is no provision for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths or changes of residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 90; provisions are as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more *or* there are no provisions of any kind with respect to canvasses, notification of boards of deaths and changes of residence, or removal of names for non-voting, 100.

Scores assigned as follows were then *subtracted* from scores assigned in accordance with the scheme just described: provision is made for removing the names of all non-voters, deceased persons, and those who have changed residence automatically and there is no requirement that notice be given the person whose name is being removed, 15; provisions are as just stated except that boards of elections are required to give notice to persons whose names are being removed for a change of residence *and* such persons must apply in person to prevent the removal of their names, 12; provisions are as just stated except that those alleged to have changed residence may testify to the contrary by mail and so prevent removal of their names, 10; boards of elections are required to give notice to persons whose names are being removed either for an alleged change of residence or for non-voting and such persons must apply in person to prevent removal of their names, 7; provisions as just stated except persons whose names are being removed may prevent such action by applying for reinstatement by mail, 5; provisions as just stated except boards of election are required to give notice twice to persons whose names are being removed, 0.

Source: Constance Smith, *op cit.*, election codes of the relevant states, answers to questionnaires sent to local boards of elections and local Leagues of Women Voters, telephone interviews with officials of local Boards of Elections.

14. *Region—West:* Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
15. *Region—Northeast:* Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
16. *Region—Border:* Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma.
17. *Region—South:* Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas.
18. *Region—Midwest:* Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota.

APPENDIX II. REGRESSION I.1: MATRIX OF SIMPLE CORRELATIONS (104 CITIES, 1960)

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Registration | 1.00 | −0.46 | −0.05 | −0.54 | 0.26 | 0.57 | −0.28 | −0.71 | 0.40 | 0.56 | −0.10 | 0.66 | 0.57 |
| 2. Age (% 20–34) | −0.46 | 1.00 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.21 | −0.11 | 0.15 | 0.38 | −0.11 | −0.32 | −0.33 | 0.13 | −0.32 |
| 3. Sex (% Male) | −0.05 | 0.39 | 1.00 | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.30 | 0.23 | −0.18 | 0.11 | −0.08 | −0.12 | 0.06 | −0.15 |
| 4. Race (% Non-white) | −0.54 | 0.34 | 0.05 | 1.00 | −0.29 | −0.41 | 0.23 | 0.39 | −0.22 | −0.36 | −0.22 | −0.10 | −0.17 |
| 5. Education (Median Years Completed) | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.12 | −0.29 | 1.00 | 0.54 | 0.19 | −0.00 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 0.01 |
| 6. Income | 0.57 | −0.11 | 0.30 | −0.41 | 0.54 | 1.00 | −0.17 | −0.55 | 0.30 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 0.02 | 0.27 |
| 7. Length of Residence | −0.28 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.19 | −0.17 | 1.00 | 0.24 | −0.07 | −0.24 | −0.18 | 0.03 | −0.04 |
| 8. Inter-Party Competition | −0.71 | 0.38 | −0.18 | 0.39 | −0.00 | −0.55 | 0.24 | 1.00 | −0.39 | −0.39 | −0.56 | 0.28 | −0.55 |
| 9. Residence Requirements | 0.40 | −0.11 | 0.11 | −0.22 | 0.08 | 0.30 | −0.07 | −0.39 | 1.00 | 0.43 | 0.28 | −0.14 | 0.23 |
| 10. Literacy Tests | 0.56 | −0.32 | −0.08 | −0.36 | 0.02 | 0.19 | −0.24 | −0.39 | 0.43 | 1.00 | 0.43 | 0.07 | 0.37 |
| 11. Closing Date | 0.66 | −0.33 | −0.12 | −0.22 | 0.08 | 0.27 | −0.18 | −0.56 | 0.28 | 0.43 | 1.00 | −0.31 | 0.64 |
| 12. Times & Places of Registration | −0.10 | 0.13 | 0.06 | −0.10 | 0.19 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.28 | −0.14 | 0.07 | −0.31 | 1.00 | −0.32 |
| 13. Registration System | 0.57 | −0.32 | −0.15 | −0.17 | 0.01 | 0.27 | −0.04 | −0.55 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 0.64 | −0.32 | 1.00 |

APPENDIX III. PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND BETA-WEIGHTS

| Variables | Regression | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | I.1 | | I.2 | | II.1 | | II.2 | | III.1 | | III.2 | |
| | p | β | p | β | p | β | p | β | p | β | p | β |
| Age (% 20–34) | −.24 | −.16 | −.27 | −.17 | −.22 | −.16 | −.11 | .07 | −.20 | −.13 | −.24 | −.14 |
| Sex (% Male) | −.03 | −.02 | | | −.02 | −.02 | | | −.06 | −.04 | | |
| Race (% Non-white) | −.21 | −.13 | −.24 | −.15 | −.25 | −.19 | −.38 | −.28 | −.23 | −.15 | −.25 | −.16 |
| Education (Median Years Completed) | .22 | .17 | .38 | .22 | .12 | .11 | | | .10 | .08 | .24 | .17 |
| Income ($100/Yr.) | .15 | .12 | | | .17 | .17 | | | .11 | .10 | | |
| Length of Residence (% from out of state) | −.14 | −.08 | | | −.14 | −.09 | | | −.17 | −.10 | | |
| Inter-Party Competition | −.30 | −.26 | −.49 | −.36 | −.23 | −.24 | −.52 | −.44 | −.25 | −.25 | −.43 | −.33 |
| Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests | .22 | .14 | .32 | .19 | .14 | .11 | | | .25 | .16 | .36 | .22 |
| Closing Date for Registration | .34 | .24 | .40 | .28 | .37 | .25 | .41 | .28 | .38 | .28 | .43 | .30 |
| Times and Places of Registration | .11 | .06 | | | .24 | .16 | .31 | .19 | .08 | .04 | | |
| Registration System | .16 | .12 | | | | | | | .10 | .08 | | |
| Residence Requirements | .10 | .05 | | | .12 | .08 | | | .04 | .03 | | |
| Purging Methods | | | | | .01 | .005 | | | | | | |
| South | | | | | | | | | −.04 | −.05 | | |
| West | | | | | | | | | .07 | .06 | .12 | .08 |
| Northeast | | | | | | | | | −.16 | −.11 | | |
| Border | | | | | | | | | −.21 | −.12 | −.18 | −.09 |

Notation: p = partial correlation coefficient.
β = Beta-weight.

# PARTY, REGION AND THE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1949–1954*

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Recent publications indicate a continuing interest among political scientists in both the aggregating of discrete acts of legislative behavior into underlying dimensions and the empirical specification of voting blocs. The latter interest is served by the former, as aggregation often producs sets of dimensions useful for descriptive purposes, as well as aiding other types of analysis. Recent studies include MacRae's work on the House of Representatives using various forms of scaling, Alker's paper on voting patterns in the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations using factor analysis, and Grumm's work on the Kansas legislature using another form of factor analysis (Q-technique).[1]

As these papers have described in some detail, the technique of factor analysis is particularly useful in producing empirical dimensions which are unitary, stable, exhaustive and parsimonious.[2] This paper presents three such analyses—one each for the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses—and interprets the results in terms of the effects on the stability of the dimensions through time of changes in the Party and regional composition of the House, as well as other historical events. The analysis demonstrates the remarkable consistency of congressmen in their legislative voting over a seemingly broad range of issues, and the factors provide the basis for describing the underlying themes which separate blocs of congressmen from one another. Although on their face the issue contents of the three congresses are remarkably dissimilar, the basic structure of voting behavior is demonstrated to be equally remarkable for its persistence through time. The sources of this stability thus become more amenable to understanding through comparisons of voting blocs through the congresses.

### I. PROCEDURES

Subjects for this research are the members of the United States House of Representatives, and the test items are the bills which came up for roll call votes during the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Either because of death, resignation, sickness or apathy several members of each congress voted on only small proportions of the bills considered. Any member who did not vote on more than half the bills was judged to be contributing more error than reliable variance and was dropped from the analysis. This left 420 representatives as the sample for the 81st Congress, 428 for the 82nd, and 430 for the 83rd.

In the 81st Congress the House "gave the nays and yeas" 275 times, in the 82nd, 181 times, and in the 83rd 147 times. All these votes were retained for preliminary correlation analysis with the exception of those meeting one of the following three criteria:

(a) Less than 15 percent of the membership was in opposition to the majority. Such highly skewed items tend to produce unreliable correlations.

(b) Less than 80 percent of the membership voted. Items with high proportions of non-

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[1] D. MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 909–926; H.R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *ibid.*, 58 (September, 1965), 642–657; J. G. Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (November, 1963), 336–356. Earlier work in this area includes D. MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, Calif.: The University of California Press, 1958); C. D. Farris, "A Scale Analysis of Ideological Factors in Congressional Voting," in J.C.Wahlke and H. Eulau (Eds.), *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1959), 399–413; and C. W. Harris, "A Factor Analysis of Selected Senate Roll-Call Votes, 80th Congress," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, (1948), 582–591.

[2] For a more complete discussion and critique of the existing literature see G. Marwell, *Dimensions of Legislative Cleavage* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, New York University, 1962). This work also contains more complete descriptions of all the procedures used in this paper and of the bills which comprise the various factors.

voters contribute substantial error variance. In addition, Belknap presents a fairly convincing argument for high-absentee votes being the least important roll calls.[3]

(c) Correlation with party of .9 or higher. This criterion was used partially for practical reasons. The maximum number of items which the computer program used could treat was 150. In the 81st Congress more than this number of roll calls remained after exclusions based on the other two criteria. It was anticipated, from the writings of MacRae and others, that a party-related factor would perhaps dominate the domain. It seemed preferable to have the first factor oriented more toward content than party allegiance, and to enhance the chances of shifting the location of the first factor away from party. Results of the three factor analyses show that party still defines the first factor despite the exclusion of these items.

Using these criteria, 150 votes were retained for analysis in the 81st Congress, 114 in the 82nd, and 92 in the 83rd.

Before entering the factor analysis two further criteria for exclusion were used. Examination of the correlation matrix revealed that there were substantial clusters of items defined exclusively by a series of roll calls with extremely high correlations and a single bill as their focus. Thus there would be a vote on recommitting the bill to committee, another on passing the bill, a third, fourth and fifth on debilitating amendments to the bill, a sixth on accepting the report of the conference with the Senate, etc. Decisions on some of these, e.g., the amendments, might relate to issues containing new content. On the other hand, several of these roll calls were mere duplications. If three such repetitious votes do not correlate very highly with one of the major common factors they will produce their own residual factor. Varimax, the rotational procedure used in the analysis, tends to emphasize these smaller factors, pulling their variance out of the more general factor. For this reason the preliminary correlation matrices were examined and most repetitive items deleted.

Finally, roll calls having no correlations greater than .5 with any other items were also discarded. These items could have little effect on the factor structures and, in comparison with other items, would tend to have very small loadings on the factors. By these procedures the number of items retained for analysis was reduced to 70 for the 81st and 82nd Congresses, and 68 for the 83rd.

The 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses were selected for analysis because they were probably as different from one another in structure, substance and circumstance as any three consecutive congresses in recent history. Where the 81st and 82nd were organized by the Democrats and faced a Democratic President the 83rd faced a Republican President and was organized by the Republicans. The 82nd Congress took place during the Korean War, while the 81st just saw its beginning and the 83rd its end. Although McCarthy began his headline-making during the 81st Congress, McCarthyism became an issue only in the 82nd, and reached a climax during the 83rd. Where civil rights legislation was a primary concern of the 81st Congress, the 82nd and 83rd had little formal interest in the issue. On the other hand the McCarran-Walter immigration issue, hotly debated, appears only in the 82nd Congress, and such business-oriented issues as tax relief for stockholders and the private development of atomic-energy projects appear only in the 83rd. Thus, if similar structures emerge from analyses of the three congresses they do so in the face of many variables seemingly operating to produce difference.

Consecutive congresses were selected so that the relationships between factor structures could be empirically described. Overlapping memberships allow comparison of the positions of given legislators on dimensions in one congress with their positions on dimensions in the other congresses. In addition, it should be noted that the selection of consecutive congresses maximizes the possibility of rejecting the notion of stability of structure through time. If such stability does not obtain for congresses close in time it is improbable that congresses further spaced would produce similar structures.

The roll-call votes of each congress were submitted to a principal components analysis, using squared multiple correlation coefficients for communality estimation. A "blind"[4] Varimax rotational procedure was used to locate orthogonal simple structure.

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[3] G. M. Belknap, "Scaling Legislative Behavior," Wahlke and Eulau, *op. cit.*, 388–398.

[4] In recent factor-analytic works by political scientists the merits of oblique rather than orthogonal factors have been strongly advanced: cf. MacRae, "A Method of Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *op. cit.*; and H. R. Alker, Jr. and B. M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). This is not the place for extended discussion of the merits of the two approaches, but it may be noted that differences between results of orthogonal and oblique rotations tend to be important where there are a large number of factors retained for rotation, and

## II. RESULTS

In general the three factor structures seem easily interpretable. They each produce three major factors which together account for a substantial proportion of the variance of the data (about 50 percent) and most of the predictable variance (over 75 percent).[5] The common thread connecting the items defining each factor is usually clear, but the huge number of these items makes interpretation somewhat risky. Whereas an item loaded .6 in most studies would constitute a strong marker variable, such items are often dwarfed in these analyses by numerous items loaded .8 and .7. Nevertheless, roll calls loaded .6 or .5 must be taken into consideration when interpreting the factors.

*The 81st Congress.* The factors elicited from the analysis of the 81st Congress present, in general, a clear picture of the major divisions of opinion in that congress. Four basic factors account for over 50 percent of the total variance of the items in the matrix, and over 80 percent of the predictable variance.[6] Loadings of all the items on all factors are reported in Table 1. Unfortunately, an adequate description of the roll calls appearing in the analysis would take several pages to present. Thus, the page and identifying number of each bill in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac[7] is given so that the reader may check any particular set of items. *Marker* variables for each factor, those roll calls whose particularly high loadings indicate that they *best* estimate the "true" meaning of the factor, are denoted by an asterisk.

Forty-three roll calls, over 60 percent of the items in the matrix, have loadings of .4 or more on the first factor. In addition, the 18 roll calls excluded from the analysis because of their high correlation with party would have loaded highly. Thus, the first factor approaches the status of a "general" factor, one which accounts for a pre-eminent amount of the data's variance; a general explanatory variable. It accounts for 44 percent of the predictable variance and almost 30 percent of the total variance of the data.

Perusal of the roll calls defining this factor indicates a common thread of government interference in the society, particularly in the economy, leading to the factor being labelled "Active Role of Government in Society." With the crucial exception of the vote on the Taft-Hartley bill (54683), congressmen on one side of the issues of the factor would be in favor of giving the government, particularly the executive branch, greater power and flexibility, and for enlarging its functions. As will be seen later, these congressmen generally would be Democrats, although the relationship is by no means perfect.

The factor might also be considered a "Fair Deal" dimension. Many of the relevant items may be found specifically mentioned in President Truman's program as presented in his State of the Union message. In general, roll calls on the factor seem to represent a liberal

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where the factors are poorly defined. Since the analysis below essentially involves the rotation of only three very well defined factors, and since a dominant-cluster technique for the generation of factor scores is used, results from the two approaches should be very similar. A look at figures 1–3 and the accompanying discussion should illustrate this. Note also that many analysts argue the theoretical advantages of orthogonal rotations, especially for domains with nearly general first factors. For a detailed discussion of factor analysis, see H. H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960).

[5] The "Total Variance" of the data is equal to the number of items, since factor analysis conventionally standardizes each item to unit variance. Thus, for the seventy-item matrices the figure is seventy, and "proportion of total variance" indicates the amount of variance accounted for by the factor, divided by seventy. "Predictable Variance," sometimes called "common variance," is the total amount of variance shared by the items of the matrix, or the sum of the communalities of the items in the matrix. Any item's communality is the amount of its variance which is common to other items in the matrix, and which may thus be predicted from these other items.

[6] Several additional factors were also extracted in this and the following two factor analyses, but are of no interest here. Most had just one item loaded above .4, precluding interpretation of *common* characteristics. The rest had two clearly *duplicative* items defining the content, and no other substantive content.

[7] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vols. V–X (Washington, D.C.; Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1949–54). The five-digit number should be interpreted as follows: the first digit gives the volume number, with 0 standing for volume ten; the next three digits give the page number; the last digit gives the number on the page given to the bill. More complete descriptions of the contents of relevant bills may be found by looking in the Almanac.

TABLE 1. ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS: 81st CONGRESS

| Roll Call | | Factor Loading | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | I | II | III | IV |
| 51783 | Repeal oleo tax, color restrictions | −24 | −14 | 39 | 18 |
| 51785 | Expand rural telephone service | −38 | −18 | 01 | −55* |
| 51786 | Agricultural Act: Continue past rigid supports (A) | 79 | −25 | −07 | 03 |
| 52526 | Red Run-Clinton River project funds: Army Civil Functions Ap. (A) | 62 | −12 | −15 | 03 |
| 52544 | Limit extension of temporary ap. to Sept., 1949 (A) | 70 | −20 | −07 | 05 |
| 52561 | No funds for a National Capitol Sesquicentennial (RCI) | 73 | 06 | −11 | 09 |
| 53283 | Loyalty oath for employees; Housing Act (A) | 69 | −43 | 00 | −02 |
| 53285 | National Housing Act: Public Housing, slum clearance, etc. | −72 | 22 | 19 | 07 |
| 53288 | Extend, liberalize Social Security (LD) | −85* | −07 | 19 | −08 |
| 54244 | Continue Presidential export controls to 7/51 | −66 | −16 | 30 | −19 |
| 54247 | *ECA: $5.4 bil. for foreign aid* | −15 | 09 | 67* | −09 |
| 54264 | Less funds for West Europe: Mutual Defense (A) | 71 | −04 | −30 | −04 |
| 54267 | Mutual Defense Assistance Act (C) | −37 | −03 | 61* | 03 |
| 54683 | Kill attempt to water down Taft-Hartley (R) | −82* | 24 | 04 | −05 |
| 54684 | Increase, extend minimum wage; substitute weaker bill for strong (LD) | −75 | −04 | 21 | −18 |
| 55504 | Kill $90 per month veterans pension bill (R) | −19 | 08 | 21 | 02 |
| 56742 | Reduce power of Rules Committee (LD) | −69 | 11 | 11 | −09 |
| 56747 | 2% D. C. Sales tax | 33 | −32 | 02 | −01 |
| 56748 | Extend D.C. rent control, recontrol some housing | −45 | 19 | 21 | −03 |
| 56761 | D.C. Revenue Act: sales tax, other revenue | 45 | −40 | −03 | −07 |
| 56762 | No segregation in Women's Reserve of Coast Guard (A) | −02 | 81* | 00 | −02 |
| 56768 | For Antipoll tax on procedural point (LD) | 01 | 71 | −05 | 10 |
| 56782 | Kill Antipoll tax by adjourning | 08 | −74 | −05 | −04 |
| 56785 | Antipoll tax | −03 | 84* | 06 | −03 |
| 58201 | Allow states, localities to decontrol rents (A) | 81 | −20 | −10 | −02 |
| 58203 | Reduce rent control extension from 15 to 3 months (RI) | 76 | −02 | −20 | 04 |
| 58204 | Extend rent controls 15 months | −54 | 27 | 22 | 08 |
| 58208 | Exempt independent gas producers from FPC jurisdiction (LD) | 43 | −51 | −02 | −07 |
| 58200 | Exempt independent gas producers from FPC jurisdiction | 38 | −66 | −04 | −05 |
| 58223 | No loosening, laws on price discrimination, fixing (basing pts) (RCI) | −64 | 00 | 05 | −05 |
| 61001 | Kill increasing cotton, peanut acreage allotments (R) | 43 | 37 | −09 | 50* |
| 61002 | Kill increasing cotton, peanut acreage allotments (RC) | 23 | 36 | 04 | 61* |
| 61004 | Kill long-range cotton, peanut acreage allotment formula (R) | 50 | 33 | −08 | 37 |
| 61523 | Reduce general appropriations $600 mil. (A) | 67 | −28 | −04 | −03 |
| 61524 | Prohibit filling more than 10% civil service vacancies (A) | 84* | −06 | −10 | 04 |
| 61527 | Guarantors not pay if Mex. laborers return illegally to Mex. (A) | 16 | −54 | −01 | −38 |
| 61528 | Not automatically end ECA, countries trading with Communists (LD) | −80 | −16 | 26 | −09 |
| 61961 | Kill *establishing National Science Foundation* (R) | 61 | −18 | −24 | 09 |
| 61965 | Funds to promote rural library serivces | −67 | 00 | 11 | −14 |
| 61966 | Housing Act: no loans for cooperative housing projects (A) | 76 | −36 | 01 | −04 |
| 61981 | Reduce Fed. power over states, admin. of Social Security (LD, RC) | 76 | −34 | 01 | 05 |
| 62602 | $60 mil. for Korean ECA aid | −63 | 13 | 45 | 05 |
| 62604 | Aid for Korea and Formosa | −50 | 12 | 61* | 03 |
| 62606 | Kill Point 4, aid to underdeveloped countries, in ECA (RI) | 66 | −03 | −48 | −01 |
| 62607 | Foreign Economic Assistance Act; ECA, Korean aid, Point 4, etc. | −32 | 05 | 75* | 02 |
| 62622 | Funds for emergency relief to Yugoslavia | −40 | −08 | 45 | −09 |
| 62626 | Allow Export-Import Bank to guarantee foreign investments | −76 | −10 | 36 | −09 |
| 62903 | Allow union shop, dues check-off, on railways | −16 | 42 | 04 | 08 |
| 63563 | Nullify some Negro civil service appointments with new exams (A) | 25 | −51 | −12 | −27 |
| 65442 | Increase power of Rules Committee (A) | 50 | −56 | −05 | −01 |
| 65461 | Kill postal rate increase (R) | 56 | 25 | −22 | −02 |
| 65465 | No cuts in other services when restore some postal deliveries (A) | −18 | −60 | 09 | −19 |
| 65467 | Restore some postal delivery services | −15 | 50 | −02 | 16 |
| 65482 | Delay FEPC by parliamentary maneuver | −11 | 62 | 01 | 06 |
| 65483 | Delay FEPC by adjourning | −01 | −84* | 11 | −17 |
| 65486 | Delay FEPC by adjourning | 10 | −81 | −08 | −11 |
| 65488 | Delay FEPC by adjourning | −05 | −90* | 03 | −05 |
| 65507 | Limit FEPC to investigation and recommendation (A) | 39 | −68 | −09 | −21 |
| 65521 | FEPC (without compulsory powers) | 09 | 82* | 10 | −01 |
| 65526 | Statehood for Hawaii | −02 | 49 | −02 | −11 |
| 65564 | Cite E. A. Rumley, lobbyist for conservative group, for contempt | −84* | 08 | 15 | −06 |
| 65588 | Kill bill for two new Asst. Secretaries, Agriculture Dept. (R) | 76 | 12 | −13 | 28 |
| 65607 | No new Dept. of Health, Education and Security | 59 | −37 | −06 | −06 |
| 67147 | Subsidize exploration, conservation of strategic minerals | −31 | 09 | −02 | −16 |
| 67148 | Exempt independent gas producers from FPC jurisdiction (C) | 27 | −63 | 01 | 03 |
| 67162 | Loosen laws, price discrimination, fixing (basing pts) | 56 | −04 | −02 | 14 |
| 67165 | Extend rent control to 1/51 | −68 | 25 | 15 | 05 |
| 67168 | Extend rent control to 4/51 | −68 | 09 | 24 | 03 |
| 67203 | Confine credit controls to consumer, real estate credit (A) | 86* | −02 | −16 | 03 |
| 67204 | No controls for commodity speculation | 67 | −42 | −06 | −06 |
| | Percent of Predictable Variance | 44% | 24% | 8% | 4% |
| | Percent of Total Variance | 30% | 16% | 5% | 3% |

* =Marker items for the factor; A =Amendment; RCI =Recommit to Conference with instructions; LD =Limit debate; RI =Recommit to Committee with instructions; RC =Recommit to Conference; R =Recommit to Committtee; C =Conference report.

thrust. They are either on bills to expand government power and activity or on amendments and motions designed to debilitate or kill such bills. This is not just a "government spending" dimension; several of the highest loaded items (e.g., 65564, 54683) would not have cost the government anything. Rather, the whole range of the conservative-liberal debate, with the exception of civil rights, seems to contribute to the factor.

The second factor emerging from this analysis is also very strong, accounting for 24 percent of the predictable variance and 16 percent of the total variance. A large number of roll calls were eliminated from the analysis because they duplicated the highest loaded items on this factor. Roll calls were faced every step of the parliamentary way on almost every civil rights bill. Despite this, almost one-third of the items retained for analysis are loaded .4 or higher on this factor. The roll calls defining the factor most clearly are easily interpretable as to common meaning. The nine highest loaded items concern Negro civil rights. Except for one roll call on segregation in the Women's Reserve of the Coast Guard, these votes deal with either the attempt to establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission, or a constitutional amendment to abolish the Poll Tax.

It would be quite simple to name this factor "Civil Rights," if we were to ignore the quite substantial loadings of several other roll calls. As previously noted, items related to a factor at a .6 level, even when there are "better" items, should be considered seriously in interpretation. Issues other than civil rights which are involved in this factor include the controversy over federal regulation of natural gas producers, statehood for Hawaii, restrictions on Mexican farm laborers, a variety of farm issues, curbs on the power of the Rules Committee, and a bill to prevent payment of salaries to employees refusing to sign an anti-Communist affidavit. If we interpret the bill concerning the Rules Committee as being highly involved with the civil rights issue, all of the roll calls loaded on this factor have a thread of special restriction or special privilege for groups within the society. They have a ring of particularism. The factor is, therefore, labelled "Protection of Private or Local Interests." There is more than a strong suspicion that the dimension is associated with regional location and, in general, congressmen on one side of the factor are for giving special treatment, while those on the other side are for greater "universalism."

There is a considerable decrease in relative importance, as judged by the amount of variance explained, as we move from the second to the third factor. Nevertheless, this third factor does account for close to 8 percent of the predictable variance and more than 5 percent of the total variance. The four items which dominate the factor are all concerned with some form of foreign aid. Thus, the title "Foreign Aid" is considered more appropriate than "foreign policy" which would imply issues such as international trade which are not related highly to this factor. For example, roll call 54244, involving export controls, correlates only .30 with this factor, but has a loading of .66 on the "Active Role" Factor. Intriguingly, one roll call ostensibly involving foreign aid displays a similar pattern. This is roll call 54264, which loads .30 on Factor III and .70 on the "Active Role" Factor. The vote was supposedly for authorizing aid for western Europe in Mutual Defense Assistance. It is probable that some other issues became involved in this particular discussion which colored the effect that passage of this amendment would eventually have had. Perusal of Table 1 reveals that no other obvious issue was related to this factor, so that interpretation is clear at a face level.

Factor IV is the last factor in this analysis which has two or more clearly non-duplicative items loaded .4 or higher. Thus, despite the factor's accounting for only 3 percent of the predictable variance and 2.5 percent of the total variance, it is a possibly significant dimension. In fact, its apparent "poor" definition is poor primarily in relation to the three previous factors. In analysis of psychological and other data a factor with three items loaded .5 or higher is often considered an important dimension. Two of the three items involve peanut and cotton acreage allotments. The third concerns a bill to help expand rural telephone service. The factor has been tentatively labelled "Rural Problems." This again is an easy and fairly clear factor to comprehend. It is somewhat interesting that roll call 51783, concerning oleo taxes, loads only .18, and that the farm program advanced by President Truman, vote 51786, loads more heavily on the "Active Role" than the "Rural Problems" factor. One roll call on Mexican farm laborers (61527) and a roll call involving both peanut and cotton acreage allotment, and, probably in a more central way, appropriations for general soil conservation (61004), had significant, if comparatively small, loadings of .37 on the "Rural Problems" dimension.

Although this fourth factor does have some importance it does not arise again in either the 82nd or 83rd Congress, and involves only a few items as the principal explanatory factor. Thus, in the discussions which follow it will not be considered further, as attention is concentrated on the three major factors which define the continuing basic structure of cleavage.

*82nd Congress.* Analysis of the 82nd Congress results in a structure roughly similar to the corresponding findings for the 81st Congress. The major difference, at first glance, is the absence of the fourth common factor. No factor beyond the third accounts for as much as 3 percent of the predictable, and 2 percent of the total variance. The fourth factor in the preceding analysis, however, was comparatively weak, and it is the similarity of the three dominant factors in each analysis which is striking. In the 82nd Congress, these three factors together account for 79 percent of the predictable, and 54 percent of the total variance, figures remarkably close to the results for the 81st Congress. Loadings of all the items on all the factors are given in Table 2.

The first factor is slightly weaker than before, accounting for just over one-third of the predictable, and 23 percent of the total variance. Thirty-four items, one less than half of those retained for analysis, loaded .4 or higher. In addition, seven roll calls correlating .9 or higher with party, and 26 roll calls duplicating items loaded high on this factor would have been strongly related. In short, this factor, which also correlates highly with party, resembles the "Active Role" factor of the 81st Congress analysis in many ways.

Scanning Table 2 reveals a difference in content emphasis as well as a thematic similarity between these two dimensions. In the 82nd Congress, Factor I becomes somewhat more directly involved with the costs of bureaucracy. In addition, a new element of restricting executive discretion in foreign dealings is introduced at a high level. The defense budget appears on this factor, and public works projects seem to be more plentiful as important items. Bills for public housing construction emerge for the first time, but at a lower level of relationship. Almost all of these bills concern governmental costs or expenditures in some fashion, but the common thread of governmental activity seems to remain. The votes for cutting the civil service, for example, may be understood as attempts to debilitate the federal executive's potential for action, as well as attempts to cut costs. Thus the title, "Active Role of Government in Society," is retained. Again, it seems that Republicans are against governmental activity. It would be interesting, however, to know how the votes would have distributed, at least on the issue of Presidential discretion, with a Republican President. Analysis of the 83rd Congress indicates that the results might have been somewhat different.

Factor II is almost as large as Factor I, accounting for 31 percent of the predictable variance, and 21 percent of the total variance in the matrix. Thirty-four items, one less than half the items in the matrix, load .4 or higher on the factor. This is in decided contrast to the corresponding factor in the 81st Congress. Also in contrast is the decline of Negro civil rights as the definitive element for the factor. Only one item, involving the construction of a segregated hospital for Negroes in Virginia, 73105, has a civil rights cast, and it loads only .59. In fact, there seems to be a definite shift in the emphasis of the factor. A bill dealing with Mexican laborers loads .7, (71044) whereas a bill on a similar subject previously loaded .5 (61527). There is a similar shift for bills dealing with the power of the Rules Committee. Nevertheless, this factor, once again, seems to be composed basically of issues of special restriction or favor. The highest loaded items try to: (a) recover special consideration for a small group of entrepreneurs, (b) discriminate aginst specific groups in immigration possibilities, (c) question the purposes of private foundations, (d) ask the president to stop a *particular* strike by taking action against a *particular* union, and (e) distribute oil resources to states rather than keep them under federal control, with the former course being vigorously supported by private oil companies. Thus, the title "Protection of Private or Local Interests" is retained.

On the other hand, several bills load heavily on this factor which are relative surprises. Public housing might be considered to have an element of "help for the downtrodden" or competition with private home builders, as well as a public vs. private aspect, and thus fit the previous interpretation. The bills on wage and price stabilization, however, have a predominantly universalistic ring. Despite these questionable items, congressmen on one side of the factor are generally in favor of special treatment, while the remainder are against.

Although not to the same extent as the "Local" factor, Factor III shifts in obvious content between the 81st and 82nd Congresses. While it retains much of its previous meaning, an entirely new aspect becomes dominant. The factor is considerably stronger this time, accounting for over 14 percent of the predictable variance and almost 10 percent of the total variance. Both of these figures are almost double their counterparts from the 81st Congress. In

## TABLE 2. ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS: 82ND CONGRESS

| Roll Call | | Factor Loading | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | I | II | III |
| 71041 | Kill increasing peanut acreage allotments (R) | 58 | −28 | −13 |
| 71043 | Kill insuring loans, facilities to market perishable goods (R) | 69 | 12 | −15 |
| 71044 | *Authorize agreement with Mexico on importing farm labor* | 12 | 74* | −02 |
| 71663 | No SW Power Admin. projects in Western Missouri (A) | 69 | 44 | −13 |
| 71666 | Cut funds for Bureau of Reclamation (A) | 62 | 39 | −06 |
| 71667 | No funds, public power projects where gov't. has private contracts (A) | 66 | 39 | −10 |
| 71681 | Fill no more than 25% of vacancies, Interior Dept. (RI) | 84* | 26 | −20 |
| 71682 | Cut funds, Voice of America (A) | 54 | 28 | −37 |
| 71683 | Limit U.S. to paying 1/3 budget of any internat'l org. (A) | −58 | −28 | 35 |
| 71701 | Cut funds for Commodity Credit Corp. (A) | 82* | 03 | −14 |
| 71702 | Fill no more than 25% of vacancies, Agriculture Dept. (A) | 79* | 29 | −19 |
| 71721 | Allow law changes (housing cuts) in appropriation bill | 50 | 53 | −21 |
| 71722 | Cut new public housing from 50 to 5 thousand units (A) | 55 | 52 | −17 |
| 71723 | Cut Pres. emergency fund from $12.5 to one mil. (A) | 77* | 26 | −17 |
| 71725 | Cut new public housing from 50 to 5 thousand units (RCI) | 44 | 48 | −37 |
| 72003 | Gov't cannot buy housing sites near defense installations (A) | 72 | 36 | −29 |
| 72005 | Unemployment insurance, Federal employees (rules suspension) | −13 | −49 | 25 |
| 72601 | Have Tariff Comm. set "peril points" to protect industry (A) | 76 | 20 | −21 |
| 72603 | Loan India funds to buy U.S. wheat | −12 | −37 | 42 |
| 72622 | Cut funds for economic aid; Mutual Security Act (R) | 63 | 33 | −28 |
| 72623 | Mutual Security Act: funds for economic, military aid | −24 | −27 | 63* |
| 72625 | Increase lending authority, life of Export-Import Bank | −21 | 00 | 50 |
| 73102 | Kill extending draft, lowering age to 18 1/2 (R) | 28 | 18 | −44 |
| 73103 | Extend draft, lower age | −13 | −06 | 34 |
| 73105 | Kill new Negro veterans hospital in Virginia | 32 | −59 | −05 |
| 73123 | Cong. Com. approval needed to transfer large defense properties | 48 | 56 | −04 |
| 74003 | Restore powers of Rules Com. cut in 81st Cong. | 32 | 73* | −17 |
| 74025 | Extend D.C. rent control one year (C) | −36 | −36 | 59 |
| 75361 | Continue wage, rent, import, price controls, one month (LD) | −28 | −21 | 63* |
| 75362 | Ban rollbacks, new price ceilings during controls extension (A) | 12 | 78* | −21 |
| 75363 | Extend import controls, fats, peanuts, dairy, rice, 2 yrs. (A) | 27 | 73 | −16 |
| 75364 | Establish agency to decide state, local construction needs (A) | 68 | 20 | −31 |
| 75365 | No controls, amount of livestock handled by any one processor (A) | 27 | 73 | −23 |
| 75366 | No authority to Pres. to acquire or build new plants, etc. (A) | 78 | 35 | −21 |
| 75368 | No beef price rollback to less than 90% of May prices (A) | −04 | 74* | −29 |
| 75381 | No ceilings, beef products not showing "reasonable profit" (A) | 37 | 46 | −40 |
| 75382 | Freeze all prices, wages, salaries, but agricul. goods below parity (A) | 31 | 55 | −34 |
| 75383 | Ceiling formula, minimum of 85% high average previous profit (A) | 13 | 62 | −35 |
| 75384 | No ceilings, stategic minerals, metals, under certain conditions (A) | 56 | 26 | −37 |
| 75385 | No use of licensing authority to enforce price controls (A) | 43 | 63 | 00 |
| 75386 | No authority to control commodity speculation (A) | 33 | 73 | −21 |
| 75388 | Defense Production Act: price, rent, wage, other controls | −21 | −24 | 77* |
| 75403 | Individual, corporate, excise tax increase & revision | −66 | −14 | 35 |
| 75404 | Individual, corporate, excise tax increase & revision (RC) | −39 | 23 | 31 |
| 75408 | Tidelands oil resources to states | 37 | 65 | −05 |
| 81281 | Cut Defense Dept. funds for year, $207 mil. (A) | 65 | 31 | −08 |
| 81282 | Limit debate on funds for Independent Offices (LD) | 25 | 68 | −17 |
| 81284 | Cut T.V.A. funds $14 mil. (A) | 67 | 27 | −15 |
| 81285 | Cut new public housing; reduce personnel; add VA hospital funds (RC) | 53 | 50 | −30 |
| 81302 | Cut Bureau of Mines conservation funds (A) | 59 | 40 | −03 |
| 81305 | Cut Coast Guard funds $1.6 mil. (A) | 49 | 39 | −20 |
| 81306 | Cut European military aid $146 mil. (A) | 60 | 29 | −32 |
| 81321 | Cut Immigration & Naturalization Service funds $3 mil. (A) | 36 | 59 | −12 |
| 81501 | Increase, extend Social Security benefits | −24 | −42 | 34 |
| 81781 | Kill forcing disclosure, agreements between Pres. & Great Britain | −80* | 16 | 21 |
| 81801 | Cut European economic aid $615 mil. (A) | 59 | 45 | −19 |
| 81802 | Cut Asian technical, economic, military aid $111 mil. (A) | 39 | 55 | −23 |
| 81803 | Mutual Security Act: economic, military, technical aid | −21 | −30 | 60* |
| 81805 | McCarren-Walter immigration quota system | 29 | 74* | −10 |
| 82261 | High school & summer military training programs (A) | 40 | 17 | −42 |
| 82262 | Kill Universal Military Training; all 18 yr. olds (R) | 36 | 06 | −24 |
| 82965 | Create Com. to investigate tax-exempt foundations | 09 | 68 | −04 |
| 82966 | Funds for Com. to investigate tax-exempt foundations | 10 | 60 | −06 |
| 83005 | Continue Pres. emergency war powers to 7/53 | −25 | −15 | 53 |
| 83761 | No price ceiling, items sold below ceiling 3 mos. or not rationed (A) | 39 | 61 | −32 |
| 83762 | Guarantee customary mark-up to wholesalers & retailers (A) | 45 | 60 | −24 |
| 83763 | Abolish Wage Stabilization Board; new Com. may recommend only (A) | 47 | 69 | −11 |
| 83764 | Request Pres. invoke Taft-Hartley in steel strike (A) | 32 | 67 | −09 |
| 83765 | End price & wage controls in one month (A) | 24 | 45 | −56 |
| 83767 | Defense Production Act: Extend controls, allocations one year | −10 | 03 | 65* |
| | Percent of Predictable Variance | 34% | 31% | 15% |
| | Percent of Total Variance | 23% | 21% | 10% |

addition, the number of items loading .4 or higher more than doubles to 13.

The three highest loaded items on Factor III are votes to impose or extend the general Defense Production Act. This is the overall program for mobilization of resources in the Korean war effort. It includes price, wage, and rent controls as essential factors. It is to be particularly noted that only the program *as a whole* is relevant to this factor. Amendments, or changes in *aspects* of the program load primarily on the preceding two factors.

Foreign aid, primarily in the form of "Mutual Security" aid continues to load high on this factor. Another aspect of foreign aid enters at a lower level with the inclusion of loans to India. Except for a bill on the Export-Import Bank, the rest of the roll calls related to this factor have a decidedly war-orientated cast. The draft and Universal Military Training, as well as the War Power Act, all have this quality. Presence of D. C. rent control on the factor is probably related to the "control" aspects of the Defense Production Act. In general, this war orientation pervades the factor and a title other than "Foreign Aid" seems appropriate. The provisional title chosen is "Foreign Involvement." This is meant to be understood in terms of reactions to problems generated by involvement in foreign affairs.

*83rd Congress.* The dimensional structure of voting in the 83rd Congress seems, on the surface, to be very similar to the structures from the previous analyses. The same three-factor solution emerges, with each factor having about the same weight as its counterparts. These three factors account for 70 percent of the predictable, and more than 50 percent of the total variance, figures again roughly comparable to those from the previous analyses. Loadings of all the items on all the factors are given in Table 3.

As in the 81st Congress, the first factor is pre-eminent, accounting for 45 percent of the predictable variance and 30 percent of the total variance. Some two-thirds of the 68 retained items load .4 or higher, another indication of the importance of the factor. Only two items were excluded from the analysis because of their high correlation with party, however, and only seven items were excluded because they duplicated items loaded high on this factor. This might be one reason for the large number of relevant items as compared to previous analyses.

Again, there seems to be a shift in the content of the defining items. There is a new set of roll calls loaded .8 on the first factor, which seem to pivot on attempts by business interests to gain concessions in developing atomic energy. Coupled with the roll calls on taxing dividend income and the rest of the 11 highest loaded items, the "government intervention" concept, in a negative sense, continues to have some weight. There are, however, other, more surprising, roll calls. Hawaii statehood, the question of summary discharge for federal employees, construction of veterans hospitals, postal rates and the pay structure for postal employees, and a bill on labelling foreign trout are all involved with what has been previously called "particularistic" questions. They seem to be the type of bills which have previously loaded heavily along Factor II, the "Protection of Private or Local Interests" dimension. In fact, even the "atomic energy" issue, which included the famous Dixon-Yates controversy, could have been expected to relate strongly to Factor II. Furthermore, some of these bills seem to be related to the factor in the "wrong" way. Some items which appear to be "conservative" or anti-activity fall in the same direction as items which appear to be "pro-activity." A vote *for* 04441, for example, seems to be a vote against civil rights. In actuality, however, it is a vote for placing a federal court permit between the federal investigator and the person whose wire is to be tapped. The unamended bill had no such provision. The Democrats were against postal pay rates in 04481, whereas they are usually *for* greater bureaucracy strength. Investigation reveals that they were against the attached postal rate increase, considering it regressive taxation, and intended to vote *for* pay raises if they were introduced as a separate motion or bill. However, in the 81st Congress, Democrats voted *for* postal rate increases. Voting against a National Advisory Committee on Education is another slight reversal of form for the Democrats, as support is a similar reversal for the Republicans. The votes on the national debt limit are also unexpected. In light of all these considerations, the title "Active Role of Government in Society" seems somewhat suspect. However, primarily because of the nature of the defining items, this title is retained. The real difference seems to be that the bills have more of a conservative thrust than before. There are definite moves against "big government" and attempts to reduce government intervention. The atomic energy development items are the clearest case, but 02476 and 94618 also have this characteristic. Any tax reduction scheme also fits under this interpretation.

Factor II is weak compared to its counterparts in the two previous analyses. It accounts for only 18 percent of the predictable variance

### TABLE 3. ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS: 83RD CONGRESS

| Roll Call | | Factor Loading | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | I | II | III |
| 91261 | Extend allowing Mex. agricultural workers, 3 years | −12 | −74* | −13 |
| 91781 | Cut soil conservation funds $55 mil. (A) | −56 | 16 | 07 |
| 91784 | Add $2.2 mil., Missouri River Bank project (RCI) | 81 | 24 | 09 |
| 91796 | Add $6 mil. aid to school districts with federal projects (A) | 60 | 23 | 15 |
| 91797 | Add $25 mil. for hospital construction (RI) | 67 | 33 | 18 |
| 91801 | 35,000 new public housing units (RI) | 45 | 51 | 32 |
| 91803 | Let V.A. decide if certain veterans get free hospital care (RI) | 70 | 26 | 11 |
| 91821 | Add $8 mil., Southwest, Bonneville Power Admin. (RI) | 82 | 27 | 10 |
| 91822 | Mutual Security Ap.: military, economic, technical aid | 16 | 07 | 87* |
| 91823 | Cut European military assistance $212 mil. (RCI) | 08 | −36 | −64 |
| 91824 | Mutual Security: military, economic, technical aid (C) | −07 | 28 | 75* |
| 91825 | No summary discharge of personnel, State & other Depts. (A) | 77 | 17 | 16 |
| 91838 | $12.5 mil. for airports (A) | 65 | 23 | 15 |
| 91841 | Add $10 mil., V.A. medical, hospital, domiciliary (RCI) | 76 | 30 | 13 |
| 91854 | $10 mil., rural telephone loans | 74 | 01 | −09 |
| 91855 | Add $20 mil., Voice of America; no personnel cuts (RI) | 54 | 37 | 30 |
| 92061 | Maximum FHA loan interest of 6% on unpaid balance (RI) | 47 | 69 | 09 |
| 92062 | Use Unemployment Comp. reserve only to pay compensation (RI) | 38 | 75* | 15 |
| 92521 | Do not add one member to Tariff Com. (RI) | 87* | 08 | 10 |
| 92523 | Petroleum products import quotas; sliding tariff, lead, zinc | 20 | −03 | −26 |
| 92536 | Mutual Security Act: $5 bil. to continue aid one year | 19 | 05 | 84* |
| 92537 | Mutual Security Act: $5.2 bil. to continue aid one year (C) | 20 | −01 | 75 |
| 92543 | Special quota immigration visas; refugees, expellees, others | −27 | 50 | 40 |
| 92544 | Kill Pres. use of gov't. food for foreign emergencies (R) | 38 | −33 | −28 |
| 92545 | 1 mil. tons wheat for Pakistan | −06 | 12 | 48 |
| 93823 | Early creation of Health, Education & Welfare Dept. | −40 | −07 | 09 |
| 93824 | Speed consideration of Agricul. Dept. reorganization | 73 | 10 | 02 |
| 93835 | Disapprove reorganization of Defense Dept. | 48 | 23 | 03 |
| 93841 | Kill Hawaii statehood (R) | 73 | 06 | 00 |
| 93842 | Statehood for Hawaii | −36 | 37 | 11 |
| 93844 | Create Com. to study tax-exempt foundations | −27 | −48 | −32 |
| 94582 | Tidelands oil resources to states | −36 | −70* | −15 |
| 94584 | Federal control, Tidelands beyond "historic state boundaries" | −32 | −68* | −03 |
| 94585 | Kill selling government-owned rubber-plants | 29 | 65 | 13 |
| 94602 | Allow new private Niagara River power facilities | −50 | −35 | 18 |
| 94603 | Increase base period for calculating excess profits, new companies (RI) | 47 | −15 | −22 |
| 94604 | Extend excess profits tax to 1/54 | 00 | 11 | 30 |
| 94605 | Increase national debt limit only until 1/55 (RI) | 82 | 11 | 03 |
| 94616 | Increase national debt limit $15 bil. | −43 | −11 | 30 |
| 94617 | Kill ending Reconstruction Finance Corp. before 7/54 (RI) | 85* | 24 | 15 |
| 94618 | Kill ending annual stockholder listing, national banks (R) | 54 | 44 | 12 |
| 01411 | Flexible, lower parity; wheat, cotton, other farm products (A) | −69 | 09 | 08 |
| 01414 | Kill Gov't. recruiting Mex. farm labor (R) | 30 | 62* | 16 |
| 01843 | No funds, administer sales of FNMA mortgages below par (RI) | 83* | 26 | 08 |
| 01854 | Mutual Security Ap: $5.2 bil. to continue aid one year | 14 | 19 | 80* |
| 01857 | Add $17 mil. subsidy to air carriers (A) | −26 | −41 | −03 |
| 02441 | 35,000 new public housing per year, 1955–58 (RI) | 40 | 45 | 36 |
| 02463 | Establish National Advisory Com. on Education | −73 | −08 | 05 |
| 02464 | Authorize White House Conference on education | −49 | 40 | 17 |
| 02476 | Kill federal reinsurance of voluntary prepayment health insurance (R) | 59 | 05 | −21 |
| 02481 | Improve, expand social security (LD) | −43 | 38 | 15 |
| 02495 | Increase unemployment compensation, number of weeks paid (RI) | 44 | 72 | 13 |
| 02925 | Pres. cannot waive some laws in Mutual Security buying (RCI) | −03 | −16 | −75* |
| 04441 | Existing wiretap evidence admissable, Courts may allow getting new (A) | 76 | 18 | 07 |
| 04481 | Increase postal rates, postal pay | −83* | −28 | −13 |
| 04484 | Adjourn; not consider postal pay bill | −68 | −26 | −08 |
| 04496 | Kill giving public lands to timbermen as pay for land bought (R) | 44 | 30 | 17 |
| 05701 | No dividend tax cut; increase personal income tax exemption (RI) | 87* | 21 | 08 |
| 05702 | General revisions of Internal Revenue Code | −36 | −19 | −04 |
| 05703 | No 4% dividend tax credit (RCI) | 81 | 28 | 06 |
| 05704 | General revisions of Internal Revenue Code (C) | −40 | −18 | −02 |
| 05718 | Fed. Reserve not buy Treasury securities if U.S. funds in Reserve (RI) | 55 | 49 | 03 |
| 05722 | Create Corp. and provide funding for St. Lawrence Seaway | −10 | 11 | −01 |
| 05724 | Allow diverting water from Lake Michigan to control level | −51 | −13 | −02 |
| 05737 | Hardboard; new tariff & limit imports from Communists | −41 | −41 | −17 |
| 05738 | Restaurants must show origin of imported trout | −53 | −01 | 01 |
| 05741 | Normal patents, privately developed, non-military atomic inventions (A) | −72 | −23 | −13 |
| 05742 | Kill exchange of atom info. with allies & private atom develop. (R) | 82 | 29 | 03 |
| | PerCent of Predictable Variance | 46% | 18% | 13% |
| | PerCent of Total Variance | 30% | 12% | 9% |

and 12 percent of the total variance of the matrix. Seventeen items, about one-quarter of those retained for analysis, are loaded over .4 on this factor. The bills are somewhat more in line with expectations than are the bills relevant to Factor I. Treatment of Mexican agricultural workers and submerged oil resources (Tidelands) have been related to the second factors of the other analyses. The immigration-quota bill is clearly within this genre. The two roll calls on unemployment compensation involve a special aspect of the program. Administration of the program and decisions on who shall receive how much compensation for how long are ultimately in the hands of the states. The states are only limited by the amount of money the federal government contributes to their programs. Several states, mostly in the South, have programs which Northern liberals feel are not equitable. Both roll calls loaded on this factor represent attempts to bring these states into line. Argument against the motions heavily involved these states rights aspects. Once again, housing loads on the factor at a low level, and the persecution or special treatment of specific groups may be thought of as being involved in the vote on tax-exempt foundations. Sale of rubber-producing facilities would have been to specific companies. In view of all of the above, the title "Protection of Private or Local Interests" is retained.

The third and last major factor for the 83rd Congress retains content very similar to its counterparts from the previous congresses. It accounts for 13 percent of the predictable and slightly less than 9 percent of the total variance. The nine roll calls loaded .4 or higher on this factor clearly support an interpretation of the factor as "Foreign Aid."

## III. COMPARISONS OF FACTORS THROUGH TIME

Despite the shifts in emphasis from congress to congress, it is clear that the three-factor structures have a rough equivalence. This conclusion is embodied in each congress having one of its three major dimensions interpreted as reflecting the question of the government's role in society, another interpreted as reflecting the question of protecting local interests, and a third interpreted as reflecting questions of foreign affairs. Because of the overlap in congressional membership it is possible to test the extent of these relationships through congresses. The method employed is simple. Scores on each factor are assigned to each congressman. Those congressmen who "overlap" two congresses constitute the sample for cross-tabulation and correlation of the factors from those congresses.

There are several methods available for the construction of tests to represent factors. Perhaps the most widely accepted is the method of "test composites" specified by Thurstone,[8] or some minor variation. In this procedure, each item is weighted according to its relationship with the factor (i.e., its factor loading) and each individual's response to each item is multiplied by the item's weight. The resultant weighted item scores are then summed to give the individual's factor score. In this research an alternative procedure has been used. The above description of the Thurstone method clearly indicates that the highest loaded items on the factors will have by far the most effect on the factor scores. Using just these items produces a very high quality estimate of the factor scores. As has been previously noted, the factor analyses done in this research include unusually large numbers of variables. The traditional method of factor score assignment requires repeated manipulation of *all* the items in the matrix, a job much more arduous than the anticipated improvement of score assignment over an estimation procedure would justify for such large matrices. In addition, there is some reason to suspect that this "dominant cluster" approach produces more stable score assignments through repeated factorizations of the same items with different samples. The *clusters* vary less than the factor locations. Evidence presented later in this paper illustrates that this might be true in this study.[9]

For the ten factors extracted in this analysis, the number of items used to construct factor estimates varied from three to five. Scores on Factor IV from the 81st Congress (Rural Problems) were derived from the only three roll calls loaded above .4. Similarly, for "Foreign Aid" in the 81st Congress the only four roll calls above .6 were used. All other factors were described by five items, usually the five with the highest loadings. On three of the factors more "unidimensional" items replaced items with high loadings on factors other than the one they were supposed to represent. Items used in

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[8] For a complete discussion see Harman, *op. cit.*, 337–361.

[9] It might also be noted that the use of dominant clusters tends to produce scores much more similar to those which would have been derived using the results of an oblique rotation. The use of unweighted scores within *clusters* is obvious. However, the generally questionable value of weighting is pointed out by L. R. Aiken in "Another Look at Weighting Test Items," *Journal of Educational Measurement* (1966), 183–185.

TABLE 4. INTERCORRELATION MATRIX: ALL FACTOR SCORES
(MISSING DATA CORRELATIONS—UNEQUAL N'S)

| | 81-II | 81-III | 81-IV | 82-I | 82-II | 82-III | 83-I | 83-II | 83-III |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *81st Congress* | | | | | | | | | |
| I. Government Action | −.030 | .501 | −.381 | .881 | −.537 | .537 | .854 | −.664 | .379 |
| II. Local Interests | | −.018 | −.363 | .182 | .572 | .000 | .295 | .437 | −.216 |
| III. Foreign Aid | | | −.172 | .496 | −.385 | .719 | .511 | −.291 | .610 |
| IV. Rural Problems | | | | −.507 | −.080 | −.102 | −.539 | .086 | .053 |
| *82nd Congress* | | | | | | | | | |
| I. Government Action | | | | | −.444 | .518 | .909 | −.545 | .284 |
| II. Local Interests | | | | | | −.441 | −.343 | .768 | −.452 |
| III. Foreign Involvement | | | | | | | .483 | −.320 | .630 |
| *83rd Congress* | | | | | | | | | |
| I. Government Action | | | | | | | | −.501 | .222 |
| II. Local Interests | | | | | | | | | −.312 |
| III. Foreign Aid | | | | | | | | | |

creating factor scores are designated by asterisks in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

Because each of these items had roughly similar loadings on the factors they represent no weighting procedure was used. Each item counted equally, with a "pro" position adding three points to the congressman's factor score, a non-vote counting two, and an "anti" position adding one. Although these scores were used in all correlations the estimates were also recoded as either "high," "medium," or "low" for use in tabular presentations. For example, where five items were used to generate a factor score, a score of thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen would be classified as "pro," a score of five, six or seven as "anti." Thus, congressmen casting four or more "pro" votes, or three "pro" votes and two non-votes, would be classified as "pro." Since most of the original scores fell at one extreme or the other, as fifteens or fives, this procedure basically collapses the non-extreme congressman into a single "moderate" category.

At this point we are primarily concerned with the relationships among those factors we have posited as having common content through congresses. Are these factors persistent through time? Do the same dimensions emerge in consecutive congresses? It must be remembered that the method employed here allows only extremely tentative conclusions. Factor invariance is reliably testable through congruence (statistical) between factor *loadings* not between factor scores. The latter procedure opens correlations to a variety of problems, at least one of which will be documented below.

Table 4 contains the correlations among all the factors. It is clear that the first factor from each analysis (Active Role) represents about the same content. The lowest correlation among the three factors is .85, an indication of considerable consistency.

The three "foreign affairs" factors evidence somewhat less definite, but still very strong stability. The lowest correlation is .61, while the highest is .72. Table 5 shows the cross-tabulations of these factors, revealing few shifts of position through time. Interestingly, it is not the factor from the 82nd Congress which seems to produce the most changes, despite the fact that it has been singled out as having "different" content. One reason for

TABLE 5. STABILITY OF CONGRESSMEN'S POSITIONS THROUGH CONGRESSES

FACTOR III: FOREIGN AID INVOLVEMENT

| | | Pro | Mod | Anti | Pro | Mod | Anti |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 81st Congress | Pro | 193 | 27 | 5 | 135 | 23 | 16 |
| | Mod | 16 | 13 | 14 | 18 | 6 | 9 |
| | Anti | 5 | 26 | 42 | 6 | 8 | 41 |
| 82nd Congress | Pro | | | | 162 | 25 | 14 |
| | Mod | | | | 22 | 11 | 23 |
| | Anti | | | | 9 | 11 | 49 |

TABLE 6: STABILITY OF CONGRESSMEN'S POSITIONS THROUGH CONGRESSES

FACTOR II: PROTECTION OF PRIVATE OR LOCAL INTERESTS

| | | 82nd Congress | | | 83rd Congress | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Pro | Mod | Anti | Pro | Mod | Anti |
| 81st Congress | Pro | 86 | 19 | 0 | 69 | 14 | 0 |
| | Mod | 34 | 10 | 4 | 30 | 2 | 3 |
| | Anti | 50 | 19 | 102 | 66 | 23 | 60 |
| 82nd Congress | Pro | | | | 160 | 18 | 0 |
| | Mod | | | | 41 | 16 | 6 |
| | Anti | | | | 8 | 20 | 63 |

this finding could simply be item emergence. It is clear that the issues differentiating this factor from similar factors in the 81st and 83rd Congresses are *additions* to the base content of foreign aid. If there had been war mobilization during these two other congresses, the relevant bills should also have appeared high on the "Foreign" factors.

In contrast to the above two sets, the second factors from the three analyses show an erratic pattern. Whereas the correlation between the factors from the 82nd and 83rd Congresses is quite high (.77), relationships with the factor from the 81st Congress are comparatively low (.44, .57). The cross-tabulations of these three factors in Table 6, however, reveal some interesting information.

The empty cells in Table 6 call for explanation. Looking over the correlation matrix in Table 4, we find that only in the 81st Congress are "Active Role" and "Local Interest" highly unrelated. What this might indicate is that only in the 81st Congress are there "pure" marker variables for the second factor. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the relative positions of marked variables on the first two factors from the three analyses. It is clear that the cluster for the second factor of the 81st Congress is "purer" than the counterpart clusters in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

Inspection of the factor matrices reveals that items which appeared to be related to the "Local Interest" factor in the 81st Congress about .55 seem to have content very close to the items *defining* the factor in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Two examples would be Rules Committee power (56742, 74003) and treatment of Mexican laborers (61527, 71004, 01414). Thus, in the absence of the relatively clear Negro civil rights items there has probably been some slight rotation of the axes toward the content of these items. Although Figure 3 makes the point much more clearly than Figure 2, the items loaded .6 or above are much more likely to fall in the same quadrant in the 82nd or 83rd Congress than in the 81st. If Factor I is reflected in the 81st Congress, eight of thirty-one items have different signs (or one of the weights is zero) on Factor I and Factor II. In the 82nd Congress only one of eighteen items does not have the same sign on the two factors. In the 83rd Congress all 24 items loaded above .6 have the same sign on the two factors. In other words, there seem to be more orthogonal clusterings in the 81st Congress than in either the 82nd or 83rd. As an approximation, a rotation of approximately 17 degrees would seem to give a better positioning of the first axis relative to the items loaded high on Factor I, in both the 82nd and 83rd Congresses (see dotted lines in Figures 2 and 3). This seventeen degree rotation would, of course, also pertain to the second factors as well. With such a rotation loadings of the defining items for "Local Interests" in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses would all fall between .5 and .72. The Rules Committee vote in the 81st Congress (56742) loads .56. Mexican worker roll calls would load .68 in the 82nd Congress (71044) and .67 in the 83rd Congress (61527), while the counterpart roll call 01414, loads .54 in the 81st Congress. In general, such rotations would tend to further equalize the locations of the factors through congresses. However, it should be noted that the *defining items* would remain essentially the same after rotation. The exceptions would be that 81781 would decrease in importance in defining Factor I (new loading would be .73), and 73105, on building a Negro veterans hospital, would gain in importance in defining Factor II in the 82nd Congress. In general, however, the positions of the congressmen relative to each other on these items would remain stable. We see that less "unidimensional" items are the marker items for "Local Interests" in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. There are no clusters of roll calls in these congresses which represent

Fig. 1. 81st Congress.

Factor I vs. Factor II: Marker Items
(Some Items Reflected)



the unique content of the factor as clearly and purely as do the Negro civil rights bills in the 81st Congress.

In fact, the marker items for "Local Interests" in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses tend to represent a less extreme pro-local position than do the bills defining the factor in the 81st Congress. On a "face" level we can appreciate this by studying the contents of these votes. If an assumption that the marker variables are "cutting" the same dimension at different points is correct we can explain the low correlations in Table 4 and still maintain the position that the dimensions are essentially the same. In fact, the cross-tabulations tend to bear this assumption out. Forgetting, for the moment, the "moderate" category and treating the factor scores as dichotomies, we may diagram the situation as shown in Figure 4.

In line with the above analysis, the "cutting point" between being "pro" or "anti" Local Interests lies closer to "pro" in the 81st Congress. In other words, it is "easier" to be classified as "anti" than as "pro." Just the opposite situation is postulated for the 82nd and 83rd Congresses; the cutting point lies closer to "anti." Thus, we find that the group near the middle which was classified as "anti" in the 81st Congress is classified as "pro" in the 82nd and 83rd. Even with exactly the same dimension three times, the "cutting point" phenomenon would produce correlations with the factor from the 81st Congress of about .5. There would be no shifting between congresses

FIG. 2. 82nd Congress.

Factor I vs. Factor II: Marker Items
(Some Items Reflected)



from "pro" to "anti;" only from "anti" to "pro." In other words, there would be zero cells in the cross-tabulations. Returning to Table 6, we see that the zero cells appear, as predicted, and are in the appropriate locations. Not a single congressman who was *for* "Local Interests" in the 81st Congress voted *against* this position in either the 82nd or 83rd. The group in the middle, who, as we shall see in the next section, are mostly Republicans, found that the specific items which defined the factor were less pro-local in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Thus, although their attitude towards the underlying "problem" remained the same, they received different scores on the factor.

## IV. PARTY, REGION AND DIMENSIONS OF CLEAVAGE

One need not be a particularly sophisticated political scientist to expect that the opposing blocs defining the emergent factors are in turn largely defined by party allegiance and regional location. Such is, in fact, the case. The first factor in each of the analyses is correlated highly with party. The correlations are .81, .91, and .96 in the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses respectively. Thus, as would be expected, location on the most important single dimension of voting is strongly, if not perfectly, related to the most important single structural element of American political life. Although many analysts have pointed out that American parties do not have much power in *demanding* votes from their members the parties *do* predict behavior on many votes very well. In fact, party allegiance predicts the location of individual congressmen on the factors better than it predicts their behavior on almost any single bill. The highest correlation between party and voting on any single bill in this analysis is .89. Thus, we may assume that the parties do tend to recruit or advance as candidates men with essentially different ideas about how active a role the government should take in society.

The second and third factors are primarily defined by cleavages within one party or the other. The presence of votes on Negro civil rights indicates that the second factor is related to the North-South split in the Democratic party, at least in the 81st Congress. The location of Republicans on this factor is also of some interest. Table 7 contains the correlations between bloc location and voting on this factor for Democrats only, (Border Democrats are here classified as Northern), and then for the entire congress; first by region and then by grouping the Republicans with the Southern Democrats in opposition to Northern Democrats.

The results in Table 7 indicate that within the Democratic party regional location specifies voting on the "Local Interests" factor to a very high degree in all three congresses and that Republicans from all areas tend to vote as a bloc. This bloc shifts from a coalition with the

FIG. 3. 83rd Congress.

Factor I vs. Factor II: Marker Items
(Some Items Reflected)



FIG. 4. Types of Congressmen.
Votes on Factor II: All Three Congresses



Northern Democrats in the 81st Congress to a coalition with the Southern Democrats in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses, where the more extreme Negro civil rights bills do not define the factor. Thus, the Republicans constitute the bulk of that group of "shifting," "in-the-middle" Representatives on this factor discussed in the previous section.

Following the work of Grassmuck and others, the "Foreign-related" factors were examined, paying attention to the "midwestern" vs. "coastal" split within the Republican Party.[10]

Table 8 contains correlations with the third factor, first for region within the Republican party alone, then by dividing the Democrats as well as Republicans into "Midwest" and "Coastal," and, finally, by grouping all Democrats with the "Coastal" Republicans.

Although a large amount of the variance in voting behavior is accounted for by these groupings the results are not as striking as they were for the other two major factors. In particular, Midwestern Democrats do not vote with their Republican counterparts. In fact, more Southern than Midwestern Democrats vote against "foreign involvement." The Southerners are fairly well split on this issue. Nevertheless, within the Republican party regional location does seem to have predictive utility.

TABLE 7. BLOC MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS ON FACTOR II: "LOCAL INTERESTS" CORRELATIONS, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

| | 81-II | 82-II | 83-II |
|---|---|---|---|
| North vs. South, Democrats only | .88 | .84 | .82 |
| North vs. South, all congressmen | .81 | .25 | .30 |
| Southern Democrats vs. all "others" | .81 | .25 | .30 |
| Northern Democrats vs. all "others" | .40 | .71 | .82 |

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[10] G. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950). The definition of "Midwestern" districts used in this analysis combines Grassmuck's "Lake" and "Great Plains" states.

TABLE 8. BLOC MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS ON FACTOR III: FOREIGN AID/INVOLVEMENT CORRELATIONS, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

| | 81-III | 82-III | 83-III |
|---|---|---|---|
| Midwest vs. Coastal, Republicans only | .50 | .42 | .53 |
| Midwest vs. Coastal, all congressmen | .38 | .40 | .31 |
| Midwest Republicans vs. all "others" | .57 | .53 | .43 |

The importance of region in structuring voting on these two factors invites again the question of why region should act as an important independent variable. Few theorists who have confronted the issue present satisfactory explanations. From Holcombe to Key, Alford, Grassmuck, Turner and MacRae the finding has been duly noted and then quickly passed over.[11] This might partially stem from the perspective most of the theoretically oriented researchers have taken; they tend to analyze voting behavior in publics and try to explain differences in party strength in various regions. Here, however, regionalism has its most important influence on cleavage *within* parties. Perhaps the best we can do at this point is to speculate that region tends to act as a sort of collective variable, adding the effects of a variety of influences all distributed geographically.

*Changes in the Dimensions of Cleavage: Elections, Presidents and War.* Although the basic dimensional structure remains the same through congresses, obvious changes in the contents of these factors have also been noted. In part these changes relate to the changing composition of the congress; in part they relate to a change in the type of President and administration with which the congress had to deal (Truman vs. Eisenhower); and in part they relate to other historical events, particularly the advent and cessation of the Korean War.

The nature of the changes in the composition of the congress should be presented in some detail. Four important blocs for the generation of cleavage dimensions have been distinguished above—Northern Democrats (ND), Southern Democrats (SD), Midwestern Republicans (MR), and Coastal Republicans (CR). Except for the Southern Democrats each of these groups experienced substantial changes in the size of its membership between the 81st and 83rd Congresses. Table 9 contains the approximate (only full-term members included) number of congressmen in each of the four blocs for each congress.

Most immediately striking about these statistics are: close to a 30 percent drop in number of Northern Democrats from the 81st to the 83rd Congress; a 25 percent rise in Midwestern Republicans; and a 34 percent rise in Coastal Republicans. The increase in Midwestern Republicans came wholly in the 1950 elections, while most of the increase in Coastal Republicans came during the 1952 elections. Northern Democratic losses were somewhat higher in the 1950 elections, but accounted, as might be expected, for almost all Republican gains. With these changes in mind we may turn to an examination of the changes in the dimensions of cleavage.

### 1. *Changes in Factor I; Active Role of Government:*

Factor I, the strongest factor in each analysis, and in some ways the least varying through time, still has an interesting history. In the 81st Congress the factor is marked by the rela-

TABLE 9. BLOC MEMBERSHIP, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

| | 81 | 82 | 83 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Democrats | 154 | 127 | 112 |
| Southern Democrats | 99 | 101 | 99 |
| Midwest Republicans | 71 | 89 | 89 |
| Coastal Republicans | 94 | 109 | 128 |

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[11] A. N. Holcombe, *The New Party Politics* (New York: Norton, 1933); V.O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961); R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963); Grassmuck, *op. cit.*; J. Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); and D. MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting, op. cit.*

tive strength of the pro-action coalition of Northern and Southern Democrats. They hold a 3-to-2 majority over the Republican coalition underlying the anti-action forces. By the 82nd Congress, this lead has dwindled to the point where the defection of approximately 20 votes reverses the results of any roll call primarily oriented toward this dimension. As defined by actual voting behavior (factor scores), however, the relative strength of the voting blocs seems to have actually shifted to the anti-action forces by a very slight majority because of a substantial number of Southern "defectors." In the 83rd Congress, the Republicans barely outnumber the Democrats, with the anti-action votes having a 5-to-4 majority.

Perusal of the roll calls defining Factor I for the 81st Congress shows a content indicative of a strong liberal thrust. The roll calls tend to be either on bills trying to extend liberal programs or on amendments or motions seeking to debilitate or kill essentially liberal bills. This latter kind of roll call tends to represent defensive measures by anti-action forces against pro-action proposals. In the 82nd Congress the factor concentrates more on government costs, with anti-action forces seeming to take the offensive in decreasing spending. These roll calls also tend to be amendments, but this is primarily because appropriations measures are almost always submitted as hopeful overestimates. Thus, any economy drive, even one to reduce the budget from what it was the previous year, tends to take the form of amendments. In addition, the "Active Role" factor seems to be weaker in the 82nd Congress than in the other congresses, accounting for less variance and having fewer items loaded above .4. Where the factor has a sense of stalemate in the 82nd Congress, it seems to represent a slightly tenuous counterthrust by the anti-action forces in the 83rd. Tax cuts for stockholders are proposed, and atomic energy patent rights are granted to private business. The pro-action forces have to fight defensive battles to increase proposed funds for the Air Force, veterans' hospitals, public power projects, and rural telephones. Amendments must be made to lessen the effects of wiretapping and summary discharge bills. As a final difference among the three congresses, we should remember that the "Active Role" factor correlated more highly with party in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses than in the 81st.

These findings suggest that where control or predominance by a given coalition is in doubt, the majority coalition will tend to stick together to a much greater extent, and press for positions which are acceptable to its less committed members. Where the size of an "extreme" bloc, such as the Northern Democrats, is especially large, issues more in its image will emerge, and more of the less committed members will desert the coalition to vote with its opponents. For a real thrust to be generated, the number of highly committed members must be quite sizeable.

Besides the changes in bloc sizes it is probable that at least two major historical events shaped the changes in this factor. President Truman, in view of his State of the Union message and his voting record as a Senator, would almost undoubtedly be classified as having "pro-action" tendencies. On the other hand, Eisenhower seemed to belong in either the anti-action, or, perhaps, the moderate category. Despite the fact that anti-action forces seemed to have slight control over the 82nd Congress, they might not have advanced a strong program because of pressure from the President. In the 83rd Congress, with Eisenhower, they could grow bolder. The second probable major influence was the Korean War. The effect of the war seems concentrated in the 82nd Congress. Congressional reaction to the war at the end of the 81st Congress tended to be quick accession to the demands of the President and unified voice votes. Since congress had almost adjourned, most of its program had already been considered. Thus, if the war were to have any effect in the 81st Congress, it would tend to be in terms of additions to legislation already considered, and should not drastically affect the basic dimensional structure or content. On the other hand, the war provided an excellent opportunity for anti-action, anti-government-spending forces to press their position in the 82nd Congress. With so much of the nation's funds being diverted to the war effort, it seemed natural that attempts to cut other costs would gain headway. If the anti-action forces had had an anti-action president, or an anti-action majority of considerable size, they might have tried more drastic cuts. For the 82nd Congress, however, they could successfully throttle attempts at expansion of spending and cut back on many programs as well. By the 83rd Congress, the war had subsided from its emergency state and the anti-action forces could begin to press their advantage. With a Republican president of moderate persuasion, however, they probably held back from demanding changes as great as they wished.

### 2. *Changes in Factor II; Protection of Local and Private Interests:*

It is in Factor II that the greatest changes took place. Not one, but two coalition patterns

TABLE 10. FACTOR II: PROTECTION OF PRIVATE OR LOCAL INTERESTS SIZES OF ALTERNATIVE COALITION PATTERNS AND ACTUAL VOTING BLOCS, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

| | 81-II | 82-II | 83-II |
|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Democrats (Anti) | 164 (38%) | 128 (30%) | 112 (27%) |
| All other congressmen (Pro) | 264 (62%) | 299 (70%) | 316 (74%) |
| All other congressmen (Anti) | 319 (76%) | 326 (76%) | 329 (77%) |
| Southern Democrats (Pro) | 99 (24%) | 101 (24%) | 99 (23%) |
| Anti | 235 (66%) | 122 (36%) | 82 (23%) |
| Pro | 118 (33%) | 218 (64%) | 277 (77%) |

have relevance for this factor. Table 10 gives each of these coalitions and the "actual" sizes of the opposed voting blocs.

Although there are definite changes in the relative coalition sizes, it does not seem that this structural variable is the major source of change in the factor. We have already noted that the shift in coalition patterns is probably due to a "cutting-point" phenomena, which, in turn, stems from the absence of unidimensional and strongly anti-local civil rights bills in both the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Instead, it is probable that the great reduction in the number of Northern Democrats, the most committed group for Negro civil rights, accounts for these highly anti-local bills not emerging in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

In other words, we might take the position that a given bloc must be particularly strong to bring to the floor a bill that all three other blocs prefer not be raised. If this is the case, the mechanism for withholding items from consideration is probably control over committees. Thus, the votes which took power away from the Rules Committee in the 81st Congress and and then returned it in the 82nd are both symbolic and significant. We might assume that the "shifting" Republicans preferred not to have civil rights bills brought up, but that if the bills *were* moved, they would vote with Northern Democrats on the roll calls. Another possibility is that when Republican strength grew large enough they made a "deal" with the Southern Democrats, suppressing civil rights bills in return for votes on other pro-local and anti-action measures. This might account for the large number of roll calls having high loadings on both the "Local Interests" and "Active Role" factors in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

Another strong possibility is that the war was a primary source of change in Factor II. The integrative problems of a society faced with war tend to center around problems directly rising out of war-necessitated societal change. War may be viewed as a decisive external force on the given societal system which eventually leads to a new set of important integrative problems and attempted solutions. Thus, society might not be prepared, while threatened, to reopen the divisive question of reallocation of resources by racial groups.

Although this "war" argument might hold for the 82nd Congress, it is more difficult to see how it works for the 83rd. In all probability, the general inactivity and balance of forces in the 83rd Congress produced the comparatively small amount of variance accounted for by Factor II. Everything seemed to gravitate towards the party split, Factor I, de-emphasizing the differences within the parties.

### 3. *Changes in Factor III; Foreign Aid/Involvement:*

The major change in Factor III seems to have more obvious roots in historical events than do changes in either of the factors discussed above. The factor is somewhat concerned with military aid in the 81st Congress, but, in general, is more orientated towards foreign aid in the more altruistic sense. With the coming of war, the aid bills of Factor III become more uniformly military in nature. In addition, the factor becomes partially defined by war mobilization roll calls in the 82nd Congress and takes on more importance, as defined by amount of variance involved. Although mobilization is no longer an important issue by the 83rd Congress, the effects of the recent war are still felt, as military aid still defines most of the items on Factor III.

One other change in Factor III should be noted. In the 83rd Congress, the proportion of Coastal Republicans who were pro-involvement increased markedly, while the proportion of Southern Democrats taking this position declined. The most probable explanation of these findings seems to be relationship with the President. Eisenhower took a pro-foreign involvement position, and this probably influenced large numbers of Coastal Republicans, who had previously tended towards the "moderate" range, to move to positive positions. The same factors probably were at work on the Southern Democrats when Truman was president.[12]

## V. CONCLUSION

In the preceding section, the major changes in each factor occurring through time were related to contemporary changes in other political and societal elements. Three major external sources were posited. The first primarily involved the progressive decline in importance of the Northern Democratic bloc. This bloc was identified as probably defining one extreme position on *each* of the major factors. On Factor I, "Active Role," both Republican blocs seem equally extreme in defining the opposite position. On Factor II, "Local Interests," Southern Democrats are almost uniform in their opposition to the Northern Democrats. The other side of Factor III, "Foreign Aid/Involvement," was defined by Midwestern Republicans. With the decline of Northern Democratic power and the increase in Republican strength, no single bloc could gain even partial dominance over the congress and the committees. Thus, the 82nd and 83rd Congresses saw extreme bills suppressed and an atmosphere conducive to "deals" among the blocs.

The second major event posited as important was the transfer of the presidency from a pro-action Democrat to an anti-action, pro-foreign Republican. This probably influenced Factor I in the differential extent anti-action groups in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses could press their position. On Factor III, the presidential shift probably caused redistribution of moderates of both parties into more extreme positions, Southern Democrats swinging towards anti-foreign voting and Coastal Republicans changing in the other direction.

Finally, from among the notable historical events of the six-year period, the Korean War was advanced as having by far the most pervasive influence. Some issues were probably suppressed and others raised primarily because of this change in the environment. All three factors seemed to feel the weight of this influence.

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[12] In comparing foreign policy votes in the 81st (Truman), 86th (Eisenhower) and 87th (Kennedy) Congresses, Kesselman documents this point. Significant proportions of Democrats moved from internationalist to isolationist positions after Eisenhower's election while a similar number of Republicans changed in the opposite direction. After Kennedy's election the process was reversed, several Republicans becoming isolationist and several Democrats changing to internationalist positions: M. Kesselman, "Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy, A Replication of a Hypothesis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (November, 1965), 401–406.

# AN ATTEMPT TO SIMULATE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I[1]

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Political games and simulations are models or representations of particular political systems and their associated processes. They are techniques for reproducing in a simplified form selected aspects of one system, $A$, in some independent system, $A'$. Games and simulations have a dynamic quality produced by the complex interaction of properties in the model. This feature enables them to generate states of the system that differ radically from those present originally. The kinds of transformations that may occur between the initial and final states of a simulation or game are difficult to represent by other means, despite a diversity in modeling procedures ranging from verbal descriptions to differential equations. Because of their apparent applicability to many problems of politics, as well as their novelty, games and simulations have been developed in a variety of areas in political science.[2] They have been used in research, instruction, and policy formation. Although the application of these techniques has been increasing, systematic evaluation of their performance is only now beginning. This essay reports one type of evaluation.

The researchers sought to structure a simulation of international politics so it would reproduce features of the political crisis that preceded the beginning of the First World War. Two separate trials or runs of the simulation were performed as a pilot project. With two runs, the data are sufficient only to illustrate what might be done in an expanded research program.[3]

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[1] This research was conducted under Contract N123(60530)25875A from Project Michelson, U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California. An earlier report on this project was distributed by the contractor as *Studies in Deterrence X: Validation Studies of the Inter-Nation Simulation*, NOTS Technical Paper 3351, December, 1963. The authors wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Harold Guetzkow, principal investigator and mentor; Thomas W. Milburn, director of Project Michelson; and Robert C. North and his colleagues at the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration who generously shared their document collection and data analysis on the outbreak of World War I. The Center of International Studies at Princeton University supported the first author during the preparation of the present article.

[2] In addition to the studies cited elsewhere in this paper, the variety is suggested by the following illustrations: Oliver Benson, "A Simple Diplomatic Game," in James A. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1961), 504–511; William P. Davison, "A Public Opinion Game," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (1961), 210–220; Robert P. Abelson and Alex Bernstein, "A Computer Simulation Model of Community Referendum Controversies," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 93–122; Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political-Military Exercise: A Progress Report," *Orbis*, 8 (1965), 854–870; Andrew M. Scott with William A. Lucas and Trudi M. Lucas, *Simulation and National Development* (New York: Wiley, 1966); J. David Singer and Hirohide Hinomoto, "Inspecting for Weapons Production: A Modest Computer Simulation," *Journal of Peace Research* (1965), 18–38; James A. Robinson, Lee F. Anderson, Margaret G. Hermann, and Richard C. Snyder, "Teaching with Inter-Nation Simulation and Case Studies," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), 53–65.

[3] The simulation runs were conducted in the summer of 1961 at Northwestern University. The exploratory nature of these runs led the authors to question whether the pilot study should be published. The supply of the original Navy report, however, is now exhausted. Moreover, no more complete set of historical runs has been conducted to date. Because a number of other published materials have discussed these pilot runs, it seems appropriate to make a fuller description of the World War I simulation more widely available. In doing so, the authors wish to caution that the work is primarily an examination of a means of evaluating simulations rather than a direct validation of the Inter-Nation Simulation. For examples of how this pilot project has been discussed elsewhere, see Arthur Herzog, *The War-Peace Establishment* (New York: Harper, 1963), esp. 183–184; Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality, and Theory in International Relations," *World Politics*, 16 (1964), esp. 507–515; James A. Robinson and Richard C. Snyder,

The study was undertaken to investigate the use of a historical situation as a means of validating simulations. The problems of model validity are critical in determining the value of the simulation-gaming technique not only to political science, but to all the social sciences. In a fuller discussion of simulation validity elsewhere,[4] one of the authors has indicated that model validity is always a matter of degree and is affected by (1) the purpose for which the model is used, (2) whether or not human participants are involved, and (3) the types of criteria employed. The World War I simulation explores the third area—criteria for estimating validity. It focuses on possible standards or criteria for establishing the goodness of fit between the simulation and the system represented. To what extent do features of a political system or its processes correspond to their simplified representation in a model? One means of investigating this question is to ascertain if a simulation produces events similar to those reported in a historical situation. Another approach is to determine whether the simulation supports more general hypotheses about political phenomena which previously have been confirmed by independent methods. Both events and hypotheses are used as validity criteria in the simulation of the 1914 crisis.

Although the validity issue is the primary reason for conducting the simulation of World War I, several other purposes are served by the exercise. First, it provides a milieu in which to explore the relative effect on political actions of personality characteristics as compared to variables more frequently associated with political analysis. Second, the simulation of past events offers a possible device for teaching and studying history.

## I. PROCEDURE

*The Inter-Nation Simulation.* Researchers differ as to the distinction between games and simulations. A number of experimenters, however, have associated "games" with operating models that involve human participants and "simulations" with models which do not.[5] Usually human participants are involved when the procedures or rules for designating the interplay of all components in the model have not been explicitly determined. When the model's relationships are incompletely programmed, human players and administrators are required to make judgments during the game. If the relationships are programmed, the need for human decision makers is reduced. In this essay an operating model will be defined as a simulation rather than a game, if a separate staff or computer is required to execute the programmed features. Thus, it is possible to have a simulation that is partially programmed and partially determined by human participants.

The model of international politics used in this study is such a hybrid. Developed by Harold Guetzkow and his associates,[6] the Inter-Nation Simulation incorporates both human participants and programmed calculations. In its usual format the Inter-Nation Simulation involves five or more nations. The government of each simulated nation is represented by human participants who assume one of several decision-making positions. During the 50-to-70 minute periods into which the simulation is divided, the decision makers allocate the military, consumer, and natural-industrial resources available to their nation. These various types of resources have different functions in domestic and international affairs. Using their resources the participants make decisions about internal matters such as economic growth, government stability, defense preparations, and research and development programs. At the international level nations may enter alliances, negotiate trades or aids, engage in various kinds of hostilities, and participate in international organizations.

Every period, which represents approximately one year of "real" time, the decision makers record their actions on a standardized decision form. Then, either a calculation staff or a computer applies the programmed rules to the decision form to determine the net gain or loss in the various types of resources. The structured part of the model also establishes whether the decision makers have maintained

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"Decision-Making in International Politics," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 445, 512; and J. David Singer, "Data-Making in International Relations," *Behavioral Science*, 10 (1965), p. 77.

[4] Charles F. Hermann, "Validation Problems in Games and Simulations with Special Reference to Models of International Politics," *Behavorial Science*, in press.

[5] For a discussion of the distinctions made between games and simulations, see Charles F. Hermann, "Games and Simulations of Political Processes," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, in press.

[6] Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. Noel, and Richard C. Snyder, *Simulation in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

TABLE 1. FOUR SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR 1914 NATIONAL PROFILES

| Nation | Basic Capability Units[a] | Force Capability Units[b] | Validator Satisfaction[c] | Decision Latitude[d] |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria-Hungary | 45,540 | 14,560 | 4 | 7 |
| England | 86,940 | 25,000 | 6 | 3 |
| France | 62,100 | 20,800 | 4 | 3 |
| Germany | 120,000 | 24,500 | 7.5 | 8 |
| Russia | 78,660 | 23,000 | 4.5 | 9 |
| Serbia | less than 4,140 | less than 1,700 | not given | not given |

Note.—With the exception of decision latitude, the 1914 data and procedures for estimating these parameters were derived from James A. Winnefeld, "The Power Equation Europe, 1914," Stanford University (1960).

[a] Basic capability units represent the human, natural, and industrial resources available in a country. For the 1914 period the following indices were combined: steel production, national income, and total population weighted by the rate of male literacy.

[b] Force capability units are the military component in the simulation and were calculated by combining two indices, regular peacetime armies and capital ships.

[c] Validator satisfaction is the degree to which a decision-maker's policies are acceptable to those elite groups with power to authenticate his office holding. A "crisis coefficient" composed of the frequencies of certain types of events (e.g., civil disturbances and insurrections, assassinations) in a given country in the 50 years preceding 1914 was combined with an indicator of national security (relative military strength). The integrated estimates of satisfaction were placed along a 10-point scale. Higher values represent more satisfaction with the government.

[d] Decision latitude is an ideological element. It is defined as the degree to which probability of office holding is responsive to changes in validator satisfaction. To estimate decision latitude, judges rated the nations on a 10-point scale. Higher values represent greater latitude for the government (i.e., less sensitivity to the demands of validators).

the support of the politically relevant sectors of the nation whose endorsement is required for them to remain in office. The calculated results are fed back to each nation, thus beginning a new period of interactions and decisions by the participants.

*Adapting the Simulation.* Five nations were represented in the simulation runs of the 1914 crisis. Each government was staffed by two decision makers. A third participant in each nation acted as a messenger. The five simulated nations were intended to replicate features of Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, and Russia. Italy was excluded altogether and Serbia was represented symbolically by the researchers without participants. Several reasons can be offered for this treatment of Italy and Serbia. Reliable records of their diplomatic communications (a major input in the simulation of the other nations) were not available. Secondly, one can argue that although Serbia seemingly precipitated the immediate conflict and Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, both nations were on the periphery in determining the question of world war when compared to the five other countries. Their exclusion, therefore, did not hinder the purposes of the exploratory runs. Although frequently other runs of the Inter-Nation Simulation have included more nations and more participants per nation, these changes are not as fundamental as several others.

Two major modifications were made in the basic simulation model. The first alteration established the initial conditions which the experimenters deemed important to characterize the international situation in the summer of 1914. Participants were introduced to some of the attributes of the historical setting by means of (1) a brief history of selected international affairs prior to the beginning of the crisis, (2) a statement of the current domestic and foreign policies of the participant's nation and the reasons they were being pursued, (3) a sketch of several personality traits of the historical policy maker whose role the participant occupied, and (4) a set of relevant historical diplomatic messages, conversations, and newspapers for the time between the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke on June 28 and the Serbian reply to the ultimatum on July 25, 1914. In addition, an effort was made to fit the programmed parameters and variables of the simulation to the national profiles of the countries involved.[7]

Several of these inputs require elaboration. Values for most of the components in the programmed part of the simulation were based on 1914 statistical indices (e.g., population, gross national product, size of armed forces) that approximated the meaning of the model's parameters. The 1914 indices were multiplied by an arbitrary constant to convert them to amounts convenient for use in the simulation. Individuals familiar with recent European history were asked to estimate decision latitude, the parameter that indicates how sensitive policy makers must be to the politically-relevant segments of their nation. These judges rated the decision latitude of each nation on a 10-point scale. Higher values were assigned to nations whose policy makers enjoyed greater freedom of action. Table 1 displays the values of each nation's basic parameters as they were reported to the simulation participants at the beginning of both runs. The historical diplomatic materials used in the simulation were compiled from hundreds of communications and documents which had been translated, edited, and verified by the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration under the editorship of Howard Koch.[8] The procedures for determining the personality characteristics are described in the section on participants and their historical counterparts.

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[7] The international history, the statements of domestic and foreign policy, and the personality sketches appear as appendices in Technical Paper 3351, *op. cit.* A complete set of the diplomatic messages in the form in which they were used in the simulation is on file with the contracting agency and with the International Relations Program, Northwestern University. For values assigned the basic parameters, see Table 1.

All of the structured inputs were masked to avoid revealing to the participants that an actual historical situation was being modeled. Proper nouns, e.g., the names of individuals, countries, and alliances, were falsified. Misleading cues casting events in the future were introduced into the world history. In addition, after a pretest the assassination at Sarajevo was modified to avoid disclosing the identity of the historical setting. In the revised simulation account, several major Austro-Hungarian officials were killed by a strafing aircraft while they were on a reviewing stand in Serbia. These precautions were taken in order that the participants' knowledge of history would not bias their responses. The introduction of an extensive amount of structured material in the initial phase of the operating model represented an important modification of the usual practice in the Inter-Nation Simulation.

The second major alteration in the Inter-Nation Simulation affected the time units represented in the model. Usually the simulation is divided into 50-to-70 minute periods which constitute the equivalent of a year in the "real" world. These intervals are associated with a year because of the programmed calculations. Every period the policy makers allocate their national resources. The consequences of their allocations are determined by the relationships between a number of variables in the programmed part of the simulation. Examples of these variables include the rate of depreciation in existing military equipment, the amount of lead time required for a new research program, and the extent of shift in popular support for the government. The equations used to calculate these and other variables are designed to reflect changes that might occur on roughly an annual basis. As a result, decisions taken by the participants and submitted for calculation normally represent the allocation of resources for approximately twelve months.

The present exercise, however, required the representation of not years, but the few critical days in late July, 1914. This reduction in time necessitated several seemingly contradictory changes. On the one hand, the existing programmed calculations had to be made relevant to the participants. If the basic model was to be maintained, persons involved in the exercise had to experience the constraints and demands imposed on their immediate behavior by the programmed features of the simulation as it is usually constituted. On the other hand, participants required a time framework that would allow them to deal with the kinds of decisions that policy makers might encounter on a daily rather than annual basis. In sum, the individuals in the simulation had to be able to make short-term decisions, while being aware of the long-term consequences as represented in the programmed calculations.

To meet these requirements only individuals who had previous experience with the Inter-Nation Simulation were invited to participate in the exercise. These experienced participants were told that the first few simulation periods would represent days. Moreover, there was the implication that these short time frames would be followed by periods which would be equivalent to years as in previous simulations. To further the impression that the initial periods were to be embedded in a series of longer time units, the participants received an annual decision form and were instructed to submit an updated version for calculations when the simulation periods began to represent years. These arrangements were made to encourage the participants to take account of the basic programmed variables and parameters in conducting their immediate interactions. A decision maker is more likely to act in a short-term situation so as not to damage such programmed variables as the probability of his continuing in office or the annual amount of consumer goods available to his nation, if he believes that the simulation is going to continue for "years." Notwithstanding the information given the participants, both simulation runs were terminated before the anticipated conversion to the longer time units had occurred. Hence no calculations were made in any of the programmed components of the model.

In addition to designating the periods as days, the shortened character of the time units was promoted by the diplomatic messages. These historical documents reflected events and decisions that were developing day by day, if not hour by hour. Finally, as an aid to short-term decision-making, a new form was introduced into the simulation. On the new instrument each nation's decision makers were able to indicate more immediate changes in the intensity of their action toward other nations. Participants were advised that daily variations in their nation's level of commitment would influence such annually computed variables as total available resources and the likelihood of office-holding. Thus, the intensity scale provided an explicit link with the long-term elements present in the programmed calculations of most Inter-Nation Simulation exercises.

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[8] Howard E. Koch with the staff of the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration, *Documentary Chronology of Events Preceding the Outbreak of the First World War: 28 June-6 August, 1914* (Stanford University, mimeographed, 1959).

*Historical Figures and Their Simulation Counterparts.* An attempt was made to select participants with personality traits similar to some of those manifested by political leaders in the crisis of 1914. This task involved three subproblems. First, a restricted number of historical figures who were active in the crisis had to be selected. Second, a judgment had to be made regarding which personality characteristics of these men were salient in their political behavior. Finally, a method had to be devised for selecting simulation participants with similar personality profiles.

The resources available to the researchers necessitated that the total number of decision makers in each run be limited to 10—two participants for each nation. Consequently, we sought the two policy makers in each of the five European nations who were major contributors to the critical decisions during the crisis. More specifically, three criteria guided the selection: (1) which persons had a dominating influence on the foreign policy decisions of their nation at the time of the crisis? This criterion recognizes that the loci of decision making may not correspond with the "legitimate authority" to make such decisions. (2) Which persons received and dispatched (or at least read) diplomatic cables and related foreign policy documents? The historical figures whom the simulation participants represented should have occupied a reasonably central position in the diplomatic communication net because diplomatic messages acted as a major source of simulation inputs. (3) About which persons was autobiographical and/or biographical material available to help in the assessment of personality traits? Utilizing these criteria, the following historical personages were chosen for representation in the simulation:

- Austria-Hungary
    - Berchtold (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
    - Conrad (Chief of General Staff)
- England
    - Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
    - Nicolson (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
- France
    - Poincaré (President of the Republic)
    - Berthelot (Acting Political Director of Foreign Ministry)
- Germany
    - Wilhelm II (Kaiser)
    - Bethmann-Hollweg (Chancellor)
- Russia
    - Nicholas II (Czar)
    - Sazonov (Minister for Foreign Affairs)[9]

Once the political leaders judged to have assumed critical roles in the crisis were selected, it was necessary to establish which personality characteristics were salient to their political behavior. This determination was made by a cursory content analysis of personal letters, autobiographies, and biographies of the chosen policy makers.[10] Each document was content analyzed for psychological characteristics or traits identified by one of several tests for measuring personality.[11] On the basis of the content analysis, dominance, self-acceptance, and self-control appeared to be characteristics which differentiated among all 10 of the political leaders. Furthermore, the personality of one or more of the selected individuals was strongly characterized by his attitude toward such concepts as fate, frankness, making decisions, his own country, peace, self-confidence, success, suspicion, and war. No claim is made that these traits provide a complete personality profile of the historical individuals under examination. Undoubtedly some important characteristics have been overlooked. This list of traits, however, yielded a distinctive profile for every leader which was consistent with features stressed in documents describing that individual.

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[9] Some illustration of how the criteria were employed is appropriate. The selection of Berthelot provides a good example of the application of the first two criteria. Although Berthelot did not have the legitimate authority to make binding decisions for his government, he nevertheless extensively influenced French foreign policy during July of 1914. With the president, premier (who was also the foreign minister), and political director of the foreign ministry on a mission to Russia in July, Berthelot was placed in charge of the foreign ministry. He became the chief advisor during this time to Bienvenu-Martin, acting Premier and Foreign Minister. Bienvenu-Martin, officially the Minister of Justice, was a novice at foreign affairs, and relied heavily on Berthelot. For further evidence on the role of Berthelot, see Richard D. Challener, "The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats: 1919–1939* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), 49–85. The third criterion was important in the choice of Conrad. Far less autobiographical and biographical material is available on the Austro-Hungarian political leaders than on those from the other countries. Most information concerns Emperor Franz Joseph, a logical selection in addition to Berchtold for the simulation. However, because Franz Joseph was quite old and recovering from a serious illness, he was not as influential on the decisions as other officials. Among the key figures, Conrad had the most available material.

[10] No inter-coder reliability was performed in the content analysis of the personality traits. For this reason, as well as because of the very limited

Two psychological tests were used to measure the personality characteristics that the researchers associated with the selected historical figures. The California Psychological Inventory (CPI)[12] not only measured the three traits judged to be relevant to all the policy makers, but it also contained measures of some secondary characteristics identified in the content analysis. The second instrument was the semantic differential.[13] The nine attitudes were estimated with this testing device. Utilizing a suggestion made by Gough,[14] one of the researchers responded to both instruments as if she were the historical policy makers. The tests were completed after the biographical and autobiographical material on each of the chosen figures had been read. Test profiles for all 10 individuals were made in this way. These 10 profiles provided a standard against which to compare the responses of potential simulation participants on the same personality tests.

Some 101 high school students, who had participated in the Inter-Nation Simulation experiment in the summer of 1960,[15] were tested. As previously noted, persons already acquainted with the operation of the simulation were used in order to facilitate the shift in the time dimension. Furthermore, experienced participants freed the experimenters from training participants in basic simulation skills. The CPI profile of each prospective participant was compared with that of each historical figure. Particular attention was paid to profiles that matched exactly on dominance, self-acceptance, and self-control and were within one standard deviation of the other traits measured by the CPI. The semantic differential was utilized as a final selection step. In other words, those individuals chosen through the CPI matching were screened further by means of the semantic differential until three individuals per role were selected. Of the 10 individuals best matched to the historical figures, six were able to participate in the runs—five in the first run and one in the second. The balance of the participants in each run were second and third choices. Because of the interest in using individuals whose profiles most closely corresponded to those prepared for the actual leaders, the participants were not controlled on sex. Four women participated in the first run and three in the second.

*Conducting the Revised Simulation.* To provide an overview of the procedures used in the modified Inter-Nation Simulation, we will describe the operations in the two attempted replications of the pre-World War I crisis. Both simulation exercises were conducted in two days. On the first day, the participants in the runs assembled together for a general introduction and review of simulation procedures. After these activities, the remainder of the first day was used to introduce the structured input for each run.

At the beginning of the input phase, each participant was assigned to a separate cubicle. There they started by reading a disguised statement of pre-1914 "world history" and a description of the individual whose role they would assume. Upon completing this material, every participant was given a set of masked diplomatic communiques, newspapers, and memoranda which might reasonably have come

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sample of materials that could be examined for each figure, the selected traits must be considered only as tentative approximations. A list of the sources used in the content analysis appears in Technical Paper 3351, *op. cit.*

[11] Sources for the personality categories were Raymond B. Cattell, *The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire*, rev. ed. (Champaign, Ill.: IPAT, 1957); Allen L. Edwards, *Edwards Personal Preference Schedule* (New York: Psychological Corp., 1953); Harrison G. Gough, *California Psychological Inventory* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1956).

[12] Harrison G. Gough, *ibid.*

[13] Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

[14] Personal correspondence from Harrison G. Gough, dated July 25, 1961.

[15] For a description of this earlier simulation research, see Richard A. Brody, "Some Systemic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7 (1963), 663–753.

to the attention of his historical counterpart. To the extent that such information was available, messages were ordered in the sequence in which they were received by the historical figure. For example, although the simulation began with an incident representing the assassination of the Archduke on June 28 (known to the participants as Day 1), some participants learned about that event the same day; others did not. In general, a participant received an incoming message and then the recorded reaction, if any, which his counterpart had made to that message. If evidence indicated that the historical figure had been aware of responses made to a message by other members of his government, the simulation participant also received this information. Thus, the Kaiser's marginal notes on diplomatic communiques were seen by the individual assuming the role of the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. The input phase terminated with the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on July 25 (Simulated Day 28). As the historical events became more rapid and complex in the latter part of the input phase, the order in which participants received information took on considerable importance.

The participants were allowed to read the set of messages available to them at their own pace. They were encouraged to write their reactions to each communication in a space opposite the message. The researchers believed that the participants would become more involved in the situation if they recorded their thoughts about the messages as they read. Moreover, these reactions provided a source of data. For the same reasons, after Day 15 and again after Day 28, every individual was required to write a summary of the events that had occurred. On these two simulated days, the participants also were provided sheets of paper and asked to draw a map of the world as they conceived it at that time.[16] After completing the second history and map, the participants were dismissed until the following day. They were cautioned not to discuss the material they had read.

The first run was concluded on the morning of the second day (hereafter designated the M-run) and the second was finished that afternoon (the A-run). When the participants returned to their respective simulations, they were informed that the world would continue with the situation as it had evolved up to that point. They were told that there would be no more structured messages. Thereafter, the situation could be handled in whatever manner they chose. Each nation's decision makers were given an annual decision form and an intensity of action scale to indicate their country's resources and commitments at the beginning of the free activity phase of the simulation. They were instructed to designate each 50-minute period as one simulated day, but the number of such periods that would occur remained unspecified. Following these initial instructions, the two participants in each nation were assigned to a room in which they were separated by a partition. A messenger or courier sat at one end of the partition to prevent unauthorized conversations, to relay messages, and to operate a tape recorder during conferences between the decision makers. Written messages and periodic conferences were used as means of communication both within and between nations.

At the end of three periods (representing July 26–28, 1914), each participant was asked to draw another map and update his statement of world events. Much to the surprise of the participants, upon completing this task they were informed that the simulation was over. A post-mortem or debriefing session was held with each simulation run. The participants first completed a questionnaire and then described their plans and reactions to events in the simulation.

## II. RESULTS

Two different standards or criteria were employed in estimating the validity of actions taken by the decision makers in the free activity phase of the simulation runs. First, both macro and micro level events in the 1914 crisis were used as standards with which to compare incidents that occurred in the simulation. Second, two general hypotheses, previously tested with documents from the outbreak of the First World War, were explored using simulation data. Findings on the hypotheses from the two data sources were checked for comparability.

*Macro and Micro Events.* In the present context, "macro event" refers to the occurrence of general war. Did war break out in the simulation runs as it had in Europe in 1914? In neither run did war—or more accurately, the representation of war—occur during the last three periods. Historically, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28th, the final day represented in the simulation runs. In 1914, the declarations of general war between the other European nations did not occur until after the last time period portrayed in the simulation.[17] Although no war had been declared when the simulations were terminated, hostilities were imminent in the M-run.

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[16] Geographical features are not incorporated in the Inter-Nation Simulation and no explicit geographical statements were included in the masked historical communiques. Therefore, the participants' maps provided data about the changing conception of relationships among nations. The distance between allied and hostile nations as well as the relative size of the nations represented in the maps were analyzed. Although the measuring device is worthy of further exploration, the results from these pilot runs proved to be quite ambiguous and are not reported here. They are included in Technical Paper 3351, *op. cit.*

In the researchers' opinion, if the M-run simulation had been continued for another 50-to-100 minutes (one or two more simulated days), war would have been declared along lines similar to the historical situation. This position is confirmed by 10 of the 15 M-run participants and messengers in their debriefing questionnaires. Throughout the free activity phase of that run the two alliance structures held. Germany[18] was prepared to give secret aid to Austria-Hungary for an attack on Serbia while signing neutrality pacts with England and France to keep them out of the war. This effort was intended to localize the conflict and to assure victory for the Dual Monarchy. If Russia then considered assisting Serbia, she would lack the support of her allies—a fact which Germany and Austria-Hungary believed would deter such action. France and England, however, had plans to go to war if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. That attack by Austria-Hungary was being planned at the close of the simulation run. An internal conference between the German participants on the next to last simulated day illustrates the direction in which the M-run was moving.

Central Decision Maker [Kaiser]: Is their war started yet? [Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia]

External Decision Maker [Bethmann-Hollweg]: I don't think so.

CDM: Here's the problem—we can certainly give them [Austria-Hungary] the aid but the aid must be kept secret because if monetary aid isn't kept secret then the promises—written promises—which I am giving to Bega [England] and Colo [France] will mean absolutely nothing; total war is bound to break out. . . . If Enuk [Russia] enters it, we have to send secret aid; if Enuk [Russia] doesn't enter it, then he [Austria-Hungary] can defeat Gior [Serbia] by himself and that will be a thorn out of our side. We have already driven a wedge into the Tri-Agreement [Triple Entente].

EDM: Another question: Suppose Colo [France] enters, then we go in?

CDM: If Colo [France] enters the war we go in. . . .

In the A-run the participant representing Lord Grey of England called for an international conference on the first simulated day of the free activity phase. Thereafter, most of the simulation time was spent in obtaining agreement from all nations to attend this meeting. At the conference Austria-Hungary was charged with making far too extreme demands against Serbia and was pressured into withdrawing them. This retraction resulted in substantial conflict among the decision makers in Austria-Hungary as well as a bitter dispute between Germany and the Dual Monarchy. Germany had pledged complete support to Austria-Hungary and was highly irritated at the failure of Austria-Hungary to consult privately before changing its policy.

Two observations should be made about these developments in the A-run. First, some historians have expressed the opinion that England should have taken a stronger position more quickly, forcing moderation upon the Triple Alliance.[19] Second, and perhaps of greater importance, if the input phase had been extended for one more historical day, the participants would have received England's diplomatic communiques proposing an international conference and the prompt rejection of this suggestion by several nations. Thus, an alternative actually considered and subsequently excluded by the historical figures provided the avenue which the simulation participants followed for the resolution of the imposed situation.

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[17] The chronology of hostilities during this critical period in 1914 was as follows: July 28—Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia; July 29—Russia orders and then cancels general mobilization; July 30—Russia again orders general mobilization, France alerts troops along German border; July 31—Austria-Hungary begins general mobilization, Germany issues ultimatum demanding Russia stop mobilizing within 12 hours or Germany will mobilize; August 1—France and Germany start general mobilization, Germany declares war on Russia. After August 1, formal declarations of war follow in quick succession from the other major European states.

[18] It is to be understood that the references to nations here are to the student decision makers in the simulated nations.

[19] See, for example, Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, edited and translated by Isabella M. Massy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. 2, p. 514; and Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), Vol. 2, p. 556.

Several major divergences from the outbreak of World War I developed in the A-run. Least parallel to historical events is the indication in some messages that England was considering the initiation of war on Germany while the advantage appeared on her side. This war was represented in communications as a defensive strategy resulting from the military and economic threat of Germany. A second significant variation was the agreement of Austria-Hungary to withdraw her ultimatum. The Austro-Hungarian decision maker, intended to represent Conrad, revealed pacifistic tendencies and readily accepted the objections to his nation's militaristic actions. This behavior suggests a need to match more closely the social-political attitudes of the historical figures and the simulation participants.

This account of the A-run's divergences fittingly introduces the analysis of smaller, more specific events that occurred in the simulation and in the last days of July, 1914. By comparing numerous micro occurrences, validity depends not on the correspondence between isolated events (war or no war) but on the overall goodness of fit between a distribution of events. In other words, we are interested in whether the overall pattern of simulation occurrences is more or less like the pattern of reported incidents prior to World War I.

To illustrate this approach a sample of micro events was drawn from the simulation (the M-run) that at the macro level displayed a higher degree of correspondence to 1914. In this analysis an action mentioned by the participants in their written communication constituted a micro event. Eighteen separate micro events were identified in the M-run messages during the first simulated day of the free activity phase. A somewhat longer series of events would probably have been discovered for that day if transcripts of conferences had been examined in addition to the written communications. No reason, however, has been found to suggest that the types of events produced in face-to-face interactions differ for validity purposes from those indicated in written messages.

After the simulation events had been abstracted, a major historical study of the beginnings of the First World War was examined for comparable events.[20] In Table 2 the simulation events are indicated in the left-hand column and the reported historical events are listed in the corresponding space in the right-hand column.

Several alternative means of comparing the events were identified. Comparable activity is one way to match events in both the pre-World War I crisis and the simulation. We describe this as occurrence similarity. A second basis of comparison involves intent or purpose. Men's purposes in initiating or manipulating events may be similar, regardless of differences in format or activity. For example, in Item 16 in Table 2 the simulation action is the reverse of that reported in the observable world of 1914, but the intentions of the decision makers in both actions were probably similar. Germany was concerned that any war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia be kept localized without the intervention of other countries. To achieve this objective the simulation decision makers chose to elicit pledges of neutrality from two important nations. In actuality, the German decision makers decided that quick action, before commitments and reactions could be made, was the preferable policy. Another way of comparing events is through temporal equivalence. The timing of some simulation events closely matches that of similar events in reality; others deviate sharply in this temporal aspect.

One of the researchers rated the 18 simulation events on each of the three bases of comparison. For each simulation event, temporal equivalence was given a score of one (i.e., assumed similarity) if it occurred within one day on either side of the reported 1914 event to which it was compared. If the time disparity was greater than the arbitrary threshold, it was coded as nonsimilar and assigned a zero. The same zero or one scoring was used for comparing events on intention and on occurrence similarity. The estimated scores for each event are presented in the center column of Table 2.

If the scores for the three categories are combined for the 18 events, the highest possible goodness of fit score is 54. The overall score for the distribution of events in the first simulated day of the M-run is 31. More specifically, all 18 events were judged similar in intent to developments that occurred in the 1914 crisis. Weighed against the significance of this finding must be the recognition that it is difficult to ascertain the intent of simulation participants, to say nothing of historical policy makers. Rules for guiding such coding are exceedingly hard to devise. For half of the simulation events (9 of 18), the researchers were able to

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[20] Luigi Albertini, *ibid.*, Vol. 2.

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF SAMPLE OF SIMULATION EVENTS WITH HISTORICAL EVENTS

| Simulated July 26, M-run | Estimated Score[a] | Reported Historical Events[b] |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Germany requests Russia to demobilize. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | *July 29:* German note to Russia: "... further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and then European war would scarcely be prevented" (p. 491). |
| 2. Russia notifies Germany that no demobilization will occur until safeguards are established for Serbia. | T = 1<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>2 | *July 26:* Russian foreign minister informs German ambassador that Russia is ready to assist in "procuring legitimate satisfaction for Austria-Hungary without abandoning the standpoint, to which Russia must firmly adhere, that Serbia's sovereignty must not be infringed" (p. 404). There is no explicit mention of making demobilization conditional on such safeguards. |
| 3. In a conference Russia asks England and France to mobilize; both refuse. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>1 | *July 24:* Conversation between Russian foreign minister and ambassadors from France and England. France agrees to fulfill all obligations of her treaty. England more evasive but conciliatory. (Pp. 294–96.) |
| 4. In a conference England and France inquire as to Russian military needs. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | |
| 5. Germany notifies Russia that the latter's support of Serbia would be aggression. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>1 | *July 28:* No evidence found of direct communication between Germany and Russia on this matter; however, Albertini concludes that this was a German objective. In support he cites several telegrams emanating from the German foreign office on July 28 including a note from the Kaiser: "It is an imperative necessity that the responsibility for a possible extension of the conflict to the Powers not immediately concerned should in all circumstances fall on Russia" (p. 474 and p. 476). |
| 6. Austria-Hungary warns Russia not to mobilize further. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | *July 29:* There is some suggestion that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador warned the Russian foreign minister against Russian intervention on this date, although the conversation was interrupted by information that Austria-Hungary had bombed Belgrade. (Pp. 552–53.) On July 26 Austria-Hungary's alliance partner, Germany, issued warnings through her ambassador to the Russian foreign minister: "I made detailed and urgent representations to the Minister about how dangerous it seemed to me to attempt to strengthen diplomatic action by military pressure" (p. 481). |
| 7. Discussion on need for attack on Serbia in Austro-Hungarian internal conference. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | *July 7:* Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers for Joint Affairs: one of a number of internal conferences before delivery of the Serbian ultimatum in which plans for attack on Serbia and the expected Russian reaction were discussed. No explicit program to make Russia appear the aggressor is mentioned although this appears to have been part of the Triple Alliance strategy. (P. 166.) |
| 8. Discussion in Austro-Hungarian internal conference on making Russia appear the aggressor in an expansion of hostilities. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>1 | |
| 9. Austro-Hungarian note to Russia charges Russia's action is aggressive. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | *July 30:* Austro-Hungarian foreign minister tells Russian ambassador: "Austria-Hungary had mobilized solely against Serbia, not against Russia. . . . By the fact that Russia is obviously mobilizing against us we should also have to extend our mobilization. . . . " (p. 662). |

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[a] "T" stands for temporal equivalence, "I" for intention, and "O" for occurrence similarity. Each of the three categories was assigned a "1" if the simulation and 1914 event were judged as similar on that criterion; or a "0" if they were judged dissimilar. Simulation and historical events rated as similar on each of the criteria received an overall score of three.

[b] The source for the reported historical events is Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, edited and translated by Isabella M. Massy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. 2. All page references are to this volume.

TABLE 2—(*Continued*)

| Simulated July 26, M-run | Estimated Score[a] | Reported Historical Events[b] |
|---|---|---|
| 10. Austro-Hungarian note to Russia states Austria-Hungary must hold Serbia accountable. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | *July 30:* On the basis of above conversation with Berchtold, the Russian ambassador telegraphs his own foreign minister: "[Berchtold] is of the opinion that it is impossible for Austria to stop her operations against Serbia without having received full satisfaction and solid guarantees for the future" (pp. 662–63). |
| 11. In note France assures England of friendship. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>1 | *July 29:* France appears to have repeatedly probed England on the issue of unified action and support. For example, the July 24 three-way conversation in St. Petersburg (pp. 294–96) or the inquiry to the British ambassador by his French colleague in Berlin, July 29 (p. 520n). A major discussion on this point took place between the British foreign minister and the French ambassador on July 29. In a follow-up conversation on July 31, the ambassador asked Grey if England would "help France if Germany made an attack on her." (P. 646.) However, the type of military aid was not specified. |
| 12. France requests military aid in note to England. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | |
| 13. France urges a united front in a note to England. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | |
| 14. Germany makes internal decision to give secret aid to Austria-Hungary. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 1<br>—<br>2 | *July 5–6:* The Hoyos mission occurred, and Germany agreed to the so-called "blank check." Subsequent conversations between the Kaiser, his Chancellor, and military staff also reveal a discussion of military assistance to Austria-Hungary. (Pp. 133–59.) |
| 15. Germany's internal decision to seek neutrality pact with France and England to keep them from aiding Russia should latter intervene in Austria-Hungary's war against Serbia. | T = 0<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>1 | While no direct documentation was found for verifying this internal decision, Albertini concludes: "The study of the German documents shows beyond all shadow of doubt (1) that in allowing Austria to attack Serbia, Germany started from the assumption that, if the attack developed into a European war, England would remain neutral; (2) that Grey's conduct until the afternoon of July 29 . . . strengthened the German leaders in this opinion. . . . ." (p. 514). |
| 16. Germany urges Austria-Hungary not to attack until neutrality of France and England is assured. | T = 1<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>2 | *July 26:* Austria receives Germany's message urging military operations against Serbia as quickly as possible: "Any delay in coming military operations is regarded here as a great danger because of the interference of other Powers" (p. 453). |
| 17. Decision in Russian internal conference not to reveal, at present, their plan to attack Austria-Hungary if she attacks Serbia. | T = 1<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>2 | *July 25:* Russian crown council decides on mobilization to be followed by war if Serbia is attacked. (P. 762.) |
| 18. Decision in Russian internal conference to announce their intention to give Serbia full military aid. | T = 1<br>I = 1<br>O = 0<br>—<br>2 | |

find historical actions which seemed to be equivalent in physical format. Four of the 18 simulation events took place at approximately the point in time that the simulation was intended to replicate. One possible explanation for the low correspondence on temporal equivalence involves the problem of equating intervals in the simulation to actual days. The simulation may not have been adequately structured to provide the participants with the impression that each 50 minute period represented 24 hours of "real" time.

*Hypotheses.* In one sense the comparison of simulation and historical events includes the investigation of a hypothesis. The hypothesis is that a macro event or a distribution of events in system $A$ is comparable in a specified characteristic to a given event or distribution of events in system $A'$. Such a proposition, however, is oriented exclusively to the two systems involved—in the present case, the outbreak of World War I and the simulation of those events. In this section, attention is directed to more general hypotheses. These statements of relationship are intended to apply not only to the situation as it existed in Europe in the summer of 1914, but to other configurations of nations in international politics. Two hypotheses which have been tested with data from the 1914 crisis will be explored with the simulation data.

The three researchers who have studied the first hypothesis in the 1914 context have stated it as follows:

> If a state's perception of injury (or frustration, dissatisfaction, hostility, or threat) to itself is "sufficiently" great, this perception will offset perceptions of insufficient capability, making the perception of capability much less important a factor in a decision to go to war.[21]

To explore their hypothesis, the members of the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration content analyzed 1,165 communications exchanged between the European states in the weeks prior to the beginning of the First World War. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the frequency of perceptions of capability and hostility. In the content analysis a perception of capability was defined as an assertion "concerning the power of another state or a coalition of states, or a statement with regard to the changing power of either a state or a coalition of states." A perception of hostility was defined as "a statement by one country about the hostility directed toward it by a second country, or about the hostility directed by a second country toward a third country. . . . Statements of hostility are defined to include statements of threat, fear and injury."[22]

The number of hostility and capability statements that the Stanford group found for the nations subsequently represented in the simulation are reported in the first columns of Table 3. Perceptions of hostility exceed those of capability for every nation. The overall difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$) by a sign test. Using the same definitions of hostility and capability, the messages written during the two simulation runs were content analyzed in a similar fashion.[23] As shown in the second and third sections of Table 3, the perceptions of hostility were significantly greater ($p < .05$) than those of capability in both runs. Thus, the simulation runs and the 1914 data produce comparable results on this general hypothesis.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF HOSTILITY AND CAPABILITY STATEMENTS FOR NATIONS IN 1914 AND IN SIMULATION

| Nation | 1914[a] | | M-Run | | A-Run | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hostility | Capability | Hostility | Capability | Hostility | Capability |
| Austria-Hungary | 179 | 26 | 91 | 38 | 63 | 28 |
| England | 32 | 16 | 17 | 13 | 24 | 7 |
| France | 26 | 18 | 41 | 36 | 21 | 5 |
| Germany | 138 | 34 | 53 | 35 | 107 | 26 |
| Russia | 50 | 28 | 30 | 16 | 69 | 20 |

[a] The 1914 data are in Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, "Capabilities, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in James A. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 476.

A further check was made on the goodness of fit between the simulation and the 1914 data. The difference between the number of hostility and capability statements was determined for each nation. Within each of the three sets of data these differences were placed in rank order, that is, with the nation having the largest difference being given the first rank, etc. Then the order of the ranks for each of the simulation runs was compared with the order produced by the 1914 data. The resulting rank-order correlation (.90) between the 1914 data and that of the M-run was statistically significant ($p = .05$). The correlation for the A-run was not significant, however.

The second general hypothesis asserts that when opposing alliances or blocs emerge in international politics, the communication between blocs will be much less than that among alliance partners. Zinnes, who has tested this hypothesis with the 1914 data, states the relationship as follows: "Frequency of interaction within the bloc will be greater than the frequency of interaction between blocs."[24] To

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[21] Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, "Capabilities, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 472.

[23] The inter-coder reliability for the simulation content analysis of hostility was .82 and for capability .83. For a description of the statistics used in this paper (the sign test, rank-order correlation, and Mann-Whitney *U* test) see Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956).

[24] Dina A. Zinnes, "A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data," *World Politics*, 18 (1966), p. 477. This article is one of the few efforts to explore simulation validity by what we have de-

TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF ALLIANCE STRUCTURE ON COMMUNICATION IN 1914 AND IN SIMULATION

| Source of Data | Number of Intra-Bloc Dyads ($n_1$) | Number of Inter-Bloc Dyads ($n_2$) | Mann-Whitney $U$[a] | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1914 | 8 | 12 | 15 | <.01 |
| M-Run | 8 | 12 | 10.5 | <.01 |
| A-Run | 8 | 12 | 43 | — |

[a] It should be noted that for a given $n_1$ and $n_2$, the smaller the $U$ the greater its likelihood of being significant.

explore this hypothesis, a count was made of the number of communications that each nation dispatched to the other four nations primarily involved in the 1914 crisis. The number of messages exchanged between each possible combination of two nations was established. Rates of communication in dyads composed of nations in the same bloc were compared with those in dyads consisting of nations from opposing blocs. A Mann-Whitney $U$ test applied to the rank-order positions of these dyads supports the hypothesis.[25] The results are shown in the first row of Table 4. Identical procedures were followed for the M- and A-runs using the messages sent by the decision makers to other nations. The results for the M-run, shown in the second row of Table 4, are statistically significant. By contrast, as indicated in the third row of Table 4, the findings for the A-run are not significant. Once again, the data from the M-run appear to be a better fit with that drawn from 1914 than do the data produced in the A-run.

## III. EVALUATION

*Replication of the 1914 Crisis.* Can the Inter-Nation Simulation replicate occurrences in the observable universe such as the outbreak of World War I? Regardless of how intriguing this question is, for a number of reasons we cannot fully answer it with the present data. The exploratory nature of this initial research has been emphasized. A more complete study would require many more runs. It would be desirable to engage more mature participants whose previous experiences and backgrounds might lend themselves to the simulation problem. Moreover, the calculations used to set the beginning values of the parameters and the procedures used to code the simulation data need further refinement.

Even if one were tempted to make rough judgments on validity based exclusively on this pilot study, the divergence between the two runs imposes constraints. Using both events and general hypotheses to check the "fit" between 1914 and simulation data, the M-run approximates the political crisis prior to the First World War more closely than the A-run. At the macro event level, the M-run appeared on the verge of war with the same alliance commitments as observed in 1914. On the other hand, the A-run averted the immediate threat of war and involved several incidents in sharp contrast to those reported in the historical situation. In data from both runs, as in the material from 1914, perceptions of hostility were significantly more frequent than perceptions of capability. Only in the M-run, however, did the differences between these two kinds of perceptions correlate with similar data from the actual nations of 1914. Furthermore, the hypothesis that communication would be greater within alliances than between them was supported both by the 1914 data and the M-run data; but it was not confirmed in the A-run. These differences occurred despite a common introductory briefing, identical materials in the input phase, and the same set of initial values for the simulation parameters.

The two runs, however, did not share the same human participants. Although an effort was made to select participants in both runs with similar personality characteristics, it will be recalled that the matching was limited to a few traits. Moreover, on those characteristics for which an attempt at correspondence was made, the personality profiles of some individuals more closely matched their historical counterparts than others. As we noted previously, five of the six individuals whose profiles corresponded most completely with those designed to represent the historical figures participated in the M-run and only one in the A-run. In other words, half of the participants in the run that best approximated the 1914 crisis were first choices on the personality matching, whereas only one of the 10 decision makers in the more divergent run was a first choice. (In the A-run, six participants were second choices and three were third choices. Of the other five participants in the M-run,

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scribed as the hypothesis approach. Statistical tests are conducted on hypotheses using data from World War I and from another series of Inter-Nation Simulation runs which made no attempt to replicate those historical events.

[25] The 1914 data for this analysis were obtained from Zinnes, *ibid.* She performed a similar statistical test using Serbia as well as the five nations represented in the simulation. It is interesting that with the addition of Serbia, the result is not significant.

TABLE 5. SITUATIONS VIEWED AS SIMILAR TO THE SIMULATION ON THE DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRES

| Situation | M-Run Decision Makers (N = 10) | | A-Run Decision Makers (N = 7[a]) | | Totals (N = 17) | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Similar | Almost Exact | Similar | Almost Exact | Similar | Almost Exact | Overall Total |
| World War I | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 7 |
| Hitler's Ultimatum to Poland | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Berlin Crisis | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Hitler's Ultimatum to Sudetenland | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 6 |
| Israeli-Arab Conflict | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 6 |
| French-Algerian Conflict | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 5 |
| Korean War | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| 19th Century Colonialism | 4 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Spanish-American War | 1 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| Attack on Pearl Harbor | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| World War II | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

[a] Three of the A-run participants were unable to attend the debriefing session.

three were second choices and two were third choices.) Correspondence between a simulation and its reference system appears to have been facilitated by closer matching of the personalities of the participant and the historical figure.

*Procedural Issues.* These initial runs do not establish whether the Inter-Nation Simulation can replicate aspects of historical events, but they do uncover several procedural issues that a more complete study would confront. One problem is the participants' awareness of the historical events being simulated. We have described the efforts to mask the historical clues to avoid biasing participant responses. Despite these attempts, the disguise was not fully successful. On the debriefing questionnaire, the participants were asked to check from a list of historical situations those incidents that appeared "somewhat similar" and those that seemed "almost exactly like" their simulation run.[26] Table 5 indicates that five of the 10 participants in the M-run and two of the seven who completed the questionnaire in the A-run perceived some degree of similarity between their simulation and World War I. No other historical situation was identified by seven participants, but four others were each chosen by six individuals.[27]

Even though the results from this questionnaire item are not conclusive, they suggest the need for more vigilance in making past events unrecognizable. When, however, the content of historical situations is changed or misleading clues are added, there is the danger that essential attributes of the actual events will be so distorted they will not provide a validity check. This difficulty can be handled by selecting a less well-known situation—providing sufficient information exists on it to construct the necessary inputs. Alternatively, means of comparing the simulation and the actual event can be chosen which are unlikely to be affected if the participants identify the general situation. For example, in the present runs even those participants who saw a similarity to World War I were less likely to know the relationship between perceptions of hostility and capability, or to be aware of the micro events that occurred on July 26, 1914.

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[26] In retrospect, this questionnaire item was not totally satisfactory. Estimating the difference between situations rated "exactly alike" and those rated "somewhat alike" is difficult. Because most participants checked several historical situations, it is not clear how much more the simulation resembled the 1914 crisis than, for example, Hitler's ultimatum to Poland. Furthermore, participants were not asked to state when they became aware of the apparent similarity between the simulation and a past event. Some evidence indicates that a messenger suggested the parallel to World War I to several individuals near the end of the M-run. An unstructured question, which provided no list of historical events, might have reduced the number of references to World War I. The alternative situations in the questionnaire item were selected from events mentioned by high school students who pretested the material for the input phase.

[27] The messengers in both runs also completed this questionnaire item. Six out of nine messengers reported a similarity to World War I. It may be that the overall view of events provided by this role increased their awareness of the similarities.

Another issue is the distinction between "self-structured activity" and "role playing." Should a simulation participant be required to play the role of a historical decision maker whose characteristic behaviors have been described to him or should the participant be free to structure his own activity? This problem is illustrated by an incident in one of the runs. A participant confronted a decision which he felt his assigned historical figure would answer one way, but he personally would answer another. Should he assume the role or play himself? Given difficulties in constructing profiles of historical figures and problems in matching participants on numerous characteristics, role playing may supplement incomplete personality correspondence. On the other hand, without detailed information one individual's interpretation of the probable behavior of another individual is likely to produce major distortions. Supplying such information would disclose the identity of the historical figure. Investigations probably should be limited to a few personality traits that are part of the natural disposition of the participant. In the event, however, that participants are asked to "play" a historical personality, selection procedures might include some indicators of the empathic qualities required for role playing or acting.

Some explicit reference should be made to the procedural problem of selecting the kind of historical situation that the simulation is intended to represent. All models—including games and simulations—are simplifications of the systems they are designed to replicate. This simplification is achieved in part by completely excluding certain properties of the referent system from the model or by combining numerous detailed elements in an aggregated form. Obviously, a simulation cannot be validated by comparing its output with historical phenomena the model was not designed to represent.

In several ways the effectiveness of the present research for validating the Inter-Nation Simulation is reduced because the 1914 crisis was selected as the historical situation to be replicated. The conversion of the basic time units in the simulation from years to days furnishes one example. With the time units scaled-down, the components in the programmed part of the model acted as constants, though many of them normally operate as variables. In these exploratory runs, then, the part of the simulated world contained in the structured programs affected the behavior of the participants only insofar as they recalled its impact on their previous simulation experience. The 1914 crisis did not provide a means of investigating the programmed relationships as they operate in the usual Inter-Nation Simulation. Although such short-term crises may be excellent for determining the validity of other simulation models, they seem somewhat less appropriate for the Inter-Nation Simulation.

The micro event analysis provides a second illustration of the problem. The variables in the programmed portion of the simulation are broad representations of properties within a nation (e.g., the sum of all human and natural resources, or overall military capability). The events in the micro analysis, however, were at the more specific level of a diplomatic conference or a decision to mobilize ground forces in a certain district. The Inter-Nation Simulation was able to produce events at this level of specificity, but it is not clear that they are produced by the aggregate variables that compose the model.[28]

## IV. HISTORICAL SITUATIONS AS AN APPROACH TO VALIDITY

The procedural problems that emerged in the exploratory attempts to replicate the 1914 crisis are not insurmountable obstacles to the use of historical situations as validity tests for simulations. With careful attention, to the selection of both participants and the past occurrences to be simulated, these difficulties can be minimized. Broader concerns about the use of historical data for verifying models, however, also must be considered. One challenge to this validity technique is raised by the developers of a simulated underdeveloped economy.

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[28] For further discussion of the level of specificity issue, see Harold Guetzkow, "Simulation in International Relations," in *Proceedings of the IBM Scientific Computing Symposium on Simulation Models and Gaming*, December, 1964, Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York, esp. pp. 264–267.

> When a simulation of a particular economy has been formulated, it should be subjected to shocks and exogenous trends like those that have impinged on the actual economy in the past so that its responses may be compared with historical records. It would seem that such tests would yield an independent verification of the model. Actually, in most cases it is unlikely that this ideal can be fully realized. . . . The difficulty, fundamentally, is that the information available in almost all countries is insufficient to establish a model without using all the relevant historical data in the formulation and in the adjustment of parameter values.[29]

The economic model mentioned above is a completely programmed computer simulation and, accordingly, requires more data for establishing its initial values. Nevertheless, the problem is applicable to all historical validation attempts. Clearly, a simulation cannot be validated against the same historical material used to determine its parameters and beginning variable values. Historical replication always will be limited by the record of past events. Not only must there be a detailed account of decisions and actions, but the sequence of events must continue over a sufficient period of time without major changes which require resetting the model's parameters. For this reason historical verification may be more feasible for some types of simulations than others. The smaller the number of variables and parameters which require historical data, the more uncommitted historical material is available for establishing the goodness of fit. Moreover, if the content of the simulation deals with the kind of phenomena that recur frequently in the observable world, then historical validation is more applicable. Thus, a simulation of American judicial decision making is more readily verified with historical data than an operating model of disarmament processes.

Let us assume for the moment that sufficient historical data exist and that the content of a given simulation model permits the use of the validity approach described in this essay. Furthermore, let us assume that a comparison of events in simulation and in history reveals a high degree of correspondence. This correspondence does not demonstrate that the simulation correctly represents the structure and processes that were operative in the historical occurrence. We are speculating on the similarity between the historical and simulated inputs on the basis of the similarity of their outputs. Different relationships among various combinations of properties in the simulation conceivably could produce outcomes like those in the historical situation.

A simulation of the 1960 national Presidential election predicted the percentage of the vote for each candidate—the outcome—with considerable success. The designers of that simulation observe, however, that "it may legitimately be asked what in the equations accounted for this success, and whether there were parts of the equations that contributed nothing or even did harm."[30] Further analysis of the equations in the simulation revealed that the outcome was predicted despite the fact that at least one equation misrepresented aspects of voter turnout. Part of the structure of the simulation was incorrect, but the simulated result still matched the actual outcome. Despite this difficulty, our confidence that the simulation has captured some aspects of the voting process is greater than it would have been if the simulation had failed to replicate the campaign outcome. Confidence in the simulation would increase further as the operating model demonstrated ability to produce outcomes that corresponded with various elections. In sum, the similarity between simulation and historical events can provide at best only indirect and partial evidence for the correctness of the simulated structures and processes that produced the outcome.

Historical material can be used for validity purposes in other ways than by providing events for simulations to reproduce. In the exploratory runs, two validation techniques were tried—event comparisons and hypothesis testing. Although general hypotheses can include events as variables, they also can involve the processes by which events are produced. When events do become variables in a hypothesis, they tend to be more the micro events that occur with sufficient frequency to permit an adequate test. Hypothesis testing, therefore, is less susceptible to the criticisms of event comparisons made above. Verba has argued that difficulties in validly simulating a macro event (such as the outbreak of war) may exceed a model's potential contribution to theories of international politics. "Even if one could design a successful simulation in that respect, it might not be useful for future situations, which would not match the historical one in many important ways." Instead, he proposes that "if the situation can be decomposed into many subprocesses, such as communications flows, emotional states of decision-makers, and so forth . . . it may be possible to develop more widely applicable principles that can deal with many political situations."[31] Historical material may prove more useful for simulation validity explorations if it yields frequency distributions of events and processes that can be employed in hypothesis testing.

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[29] Edward P. Holland with Robert W. Gillespie, *Experiments on a Simulated Underdeveloped Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), 207–208.

[30] Ithiel Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel L. Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965) rev. ed., p. 64.

We have described some important procedural problems as well as two major limitations to using the replication of historical situations as a means of validating political simulations. In addition to event comparisons and hypothesis testing, alternative ways of verifying simulations are available. But they also have substantial liabilities.[32] In part because no one approach can fully establish the correspondence between a simulation and its intended referent system, simulation validity is always a matter of degree. Yet we cannot abandon the efforts to determine the goodness of fit between verifiable empirical observations and our conceptualizations—be they stated as verbal theories, mathematical equations, or simulation models. To improve our estimates of simulation validity, a strategy is required that includes multiple methods for discerning the degree of correspondence. In such a multi-method strategy one approach is historical replication. Until more validation exercises are conducted, it is premature to accept or reject simulation as an important new tool for studying political phenomena.

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[31] Sidney Verba, *op. cit.*, 511, 513.

[32] For a survey of various validity approaches and a discussion of their assets and liabilities, see Charles F. Hermann, *Behavioral Science*, *op. cit.*

# CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS*

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> "Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a skillful Politician may be turned into Publick Benefits."
>
> —Bernard Mandeville, 1714

## I. THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Corruption, some say, is endemic in all governments.[1] Yet it has received remarkably little attention from students of government. Not only is the study of corruption prone to moralism, but it involves one of those aspects of government in which the interests of the politician and the political scientist are likely to conflict. It would probably be rather difficult to obtain (by honest means) a visa to a developing country which is to be the subject of a corruption study.

One of the first charges levelled at the previous regime by the leaders of the coup in the less developed country is "corruption." And generally the charge is accurate. One type of reaction to this among observers is highly moralistic and tends to see corruption as evil. "Throughout the fabric of public life in newly independent States," we are told in a recent work on the subject, "runs the scarlet thread of bribery and corruption . . ." which is like a weed suffocating better plants. Another description of new states informs us that "corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive policies."[2]

Others have reacted against this moralistic approach and warn us that we must beware of basing our beliefs about the cause of coups on post-coup rationalizations, and also of judging the social consequences of an act from the motives of the individuals performing it.[3] Under some circumstances Mandeville is right that private vice can cause public benefit. Corruption has probably been, on balance, a positive factor in both Russian and American economic development. At least two very important aspects of British and American political development—the establishment of the cabinet system in the 18th century and the national integration of millions of immigrants in the 19th century—were based in part on corruption. As for corruption and stability, an anthropologist has suggested that periodic scandals can sometimes "lead to the affirmation of general principles about how the country should be run, as if there were not posed impossible reconciliations of different interests. These inquiries may not alter what actually happens, but they affirm an ideal condition of unity and justice."[4] However, the "revisionists" who echo Mandeville's aphorism often underestimate tastes for moralism—concern for worthiness of causes as well as utilitarian consequences of behavior. There is always the danger for a corrupt system that someone will question what it profits to gain the world at the price of a soul. The purpose of this paper is less to settle the difference between "moralists" and "revisionists" about the general effect of corruption on development (although a tentative conclusion is presented) than to suggest a means to make the debate more fruitful. After discussing the problem in the usual general terms of possibility, we shall turn to more specific hypotheses about probability.

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* The author is indebted to Samuel P. Huntington, Leon Lindberg and Robert Erwin for reading an earlier version of this paper.

[1] C. J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), p. 167. See also "Political Pathology," *The Political Quarterly*, 37 (January–March, 1966), 70–85.

[2] Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London, 1963), pp. 11, 12. K. T. Young, Jr., "New Politics in New States," *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (April, 1961), at p. 498.

[3] See, for example: Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 8 (November, 1964), 8–14; David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19 (December, 1966), 719–732; J. J. Van Klaveren in a "Comment" in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 6 (January, 1964), at p. 195, even argues that "recent experience in the so-called underdeveloped countries has most vividly brought home the fact that corruption is not a mass of incoherent phenomena, but a political system, capable of being steered with tolerable precision by those in power."

[4] Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford, 1955), p. 135.

This paper is concerned with the *effects* of corruption, but a word should be said about causes to dispel any impression that corruption is a uniquely Afro-Asian-Latin American problem. I assume no European or American monopoly of morals. After all, Lord Bryce saw corruption as a major American flaw and noted its outbreak in "virulent form" in the new states in Europe.[5] Yet behavior that will be considered corrupt is likely to be more prominent in less developed countries because of a variety of conditions involved in their underdevelopment—great inequality in distribution of wealth; political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth; conflict between changing moral codes; the weakness of social and governmental enforcement mechanisms; and the absence of a strong sense of national community.[6] The weakness of the legitimacy of governmental institutions is also a contributing factor, though to attribute this entirely to the prevalence of a cash nexus or the divergence of moral codes under previous colonial governments or to the mere newness of the states concerned may be inadequate in light of the experience with corruption of older, non-colonial less developed states such as Thailand or Liberia. Regardless of causes, however, the conditions of less developed countries are such that corruption is likely to have different effects than in more developed countries.

Most researchers on developing areas gather some information on corruption, and this paper will suggest hypotheses about the costs and benefits of corruption for development that may lure some of this information into the open. However, in view of the fact that generalizations about corruption and development tend to be disguised descriptions of a particular area in which the generalizer has done field work, I will state at the outset that generalizations in this paper are unevenly based on field work in East Africa and Central America and on secondary sources for other areas.

Definitions pose a problem. Indeed, if we define political development as "rational, modern, honest government," then it cannot coexist with corruption in the same time period; and if corruption is endemic in government, a politically developed society cannot exist. "Political development" is not an entirely satisfactory term since it has an evaluative as well as a descriptive content. At least in the case of economic development, there is general agreement on the units and scale by which to measure (growth of per capita income). In politics, however, there is agreement neither on the units nor on a single scale to measure development.[7] Emphasis on some scales rather than others tends to reflect an author's interests.

In this author's view, the term "political development" is best used to refer to the recurring problem of relating governmental structures and processes to social change. It seems useful to use one term to refer to the type of change which seems to be occurring in our age ("modernization") and another to refer to capacity of political structures and processes to cope with social change, to the extent it exists, in any period.[8] We generally assume that this means structures and processes which are regarded as legitimate by relevant sectors of the population and effective in producing outputs desired by relevant sectors of the population. I assume that legitimacy and effectiveness are linked in the "long run" but can compensate for each other in the "short run."[9] What constitutes a relevant sector of the population will vary with the period and with social changes within a period. In the modern period we tend to assume that at least a veneer of broad participation is essential for establishing or maintaining legitimacy. In other words, in the current period, political development and political modernization may come close to involving the same things.

In this paper, political development (or decay) will mean growth (or decline) in the capacity of a society's governmental structures and processes to maintain their legitimacy over time (i.e., presumably in the face of social change). This allows us to see development as a moving equilibrium and avoid some of the limitations of equating development and modernization. Of course, this definition does not solve all the concept's problems. Unless we treat development entirely ex post facto, there will still be differences over evaluation (legitimate in whose eyes?) and measurement (national integration, administrative capacity, institutionalization?) as well as what constitutes a "long" and "short" run. Thus we will find that forms of corruption which have beneficial effects on economic development may be detrimental for political development; or may promote one form of political development (i.e., defined one way or measured along one scale) but be detrimental to another. We shall have to continue to beware of variations in what we mean by political development. (Alternatively, those who reject the term "political development" can still read the paper as relating corruption to three problems of change discussed below.)

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[5] James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), Vol. II, p. 509.

[6] Colin Leys, "What is the Problem About Corruption?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, 2 (1965), 224–225; Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," *Public Administration*, 40 (Winter, 1962), 365–371.

[7] Nor, by the nature of the subject, is there likely to be. In Pye's words, "no single scale can be used for measuring political development": Lucian Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963). See also Lucian Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," *The Annals*, 358 (March 1965), 1–19; Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (April, 1965), 386–430; Robert Packenham, "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program," *World Politics*, 18 (January, 1966), 194–235.

[8] See Huntington, *op. cit.*, 389.

[9] S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1959), 72–75.

The definition of corruption also poses serious problems. Broadly defined as perversion or a change from good to bad, it covers a wide range of behavior from venality to ideological erosion. For instance, we might describe the revolutionary student who returns from Paris to a former French African country and accepts a (perfectly legal) overpaid civil service post as "corrupted." But used this broadly the term is more relevant to moral evaluation than political analysis. I will use a narrower definition which can be made operational. Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.[10] This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses). This definition does not include much behavior that might nonetheless be regarded as offensive to moral standards. It also excludes any consideration of whether the behavior is in the public interest, since building the study of the effects of the behavior into the definition makes analysis of the relationship between corruption and development difficult. Similarly, it avoids the question of whether non-Western societies regard the behavior as corrupt, preferring to treat that also as a separate variable. To build such relativism into the definition is to make specific behavior which can be compared between countries hard to identify. Moreover, in most less developed countries, there are two standards regarding such behavior, one indigenous and one more or less Western, and the formal duties and rules concerning most public roles tend to be expressed in terms of the latter.[11] In short, while this definition of corruption is not entirely satisfactory in terms of inclusiveness of behavior and the handling of relativity of standards, it has the merit of denoting specific behavior generally called corrupt by Western standards (which are at least partly relevant in most developing countries) and thus allowing us to ask what effects this specific behavior has under differing conditions.

## II. POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND COSTS

Discussion of the relation of corruption to development tends to be phrased in general terms. Usually the argument between moralists and revisionists tends to be about the possibility that corruption (type unspecified) *can* be beneficial for development. Leaving aside questions of probability, one can argue that corruption can be beneficial to political development, as here defined, by contributing to the solution of three major problems involved: economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity.

1. *Economic Development.* If corruption helps promote economic development which is generally necessary to maintain a capacity to preserve legitimacy in the face of social change, then (by definition) it is beneficial for political development.

There seem to be at least three major ways in which some kinds of corruption might promote economic development.

a. Capital formation. Where private capital is scarce and government lacks a capacity to tax a surplus out of peasants or workers openly, corruption may be an important source of capital formation. There seems to be little question about the effectiveness of this form of taxation—Trujillo reputedly accumulated $500 million and Nkrumah and relatives probably more than $10 million.[12] The real question is whether the accumulated capital is then put to uses which promote economic development or winds up in Swiss banks.

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[10] The second part of the definition is taken from Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), p. 315.

[11] See, for example: M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption Among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 6 (January, 1964), at p. 194; Lloyd Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief: An Instance from Uganda," *American Anthropologist*, 57 (1955), 290–305. I agree with Bayley on this point: *op. cit.*, 720–722.

b. Cutting red tape. In many new countries the association of profit with imperialism has led to a systematic bias against the market mechanism. Given inadequate administrative resources in most new states, it can be argued that corruption helps to mitigate the consequences of ideologically determined economic devices which may not be wholly appropriate for the countries concerned.[13] Even where the quality of bureaucrats is high, as in India, some observers believe that "too much checking on corruption can delay development. Trying to run a development economy with triple checking is impossible."[14] Corruption on the part of factory managers in the Soviet Union is sometimes credited with providing a flexibility that makes central planning more effective.

c. Entrepreneurship and incentives. If Schumpeter is correct that the entrepreneur is a vital factor in economic growth and if there is an ideological bias against private incentives in a country, then corruption may provide one of the major means by which a developing country can make use of this factor. This becomes even more true if, as is often the case, the personal characteristics associated with entrepreneurship have a higher incidence among minority groups. Corruption may provide the means of overcoming discrimination against members of a minority group, and allow the entrepreneur from a minority to gain access to the political decisions necessary for him to provide his skills. In East Africa, for instance, corruption may be prolonging the effective life of an important economic asset—the Asian minority entrepreneur—beyond what political conditions would otherwise allow.

2. *National Integration.* It seems fair to assume that a society's political structures will be better able to cope with change and preserve their legitimacy if the members share a sense of community. Indeed, integration is sometimes used as one of the main scales for measuring political development.

a. Elite integration. Corruption may help overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict. One observer believes that it helped bridge the gap between the groups based on power and those based on wealth that appeared in the early nationalist period in West Africa and allowed the groups to "assimilate each other." Certainly in Central America, corruption has been a major factor in the succession mechanism by integrating the leaders of the new coup into the existing upper class. Whether this is beneficial for political development or not is another question involving particular circumstances, different evaluation of the importance of continuity, and the question of the relevant period for measurement.

b. Integration of non-elites. Corruption may help to ease the transition from traditional life to modern. It can be argued that the man who has lived under "ascriptive, particularistic and diffuse" conditions cares far less about the rational impartiality of the government and its laws than he does about its awesomeness and seeming inhumanity. The vast gap between literate official and illiterate peasant which is often characteristic of the countryside may be bridged if the peasant approaches the official bearing traditional gifts or their (marginally corrupt) money equivalent. For the new urban resident, a political machine based on corruption may provide a comprehensible point at which to relate to government by other than purely ethnic or tribal means. In McMullan's words, a degree of low-level corruption can "soften relations of officials and people" or in Shils' words it "humanizes government and makes it less awesome."[15]

However, what is integrative for one group may be disintegrative for another. The "traditional" or "transitional" man may care far more that he has a means to get *his* son out of jail than that the system as a whole be incorruptible, but for "modern" groups such as students and middle classes (who have profited from achievement and universalism) the absence of honesty may destroy the legitimacy of the system. Finally, it is worth noting again Gluckman's statement that the scandals associated with corruption can sometimes have the effect of strengthening a value system as a whole.

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[12] A. Terry Rambo, "The Dominican Republic," in Martin Needler (ed.), *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton, 1964), p. 172; *New York Times*, March 5, 1966. Ayeh Kumi's quoted statement has almost certainly greatly underestimated his own assets.

[13] On the economic problems of "African socialism," see Elliot Berg, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 78 (November, 1964), 549–573.

[14] Barbara Ward, addressing the Harvard Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, Mass., March 3, 1966.

[15] M. McMullan, "A Theory of Corruption," *The Sociological Review* (Keele), 9 (July, 1961), at p. 196; Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague, 1962), p. 385.

3. *Governmental Capacity.* The capacity of the political structures of many new states to cope with change is frequently limited by the weakness of their new institutions and (often despite apparent centralization) the fragmentation of power in a country. Moreover, there is little "elasticity of power"—i.e., power does not expand or contract easily with a change of man or situation.[16]

To use a somewhat simplified scheme of motivations, one could say that the leaders in such a country have to rely (in various combinations) on ideal, coercive or material incentives to aggregate enough power to govern. Legal material incentives may have to be augmented by corrupt ones. Those who place great faith in ideal incentives (such as Wraith and Simpkins) see the use of corrupt material incentives as destructive ("these countries depend considerably on enthusiasm and on youthful pride of achievement . . .")[17] of governmental capacity. With a lower evaluation of the role of ideal incentives, however, corrupt material incentives may become a functional equivalent for violence. In Mexico, for instance, Needler has described the important role which corruption played in the transition from the violent phases of the revolution to its institutionalized form.[18] At the local level, Greenstone notes that while patronage and corruption was one factor contributing to an initial decline in governmental capacity in East Africa, corrupt material incentives may provide the glue for reassembling sufficient power to govern.[19]

Governmental capacity can be increased by the creation of supporting institutions such as political parties. Financing political parties tends to be a problem in developed as well as less developed countries, but it is a particular problem in poor countries. Broad-based mass financing is difficult to maintain after independence.[20] In some cases the major alternatives to corrupt proceeds as a means of party finance are party decay or reliance on outside funds. Needless to say, not all such investments are successful. The nearly $12 million diverted from Nigeria's Western Region Marketing Board into Action Group coffers from 1959–1962 (and probably equivalent amounts in other regions)[21] seem to have been wasted in terms of institution-building; but on the other hand, investment in India's Congress Party or Mexico's *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* has been more profitable for political development.

Those who dispute the possible benefits of corruption could argue that it involves countervailing costs that interfere with the solution of each of the three problems. They could argue that corruption is economically wasteful, politically destabilizing, and destructive of governmental capacity.

1. *Waste of Resources.* Although corruption may help promote economic development, it can also hinder it or direct it in socially less desirable directions.

a. Capital outflow. As we mentioned above, capital accumulated by corruption that winds up in Swiss banks is a net loss for the developing country. These costs can be considerable. For instance, one source estimates that from 1954–1959, three Latin American dictators (Peron, Perez Jimenez, and Batista) removed a total of $1.15 billion from their countries.[22] It is no wonder that another source believes that economic development in some Latin American countries has been "checked" by corruption.[23]

b. Investment distortions. Investment may be channeled into sectors such as construction not because of economic profitability, but because they are more susceptible to hiding corrupt fees through cost-plus contracts and use of suppliers' credits. This was the case, for instance, in Venezuela under Perez Jimenez and in Ghana under Nkrumah.

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[16] See Herbert Werlin, "The Nairobi City Council: A Study in Comparative Local Government," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7 (January, 1966), at p. 185.

[17] Wraith and Simpkins, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[18] Martin Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), at pp. 310–311.

[19] J. David Greenstone, "Corruption and Self Interest in Kampala and Nairobi," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7 (January, 1966), 199–210.

[20] See J. S. Nye, "The Impact of Independence on Two African Nationalist Parties," in J. Butler and A. Castagno (eds.), *Boston University Papers on Africa* (New York, 1967), 224–245.

[21] Richard L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, 2 (1965), at p. 206.

[22] Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, 1960), p. 149.

[23] F. Benham and H. A. Holley, *A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America* (London, 1960), p. 10.

c. Waste of skills. "If the top political elite of a country consumes its time and energy in trying to get rich by corrupt means, it is not likely that the development plans will be fulfilled."[24] Moreover, the costs in terms of time and energy spent attempting to set some limits to corruption can also be expensive. For instance, in Burma, U Nu's creation of a Bureau of Special Investigation to check corruption actually reduced administrative efficiency.[25]

d. Aid foregone. Another possible wastage, the opportunity costs of aid foregone or withdrawn by outside donors because of disgust with corruption in a developing country could be a serious cost in the sense that developing countries are highly dependent on external sources of capital. Thus far, however, there has not been a marked correlation between honesty of governments and their per capita receipt of aid. If corruption is a consideration with donors (presumably it weighs more heavily with multilateral institutions), it is not yet a primary one.

2. *Instability*. By destroying the legitimacy of political structures in the eyes of those who have power to do something about the situation, corruption can contribute to instability and possible national disintegration. But it is not clear that instability is always inimical to political development.

a. Social revolution. An argument can be made that a full social revolution (whatever its short-run costs) can speed the development of new political structures better able to preserve their legitimacy in the face of social change. Thus, in this view if corruption led to social revolution, this might be a beneficial effect for political development. But it is not clear that corruption of the old regime is a primary cause of social revolution. Such revolutions are comparatively rare and often depend heavily on catalytic events (such as external wars).

b. Military takeovers. If corruption causes a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of those with guns, it may be a direct cause of instability and the disintegration of existing political institutions. But the consequences for political development are again ambiguous. Much depends on differing evaluations of the ability of military regimes (which tend to comprise people and procedures oriented toward modernity) to maintain legitimacy in a democratic age either by self-transformation into political regimes or by being willing and able to foster new political institutions to which power can be returned. To the extent that this tends to be difficult, then if corruption leads to military takeover, it has hindered political development.[26]

The degree to which corruption is itself a major cause of military takeovers is, however, open to some question. Despite its prominence in post-coup rationalizations, one might suspect that it is only a secondary cause in most cases. Perhaps more significant is military leaders' total distaste for the messiness of politics—whether honest or not—and a tendency to blame civilian politicians for failures to meet overly optimistic popular aspirations which would be impossible of fulfillment even by a government of angels.[27] Indeed, to the extent that corruption contributes to governmental effectiveness in meeting these aspirations, it may enhance stability.

Crozier sees "revulsion against civilian incompetence and corruption" as a major cause of coups in several Asian countries including Burma, but he also states that the main cause of Ne Win's return to power was the Shan demand for a federal rather than unitary state.[28] Similarly, corruption is sometimes blamed for the first coup in Nigeria, but the post-electoral crisis in the Western region and the fear of permanent Northern domination was probably a more important and direct cause. In Ghana, corruption may have played a more important role in causing the coup, but not so much because of revulsion at dishonesty, as the fact that corruption had reached an extent where it contributed to an economic situation in which real wages had fallen. Nonetheless, its impact in relation to other factors should not be overestimated.[29]

c. Upsetting ethnic balances. Corruption can sometimes exacerbate problems of national integration in developing countries. If a corrupt leader must be fired, it may upset ethnic arithmetic as happened in both Kenya and Zambia in 1966. Of course this can be manipulated as a deliberate political weapon. In Western Nigeria in 1959, an anti-corruption officer was appointed but his jurisdiction was subject to approval by the cabinet, which meant that no case could be investigated "unless the party leader decided that a man needed to be challenged."[30] But as a weapon, charging corruption is a risky device. Efforts by southern politicans in Uganda to use it in 1966 precipitated a pre-emptive coup by the northern Prime Minister in alliance with the predominantly northern army.

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[24] Leys, *op. cit.*, at p. 229.

[25] Brian Crozier, *The Morning After: A Study of Independence* (London, 1963), p. 82.

[26] In Pye's words, the military "can contribute to only a limited part of national development," *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston, 1966), p. 187.

[27] "Have no fear," General Mobutu told the Congo people, "My Government is not composed of politicians." Mobutu alleged that political corruption cost the Congo $43 million: *East Africa and Rhodesia*, January 13, 1966; *Africa Report*, January 1966, 23.

[28] Crozier, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 74.

[29] For two interpretations, see Martin Kilson, "Behind Nigeria's Revolts"; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Autopsy of Nkrumah's Ghana," *New Leader*, January 31, 9–12; March 14, 1966, 3–5.

3. *Reduction of Governmental Capacity*. While it may not be the sole or major cause, corruption can contribute to the loss of governmental capacity in developing countries.

a. Reduction of administrative capacity. Corruption may alienate modern-oriented civil servants (a scarce resource) and cause them to leave a country or withdraw or reduce their efforts. In addition to the obvious costs, this may involve considerable opportunity costs in the form of restriction of government programs because of fears that a new program (for instance, administration of new taxes) might be ineffective in practice. While this is a real cost, it is worth noting that efficient bureaucracy is not always a necessary condition for economic or political development (at least in the early stages), and in some cases can even hinder it.[31]

b. Loss of legitimacy. It is often alleged that corruption squanders the most important asset a new country has—the legitimacy of its government. This is a serious cost but it must be analyzed in terms of groups. As we have seen, what may enhance legitimacy for the student or civil servant may not enhance it for the tradition-oriented man. It is interesting, for instance, that there is some evidence that in Tanganyika petty corruption at low levels seems to have increased during the year following the replacement of an "illegitimate" colonial regime by a "legitimate" nationalist one.[32] Loss of legitimacy as a cost must be coupled with assessment of the power or importance of the group in whose eyes legitimacy is lost. If they are young army officers, it can be important indeed.

### III. PROBABILITIES

Thus far I have been discussing *possible* benefits and costs. I have established that under some circumstances corruption can have beneficial effects on at least three major development problems. I have evaluated the importance of a number of frequently alleged countervailing costs. It remains to offer hypotheses about the *probabilities* of benefits outweighing costs. In general terms, such probabilities will vary with at least three conditions: (1) a tolerant culture and dominant groups; (2) a degree of security on the part of the members of the elite being corrupted; (3) the existence of societal and institutional checks and restraints on corrupt behavior.

(1) Attitudes toward corruption vary greatly. In certain West African countries, observers have reported little widespread sense of indignation about corruption.[33] The Philippines, with its American colonial heritage of corruption. and appreciation of the politics of compromise, seems able to tolerate a higher level of corruption than formerly-Dutch Indonesia. According to Higgins, the Indonesian attitude to corruption (which began on a large scale only in 1954) is that it is sinful. He attributes the civil war of 1958 to corruption and argues that in the Philippines, "anomalies" are taken more for granted.[34] Not only is the general level of tolerance of corruption relevant; variations of attitude within a country can be as important (or more so) than differences between countries. Very often, traditional sectors of the populace are likely to be more tolerant of corruption than some of the modern sectors (students, army, civil service). Thus the hypothesis must take into account not only the tolerant nature of the culture, but also the relative power of groups representing more and less tolerant sub-cultures in a country. In Nigeria, tolerance was by many accounts considerable among the population at large, but not among the young army officers who overthrew the old regime.

(2) Another condition which increases the probability that the benefits of corruption will outweigh the costs is a degree of security (and perception thereof) by the members of the elites indulging in corrupt practices. Too great

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[30] Henry Bretton, *Power and Stability in Nigeria* (New York, 1962), p. 79.

[31] Bert Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), 193–195. See also Nathaniel Leff, *loc. cit.*, 8–14.

[32] See *Tanganyika Standard*, May 15, 1963.

[33] McMullan, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[34] Benjamin Higgins, *Economic Development* (New York, 1959), p. 62.

TABLE 1. CORRUPTION COST-BENEFIT MATRIX

| Types of Corruption | Political Conditions | Development Problems | | | | | | | General Probability that Costs Outweigh Benefits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 1. Economic development | | | 2. National integration | | 3. Governmental capacity | | |
| | | a. capital | b. bureaucracy | c. skills | d. elite | e. non-elite | f. effectiveness | g. legitimacy | |
| 1. Level | | | | | | | | | |
| top | F | low | uncertain | uncertain/low | low | uncertain | low | low | low/uncertain |
| bottom | F | high | uncertain | uncertain/high | uncertain | low | high | low | high |
| top | U | high | high | uncertain/low | high | high | low | high | high |
| bottom | U | high | uncertain | uncertain/high | little relevance | high | high | high | high |
| 2. Inducements | | | | | | | | | |
| modern | F | low | uncertain | uncertain/low | low | low | low/uncertain | uncertain | low/uncertain |
| traditional | F | high/uncertain | uncertain | high | high | uncertain | high | uncertain | high |
| modern | U | high | uncertain | uncertain/low | high | high | low/uncertain | high | high |
| traditional | U | high/uncertain | uncertain | high | high | uncertain | high | high | high |
| 3. Deviation | | | | | | | | | |
| extensive | F | uncertain | high | uncertain | uncertain | low | uncertain/low | uncertain/high | high |
| marginal | F | uncertain | low | uncertain/low | low | low | low | low | low |
| extensive | U | uncertain | high | uncertain | high | high | uncertain | high | high |
| marginal | U | uncertain | low | uncertain/low | high | high | low | high | high |

| NOTES: | |
|---|---|
| F | favorable political conditions (cultural tolerance, elite security, checks). |
| U | unfavorable political conditions |
| High | high probability that costs exceed benefits |
| Low | low probability that costs exceed benefits |
| Uncertain | little relationship or ambiguous relationship |

insecurity means that any capital formed by corruption will tend to be exported rather than invested at home. In Nicaragua, for instance, it is argued that the sense of security of the Somoza family encouraged them in internal investments in economic projects and the strengthening of their political party, which led to impressive economic growth and diminished direct reliance on the army. In contrast are the numerous cases of capital outflow mentioned above. One might add that this sense of security, including the whole capitalist ethic, which is rare in less developed countries today, makes comparison with capital formation by the "robber barons" of the American 19th century of dubious relevance to less developed countries today.

(3) It is probable that for the benefits of corruption to outweigh the costs depends on its being limited in various ways, much as the beneficial effects of inflation for economic growth tends to depend on limits. These limits depend upon the existence of societal or institutional restraints on corruption. These can be external to the leaders, e.g., the existence of an independent press, and honest elections; or internalized conceptions of public interest by a ruling group such as Leys argues that 18th-century English aristocrats held.[35] In Mandeville's words, "Vice is beneficial found when it's by Justice lopt and bound."[36]

Given the characteristics of less developed countries, one can see that the general probability of the presence of one or more of these conditions (and thus of benefits outweighing costs) is not high. But to conclude merely that the moralists are more right than wrong (though for the wrong reasons) is insufficient because the whole issue remains unsatisfactory if left in these general terms. Though corruption may not prove beneficial for resolution of development problems in general, it may prove to be the only means to solution of a particular problem. If a country has some overriding problem, some "obstacle to development"—for instance, if capital can be formed by no other means, or ethnic hatred threatens all legal activities aimed at its alleviation—then it is possible that corruption is beneficial for development despite the high costs and risks involved. While there are dangers in identifying

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[35] Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 227. See also Eric McKitrick, "The Study of Corruption," *Political Science Quarterly*, 72 (December, 1957), 502–514, for limits on corruption in urban America.

[36] Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, by F. B. Kaye, 1924), 37.

"obstacles to development,"[37] and while the corruption that is beneficial to the solution of one problem may be detrimental to another, we need to get away from general statements which are difficult to test and which provide us with no means of ordering the vast number of variables involved. We are more likely to advance this argument if we distinguish the roles of different types of corruption in relation to different types of development problems.

The matrix in Table 1 relates three types of corruption to three types of development problems, first assuming favorable and then assuming unfavorable conditions described above. Favorable conditions (F) means a tolerant culture or dominance of more tolerant groups, relative security of the elite corrupted, and societal/institutional checks. Unfavorable conditions (U) means intolerant culture or groups, insecure elite, and few societal/institutional checks. The development problems are those discussed above: economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity. The scores are a priori judgments that the costs of a particular type of corruption are likely to outweigh the benefits for a particular development problem or sub-problem. They represent a series of tentative hypotheses to be clarified or refuted by data. Under economic development, the specific sub-problems discussed are whether capital accumulation is promoted (benefit) without capital flight (cost); whether cutting bureaucratic red tape (benefit) outweighs distortion of rational criteria (cost); whether the attraction of unused scarce skills such as entrepreneurship (benefit) is greater than the wastage of scarce skills of, say, politicians and civil servants (cost).

Under the problem of national integration are the sub-problems of whether a particular type of corruption tends to make the elite more cohesive (benefit) or seriously splits them (cost); and whether it tends to humanize government and make national identification easier for the non-elites (benefit) or alienates them (cost). Under the problem of governmental capacity are the sub-problems of whether the additional power aggregated by corruption (benefit) outweighs possible damage to administrative efficiency (cost); and whether it enhances (benefit) or seriously weakens the governmental legitimacy (cost).

1. *Level of Beneficiary.* Shils argues that "freedom from corruption at the highest levels is a necessity for the maintenance of public respect of Government . . ." whereas a modicum of corruption at lower levels is probably not too injurious.[38] On the other hand, McMullan reports that West Africans show little sense of indignation about often fantastic stories of corruption by leaders, and impressions from Mexico indicate that petty corruption most saps morale.[39] In India, Bayley notes that "although corruption at the top attracts the most attention in public forums, and involves the largest amount of money in separate transactions, corruption at the very bottom levels is the more apparent and obvious and in total amounts of money involved may very well rival corruption at the top.'"[40]

The matrix in Table I suggests that under unfavorable conditions neither type of corruption is likely to be beneficial in general, although top level corruption may enhance governmental power more than it weakens administrative efficiency. It also suggests that under favorable conditions, top level corruption may be beneficial but bottom level corruption probably is not (except for non-elite integration). If these judgments are accurate, it suggests that countries with favorable conditions, like India, which have considerable bottom level corruption but pride themselves on the relative honesty of the higher levels may be falling between two stools.

The rationale of the scoring is as follows: (A) Capital. Bottom level corruption with smaller size of each inducement will probably increase consumption more than capital formation. While top level corruption may represent the latter, whether it is invested productively rather than sent overseas depends on favorable political conditions. (B) Bureaucracy. Other factors seem more important in determining whether expediting is more important than distortion; except that those with the power of the top levels will probably distort investment criteria considerably in conditions of uncertainty—witness the alleged selling of investment licenses under a previous government in Guatemala. (C) Skills. Whether top level corruption permits the use of more skills than it wastes depends upon their supply. Where they exist, as with Asians in East Africa or "Turcos" in Honduras, it is probably beneficial. Corruption of those at lower levels of power may be more likely to waste energies than to be important in permission of use of new skills simply because their power is limited.

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[37] See Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 13 (July 1965), 385–393.

[38] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

[39] McMullan, *op. cit.*, 195; Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez* (New York, 1961).

[40] Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 724.

(D) Elite Integration. It is difficult to see a clear relation between bottom level corruption and elite integration. At the higher levels under unfavorable conditions, e.g., a powerful intolerant part of the elite such as students or army, corruption would probably have a more divisive than cohesive effect. Under favorable conditions it might be more cohesive. (E) Non-elite integration. Under unfavorable conditions it seems likely that both types of corruption would tend to alienate more than enhance identification, whereas under favorable conditions corruption by the lower levels that the populace deals with most frequently might have the humanizing effect mentioned above, and alienation would be slight in the tolerant culture. Top level corruption might have the same effect though the connection is less clear because of the lesser degree of direct contact.

(F) Effectiveness. Bottom level corruption is more likely to disperse rather than aggregate power by making governmental machinery less responsive than otherwise might be the case; whereas at top levels the ability to change the behavior of important power holders by corrupt inducements is likely to outweigh the loss of efficiency, even under unfavorable conditions. (G) Legitimacy. Whether corruption enhances or reduces governmental legitimacy depends more on favorable conditions than on level of corruption. Much depends on another factor, visibility of corrupt behavior, which does not always have a clear relationship to level of corruption.

2. *Inducements.* Another distinction which can be made between types of corruption is the nature of the inducement used, for instance the extent to which they reflect the values of the traditional society or the values of the modern sector. A traditional inducement such as status in one's clan or tribe may be more tolerable to those who share the ascriptive affinity, but others outside the ascriptive relationship would prefer the use of money which would give them equality of access to the corruptee. Weiner writes of India that "from a political point of view, equal opportunity to corrupt is often more important than the amount of corruption, and therefore . . . an increase in *bakshish* is in the long run less serious than an increase in corruption by ascriptive criteria."[41]

As scored here, our matrix suggests that under favorable political conditions (e.g., India?) Weiner's hypothesis is probably correct but would not be correct under unfavorable conditions. (A) Capital. Modern inducements (i.e., money) probably lead to capital formation (at top levels) which may be invested under favorable conditions or be sent abroad under unfavorable conditions. Traditional inducements (kin status) do not promote capital formation (and may even interfere with it) but probably have little effect on capital flight. (B) Bureaucracy. What edge modern inducements may have in expediting procedure may be offset by distortion of criteria, so the relation between type of inducement and this problem is scored as uncertain. (C) Skills. Assuming the existence of untapped skills (as above), modern inducements increase the access to power while traditional ones decrease it. (D) Elite Integration. Under favorable conditions modern inducements are unlikely to divide elites more than make them cohere, but traditional inducements tend to preserve and emphasize ethnic divisions in the elites. Under unfavorable conditions, both types of inducements tend to be divisive. (E) Non-elite integration. Whether modern inducements promote identification or alienation varies with political conditions in the expected way, but the effect of traditional inducements is more ambiguous and probably varies from positive to negative according to the prevalence of traditional as against modern values in the particular country in question. (F) Effectiveness. Modern inducements probably give the government greater range to aggregate more sources of power than traditional inducements do. The probabilities will vary not only with political conditions but also by the opportunity costs—whether there is an efficient administrative machine to be damaged or not. (G) Legitimacy. Under favorable conditions whether traditional or modern inducements will decrease legitimacy more than they enhance it remains uncertain because it will vary with the (above mentioned) degree of existence of modern and traditional values in a society. Under unfavorable conditions, both will likely have higher costs than benefits.

3. *Deviation.* We can also distinguish types of corruption by whether the corrupt behavior involves extensive deviation from the formal duties of a public role or marginal deviation. This is not the same thing as a scale of corrupt inducements, since the size of the inducements may bear little relation to the degree of deviation. For instance, it is alleged that in one Central American country under an insecure recent

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[41] Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 236.

regime, a business could get the government to reverse a decision for as little as $2000, whereas in a neighboring country the mere expediting of a decision cost $50,000. Such a distinction between types of corruption by extent of deviation is not uncommon among practitioners who use terms like "speed-up money" or "honest graft" in their rationalizations.[42]

(A) Capital. It is difficult to see that the extensiveness of the deviation (except insofar as it affects the scale of inducement) has much to do with the probabilities of capital formation or flight. (B) Bureaucracy. On the other hand, marginal deviations (by definition) are unlikely to involve high costs in distortion of criteria and even under unfavorable conditions may help expedite matters. Extensive deviations are likely to have high costs in terms of rational criteria regardless of conditions. (C) Skills. It is not clear that extensive deviations call forth more unused skills than they waste administrative skills; nor is the matter completely clear with marginal deviations, though the costs of administrative skills wasted may be lower because the tasks are simpler.

(D) Elite Integration. Under unfavorable conditions, the effects of corruption on elite cohesiveness are likely to be negative regardless of the extent of deviations, though they might be less negative for marginal deviations. Under favorable conditions, marginal deviations are likely to have low costs, but the effect of extensive deviations will be uncertain, varying with other factors such as existing cohesiveness of the elite and the nature of the extensive deviations. (E) Non-elite integration. Under unfavorable conditions, corruption is likely to have more alienative than identification effects regardless of the nature of the deviations. Under favorable conditions, marginal deviation will not have high costs in terms of alienation, and extensive deviation may have special appeal to those who are seeking human and "reversible" government more than impartial or "rational" government. (F) Effectiveness. It is difficult to see that extensive deviations alone would increase governmental power more than weaken administrative efficiency, but with marginal deviation, the extent of the latter would be sufficiently small that the benefits would probably outweigh the costs. (G) Legitimacy. Under unfavorable conditions either type of corruption would be more likely to weaken than to enhance legitimacy, but under favorable conditions the lesser challenge to rationality might make marginal corruption less detrimental than extensive—though this would depend on the proportion and dominance of groups in society placing emphasis on modern values.

### IV. CONCLUSION

The scoring of the matrix suggests that we can refine the general statements about corruption and political development to read "it is probable that the costs of corruption in less developed countries will exceed its benefits except for top level corruption involving modern inducements and marginal deviations and except for situations where corruption provides the only solution to an important obstacle to development." As our matrix shows, corruption can provide the solution to several of the more limited problems of development. Whether this is beneficial to development as a whole depends on how important the problems are and what alternatives exist. It is also interesting to note that while the three conditions we have identified seem to be necessary for corruption to be beneficial in general terms, they are not necessary for it to be beneficial in the solution of a number of particular problems.

At this point, however, not enough information is at hand to justify great confidence in the exact conclusions reached here. More important is the suggestion of the use of this or a similar matrix to advance the discussion of the relationship between corruption and development. The matrix can be expanded or elaborated in a number of ways if the data seem to justify it. Additional development problems can be added, as can additional types of corruption (e.g., by scale, visibility, income effects, and so forth). The above categories can be made more precise by adding possibilities; for instance intermediate as well as top and bottom levels of corruption, or distinctions between politicians and civil servants at top, bottom, and intermediate levels.

Despite the problems of systematic field research on corruption in developing countries mentioned above, there is probably much more data on corruption and development gleaned during field work on other topics than we realize. What we need to advance the study of the problem is to refute and replace *specific* a priori hypotheses with propositions based on such data rather than with the generalities of the moralists. Corruption in developing countries is too important a phenomenon to be left to moralists.

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[42] Cf. William Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York, 1948), p. 4.

# SOCIAL BACKGROUND IN ELITE ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY*

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to comment empirically upon certain assumptions about the relationship between social background patterns and attitudinal patterns in elite analysis. All political systems are more or less stratified and their elites constitute that minority of participating actors which plays a strategic role in public policy making. As the incumbents of such key positions they have a far greater influence than the masses in structuring and giving expression to political relationships and policy outputs at various levels of authoritative decision making. They wield this influence by virtue of their exceptional access to political information and positions and their consequently highly disproportionate control over public policy making and communication processes which relate society to polity and governors to governed.

Usually exceeding no more than about five percent of the members of a political community, such elites not only know a good deal more about the internal workings of the pertinent system than do the rest of its members, but they can do a good deal more to give shape and content to general input demands and supports, as well as to formal governmental rulings at the national or sub-national level.[1] Therefore, their behavior patterns represent a crucial dimension of behavior patterns in a political system, providing important clues to characteristics making it like or unlike other systems.

Quantitative data on aggregate elite behavior are not easy to come by, except in the case of legislative roll call analysis and similar studies, but data on elite attitudes have of late become more abundant. And while attitudinal and behavioral dimensions are not necessarily identical or equivalent—other variables, such as situational factors may intervene—elite attitudes undoubtedly represent an important component of elite behavior.[2]

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[1] The concept is variously defined in the literature according to the particular research focus of the scholar using it in his work. Thus Karl W. Deutsch associates elites with key communication and command functions: *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 154–160, whereas Harold Lasswell defines as elites those who enjoy the greatest proportion of values in a society: *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: Meridian Books, 1960). Elsewhere elites have been defined as those who hold high position and perform the function of making major social decisions in a society; see, for example, Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1 (March, 1950), at p. 9; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 303–307; C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 3–5; S. F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," *International Social Science Bulletin*, 7 (1956), at p. 414; and Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 6. Gaetano Mosca's broad category of "ruling class" embodies all three criteria: *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50; while Suzanne Keller emphasizes the criterion of wielding moral responsibility: *Beyond the Ruling Class; Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 4. For a good review of the literature see, Carl Beck, James M. Malloy, and William R. Campbell, *A Survey of Elite Studies* (Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1965).

[2] We recognize that expressions of individual attitudes are usually distorted by coding procedures and that survey data—especially in the case of elite samples that are usually relatively small—must be interpreted with caution. We also recognize that a distinction exists between underlying attitude and expressed opinion, though, following common practice, we treat the two as synonymous in this article.

Though it would seem that the central concern of political science is competition for and the exercise of leadership by various elites, quantitative elite analysis has on the whole lagged behind advances in other areas, particularly mass voting and opinion studies. Thus, elite studies published in recent years have tended to rely heavily on social background or behavior, rather than upon intervening attitudes which might provide a link between backgrounds and behavior. Also, particularly in the United States, elite analysis has tended to focus on investigations of *either* national *or* local elites.[3] These have for the most part been treated as analytically exclusive categories, though they are empirically interrelated.[4] In part this has been due to the propensity of investigators to deal with clearly distinct units of political analysis; in part, too, it has reflected sensitivity to pitfalls involved in indiscriminately seeking to draw analogies between American local and national "power structures" in the United States and elsewhere.

Moreover, whereas empirical studies of local power structures in the United States have lately produced a host of studies in theoretical and explicitly methodological contexts, investigations of national elites have been comparatively few in number and have often lacked the closeness to the data displayed by the local studies.[5] Here we seem to find less rigorous approaches still quite adequate, perhaps because no better ones seem available, perhaps, too, because we have been inclined to make a virtue of a necessity.[6] Elite studies beyond the local level are not only more costly and time consuming, but involve more difficult methodological problems, particularly in identifying leaders, gaining access to them, and ascertaining their attitudes and styles of behavior. Whatever the reasons, there has been considerably less quantitative analysis and a much greater bifurcation between empirical investigations and theorizing than in the local community studies.[7] A particular problem for students of cross-national elite analysis has been the fact that empirical studies of national leaders tend to be either restricted to secondary social background data or to largely non-comparative attitudinal and behavioral data.[8]

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[3] For an exception, see Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill, and Charles R. Wright, *Public Leadership* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961).

[4] Just as the national political system may be conceptualized as functioning in an environment—the international system—so the local political system can be seen to function in the environment of the national system. While each remains susceptible to description and analysis in terms of a set of self-contained, integrated systemic roles, the central empirical fact of political decision making in the American small community is its permeation by state and federal structures. For the most part local political values are in effect authoritatively allocated by superior governmental units in the United States as elsewhere. See, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), and the abstracts by Rossi, Clelland, Arensberg, Sjoberg, and Warren, in Charles Press (ed.), *Main Street Politics, Policy Making at the Local Level: A Survey of the Periodical Literature Since 1950* (East Lansing, Michigan: Institute for Community Development, 1962). A good deal of research on this subject is now in progress and may yield significant findings on the interdependence and similarity of national and subnational elite structures.

[5] See, for example, Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); and Robert E. Agger *et al.*, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: Wiley, 1964). For convenient summaries of community elite studies see, Press, *op. cit.*; and Bell, Hill, and Wright, *op cit.* An interesting synthesis of the stratification and pluralistic approaches has recently been attempted by Robert Presthus in *Men at the Top; A Study in Community Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[6] See Harold D. Lasswell, "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), 264–389; T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1964); and Keller *op. cit.*

[7] Some recent exceptions are Wendell Bell, *Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Ch. 5; Victor T. LeVine, *The Conflict of Elite Generations in the Context of Independence in French Speaking Africa* (Hoover Institution, forthcoming); Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1965); and Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[8] For example, James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Donald R. Matthews, *United States Senators and their World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership, U. S. A.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959); Frey, *op. cit.*; W. L.

Thanks to the availability of "who's who" type of information, the compilation of social background inventories has become one of the more feasible research strategies for national elite analysis, and studies based on such data have largely preempted the field. This approach relies on descriptive material about the incumbents of elite positions from which the more comparative studies attempt some sort of configurative analysis of elite attitudes and behavior. The stated or implicit underlying assumption is that leadership, social background and recruitment patterns will facilitate understanding of the political system because we can infer from them a good deal about the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite relationships and about elite-mass relationships.[9]

Where elite political behavior is associated with latent and manifest political attitudes, these are frequently assumed to be intervening variables that are a function of socio-economic and psychological characteristics which in aggregate can be related to relevant background data. The linkages are said to be the socialization experiences through which leaders are inducted into political process from childhood onward.[10] Social circles, to use Simmel's concept, whose members have had similar socialization experiences, are presumed to hold similar attitudes. The analysis of social background variables, in this sense, represents an attempt to classify the contexts of the aggregate socialization experiences in which elite attitudes are formed in order to explain the collective orientations of members of influential social circles, or to forecast probability distributions of these orientations among them.[11]

Undoubtedly the most impressive research efforts built upon these foundations are the Hoover Institute RADIR elite studies, most of which were recently republished in a single volume.[12] This project was based on a contextual approach similar to other schemes of configurative analysis, except that it placed

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Guttsman, *The British Political Elite* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965); and W. L. Lloyd Warner, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

[9] Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, 155–56. See also, Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, N. Y.; Doubleday and Company, 1954); Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964); and Morris Janowitz, "The Systematic Analysis of Political Biography," *World Politics*, 4 (April, 1954), 405–412. Although it has been rightly objected that most studies dealing with recruitment and elite composition are primarily descriptive and fail to explain why particular elites were recruited and why they act the way they do, information about social background characteristics may well be a prerequisite for this sort of explanatory analysis. See Lester G. Seligman, "The Study of Political Leadership," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (eds.), *Political Behavior; A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), p. 178.

[10] For example, Harold D. Lasswell asserts, "Elite members who prepare to play active political roles usually become differentiated at an early age from their more passive contemporaries. Such differences of perspective affect motivation to acquire the base values appropriate to politics, notably the skills essential to leadership . . . ." See Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites*, 12–14, 21. See also, Henry Robert Glick, "Political Recruitment in Sarawak: A Case Study of Leadership in a New State," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (February, 1966), 81–84. For more general recent treatments of political socialization, see, *inter alia*, Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little Brown, forthcoming); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), Ch. 3; Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); and Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

[11] Thus, according to Lasswell and Lerner, " . . . elite perspectives can be accounted for by exploring the perspectives that were incorporated on the road toward active power or at least toward an adult status. . . . Not only predispositions but environments count": *op. cit.*, p. 18. The ultimate step is the inference of elite behavior patterns from collective attitude patterns. But since that process goes beyond the socialization experiences which concern us here, it will not be considered in this paper.

[12] Lasswell and Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites.*

greater emphasis on a developmental process.[13] The location of an elite within a "developmental context" involved a description of what we have referred to as social background variable inventories, beginning in childhood and extending through the elite's adult years.[14] Trend analysis and elite composition and circulation were studied in terms of the frequency distribution of these life history characteristics among elite members at different points in time.

These inaugural efforts in quantitative cross-national elite analysis were important steps and potentially very fecund, but they have failed to produce their potential fruit in a second generation of studies which would actually relate social background variables to elite attitudes. By and large, applications of the social background approach have left unanswered the question of how and to what extent data of this nature actually can be used to forecast attitudinal distributions. Which social background variables best predict which attitudes under what conditions? Are all background variables presently used equally good attitudinal indicators? Might not some need to be refined, and should we not add others to our inventories?

Granted that it is plausible that social background variables are related to elite attitudes, it seems equally plausible that, (1) some background characteristics have more relevance than others for elite attitudes in a particular national political system, (2) some attitudes are more strongly related than others to background characteristics in such a system, and (3) the relative importance of the association between background and attitude varies from one system to another. We hope to demonstrate in this article that such is actually the case among elite members in two national political systems, and, at the same time, suggest a method for handling multivariate analysis of this type of data relatively easily.

Social background categories are usually chosen *ad hoc* and assumed to be *prima facie* operational. But it seems to us that we must face questions raised by the above propositions, if we are to justify their use for projecting elite attitudes.[15] Our argument is that the typical research procedure in elite studies—flowing as it does from social background data into attitudinal orientations—has not, and perhaps cannot, by itself resolve the problems which have been raised. Attitudes are described and organized in terms of social background variables brought to the research from the outside and not themselves evaluated within the context of the research project. Moreover, not only does the relevance of the social background variables as a set remain unquestioned, but the relative strength of one background variable vis-à-vis another is rarely determined. In other words, in the absence of any evaluative criterion, each background variable is treated as if it were, in all cases, as important as any other. What we would like to know, however, is whether we can predict with a high degree of probability that particular background variables are associated with particular attitudes, whether conditionally or unconditionally. That is, can we expect that a given elite background will also yield certain orientations, and to what extent? Before we can seriously attempt such a task in comparative analysis, it will be necessary to explore background-attitudinal relationships extensively and intensively through cross-national research.

Here the optimum strategy, in our opinion, is to follow the approach of the biological sciences and gather and prepare for analysis large amounts of comparative elite attitudinal *cum* social background data from diverse political systems. Such information has of late become more abundant and its availability is likely to increase in the future.[16] It will consequently become easier to begin analysis with the attitudinal data and proceed to locate those background variables most frequently associated with attitudes and attitudinal clusters in diverse milieus, both in particular political systems over time and in different political systems across space as well as time.

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[13] Gunnar Heckscher, in contrast, seeks to approach social background in elite studies from a more problem-oriented, functional perspective. See his *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), 108–120.

[14] Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites*, 6–8.

[15] The search for attitudinal predictors does not necessarily imply, of course, a commitment to a determinism of the type underlying some socioeconomic and psychological theories. (See Wilbert E. Moore, "The Utility of Utopias," *American Sociological Review*, 31 (December, 1966), 765–773. While most men are creatures of habit and believe and behave in patterned ways, such patterns and their antecedents are admittedly complex and ephemeral. Ours, however, is not an argument against the possibility of their study, but rather a plea for a probabilistic approach dictated by the complexity of multivariate elite data.

[16] See, for example, John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, James Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962); Wendell Bell, *Jamaican Leaders;* Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis,

Such a research strategy rests upon the development of adequate multivariate techniques for tracing social background-attitudinal relationships in large and complex elite data. The nature of such data suggests that these techniques should, ideally, satisfy three key criteria: (1) we want a technique to deal with discrete rather than continuous data; (2) we want a way to find the best multivariable (combinations of background variables) predictors of attitudes in the data; and (3) we need a simple procedure for examining many variables relatively quickly. Thus, if we had collected data for forty background variables and wanted to relate them to ten elite attitudes on the basis of the best combination of three of these background variables (triplets), the number of possible combinations of background variables to be examined would be

$$10\left(\frac{N(N-1)(N-2)}{3}\right)$$

or 197,900 possible combinations. Obviously, we could not possibly examine the predictability of each combination in a short time, if at all.

Fortunately a computer program has recently been developed by Theodore D. Sterling and his associates which meets our three criteria, and we have employed it in the following analysis. The program's *predictability* measure, which we have used throughout this article, is a *maximum likelihood estimator*, easily interpreted as the percent of correct classifications of respondents which would have been made on dependent attitude $x$, by using independent background variable(s) $Y$. In other words, if background variable $Y$ has a predictability of .70 for attitude $x$, and we had predicted the distribution of attitude $x$ among this elite group on the basis of background variable $Y$, we would have been correct in seventy cases out of a hundred. This straightforwardness in interpretation seems to us a strong point favoring this procedure over currently employed statistical approaches to multivariate analysis. Therefore when we use the term "predict" in this paper, we are referring to this measure of classificatory accuracy in the data we are examining.[17]

## II. DATA

During the summer of 1964 eight American university professors conducted extended interviews with French and German national leaders in connection with a project directed by Karl W. Deutsch under the auspices of Yale University.[18] The questions asked were designed to elicit the respondent's attitudes about his political system and its domestic and foreign policies, with particular reference

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and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribners, 1967); James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy;* Lester G. Seligman, *Leadership in a New Nation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964); and Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena (eds.), *Studying the Venezuelan Polity* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).

[17] The program was designed for use on discrete data and employs a "logical," as opposed to a "statistical" criterion for multivariate analysis, to group data into deterministic models. This alone appeared to make it preferable to factor analytic techniques, which are further limited by the element of arbitrariness introduced with axis rotation. Robot data screening performs a selective search of the data in stepwise fashion, utilizing all possible combinations of N-1 variable predictors at each new level of combinations, until no further combinations of independent variables are found which would raise the predictability of the dependent variable. It allows for manipulation of the significance level and includes an entropy measure of uncertainty derived from information theory. See T. Sterling *et al.*, "Robot Data Screening: A Solution to Multivariate Type Problems in the Biological and Social Sciences," *Scientific Applications: Communications of the A.C.M.*, 9, 7, (July, 1966), 529–532; T. D. Sterling, *et al.*, "Robot Data Processing Techniques for Multivariate Epidemiological Predictions," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 126 (August 6, 1965), 779–794; and T. D. Sterling and S. V. Pollack, *Computers and the Life Sciences* (New York: Columbia Press, 1965).

[18] Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *Arms Control and European Unity: Elite Attitudes and Their Background in France and the German Federal Republic* (New Haven: Yale Political Data Library, 1966); and Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, Richard L. Merritt, and Helga Voss-Eckermann, *French and German Elite Responses, 1964: Codebook and Data* (New Haven: Yale Political Data Library, 1966). See also Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary Report," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 354–365.

to European integration and arms control issues.

After identifying seven elite groups believed nearest to the national political decision-making process (military, political, civil service, and business leaders, other key interest group elites, mass media leaders, and intellectuals in France, university professors in Germany), the names of individuals who were to be representative of their elite, as well as themselves political influentials, were sought from a panel of recognized experts in the politics of contemporary France and the German Federal Republic. This "reputational" sample was, in effect, largely based on "positional" criteria and the sample was subsequently enlarged by the addition of other incumbents of key offices.[19]

In response to letters requesting talks with the individuals thus selected, 44 percent of the French and 74 percent of the German leaders contacted agreed to be interviewed. This criterion of "self-selection" was further complicated by scheduling problems, but on the whole efforts to fill stipulated quotas for each of the six elite groups, and to contact the respondents believed to exercise the greatest influence from among those answering the initial letter, were quite successful. All told, the respondents interviewed included 147 French and 173 German leaders. However, it should be kept in mind that the respondents who provided the data on which our study is based, represent an analogous rather than an exact sample of the elite groups in their respective countries. Since, "interview studies of leaders are as rare as interview studies of workers are frequent in Europe,"[20] the information which was collected provided data extremely useful for our purposes.

Three different instruments were employed in the project's data collection phase. The first, a precoded Manifest Attitude Schedule, consisted of twenty major and seventy-eight subsidiary questions, most of them "open-ended," on which the interviews were based. The second, a Biographical Data Schedule, coded information about the socio-economic background of each respondent. In part these data were ascertained in the course of the interviews, in part they came from standard reference sources.[21] Finally, the latent attitudinal orientations of each respondent were assessed by the interviewer according to the dimensions of information, involvement and influence, and recorded in a Latent Attitude Schedule.

Using these data, which were primarily collected for purposes of assessing French and German elite opinion on arms control and European integration, we have taken preliminary steps in the direction of a broader investigation based on secondary analysis of these and similar materials.[22] Toward this end we are reexamining the Yale data in our investigation; the questions we asked of them for this article are different from those they were originally meant to answer.[23] Our concern here is more methodological than substantive. First, we hope to emphasize the need for a discriminating use of background variables in elite analysis, and to explore the utility of a proposed strategy for enriching the social background approach by discovering those multiple combinations of background variables in a body of data which best predict particular attitudes. Secondly, we hope to suggest some of the payoffs in using this strategy by outlining briefly some of our preliminary findings.

## III. MANIFEST ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

We asserted earlier that in practice the social background approach has tended to employ all background variables as though they were equally strong indicators for general elite attitudes. More importantly, in the absence of any assessment of the predictability of a *specific* attitude by *particular* background variables in the data, all background variables have often been treated as equally good indicators of that specific attitude. We sought to shed some light on these assumptions by examining the relationships between social background variables and all manifest and latent attitudes of German and French elite respondents.[24]

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[19] The combination of reputational and positional approaches yielded an initial group of 441 French and 650 German leaders which for operational purposes was understood as representative of elites in both political systems. *Cf.*, Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis and Merritt, *op cit.*, Ch. 1.

[20] Ralf Dahrendorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structures of European Societies," *Daedalus*. 93 (Winter, 1964), at p. 242.

[21] Categories for this instrument were based upon Lewis J. Edinger's previous studies of West German elites. They included many of the most frequently employed background characteristics in elite studies.

[22] As a first step in the secondary analysis of such data recorded on punch cards, it is often necessary to recode the information, rearranging it in such fashion as might be more amenable to the new questions that are to be asked. Since we sought to make considerably greater comparative use of the Yale data than was intended when it was originally collected and coded, we had to recode most of it so as to develop commensurable categories for both nations.

[23] In addition to treating the French and West German elites as separate populations (in which case one must invoke a *caveat emptor* in so far as the samples are analogous rather than exact) we have sometimes treated the French and German respondents as an analytic universe. Not as a sample of all French and German elites, that is, but rather as an elite population within which we may examine the relationships between social background variables and attitudinal patterns.

*Finding: While most social background variables showed some degree of association with manifest elite attitudes in the German case, some background variables were clearly better predictors of manifest attitudes than others.*

Looking at Table 1 we see that 38 out of 40 background variables are predictors of at least one of the German elite's manifest attitudes. In order to compare the overall predictability of one background variable with another, we have employed two indices: *scope*, which simply refers to the number of all attitudes the background variable predicted; and *strength*, which refers to the mean of all the background variable's attitudinal predictions.

By the *scope* criterion we find that 38 out of the 40 background factors did, in fact, allow us to predict at least one manifest attitude. But some background factors predicted far more such attitudes than others. The first two, both occupational categories, predicted eleven to twelve attitudes, while 30 other categories predicted only four or fewer.[25]

As to their *relative strengths* as predictors, some background factors clearly were more important than others, the range extending from .41 for the lowest to .84 for the highest. Moreover, in almost all cases, background categories were not steady predictors of those attitudes they did predict. The *prediction range* in Table 1 shows that many variables predicted some attitudes considerably better than others. To take an extreme example, principal occupation 1952–64, the background variable that predicted the greatest number of attitudes, (i.e., had the widest *scope*) varied in its predictions between .39 and .85.

In sum, while the predictive strength of 16 background categories among the German elites was fairly high—.61 or better—the number of attitudes they predicted was generally very small. Moreover, an examination of the entire prediction matrix—too large to reproduce here—indicated that in most cases it would have been practically impossible to have forecast which background category would have predicted what attitude(s) of the German leaders.

Note that the five background categories which predicted the greatest number of German elite attitudes (i.e., *scope*)[26] were all related to adult socialization experiences during the preceding 14 years. On the other hand, level of education, a background variable often highly associated with attitudes in mass opinion surveys, was near the bottom of the scope scale. It predicted only one of the 48 elite attitudes. Another point worth noting is the type of attitudes that were most susceptible to probabilistic prediction. The four attitudes predicted by eight to twelve background categories were all associated with particularly salient political issues.[27]

Next, let us look at the French elite data and compare it with the German.

*Finding: Among French elites, as among German, some social background factors were considerably better predictors of manifest atti-*

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[24] The number of latent attitudes (11) used was the same for both the French and German leaders. However, with regard to manifest attitudes less data was available for the French (39 attitudes) than for the Germans (48 attitudes). With regard to the biographical or social background data, there was considerably less data available in the French case (11 variables), than for the German (40 variables). We felt that for theoretical reasons it was worthwhile to utilize the greater body of German data, which will explain differences in our tables. Whenever the French and German respondents were compared, however, this was done using only the attitudes and background variables for which adequate data were on hand for both.

[25] It is worth emphasizing that even the background variable predicting the greatest number of attitudes allowed us to do so for only twelve, that is, 25 percent, of all 48 attitudes.

[26] We use *scope* rather than *strength* as a summary measure because for purposes of the present discussion—demonstrating that some background variables have more relevance than others for elite attitudes in a national political system—the number of attitudes a background variable predicts seems more to the point.

[27] These were responses to the following interviewer questions: (1) What development in domestic policy are likely to bring about a change in German foreign policy? (2) Would the recognition of East Germany ease international tension? (3) How would recognition of the Oder-Neisse line affect efforts toward German reunification? and, (4) What is the greatest threat to German security at the present time?

TABLE 1. GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND SET OF 48 MANIFEST ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

| Background Factor | Relationship to Set of 48 Manifest Attitudes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scope | | | |
| | Number of Attitudes Predicted | Percent of all Attitudes Predicted | Strength (by Mean) | Prediction Range |
| 1. Principal Occupation, 1952–1964 | 12 | 25 | .62 | .39–.85 |
| 2. Present Occupation | 11 | 23 | .62 | .40–.85 |
| 3. Political Party Leader, 1964 | 9 | 19 | .65 | .39–.86 |
| 4. Political Party Affiliation, 1956 | 9 | 19 | .61 | .38–.79 |
| 5. Political Persecution, 1933–1944 | 8 | 17 | .51 | .37–.65 |
| 6. Nazi Political Activity, 1933–1944 | 8 | 17 | .61 | .40–.83 |
| 7. Present Political Party Affiliation | 6 | 13 | .69 | .48–.80 |
| 8. Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations | 5 | 10 | .66 | .50–.84 |
| 9. Religious Affiliation | 5 | 10 | .57 | .46–.77 |
| 10. Incumbent Governmental Office, 1956 | 5 | 10 | .56 | .41–.78 |
| 11. Political Party Leader, 1956 | 4 | 8 | .56 | .37–.78 |
| 12. Principal Occupation, 1945–1952 | 4 | 8 | .61 | .59–.68 |
| 13. Region of Birth | 4 | 8 | .56 | .39–.62 |
| 14. Size of Town of Birth | 4 | 8 | .48 | .37–.63 |
| 15. Political Party Affiliation, 1933–1934 | 4 | 8 | .59 | .41–.73 |
| 16. Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association | 3 | 6 | .55 | .41–.67 |
| 17. Military Service | 3 | 6 | .60 | .51–.75 |
| 18. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1956 | 3 | 6 | .50 | .36–.71 |
| 19. Number of Years in Present Elite Position | 3 | 6 | .50 | .41–.64 |
| 20. Membership in One Voluntary Non-Economic Association | 3 | 6 | .68 | .65–.71 |
| 21. Membership in Three Voluntary Non-Economic Associations | 3 | 6 | .52 | .44–.66 |
| 22. Principal Occupation, Pre-1933 | 3 | 6 | .54 | .38–.76 |
| 23. Political Party Affiliation, 1946 | 3 | 6 | .55 | .41–.74 |
| 24. Political Party Leader, 1946 | 3 | 6 | .47 | .42–.56 |
| 25. Social Class Background | 2 | 4 | .59 | .57–.60 |
| 26. Highest Academic Degree Attained | 2 | 4 | .57 | .47–.66 |
| 27. Country of Birth | 2 | 4 | .49 | .38–.60 |
| 28. Principal Occupation, 1933–1945 | 2 | 4 | .64 | .63–.64 |
| 29. Age | 2 | 4 | .59 | .57–.61 |
| 30. Positions in Two Voluntary Economic Associations | 2 | 4 | .58 | .51–.64 |
| 31. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1946 | 2 | 4 | .55 | .53–.56 |
| 32. Membership in Three Voluntary Economic Associations | 1 | 2 | .78 | — |
| 33. University Specialization | 1 | 2 | .73 | — |
| 34. Level of Education | 1 | 2 | .41 | — |
| 35. Political Party Leader, Pre-1933 | 1 | 2 | .68 | — |
| 36. Membership in Two Voluntary Non-Economic Associations | 1 | 2 | .46 | — |
| 37. Highest Military Rank Attained | 1 | 2 | .61 | — |
| 38. Position in Three Voluntary Economic Associations | 1 | 2 | .84 | — |
| 39. Position in One Voluntary Economic Assn. | 0 | 0 | — | — |
| 40. Political Party Affiliation, Pre-1933 | 0 | 0 | — | — |

* *Scope* is the number of manifest attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (48 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.

Number of Respondents ($N$) = 173.
Number of Attitudes = 48.

TABLE 2. FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMMON SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND MANIFEST ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

| Background Factor | French Respondents Prediction of Manifest Attitudes | | | | German Respondents Prediction of Manifest Attitudes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scope | | | | Scope | | | |
| | Number of Attitudes Predicted | Percent of Attitudes Predicted | Strength (by Mean) | Prediction Range | Number of Attitudes Predicted | Percent of Attitudes Predicted | Strength (by Mean) | Prediction Range |
| 1. Present Political Party Affiliation | 9 | 23 | .65 | .53–.77 | 4 | 10 | .68 | .48–.75 |
| 2. Political Party Affiliation, France, 1958; Germany, 1956 | 9 | 23 | .68 | .50–.81 | 6 | 15 | .60 | .38–.75 |
| 3. Present Occupation | 6 | 15 | .65 | .49–.82 | 7 | 18 | .68 | .44–.85 |
| 4. Social Class Background | 4 | 10 | .75 | .67–.80 | 2 | 5 | .59 | .57–.60 |
| 5. Size of Town of Birth | 4 | 10 | .64 | .42–.86 | 1 | 3 | .47 | — |
| 6. Principal Occupation, France, 1958–1964; Germany, 1952–1964 | 3 | 8 | .54 | .48–.61 | 8 | 21 | .66 | .45–.85 |
| 7. University Specialization | 3 | 8 | .67 | .60–.75 | 1 | 3 | .73 | — |
| 8. Level of Education | 2 | 5 | .71 | .63–.79 | 0 | — | — | — |
| 9. Age | 1 | 3 | .77 | — | 2 | 5 | .64 | .63–.64 |
| 10. Region of Birth | 0 | 0 | — | — | 3 | 8 | .53 | .39–.62 |
| 11. Principal Occupation, France, 1945–1958; Germany 1945–1952 | 0 | 0 | — | — | 2 | 5 | .60 | .59–.60 |

* *Scope* is the number of manifest attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (39 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.

Number of Respondents (*N*) = French, 147; German, 173.

Number of Attitudes = 39.

*tudes than others, and some manifest attitudes were again more frequently predicted by background categories than were others.*

While nine of the eleven French background factors predicted at least one French elite attitude in the data, Table 2 shows the differences in their relative *scopes*. Two were related to nine manifest attitudes, while six were related to only three or fewer attitudes. In predictive *strength* they varied between .64 and .77 for particular attitudes and the *prediction range* indicates that the same background categories were far from being steady predictors for the set of attitudes they did predict. As in the case of the German elites, however, when the background variables predicted attitudes, their strength was usually high, but their scopes, the number of attitudes they did predict, were low. Here too, it would for the most part have been difficult to have forecast which background factors would predict which attitudes.

Observe that the background factors with the widest scope (predicting in this case six to nine of all attitudes) were again associated particularly with adult socialization experiences—especially occupation and party affiliation. And again, level of education was a relatively poor predictor of elite attitudes.

In order to contrast these results with the German findings, let us look at those background variables and attitudes for which comparable results were available (see Table 2). While age and social class background had the highest predictive *strengths* for the French elites they were comparatively low in the German data. As we have already noted, party affiliation and occupation have relatively wide *scopes* for both French and German elite attitudes. On the whole, however, the rank orderings of all background variables by scope in the French and German social circles was highly dissimilar. The Spearman $r^s$ is .16 for the two rankings.

But scope is a crude index, describing only the total number of attitudes a background variable predicted. It could be that the same background factor, at least, predicts the same attitudinal responses to identical questions for both German and French elite respondents. In our analysis, this might have been the case for 24 background-attitude combinations.

But it proved to apply to only four of these: the same background factors generally predicted different attitudes in the French and German data.

Shifting our perspective from the background categories to the attitudes predicted, we find, as in the German case, that some attitudes were predicted by more background variables than were others: two attitudes were predicted by four to five background factors, but twenty of the remaining attitudes were not predicted by any background factors.[28] None of these attitudes were among those most frequently associated with the same background variables in the case of the German elites. They did however touch upon extremely salient issues in French politics—just as the German attitudes most often predicted by German background variables were particularly salient issues in German politics.[29] This suggests that, generally, elite socialization experiences associated with social background factors may possibly be more strongly related to orientations toward highly salient issues than to orientations concerning issues of lower saliency. If this hypothesis should be sustained by further research, future analysis would require considerable discrimination among attitudes conditioned by the differential saliency of issues in various political systems and periods of time.

### IV. NATIONALITY AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Nationality is frequently believed to be an important social background variable, with widespread and powerful effects on elite attitudes. However, its actual relationship to elite attitudes has infrequently been analyzed quantitatively and cross-nationally. Most studies focus on elites of the same nationality and do not include cross-national attitudinal responses to identical questions which permit comparison. But if all respondents are Germans, for example, there is no way to assess the relative importance of their "Germanism" for different attitudes.

The Yale group, however, did ask the same questions of French and German respondents, affording us an opportunity to compare the relationship between the nationality factor and manifest attitudes to similar relationships between other background variables and the same attitudes. To explore this problem we combined the French and German elite responses, and utilized nationality as a social background predictor of differential attitudes. We then compared our findings with those of other background factor predictions in the French and German groups treated separately.

*Finding: Nationality had a significantly greater scope (i.e., predicted more attitudes) than any other background variable in either national group. However, its strength as a predictor was about the same as that of other elite background variables in Germany and below the average in France.*

In *scope*, nationality predicted 85 percent of the manifest attitudes in the combined groups. When they were examined separately, no other social background factor proved a predictor for more than 25 percent of the same set of attitudes and most others predicted far less than that. But on the *strength* index, nationality had only a mean predictability of .60 for the combined groups; taken separately the average background variable for the German elites had practically the same mean predictability (.59) and for the French it was higher (.67).

The extremely wide scope of nationality as a predictor might lead us to inquire whether or not this factor affects the attitudinal predictions of other background factors. In other words, we are now interested in the relative impact nationality had on the relationships we have already observed between other background categories and manifest attitudes among French and German elites considered by themselves. The method for determining this is a simple control. When we examined the re-

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[28] Since only eleven French background categories were examined, we prefer not to extend our interpretation to argue that because fewer French elite attitudes were related to background factors, background as such was less related to French attitudes than to German. However, this limitation imposed upon the present analysis by the nature of the data employed merely emphasizes the need to expand and coordinate data collection for more extensive cross-national comparisons.

[29] Those attitudes predicted by more background variables (three to five) than other attitudes were responses to the following questions put by the interviewers: (1) Are you content with the present governmental system in France? (2) Are you satisfied with the government's foreign policy measures? (3) Which group or groups do you feel have gained in political power over the last few years? (4) Which features of French foreign policy, if any, are likely to remain after deGaulle? (5) Do you expect an appreciable change in the relations between France and the countries of Eastern Europe during the next few years? and, (6) Is an independent nuclear deterrent necessary for a nation's prestige in the world?

TABLE 3. FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: COMPARISON OF ATTITUDINAL PREDICTIONS BY BACKGROUND FACTORS IN SEPARATE NATIONAL SAMPLES CONTROLLED FOR NATIONALITY WITH ATTITUDINAL PREDICTIONS AFFECTED BY NATIONALITY IN COMBINED GROUP*

| Background Factor | French Respondents | | German Respondents | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Attitudinal Predictions in Separate Sample Controlled for Nationality | Number of These Attitudinal Predictions Affected by Nationality | Number of Attitudinal Predictions in Separate Sample Controlled for Nationality | Number of These Attitudinal Predictions Affected by Nationality |
| 1. Principal Occupation, France, 1958–1964; Germany, 1952–1964 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 5 |
| 2. Present Occupation | 6 | 4 | 7 | 6 |
| 3. Political Party Affiliation, France, 1958; Germany, 1956 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 6 |
| 4. Present Political Party Affiliation | 9 | 8 | 4 | 3 |
| 5. Principal Occupation, France, 1945–1958; Germany, 1945–1952 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
| 6. Region of Birth | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 |
| 7. Size of Town of Birth | 4 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| 8. Social Class Background | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| 9. Age | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| 10. University Specialization | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| 11. Level of Education | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Totals | 41 | 36 | 36 | 30 |

Significance Level .05.
Number of Respondents ($N$) = French, 147; German, 173.

* The criteria for attributing a nationality effect to a background factor's attitudinal prediction are whether or not this predictability decreases or drops below the .05 level in the combined French-German group compared to its attitudinal prediction in the separate sample controlled for nationality.

lationship between background variables and manifest attitudes in each country separately, we were controlling for nationality. By combining the two groups we no longer do so. Thus, if another background factor's prediction of an attitude now decreases in predictability or drops below the .05 significance level we have been using when compared to its predictability in the controlled samples, we can attribute this effect to nationality.[30]

As shown in Table 3, nationality affected over 80 percent (36 out of 41 for the French and 30 out of 36 for the Germans) of the attitudinal predictions made by other background variables among the French and German elites. Those background factors less affected by nationality in their attitudinal predictions again referred to contexts of adult socialization experiences.

## V. LATENT ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

The data provided through the Latent Attitude Instrument of the Yale Study present an opportunity to examine the social background approach from yet another perspective. It enables us to consider—apart from manifest response patterns—eleven implicit attitudinal orientations, such as respondents' level of political affect, sense of involvement, level of information, resistance to new information (cloture), and alienation from the prevailing political order.

The Latent Attitude Instrument, it will be remembered, coded the interviewer's intuitive judgements of response patterns. In that sense it provided ostensibly "softer" data than the actual responses coded in the Manifest Attitude Instrument and the social background information included in the Biographical Data schedule. In view of this we first sought to check its reliability as a source for data evaluating the respondent's orientations. Included in these latent ratings were questions requesting the interviewer to categorize each respondent's degree of information along an ordinal scale. If accurate, the interviewer's judgement should correspond roughly to the total number of "don't know" answers the respondent gave

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[30] By combining the French and German data we are once again limited to examining only those background variables (11) and those attitudes (39) for which we have comparable information. Moreover, we can observe a drop in predictability in the combined groups for only those background predictions that were already found to be significant when the two national elites were considered separately.

TABLE 4. GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND SET OF 11 LATENT ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

| Background Factor | Relationship to Set of 11 Latent Attitudes | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Scope of Attitudes Predicted | Strength (by Mean) | Prediction Range |
| 1. Military Service | 6 | .71 | .55–.86 |
| 2. Principal Occupation, 1952–1964 | 4 | .67 | .58–.78 |
| 3. Present Occupation | 3 | .70 | .62–.78 |
| 4. Political Party Leader, 1964 | 3 | .70 | .63–.79 |
| 5. Political Party Leader, 1956 | 3 | .68 | .62–.79 |
| 6. Membership in Two Voluntary Non-Economic Associations | 3 | .60 | .59–.62 |
| 7. Present Political Party Affiliation | 3 | .69 | .60–.78 |
| 8. Political Party Leader, Pre-1933 | 2 | .71 | .64–.77 |
| 9. Political Party Leader, 1946 | 2 | .68 | .57–.78 |
| 10. Principal Occupation, 1933–1945 | 2 | .78 | .77–.78 |
| 11. Membership in Three Voluntary Non-Economic Associations | 2 | .67 | .63–.70 |
| 12. Political Party Affiliation, 1946 | 2 | .70 | .64–.76 |
| 13. Age | 2 | .81 | .77–.84 |
| 14. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1946 | 2 | .69 | .59–.78 |
| 15. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1956 | 2 | .70 | .62–.78 |
| 16. Principal Occupation, 1945–1952 | 2 | .69 | .60–.78 |
| 17. Nazi Political Activity, 1933–1934 | 1 | .77 | — |
| 18. Incumbent Governmental Office, 1956 | 1 | .84 | — |
| 19. Highest Military Rank Attained | 1 | .62 | — |
| 20. Highest Academic Degree Attained | 1 | .53 | — |
| 21. Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association | 1 | .61 | — |
| 22. Position in One Voluntary Economic Association | 1 | .77 | — |
| 23. Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations | 1 | .55 | — |
| 24. Membership in Three Voluntary Economic Associations | 1 | .78 | — |
| 25. Position in Three Voluntary Economic Associations | 1 | .78 | — |
| 26. Political Party Affiliation, 1933–1944 | 1 | .73 | — |
| 27. Political Party Affiliation, 1956 | 1 | .78 | — |
| 28. Number of Years in Present Elite Position | 1 | .77 | — |
| 29. University Specialization | 1 | .77 | — |
| 30. Religious Affiliation | 0 | — | — |
| 31. Social Class Background | 0 | — | — |
| 32. Size of Town of Birth | 0 | — | — |
| 33. Country of Birth | 0 | — | — |
| 34. Region of Birth | 0 | — | — |
| 35. Level of Education | 0 | — | — |
| 36. Position in Two Voluntary Economic Associations | 0 | — | — |
| 37. Membership in One Voluntary Non-Economic Association | 0 | — | — |
| 38. Principal Occupation, Pre-1933 | 0 | — | — |
| 39. Political Party Affiliation, Pre- 1933 | 0 | — | — |
| 40. Political Persecution, 1933–1944 | 0 | — | — |

* *Scope* is the number of latent attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (11 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.

Number of Respondents ($N$) = 173.

Number of Attitudes = 11.

to explicit questions in the Manifest schedule.[31] While such a reliability measure is by no means ideal, it seemed a reasonable and feasible estimate given the nature of the data.

We took the number of "Don't Know" answers given by each respondent as a percent of the total number of questions put to him from the Manifest Attitude Schedule. Respondents were ranked from high to low according to this criterion, and the ranking was compared to a similar ranking of the same respondents according to their degree of information as estimated by the interviewer in the Latent Attitude Schedule. For the latent ratings of the German sample, we found seven ranking errors (4% error), and four ranking errors (3% error) in the French sample. This low percentage of error appeared to lend sufficient credence to the Latent Attitude ratings to permit us to employ this data in further exploration of the social background hypothesis.

*Finding: For both the German and French elites there was considerable association between social background factors and latent attitudes, though not as much as between background factors and manifest attitudes.*[32] *Again, some background variables proved better predictors of latent attitudes than others in the two sets of elites.*

As shown in Table 4, in *scope* twenty-nine of the forty German background variables predicted at least one latent attitude, but only seven predicted more than two. Predictive *strength* varied considerably among different background factors (from .53 to .84), and also within each one, as indicated by the *prediction range*. The two background variables with the widest scope proved to be military service and principal occupation 1952–1964, whereas for the manifest attitudes, it was political party factors and present and past occupations that were the most frequent predictors. However, note that in both instances the highest predictors relate particularly to adult socialization experiences, while level of education is at the bottom, and in the case of the latent attitudes does not even qualify as a predictor.

Among the French elite respondents, eight of the eleven potential background predictors for which data was available were related to at least one latent attitude (see Table 5). Once again the background factors varied in scope: two predicted four to five latent attitudes, while three predicted none. As with the German elites, strength varied—though not as much—among different factors (from .58 and .72) and again certain background factors generally predicted some attitudes better than other attitudes. In France too, the factors with the widest scope, present occupation and present political party affiliation, related to adult socialization experiences. These two thus proved to be among the strongest predictors of manifest as well as latent elite attitudes in both countries, while level of education, with equal consistency, was a very poor predictor. Note, however, that the comparison between the predictive scopes of the same latent attitudes by all identical French and German background factors in Table 5 shows their overall rank order to be quite dissimilar in the two countries.

As with the manifest attitudes, differences in the comparative scope of a background factor does not preclude that it might have predicted the same latent orientations of both German and French elites. In our analysis this could have occurred eight times. In fact, however, only three such orientations—level of involvement, level of affect, and cloture of thinking—were predicted by the same factor in both countries, all three being predicted by a single one, namely present occupation.

To sum up, we found latent attitudes to show associative patterns similar to those for manifest attitudes among French and German elites. When predictions were made by the background categories their *strength* was acceptable and, in many cases, quite high. Predictive *scope*, on the other hand, proved rather limited, and indicated wide differences in the associative patterns in France and Germany apart from the consistency with which occupation and party affiliation turned out to be high predictors of latent as well as manifest attitudes.

Repeating our study of the nationality factor with the latent attitudinal data, we found

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[31] The expectation was that if the ratings were accurate, a respondent rated low on degree of information in the Latent Schedule should have given a high number of "D.K." answers in the Manifest Schedule, and vice-versa. While our check indicated a relatively low number of interviewer errors and appeared to justify an assumption of high accuracy for the "Latent" estimates, we should note that an estimate of this nature is purely quantitative, while it is likely that qualitative judgments were to some measure a component of the original ratings.

[32] We had expected the association to be greater because the Latent Attitude Schedule listed much more diffuse orientations than the Manifest. However, the Latent Attitude data seems comparatively weak and limited; it includes only about one-quarter as many items as were covered by the Manifest Schedule. We are presently exploring this problem in greater depth.

TABLE 5. FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMMON SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND LATENT ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

| Background Factor | French Respondents Prediction of Latent Attitudes | | | German Respondents Prediction of Latent Attitudes | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Scope (Number of Attitudes Predicted) | Strength (by Mean) | Prediction Range | Scope (Number of Attitudes Predicted) | Strength (by Mean) | Prediction Range |
| 1. Present Occupation | 5 | .68 | .63–.74 | 3 | .70 | .62–.78 |
| 2. Present Political Party Affiliation | 4 | .70 | .66–.79 | 3 | .69 | .60–.78 |
| 3. Political Party Affiliation, France, 1958; Germany, 1956 | 3 | .71 | .65–.80 | 1 | .78 | — |
| 4. University Specialization | 2 | .59 | .52–.65 | 1 | .77 | — |
| 5. Social Class Background | 2 | .58 | .50–.66 | 0 | — | — |
| 6. Level of Education | 1 | .58 | — | 0 | — | — |
| 8. Age | 1 | .63 | — | 2 | .81 | — |
| 9. Size of Town of Birth | 0 | — | — | 0 | — | — |
| 10. Principal Occupation, France, 1945–1958; Germany, 1945–1952 | 0 | — | — | 2 | .69 | — |
| 11. Principal Occupation, France, 1958–1964; Germany, 1952–1964 | 0 | — | — | 4 | .67 | .58–.78 |

* *Scope* is the number of latent attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (11 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factor at this level.

Number of Respondents ($N$) = French, 147; German, 173.

Number of Attitudes = 11.

nationality again to have an impressively broader scope than other background variables. Nationality was related to 73 percent of the latent attitudes, while on the average other French and German background factors were respectively related to only 16 and 13 percent of those attitudes. However, its strength, or mean predictability, was .63, below the average for other background predictors for the French (.65) and the Germans (.72). Once more we combined the French and German elites and compared resulting attitudinal predictions with those made by the same background variables when nationality was held constant. Here we found that nationality affected the attitudinal predictions of more than three-quarters of the background variables in both French and German cases, about the same proportion as with manifest attitudes.

### VI. ATTITUDINAL COHESION AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND WITHIN NATIONAL ELITES

As a further step in our cross-national analysis, we reduced the ninety-eight questions in the Manifest Schedule to eight basic questions which could serve as a core for a comparison of attitudinal consensus and disconsensus among French and among German leaders. For purposes of identifying clear attitudinal dimensions on the basis of these eight questions, we next dichotomized them into two distinct and mutually exclusive sets of manifest orientations, bearing in mind the purposes which underlay the original formulation and employment of the questions in the Yale Project. Following this procedure, we constructed a matrix depicting the distribution of answers to each of the eight questions across replies to each of the remaining seven. A simple examination of the cells for those cases where a proportion of the respondents reversed themselves—indicating a division of opinion *across* our two dimensions—allowed us to identify attitudinal orientations of relatively high agreement and disagreement.

*Finding: German elites displayed an exceptionally high attitudinal consensus, while French elites showed considerable dissension.*

French leaders generally identified the positive features of their regime with its effective "leadership" and the contents of "policy-making." While in their orientation toward internal or external problems relating to the purpose of European integration French respondents divided approximately 5:3 in favor of an internal orientation, this division did not show up as a cleavage across any of the other dimensions.

Not surprisingly, the most significant elite cleavages in the deGaulle Republic were found to exist along the approbation/alienation, nationalist/supranationalist, and European/Atlantic dichotomous dimensions. Those who

TABLE 6. DEGREE OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND INTEGRATION AS MEASURED BY AGREEMENT ON MULTIPLE QUESTIONS

| Number of Questions | Elite Respondents | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | French | | German | |
| | *N* | % | *N* | % |
| 1 | 106 | 72 | 161 | 93 |
| 2 | 74 | 50 | 143 | 83 |
| 3 | 61 | 41 | 99 | 57 |
| 4 | 36 | 24 | 69 | 40 |
| 5 | 19 | 13 | 47 | 27 |
| 6 | 11 | 07 | 30 | 17 |
| 7 | 06 | 04 | 11 | 06 |
| 8 | 0 | 0 | 06 | 03 |

evaluatively (*i.e.*, instrumentally) and affectively (*i.e.*, emotionally) approved of the present governmental system, also tended to take a "nationalist" position on NATO strategy and to focus cognitively upon "European" as opposed to common "Atlantic" interests. This Gaullist position was opposed correspondingly on the same dimensions by the anti-Gaullists who were evaluatively and affectively more or less alienated from their political system.[33] In short, while the French respondents manifested high disagreement along the lines of Gaullist–anti-Gaullist questions, their agreement was usually in areas where leadership and foreign policy issues were less salient.

The German elites, in sharp contrast to their French counterparts, appeared highly consensual and integrated. The contrast between the two elite groups in terms of their integration may be seen clearly in Table 6, which summarizes the proportion of individuals within each sample who agreed with one another—that is, gave identical responses on one or more of our eight questions.[34]

Looking at Table 6, we find that on three questions the German respondents demonstrate higher consensus than the French in taking a position by an average ratio of 4:3; on four through six questions the Germans show about twice the amount of agreement on a position than do the French.

When the German respondents were in disagreement it was along the trust/non-trust and European/Atlantic dichotomous dimensions. However, these two divisions did not show up along any other dimensions; there were no cleavages across multiple questions, as in the French sample. Also, in contrast to the French, the German elites, on the whole, supported their political system and were strongly oriented toward structural, regime features rather than leadership and policy features. They manifested internationalist orientations in both NATO strategy and evaluative perceptions of prospective European union partners. But they were concerned more with internal—primarily economic—European problems than with world bi-polarism in their evaluations of the purpose of European integration.

In sum, whereas the German sample demonstrated a generally high degree of consensus along our eight dimensions, the French respondents seemed deeply divided on all of them. In France the most basic elite cleavages appeared related to approbation vs. alienation toward the political system, or, more specifically, to lie along dimensions which can be labeled Gaullist and anti-Gaullist.

In comparing the manifest attitudes over which there was high disconsensus among the French elites with those attitudes that were found to have been frequently predicted by social background factors, we found that they were not identical. This led us to hypothesize that, though the strength of social background predictions of manifest attitudes for the French group as a whole was relatively high, background variables would not be as strongly related to attitudes if we narrowed the focus from the entire national samples to intra-national groups in high agreement and disagreement.

To pursue this hypothesis, we divided our respective French and German leaders into two groups for each country—four altogether—which agreed internally and disagreed between each other on three attitudinal dimensions. The members of each group had in common that they all took precisely the same position on a number of questions, while the distinction between the two groups was that their respec-

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[33] Moreover, these alienated elites are generally oriented beyond the boundaries of France: not only are they on the whole supra-nationalists, but their cognitive focus extends to a "larger European" and "Atlantic" outlook, *i.e.*, to a diffuse internationalism.

[34] Our procedure was as follows: starting with the question on which responses by both French and German elites showed the greatest consensus (*i.e.*, where the greatest number of respondents agreed on one or another position) we separated out the groups of greatest agreement. We then culled from these those who were in highest agreement on a second question as well and continued this dichotomizing selection process through all eight questions.

FIGURE 1

FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND SELECTED MANIFEST ATTITUDES OF DICHOTOMOUS GROUP MEMBERS COMPARED TO DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE SAME SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDE IN ENTIRE ELITE SAMPLES*



*Measure of Association = Pearson's Contingency Coefficient

Note: Groups I and II are in internal agreement but dichotomous in attitude.

tive members took exactly opposite positions on these questions. Thus, respondents within each agreed with each other but absolutely disagreed with all members of the other group. If all in Group I answered a question one way, then all members of Group II had answered it in the opposite direction.

Now, if social background factors are indeed strong indicators of elite attitudes they should clearly discriminate between groups within a country that are internally homogeneous in attitudes but in absolute disagreement with each other. As Groups I and II in each country are distinguished by the opposite attitudes of their members, if social background is highly related to attitudinal group membership, the two groups should have highly dissimilar backgrounds because they have dissimilar attitudes. Or at least, they should show greater dissimilarity in their backgrounds than would be found in the entire French and German elite samples when there are no internal controls for attitudinal group membership. On the three attitudes which define attitudinal group membership, common background characteristics should be highly associated with these attitudes, or at least more highly associated than in the entire elite samples.

*Finding:* 1) *In the German sample, background characteristics were more highly associated with attitudes in dichotomous groups than they were for the German elites as a whole on the three responses.* 2) *In the French sample the relationships between background and attitude in dichotomous groups was less highly associated than they were for the entire French sample on the same three responses.*[35]

In Figure 1 the German background-attitude relationships are depicted by solid lines and the French by broken lines. It shows that among German elites background remained an adequate attitudinal indicator when they were divided into groups which agreed internally and disagreed with each other. Among the French exactly the opposite happened. With the exception of size of town of birth, significance of background decreased in relationship to attitude in the case of the two groups below what it was in the French entire elite sample.[36]

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[35] Our measure of association was Pearson's contingency coefficient. If background characteristics were distributed indiscriminately, or in the same way, in both Groups I and II which were in absolute disagreement on three attitudes, then they could not have been related to these attitudes and the coefficient would be zero. As the coefficient increases, however, the background characteristic increasingly discriminates between the two groups, and is therefore a more reliable indicator in predicting attitudinal group membership.

[36] Two control groups of the same size as Groups I and II were randomly selected from each of the entire French and German elite sam-

TABLE 7. GERMAN RESPONDENTS: BACKGROUND FACTOR COMBINATIONS YIELDING HIGHEST PREDICTIONS FOUND IN DATA OF SELECTED MANIFEST ATTITUDES

| Attitude Predicted | Background Factors in the Combination and Their Relative Contributions to the Combined Prediction | | | Combined Predictions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Approbation—Alienation Toward Governmental System | Social Class Background .62 | Political Party Leader—Pre-1933 .62 | | .66 |
| 2. Policy, Government—Structure, Regime Orientation | Region of Birth .60 | Principal Occupation, 1952–1964 .60 | | .64 |
| 3. Secure, Trust Society—Bad Portents, Distrust Society | Highest Degree Attained .50 | Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations .51 | Political Persecution, 1933–1944 .50 | .57 |
| 4. Nationalist—Supra Nationalist | Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association .59 | Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations .59 | Number of Years in Present Elite Occupation .64 | .70 |
| 5. European—Atlantic Orientation | Military Service .51 | Political Party Affiliation, 1946 .50 | | .58 |
| 6. Little European—Larger European Orientation | Highest Degree Attained .49 | Principal Occupation, Pre-1933 .60 | Political Persecution, 1933–1944 .56 | .72 |
| 7. Internal Problem—External Problem Orientation | Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association .68 | Number of Years in Present Elite Occupation .68 | | .68 |
| 8. Communist Threat—No Communist Threat Perception | Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations .73 | Present Political Party Affiliation .76 | | .80 |

Thus, social background became a stronger indicator for attitudinal group membership in the German sample, while its significance actually decreased in the French case.

In terms of our thesis that social background factors vary in their relationship to attitudes—and more particularly, that social background is likely to be differentially related to attitudes among various nations even within the same "Western" culture area—the above finding seem persuasive. It suggests that where background data on elite members is collected for comparative purposes on the assumption that it is significantly related to elite attitudes, the researcher should therefore proceed with caution. With regard to elite attitudes, at any rate, our analysis indicates to us that social background categories do not necessarily have equal meaning and significance in different political systems.

## VII. CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to make a modest contribution to cross-national comparisons of political systems in general and to the study of their leaders in particular. Analysis of the relationships between the social backgrounds of elites on the one hand, and their orientation patterns on the other, has obvious relevance for the study of sub-national and national, as well as supra-national political systems. For example, where nationality is a significant factor relating to elite attitudes, it may tell us a good deal about the cohesiveness of old and new national states and about the prospects for supra-national political entities. Strong relationships or, conversely, weak relationships, between attitudes and religious or age cohort socialization experiences may similarly reveal significant patterns of elite ties and cleavages within, between, and across political communities.

The social background approach comes to us with a long lineage and a history of diverse applications. Its employment in elite analysis, however, has usually had rather specific purposes. Whether these have emphasized the projection of trends in attitudinal distributions in a policy science context, or stressed less policy-oriented studies of elite socialization, the implicit common goal has been to relate background variables as contexts of elite socialization experiences to elite attitudes.

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ples. They moved in the opposite direction from Groups I and II for the Germans, and remained about the same as the French entire elite sample or moved but slightly in the direction of the French Groups I and II.

At the present juncture, the background data that have been collected are often used undiscriminatingly for lack of conclusive evidence on the actual relationships between particular background variables and particular attitudes in different cultural circumstances. Our analysis suggests the following qualifications: (1) some background variables are considerably better predictors than are others of attitudes within a single national political system;[37] (2) some elite attitudes in a particular national polity are more frequently related to background variables than are others; and (3) relationships between social background and attitude vary from one national political system to another even within the same supranational culture area.[38]

If the social background approach is to fulfill its purposes and justify its promises of making background data a powerful predictive index of attitudinal distributions, it seems to us that it must first come to grips with the very complex problems of the relationship between the two. This calls for data including many background-attitude relationships under diverse cultural and structural circumstances and their analysis in terms of comparative socialization theories yet to be developed.[39]

In this article, we introduce a multivariate technique which makes the necessary manipulation of large quantities of such complex data at least feasible. The Robot Data Screening program we employed permits the investigator to examine readily all possible combinations of variables in search for those which have the highest predictive scope and strength in a given body of data. Moreover, it allows us to discover combinations of several "causal" variables which together have a greater predictive power than any one of them alone.

For example, in the case of our German data we were confronted with the need to examine the predictive strength of 40 background factors for 48 elite attitudes. By running our data through the Robot Data Screening program—rather than undertaking to study more than a million tables for possible combinations of up to three background predictors—we found that 43 attitudes could be related to single background factors. Going further, we learned that in some instances the predictability of 40 attitudes was increased by a combination of background factors. Table 7 illustrates this procedure in the case of the eight key German elite attitudes considered earlier.

A technique, however, cannot substitute for interpretation. It may be that even if sophisticated methods of ascertaining elite attitudes permit us to distinguish "real" attitudes from expressed attitudes, the data may still be inadequate for our purpose. We may be unable to obtain sufficiently detailed information on the social background histories of elite group members to allow us to achieve satisfactory explanations and predictions. And we may not find sufficient attitudinal consistency related to social background to do better than investigators employing less quantitative and more intuitive approaches. If we are to do better, both requirements will have to be satisfied.

In any event, our admittedly tentative findings and inferences based on a comparative analysis of two groups of national leaders seem to us to raise some doubts about several assumptions implicit in the standard social background approach to elite studies. We believe they underscore the need to sharpen social background studies through comparative research into empirical relationships between specific social background variables and attitudes within the framework of socialization processes.

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[37] In the case of the data used here predictive strength often proved acceptable, but the scope of prediction was frequently lower than might have been expected and did not seem to conform to any obvious patterns beyond those we suggested rather tentatively. Moreover, the relevance of the diffuseness or specificity of the attitudes in question remained to be resolved. Despite our contrary findings in comparing latent with manifest attitudes among French and German elites, we suspect that quantitative forecasting may be more successful with diffuse than with specific attitudinal responses.

[38] This was underscored in our study of attitudinal cohesion, while the pervasive effects of nationality emphasized the theme from a different perspective.

[39] Some indications of a possible approach were suggested to us by our finding that adult socialization experiences—particularly those isolated by occupation and party affiliation categories—were consistently highest in relationship to attitude, and that those attitudes most frequently predicted by the background data usually were related to salient political issues. We realize, of course, that the data base for these particular findings was extremely limited and our conclusions correspondingly tentative.

# PROTEST PARTICIPATION AMONG SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGE STUDENTS

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A recent article in this REVIEW has drawn attention to the inadequacies in our knowledge of how great social movements arise.[1] On the Negro protest movement there are many hypotheses but few attempts to relate them to differences in individual behavior. Considerable confusion also exists in the variety of explanatory terms involved. James A. Geschwinder lists five hypotheses that focus variously on economic conditions and the psychological meaning given them. They are the *Vulgar Marxist* hypothesis—that Negro dissatisfaction results from a progressive deterioration in the social and economic position of the race; the *Rising Expectations* hypothesis—that Negro expectations are rising more rapidly than their fulfillment; the *Sophisticated Marxist* hypothesis or the *Relative Deprivation* hypothesis—that Negro perceptions of white life have led to dissatisfaction with their own rate of improvement; the *Rise and Drop* hypothesis—that improvement in conditions followed by a sharp drop is responsible; and the *Status Inconsistency* hypothesis—that a group possessing status attributes ranked differently on various status hierarchies of a society will be dissatisfied and prone to rebellion.[2]

This paper will suggest that theory based on variations in the structure of intergroup relations can go some way toward integrating the different kinds of explanation that have been advanced. A more general aspiration is to draw attention to one set of terms that might be useful in the long overdue development of a genuinely comparative study of social movements such as the Negro movement. The broad hypothesis arising from—but by no means fully tested by—an examination of several individual and contextual variables is that *proximity to the dominant white culture increases the likelihood of protest involvement.* The analysis will give a priority to structural considerations, but will also suggest something about intervening psychological variables.

Most of the existing knowledge about this and other social movements comes from case studies of one, or at best very few, cities or districts.[3] Consequently, we know little about the variation in participation *among* such areas. The data on which the present study is based are drawn from a survey of Negro college students conducted in 1962, about two years after the sit-in movement began, by Professors Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro as part of their wider study of Southern attitudes and behavior.[4] Included were 264 Negro students who attended, in all, thirty colleges of various kinds in all eleven former Confederate states. Although there were never enough students interviewed in any one college to treat them as a separate sample, the breadth of the survey lets us test a variety of ecological and institutional variables as well as many individual variables.

The dependent variable of this study is participation in the Negro college student protest movement. Presumably this should be conceptualized, in the manner of more general political participation, as stretching on a continuum of related activities.[5] A number of

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[1] See Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), at pp. 293–295.

[2] James A. Geschwinder, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An Examination of Some Hypotheses," *Social Forces*, 43 (December, 1964), at pp. 248–249.

[3] See for example, Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, *Racial Crisis in America* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Daniel C. Thompson, *The Negro Leadership Class* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Jack Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (May, 1963), 99–124.

[4] See Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966). The present survey was made in addition to their surveys of the adult Negro and white populations in the South. The author is most grateful for their permission to use these data and their helpful suggestions at several stages of the research.

[5] See, for example, Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 92; and Matthews and Prothro, *op. cit.*, 53–58. The latter uses a cumulative scale of political participation stretching from talking politics, voting, taking part in campaigns, belonging to political organizations and holding party or public office, and demonstrates that these factors " . . . are not only related to one another but are, in fact, different forms of the same phenomenon" (p. 53).

TABLE 1. THE DIMENSIONS OF PROTEST PARTICIPATION

| | | Participation in Freedom Rides or Sit-ins | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Yes | No | Totals |
| Membership in Protest Organizations | yes | 42 | 41 | 83 |
| | no | 23 | 158 | 181 |
| | Totals | 65 | 199 | 264 |

different kinds of behavior suggest themselves. Students belonged to protest organizations, marched, picketed, took part in sit-ins and freedom rides. Simply giving support to the protest movement was nearly universal among the students and of little use in differentiating them. In this case, however, the various kinds of protest behaviors reported by the students could not be related acceptably as a Guttman scale[6] and instead a simple index was adopted. In what follows, the term "participants" refers to those students who had either taken part in a sit-in or a freedom ride or belonged to one of several kinds of protest organizations.[7] Although these two variables are strongly associated, in several instances it will be appropriate to examine them separately. Table 1 gives the distribution of students according to these categories.

## I. COLLEGE VARIABLES

Not all protest activities that Negro college students get involved in have their origin in the colleges they attend, but the data suggest that at least two college variables have a significant impact on protest, independent of all other factors.[8] These are the manner in which the college is supported—by state or private finance—and its quality.

### *Control of the College*

The reasons for believing that college control may have an impact on protest are straightforward: state-run institutions are open to many kinds of pressures from which private colleges are free. Undoubtedly the willingness and ability of college administrators to resist such pressures vary from college to college and state to state, but there is ample evidence that they can be most compelling. At Southern University, Baton Rouge, students became involved in demonstrations shortly after the sit-in movement began in North Carolina. On March 29, 1960, a large number of Southern's students were arrested following sit-ins at S. H. Kress and Co. and the Greyhound Bus Station. As had already happened elsewhere, the all-white State Board of Education immediately warned that "stern disciplinary action" would be taken against any future demonstrators. The president of the University, Dr. Felton Clark, was reported as saying he had "no alternatives," and further demonstrations resulted in eighteen students being expelled from the University.[9] In a speech to the students he said, "Like Lincoln who sought to preserve the Union, my dominant concern is to save Southern University."[10]

Colleges not run by state governments can be divided according to whether their administration is formally secular or denominational. Participation was about equally likely among students attending these two kinds of colleges: 55 percent in the former and 53 percent in the latter participated. However, only 33 percent of the students attending state colleges were participants. Table 2 shows that both organizational membership and participation in demonstrations were less probable among state college students—although it also suggests that the difference between the two modes of participation at state colleges was less than at either of the two kinds of private colleges. All plausible situational or individual control variables failed to eliminate this relationship.

Some further data support the conclusion that more restrictive circumstances do exist at the state colleges and also suggest something

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[6] See R. N. Ford, "A Rapid Scoring Procedure for Scaling Attitude Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14 (Fall, 1950), at p. 507.

[7] The protest organizations included were: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), The Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), The Urban League and any other Negro Voters' League. No students claimed membership in the black Muslims.

[8] In *Organizational Measurement and Its Bearing on the Study of College Environments* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961), Alan H. Barton gives useful guidance to the dimensions of colleges that may be measured and may have an impact on the behavior of individuals in them.

[9] *The New York Times*, April 11, 1960, p. 25.

[10] Quoted in Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 209.

TABLE 2. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF PROTEST BY COLLEGE CONTROL[a]

| Control of College: | Type of Participation | |
|---|---|---|
| | Sitting-in | Membership |
| State | 19%<br>(169) | 23%<br>(169) |
| Denominational, private | 37%<br>(62) | 57%<br>(62) |
| Secular, private | 30%<br>(33) | 55%<br>(33) |

[a] The entry in each cell is the percent of respondents in colleges of a given kind who reported participation of the type indicated. In this table and those following, the figures in parentheses are the base from which the percentages were calculated.

about sub-culture tensions accompanying the development of protest. Louis Lomax has commented on such tensions between Negro teachers and their students:

> 'Intellectual Uncle Tom!' That's the phrase one hears throughout the South nowadays. It is uttered by college students and their supporters, and it is used in the open, at public meetings and rallies. It is the students' way of talking about the 'failure' of Southern Negro intellectuals—school teachers, for the most part—to support the revolt in clear, open terms.
>
> This is excruciatingly painful.[11]

The interview schedule included two questions asking sit-inners for their perceptions of what their college administrators and professors thought about what they were doing. Although such perceptual data should not necessarily be taken as recording an *actual* state of affairs, the responses were different between state and private colleges. For each sit-inner who perceived neutrality from a given group, a score of zero was recorded; "strong approval" and "strong disapproval" were scored +2 and −2 respectively; while "approval" and "disapproval" were scored +1 and −1 respectively. The resulting figures were then normalized in percentage terms. The final scores, shown in Table 3, suggest plenty of scope for the development of the hostilities Lomax writes about: no matter where the students attended college, their perceived support from both professors and college administrators fell far below the possible 100 percent. On the other hand, the striking thing about these data is the similarity of all the scores except that recording the attitudes of state college administrators. Private college sit-inners saw little difference in the attitudes of their professors and administrators; but at state colleges, while support from professors is seen at about the same level as at private colleges, support from administrators is seen far less frequently than from their private counterparts. Perhaps evidence can also be found in these perceptual data that points to differences of opinion between professors and administrators at state colleges. At any rate, the conclusion seems justified that sub-culture tension arising from the student movement is most acute in state colleges, and that it centers on those roles which mediate between the sub-culture and the dominant white culture.

TABLE 3. SIT-INNERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SUPPORT FROM PROFESSORS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN STATE AND PRIVATE COLLEGES

| Perceived Attitudes | Type of College | |
|---|---|---|
| | Private | State |
| of Professors | 46% | 50% |
| of Administrators | 46% | 15% |

### *Quality of the College*

College quality was measured in essentially the manner developed by Lazarsfeld and Thielens in *The Academic Mind.*[12] Five indicators of quality were selected, the appropriate data on the thirty colleges included in the sample were collected from a number of standard sources, and an acceptable Guttman scale was developed.[13] Four categories of quality were used.

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

[12] P. F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 412.

[13] Lazarsfeld and Thielens developed an index rather than a scale. In this case the scale was preferred because it gave the added assumption of uni-dimensionality in the indicators selected. The index, however, did have some advantages. It was not necessary for Lazarsfeld and Thielens to dichotomize their indicators, and as a result the index could take into account disproportionate "contributions" of quality by one of the indicators. An index was also developed in the present case and findings based on it were found to compare

The resulting data show quite clearly that protest participation—both organizational membership and participation in demonstrations—increased as the quality of the college increased. Only 22 percent of the students in the lowest category colleges claimed participation, 41 percent did so in the second lowest, while in the highest two participation was nearly equal—around 54 percent. In each category of colleges organizational membership was more frequent than activism, but both increased as the quality of college increased.

Several explanations are available for this association between college quality and protest participation. On the one hand, high-quality colleges may selectively recruit students whose participation can adequately be accounted for by certain individual variables; on the other hand, high quality in Negro colleges may be associated with some other situational factor which itself explains the levels of protest. Perhaps the distribution reflects the spatial spread of protest throughout the South; perhaps protest spread first to the comparatively few high quality colleges in the South, and only later to the poorer institutions. Without a panel design surveys are poorly suited to treat such longitudinal processes as the spread of a social movement through time, but even if this spread were systematically associated with college quality we would still be left with the original question unanswered.[14]

As might be expected, the data leave no doubt that the higher quality colleges recruit from the higher status part of the Negro popu-

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closely with those derived from the scale method. As it resulted, the scale findings were the more conservative of the two in terms of fulfilling expectations of an association between college quality and protest participation.

Obviously no single indicator of quality would do justice to variations in such a heterogeneous collection of colleges; agriculture and technical colleges, teachers' colleges, and some of the most outstanding of southern Negro colleges concentrating on the humanities were all included. The indicators adopted were as follows:

The number of books in the college library
The ratio of books in the library to students
The proportion of Ph.D.'s on the faculty
Dollars in the college budget per student
The faculty-student ratio

The last mentioned indicator was not used by Lazarsfeld and Thielens, despite the fact that it is one of the most frequently used "rules of thumb" about the quality of the education a college offers. Two indicators used by them were not used in the persent case. They were tuition fees paid and the Knapp and Greenblaum index of scholar productivity. Lazarsfeld and Thielens argued that higher tuition fees gave a college greater financial resources with which to provide education, and also that "tuition to some extent indicates the demand for a college's educational 'product'" (p. 412). However appropriate this indicator might have been for the population of colleges they studied, for the present state and private colleges it does not seem likely to make valid distinctions of quality. The Knapp and Greenblaum index of scholar productivity, used by Lazarsfeld and Thielens, was not used here for the very good reason that the data on which it was based were not available for the colleges under consideration. It is also true that scholar productivity might not be a particularly good indicator of quality in a mechanical or agricultural college.

The variables were dichotomized in the following ways:

| | |
|---|---|
| Student-faculty ratio: | better than 1:11.8 |
| Ph.D.'s on faculty: | better than 22.5% |
| Books in library: | better than 38,000 |
| Books per student: | better than 25 |
| Dollars per student: | better than $800.00 |

The decision was made by inspection in each case. The coefficient of reproducibility for the scale was .889.

The sources from which the college data were collected were: *The College Blue Book*, 1962 (10th ed.; New York: The College Blue Book, 1962); *American Universities and Colleges* (8th ed.; Washington: American Council on Education, 1960); *American Junior Colleges* (5th ed.; Washington: American Council on Education, 1960); *The World Almanac 1961*. In addition, use was made of G. W. Jones, "Negro Colleges in Alabama," *Journal of Negro Education*, 31 (Summer, 1962), 354–361.

[14] Newspaper reports of student demonstrations give reasonably good grounds for believing that geographic patterns were well established by the time the survey was taken in the early months of 1962. Examination of *The New York Times* for the two years between that date and February 1960, when the movement started in Greensboro, N. C., suggests that it took only a matter of two or three months for sit-ins to spread to other states outside the Deep South and then to penetrate the Deep South itself. It would be extremely hard to demonstrate from historical data that protest had still to reach the large number of low-quality colleges scattered throughout the whole South two years after the movement had begun, although the possibility must be admitted.

lation, but they also show that such high status is strongly associated with protest participation. Only 35 percent of students from households where the head was classed as semi-skilled or unskilled were participants, while 53 percent of the skilled or professional group could be similarly classed. There is a nearly linear association between participation and family income from the under-$2,000 bracket in which only 13 percent were participants to the above-$6,000 bracket in which 53 percent participated.

However, the data given in Table 4 show that quality of college has an effect even when family income is held constant, although the *strength* of the quality-participation relationship varies between income categories.

TABLE 4. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING BY QUALITY OF COLLEGE AND INCOME OF STUDENT'S FAMILY

| Quality of College: | Income of Student's Family[a] | |
|---|---|---|
| | High | Low |
| High | 57%<br>(44) | 50%<br>(34) |
| Low | 46%<br>(63) | 25%<br>(102) |
| Difference: | 11 | 25 |

[a] The cut-off point between the "high" and "low" income categories was $4,999.

There are signs here of what Hubert M. Blalock and others have called a "multiplicative effect." In one kind of situation—called "additive"—there is no evidence that independent variables $X_1$, $X_2 \ldots X_n$ interact with each other in their impact on the dependent variable Y; their effect remains the same regardless of empirical juxtapositions with each other. In a multiplicative situation the combined impact of two or more independent variables is greater than expectations based on knowledge of each acting in isolation from the others. "In a fairly common kind of theoretical situation," says Blalock, "one assumes that a given phenomenon is most likely when two (or more) factors are *both* present, but that it is unlikely whenever either of these factors is absent."[15]

This crude dichotomization of income and quality modifies the conclusions that can be drawn from examination of both variables acting in isolation from each other, while failing to eliminate the original association in either case. Adopting the method used by Blalock to infer interaction, we can observe a 14 percentage point difference between the two difference scores in Table 4. If low family income and low college quality are both present the depressing effect on participation is substantially greater than additive expectations.

The data also confirm the suspicion that most high-quality Negro colleges in the South are private and that most low-quality ones are state-run. But again that fact is not sufficient to eliminate the original association between college quality and participation. Holding control of college constant and varying quality produces an eight percentage point difference in participation among state college students—31 and 39 percent at the high and low quality state colleges respectively—and a twenty percentage point difference among private college students—41 and 61 percent respectively. As in the previous case, the relation between the three variables appears to be multiplicative. When quality and control are acting together to boost participation, their impact is greater than the sum of each acting in isolation.

## II. SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTY

County-level social variables have been shown to relate importantly to many aspects of Southern politics. Two in particular should be tested in the present case: the urban-rural character of the county and the Negro proportion of the population.

### *Urbanism*

Matthews and Prothro find that urbanism and industrialization ". . . are vastly overrated as facilitators of Negro registration. Urbanization and industrialization may provide necessary conditions for high levels of Negro participation but, by themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure them."[16] Protest participation is markedly different from Negro voter registration in this respect, but the relation is a threshold rather than a linear one. Variation in the proportion of the population that is rural-farm in the county where the college is situated makes very little difference in protest until the least rural category is reached. At that point

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[15] Hubert M. Blalock, "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), at p. 375.

[16] Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 52 (March, 1963), at p. 28.

(0–4.9% rural-farm), there is a jump of 23 percentage points—from 29 percent participating to 52 percent. Student protest, unlike other forms of Negro political activity, is characteristically an urban phenomenon.

The addition of further variables to the analysis elaborates on this association. Table 5 shows percent rural-farm and quality of college have an independent impact on participation, but it also suggests that when they are acting together their impact goes considerably beyond simple additive expectations. The difference between the differences in this case is 14 percentage points. Interestingly, a comparable finding does not appear when control of colleges and percent rural-farm are considered together; the data confirm that each variable has an impact independent of the other, but the difference-of-differences score is almost zero.

TABLE 5. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING BY PERCENT OF COUNTY POPULATION RURAL-FARM AND QUALITY OF COLLEGE

| Quality of College: | Percent of County Population Rural-farm[a] | |
|---|---|---|
| | Low | High |
| High | 71%<br>(44) | 38%<br>(45) |
| Low | 43%<br>(84) | 24%<br>(91) |
| Difference: | 28 | 14 |

[a] The cut-off point between the "high" and "low" categories was 4.9% rural-farm.

TABLE 6. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING BY PERCENT OF COUNTY RURAL-FARM AND INCOME OF FAMILY[a]

| Income of Family: | Percent of County Population Rural-farm | |
|---|---|---|
| | Low | High |
| High | 54%<br>(62) | 44%<br>(45) |
| Low | 46%<br>(55) | 20%<br>(81) |
| Difference: | 8 | 24 |

[a] The cut-off point between "high" and "low" categories of income was $4,000.

When income and percent rural-farm are considered together in relation to participation, however, there is once again evidence of interaction. The data are given in Table 6.

The presence of two interaction effects such as these raises the possibility of what Blalock calls a "second-order" interaction—that all three variables may interact to produce levels of participation beyond additive expectations for the three individually.[17] Unfortunately, testing this possibility involves frequencies too small to use with any confidence. The data do suggest, however, that such a higher level of interaction also exists.[18] When urban living, high college quality and high income all occur together, participation is boosted beyond what would be the case if all three variables were acting independently. In other words, although the generalization does not include variations in the control of colleges, adding successive favorable conditions to attending college in an urban county produces an accelerating curve of participation.

### *Percent Negro in the College County*

The power of the percent Negro in a Southern county to predict many aspects of its social and political life has been repeatedly documented.[19] Matthews and Prothro conclude that

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[17] H. Blalock, *op. cit.*

[18] Testing for such a second-order interaction involves relating college quality and percent rural-farm to participation with income held constant. It is thus possible to arrive at a difference between the two difference-of-differences scores. In this case the difference of difference-of-differences scores was 11 percentage points. The data are as follows:

| Quality: | High Income<br>Percent rural-farm<br>Low | <br><br>High | Quality: | Low Income<br>Percent rural-farm<br>Low | <br><br>High |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | 67%<br>(24) | 45%<br>(20) | High | 67%<br>(15) | 37%<br>(19) |
| Low | 47%<br>(38) | 44%<br>(25) | Low | 38%<br>(40) | 16%<br>(62) |
| Difference: | 20 | 1 | Difference: | 29 | 21 |

(20-1) – (29-21) = 11

[19] For example, see V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); John H. Fenton and K. N. Vines, "Negro Registration in Louisiana," this REVIEW, 51 (September, 1957), 704–713, and H. D. Price, *The Negro in Southern Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1957).

the variable is "more strongly associated with the county's rate of Negro registration than any other social and economic attribute on which we have data."[20] There are, however, good reasons for expecting its impact on student protest participation to be somewhat muted. H. D. Price has argued that the percent Negro should not be seen as working in some mechanical way on the behavior in question, but as representing in a summary way the history and cultural traditions of race relations in the area.[21] Thus, where Negroes are a large part of the population there is also likely to be a history of a particular kind of race relations often dating to slavery times. A student population, however, is often a distinct community with its own mores and traditions that may run quite counter to those of the locality. Even in colleges where no such community exists—possibly a majority of those included in this study—the population is distinct in age, socioeconomic status, education, and usually the frequency of social roots outside the area itself. The history and cultural traditions of the area seem likely to have less impact on participation in the student protest movement than on other kinds of political participation among the general Negro population in the county.

Despite these expectations student protest participation seems to be inversely related to percent Negro, in line with other kinds of behavior. Participation increases in a linear fashion from about 22 percent among those students attending college in areas with more than 40 percent Negroes to about 62 percent among those where there is less than 20 percent Negroes. The association is maintained when all other individual and contextual factors are held constant, and there is little evidence of interaction between percent Negro and any of the other variables tested. The data also show only a very slight and probably insignificant association between the percent Negro in the students' home counties and protest participation of any kind.

Matthews and Prothro have demonstrated that areas where Negroes are a high proportion of the population have whites with considerably less permissive attitudes toward Negro political participation,[22] and James W. Vander Zanden has pointed out the general role that resistance to social movements can have in shaping the course of a movement.[23] Perhaps this opposition is an important factor in explaining the varying rates of student protest participation by percent Negro, just as the opposition of state college administrators seems to be important in explaining the power of variations in college control.

But the question of motivation is also relevant here. Matthews and Prothro have demonstrated that "Negro commitment to voting declines as white disapproval of Negro voting increases. Not only are fewer Negroes registered where white attitudes are less permissive, but fewer Negroes express a desire to vote." This lack of desire, they suggest, represents in part, "a realistic adjustment to the environment and in part the psychological mechanism of rationalization. Some Negroes will realistically calculate that they do not want to vote if the costs in terms of possible social, economic, or physical reprisals are too great."[24] Quite possibly such a lowering of motivation extends across the barriers that separate the college from the population at large and is responsible, in turn, for lowering rates of student protest participation.

If overt pressures are involved, however, there is no sign of it in the reports from demonstrators of the white hostility they encountered as a consequence of their participation. There was no difference in the number or character of the incidents reported by students in areas with a high proportion of Negroes and those with only few—although the *n*'s involved are admittedly very small. While it seems quite likely that differences in Negro assertiveness are associated with differences in the percent Negro in the area, how much of this is a "mechanical" result of white attitudes in the area and how much is due to other properties of the social structure must remain an open question.

### III. PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES

Personality variables have not been successful in predicting more than a slight amount of the variance of other kinds of political behavior.[25] However, in the light of much theorizing about social movements, two such variables do demand attention. They are anomia and frustration.

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[20] *Op. cit.*

[21] H. D. Price, "The Negro and Florida Politics, 1944–1954," *The Journal of Politics*, 17 (May, 1955), at pp. 198–200.

[22] Matthews and Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*, p. 118.

[23] James W. Vander Zanden, "Resistance and Social Movements," *Social Forces*, 37 (May, 1959), at pp. 312–315.

[24] *Op. cit.*

[25] On the subject of party identification, for example, *The American Voter* concludes: "In the broad electorate devoted in an habitual way to a pair of traditional parties, there is little reason to expect much visible instruction of personality dynamics in the determination of who is a Republican and who is a Democrat": Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

### *Anomia*

Leo Srole's conceptual distinction between *anomie* and *anomia* is worth repeating. "For semantic neatness," he suggests that the *eunomia-anomia* continuum should be used to refer to variations among *individuals* "as they are integrated in the total action fields of their interpersonal relationships," and that *anomie* should be kept as a societal rather than an individual term.[26] We are dealing here with the individual level of analysis. Whatever the propensity of anomic *societies* for mass movements of various kinds, there are common sense grounds for expecting participation in the protest movement to increase as the individual anomia decreases. "The principal advocacy of social change, as is implied in the term desegregation," says Melvin Tumin, "comes from those who have the widest perspective on themselves and their communities, and the deepest sense of stake in the community-in-progress."[27]

When discussing the impact of a different personality variable, the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* comment: "Personality is mainly a potential: it is a readiness for behavior rather than behavior itself."[28] There are, they argue, a situational and a personality factor, both of which have to be taken into account for complete explanation. Before third variables are taken into account anomia does have a measurable impact on participation in the direction predicted: across four scale types, participation increases by about 12 percentage points as anomia decreases.[29] However, this variable appears to operate differently in different social contexts. In rural counties a dichotomy between 'high' and 'low' anomia is associated with a 16 percentage point difference in participation; in urban counties the difference is an insignificant one percentage point. At state colleges there is a difference of 12 points, compared to an insignificant two points at private colleges. Although there is no such interaction effect between the psychological variable and percent Negro, there is evidence here that when the situation is not generally supportive for protest, anomia differences are more likely to have an impact than when it is supportive. The data do not permit an extensive exploration of the hypothesis. It seems, however, that this personality variable, and perhaps others, should not be considered out of the social context.

### *Frustration and Aggression*

There has been much easy hypothesizing about the relation between social movements and aggression. "No great social movement," says Norman R. F. Maier, "is possible unless it rests primarily on frustration."[30] In conformity with most observers, James W. Vander Zanden has pointed out that American Negroes characteristically experience most severe frustrations arising from their ascribed status in American society. He goes further, however, and relates the present protest to resulting aggressive drives. Participation allows Negroes to indulge in aggressive action against the frustrating agent—the white community—while the non-violent credo lets them rationalize their behavior to conform with a more passive Negro tradition.[31]

There are two related problems here that should be kept analytically distinct. On the one hand, data from this survey are relevant to the question of student hostility toward whites.

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[26] Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (December, 1956), at p. 710.

[27] Melvin J. Tumin, *Desegregation: Resistance and Readiness* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 199.

[28] T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950), pp. 7–10.

[29] The questions used to measure anomia were those originally developed by Srole. They were, from "hardest" to "easiest," as follows: "Sometimes I think people ought not bring children into the world, the way things look for the world"; "In spite of what some people say, the conditions of the average man is getting worse, not better"; "Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself"; "These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on"; One question was rejected because it failed to meet the Ford criterion that the positive category should contain more than 20 percent of the respondents (R. N. Ford, *op. cit.*, p. 515). Interestingly, this question was: "There's not much use in people like me voting because the candidates are usually against what I want." Only 11 of the 264 students were willing to agree with this proposition. Political alienation among southern Negro students, it seems, is very low.

[30] Norman R. F. Maier, "The Role of Frustration in Social Movements," *Psychological Review*, 49 (November, 1942), at p. 594.

[31] James W. Vander Zanden, "The Non-Violent Resistance Movement Against Segregation," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), at p. 546.

From the broad hypothesis associating protest with a structural position in Negro society closer to the dominant white culture, we may expect the students who participate to be less overtly hostile toward that culture than those who do not; there is, after all, a large literature on the effects of intergroup contact and interaction in reducing such hostility toward minority groups, and there seems no reason why the same effect should not work in the case of minority group attitudes toward the majority group. This appears to be borne out in fact: across several questions the participants were significantly less likely to express hostility toward whites than were those who did not take part.[32]

On the other hand, it is not valid to argue from data on hostility to matters of aggression. Robin Williams and others have pointed out that one can be aggressive without being hostile, or hostile without being aggressive. The two are conceptually and empirically distinct.[33] The nearest approach to operationalizing frustration included by the schedule of questions was a battery of questions probing the extent to which the respondents anticipated frustration in their future life experience. The student was asked, first, what part of the country he wished to live in on completion of a college career, and second, what part of the country he expected to live in. A "frustrated" response was then taken as one in which aspirations and expectations did not match.[34]

The findings parallel those on hostility. There is no support for the hypothesis that frustration is linked to participation in the protest movement. Only 31 percent of the students who anticipated frustration in this respect were participants, compared to 39 percent of those who anticipated satisfaction. A claim that this particular "great and effective" social movement "rests primarily on frustration" would be difficult to sustain in the light of these data.[35]

### IV. PROTEST AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A full explanation of the variance in protest would require consideration of such things as the role of initiators and accidents of leadership in certain places, underlying economic conditions, the role of resistance from groups opposing the movement, geographic spread and many other factors. Nothing so ambitious has been attempted here. Rather, the suggestion is made that by focusing on one factor—the structure of intergroup relations—some advance can be made toward integrating various theoretical propositions about the origin of the Negro protest movement. In a nutshell, the argument runs as follows: Certain structural positions in Negro society are characterized by higher awareness of the wider society and, as a consequence, individuals occupying these positions are more prone to develop the particular set of attitudes and perceptions that lead to

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[32] The questions and data are as follows:

| | Percent giving "hostile" answer | |
|---|---|---|
| | Participants | Non-participants |
| All whites are prejudiced? | 5%<br>(106) | 23%<br>(158) |
| Arrested Negroes get fair treatment? | 70%<br>(106) | 79%<br>(158) |
| Can't change white attitudes? | 6%<br>(106) | 17%<br>(158) |

[33] Robin Williams, *Strangers Next Door* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 86.

[34] There are two conceptual shortcomings in the use of responses to these questions as indicators of frustration. First, they deal with the anticipation of future frustrating experiences and it is perhaps stretching a point to argue that this is the functional equivalent of present experiences. Second, there is no way of telling from the responses the centrality of these expectations to the respondents. Mobility expectations might be unimportant to some individuals but loom large for others. One other battery of questions might have been used to strengthen these responses had the pattern of answers differentiated the students more than it did. They were directed in the same way toward expectations and aspirations on future jobs, but—interestingly—all kinds of students overwhelmighly anticipated job satisfaction.

[35] Of course we are not concerned here with riots and other kinds of unpremeditated mob action that might more plausibly be related to frustration. See Philip Worchel, "Hostility: Theory and Experimental Investigation," in D. Willner (ed.), *Decisions, Values and Groups* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1960), cited in Robin Williams, *op. cit.* In frustration, "there are changes in the perception of the field, widespread psychological involvements, interference with complex learning, and an affectual component of hate." Described in this way we might even expect frustration to be *dys*functional to planned social action of the kind under consideration here—a speculation not inconsistent with the present slim data.

protest. Resistance from the white community, particularly as it is channeled through state college administrators and, possibly, as it occurs in certain kinds of areas, plays a role in modifying and shaping the particular patterns of protest that arise.

Unfortunately, it is necessary to rely on a rather small amount of data and a rather large amount of inference in arguing that such structural factors as high quality in colleges, high socio-economic background, and urban residence all involve high levels of interaction with the wider society. The inferences, however, are not too strained. All the respondents in the survey were students and therefore more likely to have higher levels of general awareness than the rest of the Negro population; high quality colleges might not unreasonably be expected to increase that awareness. In fact the data show that students attending these colleges were more able to answer correctly a series of factual questions about politics than were the others.

In his large study of intergroup relations in several communities, Robin Williams finds support for the basic proposition that

> exposure to intergroup situations available in a community depends to a large extent upon the individual's daily living patterns—which in turn are strongly influenced by his position and function (or status and role) in the community.[36]

He also shows that in these communities, ". . . the more educated Negro has more opportunity for contact with whites than the less well-educated," and that higher occupational status works the same way.[37] Data from the present study show that students attending high-quality colleges do have considerably higher levels of social interaction across the race barrier—particularly with white students and teachers, although the generalization extends to a wide variety of contacts. The same applies to students from high socio-economic backgrounds.

Attending college in an urban county is likewise associated with a higher frequency of intergroup contact than doing so in a rural county. The presence of such contact seems to make the urban environment a particularly fertile ground for protest. When urban living is considered in conjunction with several indicators of intergroup contact, a marked multiplicative effect appears. Matthews and Prothro comment that urban living appears to provide the necessary conditions for high levels of Negro voter registration.

> The urban-industrial life is more rational, impersonal and less tradition-bound; both Negroes and whites enjoy more wealth and education; the Negroes benefit from a concentration of potential leaders and politically relevant organizations in the cities. The urban ghetto may provide social reinforcement to individual motivations for political action.[38]

When intergroup social fluidity is added to these conditions, the data suggest that such individual motivations are particularly high.

Intergroup communication is, of course, a most difficult concept to operationalize; social contact across the race barrier is only one indicator of a complex process that can go on in a great variety of informal and formal ways. There are, nevertheless, several reasons why it is congenial to focus theory building in the present case on such communication and the structural conditions that promote it. First, it provides a firm basis for what Sherif and Sherif call a "clear functional picture" of the factors that lead to protest participation.

> . . . Social psychological theories of intergroup relations which base the whole edifice primarily on a universal instinct (e.g., aggression), on displacements of aggressions always as the product of frustrations in personal life history, on a leadership principle, on situational factors, on culture, on national character, or, in a direct and mechanical way, on economic considerations result in one-sided pictures . . . . Compilations of these factors side by side in the form of a syllabus have not led to a clear functional picture.[39]

Economic and psychological variables are, from this perspective, placed in a theoretical context from which their importance in the whole structure of explanation can be assessed. Data have been given indicating that feelings of discontent about *personal* prospects in a bi-racial world are not associated with particularly high levels of protest. On the other hand, there is a marked association between protest and feelings about the general position of the *whole Negro race:* among students who recorded "high" on a measure of satisfaction with the present racial situation 28 percent were participants; among those recording

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[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 146.

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] Matthews and Prothro, "Social Factors . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[39] M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), p. 136.

"low" 52 percent were participants.[40] Evidently, explanation that focuses on feelings of personal relative deprivation must be modified to emphasize perceived deprivation of the *group* with which the individual identifies.[41] The present data do not detail just what objective social and economic conditions might lead to such feelings, but it is clear that such feelings would be particularly likely to develop in situations that constantly emphasize the differences between the races. The objective conditions are there for the whole group; but only some individuals are constantly exposed to the fact that they are differences. It is among this population that protest is most likely to develop.

A further advantage is that such a theoretical position also provokes useful speculation about why the Negro protest developed at this particular point in American history and about its likely future course. Arguing that protest can be explained adequately in terms of the economic fortunes of the Negro group as a whole fails to explain why the movement did not develop when—as seems quite possible—comparable conditions existed in the past. By emphasizing that other structural changes have a priority over purely economic ones, we are led to search for factors that can increase the visibility of whatever objective situations may lead a group to revolt. They are readily available in the increased mobility of all groups in United States society, the development of modern mass communications, and major wars that have at once increased mobility and brought different groups into close proximity with each other. So long as the objective conditions exist, we can expect that increased communication between the races will bring a furtherance of protest, not a quieting. Conservative Southern claims that the progress of integration will only bring an increase of Negro assertiveness seem quite plausible from the present theoretical position.

Much significant contemporary history concerns massive demands from various groups for large-scale adjustments in their social, economic and political positions, but there has been little systematic theory-building about such phenomena. Existing knowledge about the conditions that give rise to various kinds of social movements is generally couched in terms unique to the movement being considered and meaningless to the analysis of others. The structural perspective on the Negro movement suggested here does point to one direction in which research might be fruitful. If analysis were to concentrate, first, on the objective economic, social and political differences between groups, and then on the processes by which such differences are communicated and given meaning to the individuals concerned, major advances might be made. A large literature on the relation between communication and national integration has appeared in recent years. Analysis of the structure of communication between groups might lead to a better understanding of why some groups—such as the American Negroes—produce integrative movements, while others—such as the French Canadians—produce disintegrative ones. It would at least cast the analysis of broadly comparable phenomena in comparable terms.

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[40] The students were given a self-anchoring scale and asked to indicate where on a continuum between the "very worst" and the "very best" possible race situations they would place the South at the present time.

[41] For example, see Ruth Searles and J. A. Williams, "Negro College Students' Participation in Sit-Ins," *Social Forces*, 40 (March, 1962), 215–220. The authors argue that reference groups have changed for a large part of the Negro middle class that now identifies with the middle class standards of the wider society. The result is feelings of relative deprivation that have led to the protest movement.

# THE MEASUREMENT OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION AND SYSTEMIC STABILITY*

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The American two-party system is a constant object of study by many political scientists, yet there exists no adequate scale by which to measure inter-party competition and the stability of our two-party system. It is the purpose of this article to present a simple index by which the condition of any two-party system (national or state or foreign) can be determined in relation to its expected behavior.

## I. EXISTING MEASURES

Four types of measures have been applied to inter-party competition: the pendulum effect, percentage of elections won, percentage of the vote, and alternation in office by parties. Sometimes in place of the second measure there is used percentage of legislative seats held, the latter being somewhat a function of the former.

The pendulum or "tide" effect appears most often in non-technical discussion. When no other explanation suffices, political commentators use the idea of a pendulum swing to explain why a party unexpectedly gains or loses votes. Although this idea lends itself well to graphic illustration, it is limited in precision and explanatory power.[1] It does, however, turn up again in a new guise discussed below.

The first major attempt to measure inter-party competition employed the pendulum concept. It was used not by a political scientist, but by an economist, Louis Bean, who was fascinated with the idea that some states seem to be barometers of Presidential elections.[2] Using percentage of the vote, Bean figured what percent of the vote the Democrats would receive in each state when the nation voted from 40.0% to 60.0% Democratic in a Presidential election.[3] With Bean's data it is possible to classify each state, but the results lack much in precision. To be able to say that when the Democratic candidate for President receives a 60.0% vote nationwide he will receive only a 41.4% vote in Vermont indicates little about inter-party competition in Vermont.[4] It does indicate that Vermont's Republican Party is strong, but how strong? How does the Vermont party system of 1942 compare with that of 1940 or 1944 in regard to inter-party competition? Obviously such a question cannot be answered with Bean's typology, but then, in all fairness, he was not asking just that question. The major use of Bean's approach today is to describe national and sometimes state trends in voting.[5] The reasons for its simplicity detract from its usefulness.

As noted above, the second basis used for inter-party competition measurement is the percentage of elections won or, alternatively, the percentage of legislative seats held. Whenever one is concerned with welfare or other policies embodied in legislation, a measure of the seats, i.e., votes, held is useful. When one is concerned with comparing the performance (inter-party competition in this case) of a party system in two or more elections, percentage of legislative seats held is of less efficacy. It was used, however, in the first actual categorizing of states according to inter-party competition.[6] While the three categories established by Zeller were sufficient for her purposes, it is necessary to have more refined ones in order to go beyond superficial analysis.[7] An attempt to place Zeller's categories on a firmer analytical basis while avoiding other pitfalls can be found in an article by Robert T. Golembiewski.[8] He improved upon the basis for classification, but his inter-party competition index still suffers from two problems in common with Zeller's: (1) the index, if based only on the office of governor and the percentage of legislative seats, has a limited utility; and (2) three categories are insufficient to comprehend the complexity of inter-party competition found in American states. Malcolm Jewell's work on state legislatures transcended the latter problem by establishing seven categories four of which can be divided between Democrats and Republicans giving a total of eleven categories.[9] Certainly eleven is a sufficient number for complex analysis of inter-party competition, but they are determined in such a way as to be limited to Jewell's topic, American state legislatures.

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* I wish to thank my colleague Mrs. Verna Engstrom-Heg, Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Keuka College, for her invaluable aid and to thank my fellow participants in the Summer, 1965, Conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science for comments on an earlier draft of this paper especially in regard to the problem of establishing adequate categories.

[1] Attempts to delineate this phenomenon more precisely have been made: cf. Donald E. Stokes and Gudmund R. Iverson, "On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Summer, 1962), 159–171; and Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Spring, 1965), 16–38.

[2] Louis Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). In an earlier work, *Ballot Behavior: A Study of Presidential Elections* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940), Bean discussed how state trends differ from the national trend (chapters 2–5), but he was interested in predicting elections and not measuring inter-party competition. Bean's ideas were presented in a more sophisticated way by Harold F. Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942).

[3] *How to Predict Elections*, Table 8 (pp. 186–87) and chapter ten, especially pp. 120–21.

[4] Bean's data extend from 1916 to 1944.

[5] For example, cf. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 89–90.

Percentage of elections won does have greater explanatory power when measuring inter-party competition than the pendulum concept, but it is a function of the next type of measure: percentage of the vote. A fundamental contention of this article is that over a "sufficient" period of time the percentage of elections won adds no significance to the percentage of the vote in measuring inter-party competition. The two measures have been used jointly, but a blurring of certain types of competition is the only result. For example, during the period 1940–1964 in state-wide elections in California the Republicans received an average of 53.35% of the vote winning 20 out of 37 elections. In Nevada the Democrats received an average of 55.03% of the vote winning 28 out of 37 elections. In New Hampshire the Republicans received an average of 54.88% of the vote winning 31 out of 42 elections. By measuring percentage of vote alone, all three states are competitive, two-party systems. When considering the number of elections won, California's 54.05% for the Republicans places it into a competitive category while Nevada's 75.67% for the Democrats and New Hampshire's 73.81% for the Republicans place them out of the competitive category. However, when the elections are more closely examined the following distribution is found.

MINORITY PARTY VOTE, 1940–1964

| | 0.0% | 1.0%–29.9% | 30.0%–39.9% | 40.0%–49.9% | 50.0%+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| California Democrats | 3 | none | 2 | 16 | 16 |
| Nevada Republicans | none | 1 | 9 | 18 | 9 |
| New Hampshire Democrats | none | none | 13 | 22 | 7 |

In 27 out of 37 elections (72.97%) in Nevada, the Republicans received more than 40.0% of the vote. In 29 out of 42 elections (69.05%) in New Hampshire the Democrats received more than 40.0% of the vote. Although the California Democrats did better (86.48%), the Nevada Republicans and the New Hampshire Democrats fared well enough to be contenders in each election. Only once did the Nevada Republicans fall below 30.0% and never did the New Hampshire Democrats, while the California Democrats fell below 30.0% of the vote three times. Although the three states have varying degrees of competition, they are closer than percentage of elections alone would indicate. Resorting to Occam's Razor, the inter-party competition index presented below disregards number of elections won.

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[6] Belle Zeller (ed.), *American State Legislatures: Report of the Committee on American Legislatures, American Political Science Association* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), chapter 12.

[7] Essentially this criticism holds true for the inter-party competition index based on percentage of elections won applied to Iowa counties by David Gold and John R. Schmidhauser, "Urbanization and Party Competition: The Case of Iowa," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1960), 62–75, and to the rather crude inter-party competition index used for purposes of illustration by V. O. Key Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (fifth edition; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), chapter 11.

[8] Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength," *Western Political Quarterly*, 11 (1958), 494–513.

[9] Malcolm E. Jewell, *The State Legislature: Politics and Practice* (New York: Random House, 1962).

Percentage of elections won and percentage of vote were used in the first successful inter-party competition index developed by Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall.[10] Their index marks the inception of virtually all recent research on the ecology of party systems from the viewpoint of competition. Ranney recently presented a more sophisticated version his inter-party competition index designed specifically for state politics.[11] While useful for complex analysis (on the state legislative level only, however), the earlier contention must be raised: percentage of elections won and percentage of seats held (or terms) both are functions of percentage of vote in almost every case.

Perhaps the simplest way to measure two-party competition with percentage of vote is to find the average margin of victory for the winning candidate. This index has drawbacks: it is not possible to handle non-competitive states in this manner, or, alternately, to specify party domination over a period of time. If, for example, only Democratic margins are used to classify states from one-party Democratic to one-party Republican, a problem arises when a Democrat fails to win. If the margin is counted as a negative quantity, the average difference (upon which the states are classified) is affected in a way that the average vote is not affected. If defeats are not counted, it is possible to have conflicting results when both Democratic and Republican wins are computed. The problem can be surmounted by squaring the margins before averaging, but this procedure defeats the simplicity of the method. In addition it is more intelligible in a common sense way to say that a state is, on the average, 58.0% Republican in its voting behavior rather than saying that the average winning margin for the Republicans in a state is 16.0%.

In an attempt to be more precise some analysts have used a fourth measure: alternation in office by parties.[12] This concept is another way of describing the pendulum effect. Short swings of the pendulum produce frequent alternation. Long swings produce periods of one party holding an office. Such a measurement as alternation has great use when studying one office, but when an entire party system with several offices is to be viewed, alternation measurement produces problems in data gathering and in presentation of results which lower its attractiveness. Again using Occam's Razor, alternation in office is disregarded—for reasons further elaborated below—when constructing the inter-party competition index presented in this article. Alternation is not necessarily a poor unit of measurement, but it is not useful when certain problems arise.

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[10] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this Review, 48 (1954) 477–485; it will also be found in their work *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), pp. 161–64. The same technique with variations was used extensively by others: V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), used gubernatorial elections in 21 non-Southern states over a varying span of time; Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., *The Office of Governor in the United States* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1956), added two needed categories but restricted himself to gubernatorial elections; Heinz Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party Systems: The Case of Ohio," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 1 (1957), 125–135, limited himself to the Ohio House of Representative elections and reduced the categories to three; William H. Standing and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition and Primary Contesting: The Case of Indiana," this Review, 52 (1958), 1066–1077, objected to the Ranney-Kendall index but applied the same technique to three state-wide races; Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), changed the terminology but used the technique; Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), and *The Politics of State and Local Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), shortened the base period from 40 years to 16 and considered only Presidential and gubernatorial elections; Edward F. Cox, "The Measurement of Party Strength," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (1960), 1022–1042, added some statistical sophistication to the Ranney-Kendall index; Phillips Cutright, "Ubanization [sic] and Competitive Party Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963), 552–564, used the Ranney-Kendall technique to verify the substantive results of Eulau, *op. cit.*, while rejecting those of Gold and Schmidhauser, *op. cit.*; Frederick M. Wirt, "The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpretation," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 647–666, also used the Ranney-Kendall technique while acknowledging its limitations; all of the studies cited below are also indebetd to Ranney and Kendall.

[11] Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), chapter 3.

[12] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," this Review, 49 (1955), 1120–1128, and "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States," *Behavioral Science*, 5 (1960), 197–210. Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach*, *op. cit.*, used the same terminology as Schlesinger but not his technique using instead percentage of vote; Thomas W. Casstevens and Charles Press, "The Context of Democratic Competition in American State Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), 536-543 used the results from Schlesinger's 1955 and 1960 articles, from Ranney and Kendall, and from Key's *American State Politics* to discuss the ecological basis of American party competi-

One more inter-party competition index must be mentioned. Richard Hofferbert has presented one of the best discussions of the problem of an inter-party competition index to appear in print.[13] But his own index suffers from certain drawbacks discussed below.[14] Hofferbert was concerned with establishing a rank order of the states in order to investigate correlations with certain variables. Using percentage of elections won he ranked the states in six ways and then calculated the average of these six rank scores for each state and ranked them according to it.

## II. THE MEASURES CRITICIZED

The main criticism of the pendulum concept, as stated above, is that it lacks the precision necessary for complex analysis. The same is true of measurement by percent of elections won and by percent of seats held. The illustration of the California Democrats, the Nevada Republicans, and the New Hampshire Democrats should suffice. The problem with the Ranney and Kendall technique is that by combining percent of elections won with percent of vote an element of imprecision is introduced. While this imprecision could be removed, it is much simpler to drop percent of elections won and to expand the categories as is done in the inter-party competition index presented below. The problem with Ranney's most recent index is three-fold: first, it is concerned only with state offices; second, it is overly and unnecessarily complicated; and third, its results are liable to be skewed by Gerrymandering and by differing lengths in terms of office.

Schlesinger's contention about alternation in office has often been noted but rarely examined. There are several minor criticisms of his index connected with alternation,[15] but the major criticism has to do with its interpretation and convenience. Regarding interpretation, one loss out of five elections means a 20.0% turnover. If these five elections are Presidential elections, they span 20 years. If they are U. S. senatorial elections, they span either 20 or 30 years depending on whether you treat the offices as separate. Two losses out of ten elections would also give a 20.0% figure, but now over spans of 40 and 60 years respectively.

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tion (cf. also a comment upon Casstevens and Press' article by Phillips Cutright, *American Journal of Sociology*, 69 (November, 1963), 291–292, and a rejoinder by the authors in *ibid.*, 69 (November, 1963), 292–294, centering on the economic indicators used and on the inter-party competition index); Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963), 265–289, combined the technique of Ranney and Kendall with that of Schlesinger and found a high correlation between them when ranking the states according to inter-party competition.

[13] Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (1964), 550–567.

[14] Its analysis is put off in order to criticize all the major attempts with their suggested techniques at one time. Hofferbert has used his index in his article "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 50 (March, 1966), 73–82.

[15] Such as not indicating trends, not revealing much about the Southern states, and not always being able to measure alternation after reapportionment of the U. S. House, all of which Schlesinger mentioned. One criticism which he implicitly noted on page 208 of his 1960 article, but the import of which he did not seem to realize, is that a measure of alternation in the office of U. S. Representative measures Congressional district competition, not state-wide competition. To compare a district measure with state-wide measures certainly does produce "a special effect upon the result" as he said on page 200 of the same article. Furthermore, as he presents it, there is no party identification connected with the rate of alternation. This identification can easily be added and probably would have produced different configurations in his diagrams (pages 202–205 of his 1960 article). Finally, because there are two offices with the same title (U. S. Senator) Schlesinger treated them as if they were one office being held by two persons at the same time. Measuring alternation in office for the two offices of U. S. Senator produces no more problems than measuring it for a four-year-term governor and two-year-term U. S. Representative.

Caution is necessary to avoid misinterpretation of such results, but even if caution is observed, such a measure can give the appearance of arbitrariness. Regarding convenience, the researcher is compelled to process his raw data three times in different ways each time. First, he must obtain the "overall" dimension, that is, percent of elections won. Second, he must calculate the precent of turnover. Third—to distinguish cycles, if any—he must determine how long it is between alternations. This process must also be repeated for each office.

With Hofferbert's index, as with Schlesinger's, there are several minor criticisms,[16] but the major criticism involves Hofferbert's basis of computation. As explained above, Hofferbert ranks each state six ways and then averages these rankings to obtain a new ranking. To begin with, rank correlation is not necessarily the most significant statistical operation available. It depends on the data and one's purpose because in many instances rank correlation can be misleading. Yet Hofferbert says a rank ordering by competitiveness taking both the "overall" and the cyclical dimensions into account will produce a greater amount of statistical utility than any other approach. The only other alternative he presents is grouping, which, he says, obscures relationships; but so does ranking if the data cluster. Further, Hofferbert says that one can always obtain groups from ranks, but not necessarily ranks from groups. Very crude or broad groupings can be obtained from ranks if one is willing to say that the dividing line between two ranks is sufficient to divide two groups; but then one may be forced to have as many groups as ranks, hardly any gain. Again, if the numerical basis for grouping is retained, then ranks can be easily obtained.[17] Finally, the major criticism of Hofferbert's technique centers around the similarity of Presidential, U. S. senatorial, and gubernatorial elections. Schlesinger emphasizes that different levels of office have different amounts of inter-party competition. Why then should the rankings (both percent of elections won and alternation in office) for the three elections be averaged to produce another ranking? If three (or six) items are logically similar, then their average rankings may have some meaning. Otherwise such a procedure only compounds error.

To sum up the criticisms: (1) The categories in most cases are too crude and are not sufficient for complex analysis. (2) Often the data is too limited: only one office, or only state offices, or only the Presidency, or only a few years covered providing not enough cases upon which to generalize. (3) The techniques are inadequate to handle the data. (4) The results are presented in such a way as to be misleading, as to be usable in only a limited way, or to be unusable by anyone else.

Although the criticisms of the indices presented by Bean, by Ranney and Kendall, and by Schlesinger could be overcome with sufficient refinement of method, there is one major problem remaining: a fundamental divergence over goals. Schlesinger primarily wants to indicate that competition varies among levels of office and he does so. Ranney and Kendall want to show that competition varies among states and they do so. The question is whether one or the other of these techniques can do both and the answer is that neither is adequate to do its own job much less the other's. There is a third relevant goal for which neither technique is adequate: to show that competition varies from one election year to another. (Bean, in a very crude way, heads in this direction.) There is a fourth goal: measuring trends toward or away from two-party competition. And a fifth goal is estimating the stability of the party system. When all five of these goals are combined one comes out with the objective of measuring the

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[16] Hofferbert has the same trobule as Schlesinger in handling the office of U. S. Senator; he includes only three offices; he considers his base period (1932–1962) as one which "adequately reflects the contemporary alignment between the parties" (page 558) but nowhere substantiates his contention or even tries to do so and in fact has to shorten the period to 1946–1962 for Minnesota and Wisconsin; his ranking system fails to distinguish between parties; his method requires even more computations than Schlesinger's; his example to show the efficacy of ranking turned out to be a poor one (a Rho of only +0.58 was an unfortunate result although the term "significant correlation" is open to debate); and gremlins were very active with his Table I (pp. 562–563) because Kansas was left out entirely, Georgia's average rank is an obvious typographical error, Vermont's is also incorrect, and New Mexico seems to have been wrongly ranked.

[17] An attempt, not very successful, was made to obtain groupings (two-party, weak two-party, modified one-party, and one-party) from Hofferbert's ranking. Actually the rank versus group quibbling is silly because we still do not know exactly what we want to do with these data. Both methods must be used and results compared. More important, however, is that changing an interval scale into an ordinal scale (as Hofferbert had done) unnecessarily limits applicable procedures.

FIGURE 1. CATEGORIES OF COMPETITION

| One-Party Democratic | Modified One-Party Democratic | Weak Two-Party Democratic | Two-Party | Weak Two-Party Republican | Modified One-Party Republican | One-Party Republican |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| $100.0\% \geqq V_D \geqq 71.0\%$ | $70.9\% \geqq V_D \geqq 61.0\%$ | $60.9\% \geqq V_D \geqq 56.0\%$ | $49.0\% \leqq V^D \leqq 55.9\%$ | $60.9\% \geqq V_R \geqq 56.0\%$ | $70.9\% \geqq V_R \geqq 61.0\%$ | $100.0\% \geqq V_R \geqq 71.0\%$ |

$V_D$ = Democratic percentage of the vote.
$V_R$ = Republican percentage of the vote.

behavior of a party system. Each technique or approach is partially adequate in relation to its goal, but no one technique nor any combination of them is adequate to measure inter-party competition on a systemic basis. A new measure is needed.

## III. A SYSTEMIC MEASURE

The basis for the inter-party competition index here presented is that each political unit has a systemic electoral behavior which can be described in terms of percentage of vote received by the parties. Although the index is designed to be used at any level providing sufficient data, it will be applied to the electoral behavior of the fifty states using different offices and election years. In the tables illustrating the index, differences among the states, between offices, and in election years can be observed and from the tables trends regarding competitiveness and stability can be established. In addition the tables suggest problems for further research.

In the construction of any index certain decisions must be made: what base period,[18] which offices,[19] and how to measure the competition. It is the last decision which adversely affects other inter-party competition indices. The advantages of measuring competition by percentage of vote are: (1) simplicity of computations, (2) simplicity of presentation, (3) expression of percentages on an interval scale which means that they are subject to all common parametric statistics and tests,[20] and (4) with percentages and total vote the vote received by each party can be computed and expressed on a ratio scale subject to all statistical tests.

Once the above decisions are made, the categories of inter-party competition can be established. The categories presented below had their origin in the work of Ranney and Kendall and were modified on the basis of the states clustering within them (although some exceptions exist). In addition they were intuitively agreeable to many persons. Beyond these two arguments justification cannot go at present.[21]

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[18] Cf. Cox, *op. cit.*, pages 1022–28.

[19] *Loc. cit.* and Schlesinger (1960), *op. cit.*, page 198.

[20] Ranks, on the other hand, are expressed on an ordinal scale suitable only for calculating some nonparametric correlation coefficients.

[21] It is hard to escape the contention that all of these decisions must be arbitrary. Perhaps they must remain so for the present. An awareness of the problems involved and of the limitations are the only real bench mark at this time. Cf. Golem-

During the collection of the data and the computations, certain problems of classification were encountered. Until the whole endeavor is on firmer ground, these problems must be resolved by the researcher who makes clear both the problems and the solutions.[22] The categories decided upon are to be found in Figure 1.

In order to establish a norm for the electoral behavior of each state, vote data were gathered for all state-wide general elections beginning in 1940 and ending with the 1964 elections. (Included were the third parties as well as the two major ones.) The offices chosen were President, U. S. senator, governor, and any other official elected on a state-wide basis. The other officials varied not only because of the difference in number elected in the various states, but also because of lack of information in certain cases. Elections for U. S. Representative at Large were included and so was a composite U. S. Representative vote, calculated by adding the party vote in each Congressional district for a state-wide total. Percentages were computed for each election for the Democrats, for the Republicans, and for "Others" consisting of all third party votes. The arithmetic mean of the percentages for the 1940–1964 base period was calculated for the Democrats, for the Republicans, and for the Others. On this basis each state fell into a category of inter-party (i.e., Democratic v. Republican) competition. Third party votes were counted in order to give an accurate reflection of how much the majority party received of the total vote.

The arithmetic mean was chosen over the median and the geometric mean precisely because the arithmetic mean emphasizes or is greatly affected by the extremes. That is, an election with a 90.0% Democratic vote will be emphasized more than one with a 55.0% Democratic vote. This emphasis is to be desired because in the former election the Republicans had no chance to win while in the latter election there was "competition." It is these noncompetitive elections which need to be emphasized when an inter-party competition index is constructed, because their shift toward or away from the category of "two-partyness" is more relevant to systemic competition than a shift from a 55.0% Democratic vote to a 51.0% Democratic vote.

One must remember at all times that an index measures only that for which it is constructed. In this case the indices measure "two partyness" or "competition" and "stability" on a systemic basis. That is, the index does not measure whether the system produced a Democratic or Republican victory; rather how close the vote split came to a perfectly "competitive" or "two-party" state: 50.0% Democratic, 50.0% Republican, 0.0% Other with a majority party receiving one vote more in order to pro-

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biewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 494–499; Jewell, *op cit.*, p. 13; Dawson and Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 273; Hofferbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 554–555, although on page 558 he appears to have forgotten. In any event, the appearance of arbitrariness will disappear when satisfactory results are obtained.

[22] In this instance the following problems were encountered at this point. In New York the votes cast in one party's column for a candidate of another party were counted for the candidate's party. In the three state-wide elections in California (during the time selected) in which there was only one major party candidate due to cross-filing, his votes were attributed to his party. Although not a satisfactory solution, it can be defended (perhaps) on the ground that one party was not strong enough to field a candidate who could win over the opposition party's candidate in the first party's primary. In Wisconsin the Progressive Party was counted as a third party—cf. Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), chapter III. One-party Southern states were counted as one-party although there is strong opposition to doing so—cf. Allan P. Sindler, "Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana," this REVIEW, 49 (1955), 641–642. As noted in the text below, a composite vote for U. S. Representative was obtained for use by adding the votes in each district to get a state-wide total for each party. (In Arkansas the vote in unopposed races is not tabulated so when there were opposition candidates in only a few of the U. S. Representative districts from 1958 to 1964, it was not possible to compute the percentages accurately. In these cases the elections were not counted. If there were no opposition candidates at all, then the candidates' party received 100% of the vote.) Whenever conflicts appeared in vote totals, the governmental source was taken as authoritative. The source for the data was primarily the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1940–1964) supplemented where necessary by Richard M. Scammon (ed.), *America Votes 5* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1964), the *World Almanac* for various years, the *CQ Weekly Report*, *The Political Almana, 1952* (New York: B. C. Forbes & Sons Publishing Co., Inc., 1952), and *The New York Red Book, 1944* (Albany: Williams Press, Inc., 1944). As soon as the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research has completed its data bank, it will be the best source of election data.

duce a victor. It must also be remembered that each state is to be viewed as an element in the national party system. The indices presented below measure how the system at one point in time compares (a) with the competitive behavior of the system at another point in time, (b) with the amount of possible change on the scale toward perfect competition or two-partyness, (c) with the amount of possible change on the scale in absolute terms (the stability scale), and (d) with the normal competitive behavior of the system over the twenty-five year base period. The next-to-last measurement—the stability index—is necessary because it is possible for the elements of system to cancel each other's moves on the two-party scale and to present the picture of a stable election. In such an event the stability index will indicate how much activity or shifting of categories occurred.

The scale by which the indices are computed is reproduced in Figure 1 and the states in each of the categories are listed in Table 1.

*Index of Two-Party Change*

Since the 1964 Presidential election was the genesis of this article, the Presidential election years from 1940 to 1964 were chosen to illustrate the indices. Each state was located on the scale according to its normal competitive behavior. Then the total number of moves it could make on the scale toward the two-party category was determined. For example, a normally two-party state could make zero moves while a one-party state could make three moves. The figures for all the states were added giving the number of shifts on the scale necessary for a completely competitive election. Next, each state was categorized according to its vote for the Presidency in that year and the

TABLE 1. THE STATES CLASSIFIED BY DEGREE OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

*One-Party Democratic*

Alabama (79.03%)
Arkansas (82.34%)
Florida (73.62%)
Georgia (90.50%)
Louisiana (84.46%)
Mississippi (88.06%)
South Carolina (87.30%)
Texas (80.03%)

*Modified One-Party Democratic*

North Carolina (66.44%)
Tennessee (64.60%)
Virginia (66.56%)

*Weak Two-Party Leaning Toward the Democrats*

Alaska (58.89%)
Arizona (56.28%)
Hawaii (59.94%)
Oklahoma (56.67%)
Rhode Island (58.67%)

*Two-Party*

California (53.35% R)
Colorado (50.36% R)
Connecticut (50.21% D)
Delaware (49.99% R)*
Idaho (51.84% R)
Illinois (50.01% R)
Indiana (51.50% R)
Iowa (53.46% R)
Kentucky (54.48% D)
Maryland (53.91% D)
Massachusetts (51.56% D)
Michigan (50.00% R)
Minnesota (50.48% R)
Missouri (54.98% D)
Montana (52.93% D)
Nevada (55.03% D)
New Hampshire (54.88% R)
New Jersey (51.39% R)
New Mexico (54.68% D)
New York (49.55% R)*
Ohio (51.26% R)
Oregon (55.29% R)
Pennsylvania (50.56% R)
Utah (49.97% D)
Washington (51.25% D)
West Virginia (54.84% D)
Wisconsin (51.08% R)
Wyoming (52.05% R)

*Weak Two-Party Leaning Toward the Republicans*

Kansas (56.25%)
Maine (57.05%)
Nebraska (59.43%)
North Dakota (56.38%)
South Dakota (58.10%)

*Modified One-Party Republican*

Vermont (62.12%)

*One-Party Republican*

(None)

* In Delaware, New York, and Utah the split was so close to 50.00% that the third party vote produced the following: Delaware, 49.79% Democratic, 49.99% Republican, 0.22% Other; New York, 46.87% Democratic, 49.55% Republican, 3.57% Other; and Utah, 49.97% Democratic, 48.46% Republican, 1.57% Other. In Michigan the following held: 49.55% Democratic, 50.00% Republican, 0.45% Other.

total number of shifts made by all states in that election was figured. If a state moved away from the two-party category the moves were rated negatively. Thus a normally two-party state which fell into the modified one-party category was rated as "−2". A modified one-party Democratic state which fell into the weak two-party Republican category received a "+1" (two plus a minus one) while if it had gone further and had become a modified one-party Republican state it would have received a zero (two plus a minus two). It would have ended up no closer to the two-party category than where it had begun. If a state was carried by a third party, as happened in four states in 1948 and one state in 1960 (all one-party Democratic states), the total number of moves from its normal category to the nearest one-party category was counted, one was added, and the result was made negative. The sum of the moves in the particular Presidential election was then divided by the sum of all possible moves to give the Index of Two-Party Change for that election in that year. In other words:

$$I_t = \frac{\Sigma t}{\Sigma p}$$

where $I_t$ is the Index of Two-Party Change, $t$ is the number of moves on the two-party scale, and $p$ is the number of moves possible from the base period category to the two-party category. If $\Sigma t$ is negative it will make $I_t$ negative, indicating that more moves were made away from the two-party category than toward it. If $I_t = 0$, then either it is a normal election or else the shifts cancelled each other. (To disclose the latter event a stability scale was used and will be discussed below.) The results as computed for the seven Presidential elections (represented by the symbol $I_t$) are to be found in Table 2.

Serious objection can be raised to treating all states as equal. Obviously New York's shift to the one-party category can be of more significance to the winner of the Electoral College vote than Nevada's shift to the one-party category. The same is true for any and all offices unless one is making a purely state to state comparison. Consequently the moves (potential and actual) were also weighted by the state's electoral vote. Although this weighting gives the smaller states with the minimum of three electoral votes more proportionate weight than the larger states, the role of the Electoral College in electing the President cannot be overlooked. It can be argued in addition that for the sake of convenience and uniformity this weighting should be used for all offices. The result of such weighting (designated by the symbol $I_{tw}$) is also given in Table 2.

TABLE 2. INDEX OF TWO-PARTY CHANGE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1940–1964*

| Year | $I_t$ | $I_{tw}$ (weighted) |
|---|---|---|
| 1940 | −19.51% | −19.49% |
| 1944 | +10.00% | + 3.54% |
| 1948 | +17.50% | +17.47% |
| 1952 | 0.00% | +21.46% |
| 1956 | −17.50% | −22.98% |
| 1960 | +54.76% | +64.82% |
| 1964 | −64.29% | −96.52% |

* As $I_t$ or $I_{tw}$ approach +100% all moves toward a perfect two-party system are made in an increasing amount; as $I_t$ or $I_{tw}$ approach −100% all moves possible are made away from a perfect two-party system in an increasing amount.

Looking at the unweighted figures in Table 2, one can see that the 1964 Presidential election was obviously detrimental to the two-party system, while in the 1960 Presidential election the reverse was true. The 1952 Presidential election coincided with the norm after all the shifts had been made. How many shifts were made is revealed below by the stability scale. Notice that when the moves are weighted the differences between the two indices in 1940 and 1948 are very small, that 1944, 1956, and 1960 vary by only about 10% or less, and that the differences between the two indices in 1952 and 1964 are much greater. Notice also what happens to the 1952 index when it is weighted. Which index (the weighted or unweighted) should be used depends on how one views the states: are they equal partners within the system or unequal ones? The unweighted index is simpler, but the weighted one seems to conform more to the realities of American Presidential politics. When using the index in other ways the unweighted index would be preferable. In each case one must determine what is to be measured keeping in mind the implications of weighting and non-weighting.

### *Index of Stability*

Due to the possibility which occurred in the 1952 election (unweighted index), an index of the stability of the entire system was figured. The stability scale is identical to the two-party change scale. The only difference is the elimination of negative values so that a two-party state shifting to the modified one-party category would receive a "+2" and a one-party Democratic state shifting to the one-party Republican category (as Mississippi did in 1964) would receive a "+6". If a state was carried by a third party, the shift was counted as seven moves. As with the Index of Two-Party Change, the sum of the shifts on the stability scale for the election under study was divided by the sum of the possible shifts for the base period:

$$I_s = \frac{\Sigma s}{\Sigma b}$$

where $I_s$ is the Index of Stability, $s$ is the number of moves on the stability scale, and $b$ is the largest number of possible moves on the stability scale from the base period category in either direction. Again the shifts were weighted by the electoral votes and the results (represented by the symbols $I_s$ and $I_{sw}$) are presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3. INDEX OF SYSTEMIC STABILITY FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1940–1964*

| Year | $I_s$ | $I_{sw}$ (weighted) |
|---|---|---|
| 1940 | + 8.65% | + 5.35% |
| 1944 | + 5.43% | + 4.43% |
| 1948 | +27.72% | +24.70% |
| 1952 | +30.43% | +26.80% |
| 1956 | +35.33% | +36.75% |
| 1960 | +22.92% | +21.25% |
| 1964 | +50.52% | +51.42% |

* As $I_s$ or $I_{sw}$ approach 0.00% the system approaches complete stability; as $I_s$ or $I_{sw}$ approach +100.00% the system has shifted on the scale as much as it can. There can be no negative figures due to the way shifts are counted.

### *Index of Competition*

Not only would it be informative to know how much change toward or away from two-partyness occurred (as well as the system's stability), but it would also be valuable to have an index of how competitive the system was in the particular year under study. Therefore an Index of Competition was devised by putting a value on each category as follows: two-party, 4; weak two-party, 3; modified one-party, 2; one-party, 1; if carried by a third party it was valued as zero. A sum was figured for each Presidential year and divided by the sum of a perfect two-party system (the number of states times four):

$$I_c = \frac{\Sigma c}{\Sigma g}$$

where $I_c$ is the Index of Competition, $c$ is the value of the two-party scale categories for the election under study, and $g$ is the value of the two-party scale categories in a perfect two-party system.[23] This index was weighted also by electoral votes and the two results ($I_c$ and $I_{cw}$) can be found in Table 4. The closeness of the weighted and unweighted indices is noteworthy as is the change from 1956 to 1960 to 1964.

TABLE 4. INDEX OF COMPETITION FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1940–1964*

| Year | $I_c$ | $I_{cw}$ (weighted) |
|---|---|---|
| 1940 | +75.00% | +78.06% |
| 1944 | +81.25% | +82.06% |
| 1948 | +82.81% | +84.65% |
| 1952 | +79.17% | +85.36% |
| 1956 | +75.52% | +77.07% |
| 1960 | +90.50% | +93.30% |
| 1964 | +66.50% | +63.08% |

* As $I_c$ or $I_{cw}$ approach +100.00% the system approaches a state of perfect two-partyness.

An Index of Total Competition ($I_z$) for the entire twenty-five year period for all elections was calculated. If the American party system was composed of only two-party states the weighted (by category) value would be $4 \times 50 = 200$. By adding the sum from the norm (Table 1) and dividing it by 200 one obtains an Index of Total Competition ($I_z$): $158/200 = 79.00\%$. A system composed of all one-party states would have $I_z = 25.00\%$; a system composed of all modified one-party states would have $I_z = 50.00\%$; a system composed of all weak two-party states would have $I_z = 75.00\%$; and a system composed of all two-party states would have $I_z = 100.00\%$. Since the electoral votes for the different states as well as the total number of electoral votes varied over the years, it was not possible to calculate a weighted Index of Total Competition ($I_{zw}$).

## IV. CONCLUSION

Once the computation has been done it is easy to compare the competitiveness of the states as Ranney and Kendall wished to do. Table 1 is such a comparison. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the five indices for the office of President. Similar tables can be constructed for all state-wide offices in selected states as Schlesinger wanted to do. Such tables could also be used for comparing election years as Bean tried to do. Many other indices can be constructed without changing the scale. The indices are applicable as well to other two-party systems besides the one in this country.[24] One of the most pressing problems in political science today is cross-national studies, and with the indices here presented two-party political systems can be closely studied and compared. With a multiparty index the scope can be expanded even further. By converting the scale from party competition to ideological position (left to right?), one could make even more indices.[25] The use of the scale and index is vast.

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[23] For the years 1940–1958, $\Sigma g = 48 \times 4 = 192$; for the years since 1960, $\Sigma g = 50 \times 4 = 200$.

The advantages of such an index (or indices) as presented here are many. Besides advantages in computation and presentation, there is the advantage that the data can be stored on punch cards along with necessary programs. As new election data are collected it will take only moments to have current indices. Furthermore, in a time such as today when many political scientists lack both computer and statistical knowledge the indices can be calculated using only simple arithmetic.

Properly speaking a conclusion cannot be drawn from the presentation of a new research tool. Perhaps warnings should be issued, but the pitfalls are too obvious. One must keep in mind that figures can be made to indicate anything he desires whether warranted or not. All mathematical applications to political science must begin and end with interpretation. The index presented here is only a tool to help formulate hypotheses concerning party systems: before one can analyze a phenomenon, he must be able to measure it.

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[24] An index applicable to multiparty systems is now under development as is one to be used for primary elections.

[25] On this problem cf. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, 57 (June, 1963), 368–377.

# A NOTE ON LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH: LABOR REPRESENTATION IN RHODE ISLAND*

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In the last ten years, an extensive and useful literature has developed on state legislative behavior.[1] This paper reports on an exploratory study of three questions about state legislative processes: (1) What is the relationship between labor representation and legislative outcomes? (2) Are there measurable connections between a legislative role and perceptions of political events and relationships? (3) Does simultaneous individual association with labor and a legislative party result in measurable cross-pressures? The responses of sixty-two Rhode Island activists provide the data. The research was designed to provide an empirical basis for comparisons of the perceptions of various participants.

The study utilized differentiated sets of legislators plus a set of interest group leaders. *Labor legislators* were Democratic legislators serving between 1952 and 1962 who, in their *Rhode Island Manual* biographies (for which they personally provided all the information), listed one of these associations with labor: official union position, union membership, or a source of livelihood in manual or crafts work. Fifteen of a universe of thirty were interviewed; the sample was weighted for legislative tenure. *Rank and file Democratic legislators* were legislators who served one or more terms in the General Assembly between 1952 and 1962, listed no association with labor in their biographies, and were not elected party leaders. Fifteen were sampled from a universe of one hundred twenty-three; the survey was weighted for legislative tenure. In addition, seven elected leaders, *Democratic legislative leaders*, were interviewed from a universe of ten. *Labor executive board members* were local union leaders between 1952 and 1962 who sat on the executive board of the Rhode Island AFL, CIO, or AFL-CIO (the product of a 1958 merger). Twenty-five were interviewed of a universe of sixty-one; the sample was weighted for terms on the board as well as to obtain the proper proportion from each group's pre-1958 governing structure. None served in the Assembly.

## I. LABOR REPRESENTATION AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES

The discipline knows a great deal about state legislators. They are often, unlike their federal counterparts, part-time politicians whose main source of livelihood is outside legislative halls. Typically, their private occupations allow time for politics and may be furthered by such participation. State legislators are customarily open-minded about interest group activity.[2] When one goes a step beyond, however, and turns to organized labor's relationship to the state legislative process, the literature is less complete. A 1954 special committee of the American Political Science Association noted the presence of union men in the legislatures of most states. Rhode Island was, interestingly, foremost among these, but the Association study yielded little of theoretical utility.[3] A different report served only to mark the coordinate rise of organized labor and the Democratic party in Oregon.[4] Yet, *potentially* organized labor was important in state systems. Harry M. Scoble argued:

The most fundamental post-war change in the

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[1] See, for example, John C. Wahlke *et al.*, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962); Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove, *Legislative Politics in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960); and Malcolm Jewell, *The State Legislature* (New York: Random House, 1962).

[2] See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Role of the State Legislator in Massachusetts," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (April, 1954), at p. 185; Heinz Eulau *et al.*, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision Makers* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961) pp. 237–238, 247; and John C. Wahlke *et al.*, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (May, 1960), at p. 212.

[3] Belle Zeller, *American State Legislatures* (New York: Crowell and Co., 1954), p. 72.

[4] See L. G. Seligman, "Political Change: Legislative Elites and Parties in Oregon." *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (June, 1964), 177–187.

structure and process of political parties has been the entrance of organized labor into electoral activity at the precinct level and up.[5]

Beyond such impressionistic assertions, there was little. Scoble himself asked:

> Who in the political sicence profession is carrying out trend analyses to find out whether, regardless of labor propaganda, labor ideology is in fact being advanced by increasing union representation in state legislatures?[6]

The same problem in more generalized form was recognized by the authors of *The Legislative System*. They wrote:

> . . . in spite of the critical importance of the relationship between interest groups and law-making institutions, research offers surprisingly little theoretical explanation and few cumulative or comparative empirical data about this phase of the representative process.[7]

The Rhode Island project utilized several approaches to uncover relationships between labor representation and legislative outcomes. One method was to test correlations between the number of labor-associated legislators (using *Manual* biographies as the source) and the number of labor bills passed between 1934 and 1962 (using the forty-four categories of labor legislation listed in the *Rhode Island General Laws*). A rank order correlation analysis (ranking each session on the quantity of labor legislators and the proportion of labor bills to total legislative output) revealed no significant relationship. The $r_s$ was .225. When the 1934–1962 span was split in half, with 1934–1948 representing the New Deal-Fair Deal era and 1948–1962 a post-war period, the results were slightly different. The first period showed a $r_s$ of .536 where .05 significance was .714; this could be interpreted as a very weak positive correlation. The second yielded a $r_s$ of .042, no correlation. Quantitative devices cannot judge the saliency of individual bills, but they do suggest that in Rhode Island it was not the number of labor legislators which brought about labor legislation.

Correlation analysis does not prove that labor legislators were without use to organized labor. To find out if they did perform political tasks for labor, I asked them about their interactions with labor officials and their Assembly actions. A mixed picture emerged. Not all of the fifteen labor legislators maintained the same kind of communications with labor leaders. Six said they conversed frequently with such officials; six said, in effect, "we were in touch now and then"; and three said they never talked with anyone from labor. Seven said they worked in Assembly committees to help labor, and the same number said they spoke for it in the party caucus. Three said they talked informally with colleagues on labor's behalf, and the same number recalled giving pro-labor floor speeches. The data indicate that organized labor could count on the help, in differing degrees, of about half of its associated representatives.

The interviews revealed that the most important service labor legislators provided labor was transmitting information to the rank and file Democratic legislators. These ordinary Democrats, who perceived themselves as backers of organized labor, said they found out about labor's bills from the labor legislators. They ranked their labor colleagues far ahead of both labor officials and party leaders as sources of information. The Democratic legislative leaders ranked labor officials outside the Assembly first and labor legislators second. The leaders seemed to behave like Wahlke's "facilitative" legislators; they described their activity as *choosing* which parts of a labor-conceived and -initiated package they would support.[8] Running a highly cohesive party unit, the Rhode Island leaders customarily announced in the caucus which of labor's bills would have the party's blessing, but they often waited until the last legislative day of the term (usually lasting all night) to do so.[9] For most of the session, routine communications on labor's program for rank and file Democrats came primarily from labor legislators.

## II. LEGISLATIVE ROLE AND LEGISLATORS' PERCEPTIONS

The Wahlke researchers maintained that the concept of role would have the most utility in explaining legislative behavior in relation to interest groups. They defined role as a "status" consisting of mutual expectations about behavior. All the participants in the legislative process possessed such expectations about each other and the legislative member role was itself distinctive. A legislator's perceptions of what constituted legitimate group activity and what "the supposedly objective 'facts' of such activity" were, were tied to his own role.[10] The perceptions connected with role were as important in determining legislative behavior as

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[5] "Organized Labor in Electoral Politics: Some Questions for the Discipline," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (September, 1963), p. 666.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Wahlke, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations," *op cit.*, p. 203.

[8] *Ibid.* p. 226.

[9] Cf. Lockard, *op. cit.*, pp. 217–218; and Jewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

[10] Wahlke, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations," *op. cit.*, p. 205.

> number, size, strategy, skill or other choices of pressure groups themselves, the individual group affiliations and identifications of legislators, or the peculiarities of personality and personal whim of the legislators.[11]

Part of the Rhode Island research was designed to test hypotheses about a legislative role. Comparative populations were used in order to go beyond the conclusion in *The Legislative System* that "our data provide only inferential evidence that the legislative role tends to take precedence over the interest-group member role in cases of conflict."[12]

If the authors of *The Legislative System* were correct in arguing that group affiliation is overridden by the legislative role, then, in terms of my data, labor legislators should have the same perceptions as rank and file Democratic legislators when the latter differ from the labor executive board members. If they were incorrect, there are several other possibilities. Labor legislators could have perceptions different from both labor executive board members' and rank and file Democratic legislators'. Such a finding would suggest that dual labor-party membership produces distinctive perceptions in a legislator. Or, labor legislators could have perceptions identical to those of their labor associates but different from those of their political colleagues; this would point towards group affiliation predominating over legislative affiliation. Or, labor legislators could be more like their fellow legislators than their labor associates, but still distinguishable. Would one then talk of an influential but not dominant legislative role? The interviews were structured to allow for any of these possibilities.

It should be interjected here that there were no major differences among the three sets in age, education, ethnic origin, or tenure in office. This increases the confidence that differences in role orientations are not products of intervening variables and that all that differentiates the three sets is group affiliation (labor executive board members) versus group and party association (labor legislators) versus party affiliation only (rank and file Democratic legislators).

The data are consistent with the theory of a legislative role. The labor legislators *do* respond like rank and file Democratic legislators on a number of perceptual questions; furthermore, on another series, comparing both sets of legislators with labor executive board members, measurable differences are present. To begin with examples of similarities, there is no statistical difference between the two sets of legislators in the distribution of responses to a question designed to measure self-perception of behavior in a situation of labor-party conflict. As Table 1–1 shows, two Democratic legislators and one labor legislator said they would go with labor; six and five respectively said they would stick with the party. Table 1-2 indicates a symmetry of labor legislators' and rank and file Democratic legislators' views on questions about Rhode Island politics at the time of the interviews, 1964–1965. They offered similar assessments of organized labor's statewide power and its importance to the Democratic party. (Democratic legislative leaders saw these relationships differently than the two other sets of legislators. Four of them said labor was as powerful as ever and three said it was not; four of them said labor was not as important to the party, one had reservations, and only two said its importance was the same.)

There are differences among the three sets of activists on three other questions. Table 1-3 contains a suggestive dissimilarity. Labor executive board members are inclined to assess labor's "over-all political activities" between 1952 and 1962 in a favorable light. Fifteen of twenty-five said labor was effective and eight ventured it was even "very effective." Rank and file Democratic legislators, while not denying labor's contribution, were markedly less enthusiastic. Surprisingly, seven labor legislators chose to opt out of this question entirely. If one takes the not illogical analytical step of interpreting their "no answer" responses as "ineffective" signals and their score is placed in a cell opposite the "ineffective" replies of the other two sets, there is a difference significant at the .10 level. When labor legislators and rank and file Democratic legislators are each compared separately with labor executive board members, there are in each instance differences at the .05 level. When the legislators are compared to each other, there are no differences. Thus, in perceptions of labor's political effectiveness, the two sets of legislators appear to be like each other but unlike the labor leaders.

Table 1-4 was designed to ascertain if the three sets of activists perceived a decline in labor's influence in the Rhode Island Democratic party from the 1950's to the early 1960's. Once again the two sets of legislators were closest in response: six out of fifteen of each set said labor was more influential in the party during the 1950's (a view shared by five of seven Democratic legislative leaders). Seventeen of twenty-five labor executive board mem-

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

[12] p. 333.

TABLE 1. ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF LABOR-PARTY RELATIONS IN RHODE ISLAND

| | Rank and File Democratic Legislators (*N*-15) | Labor Legislators (*N*-15) | Labor Executive Board Members (*N*-25) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. *How They Perceived Their Own Actions in Situations of Labor-Party Conflict:* | | | |
| Sided with Labor | 2 | 1 | |
| Sided with Party | 6 | 5 | |
| Don't Remember any Cases | 5 | 5 | |
| Other Response | 2 | 4 | |
| 2. *Assessments of Labor's Current (1964–1965) Position in Rhode Island Politics:** | | | |
| (a) Is Labor as Powerful as Ever? | | | |
| Yes | 9 | 7 | |
| No | 4 | 5 | |
| No Answer | 2 | 3 | |
| (b) Is Labor as Important to the Democratic Party? | | | |
| Yes | 8 | 7 | |
| Yes/with reservations | 4 | 4 | |
| No | 3 | 4 | |
| No Answer | — | — | |
| 3. *Assessments of Labor's "Over-all Political Activities" Between 1952 and 1962:*** | | | |
| Very Effective | 4 | 2 | 8 |
| Effective | 5 | 6 | 15 |
| Ineffective | 4 | — | 2 |
| No Answer | 2 | 7 | — |
| 4. *Perceptions of Labor's Influence in the Rhode Island Democratic Party:**** | | | |
| Labor More Influential in the 1950's (than 1960's) | 6 | 6 | 17 |
| Labor Equally Influential in the 1950's and 1960's | 8 | 5 | 5 |
| Labor Less Influential in the 1950's (than 1960's) | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| No Answer | — | 1 | — |

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* On both issues, when rank and file Democratic legislators' and labor legislators' responses are combined into a 2+2 Yes-No table, there are no significant differences on the Fisher Exact Probability Test.

** A chi-square table was constructed in which labor legislators' "no answers" were placed in a cell opposite the "ineffectives" of the other two sets. Chi-square for all three sets equalled 9.19, significant at the .10 but not at .05 level. When labor legislators are compared to labor executive board members, chi-square equals 8.39, significant at .05; when rank and file Democratic legislators are compared to labor executive board members, chi-square equals 6.22, significant at .05. When labor legislators and ank and file Democrats are compared to each other, there is no difference. Although some statistics exts warn against the use of chi-square when more than 20% of the cells have frequencies of less than ve (see Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics*, New York, 1956, pp. 178–179), the test has been utized in political science when no other means of analyzing small sample data are available (see Alvin oskoff and Harmon Ziegler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election*, Philadelphia, 1964, pp. i–ii).

*** When the three groups are compared, chi-square equals 7.51, not significant at .10. When labor islators are compared to labor executive board members, chi-square equals 4.38, significant at .05, when the rank and file Democratic legislators are compared to the labor executive board members, uare again equals 4.38, significant at .05. When the two sets of legislators are compared to each there is no difference.

TABLE 1.—(*Continued*)

| | Rank and File Democratic Legislators (*N*-15) | Labor Legislators (*N*-15) | Labor Executive Board Members (*N*-25) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5. *Perceptions of the Labor Party Relationship Between 1952 and 1962:***** | | | |
| Very Satisfactory | 8 | 3 | 3 |
| Satisfactory | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Unsatisfactory | — | — | 1 |
| No Answer | — | 1 | — |
| Very Satisfactory to 1958/Unsatisfactory thereafter | 2 | 3 | 10 |
| Satisfactory to 1958/Unsatisfactory thereafter | — | — | 5 |
| Very Satisfactory to 1960/ Satisfactory thereafter | — | 2 | — |

**** When only post-1958 evaluations are considered and Very Satisfactory and Satisfactory responses are combined into cells compared to Unsatisfactory replies, the following frequency table results (with chi-square equal to 11.59, significant at .01):

| | Rank and File (*N*-15) Democratic Legislators | Labor (*N*-15) Legislators | Labor Executive Board Members (*N*-25) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very Satisfactory/Satisfactory after 1958 | 13 | 11 | 9 |
| Unsatisfactory after 1958 | 2 | 3 | 16 |

bers offered this evaluation. There is not quite a significant difference among the three sets at .10, but when two-by-two comparisons are repeated, once again both sets of legislators are different from the labor executive board members but like each other.

Table 1-5 is interesting on two counts. First, it is a graphic illustration that sophisticated political respondents will not always allow themselves to be put into questionnaire slots arranged beforehand by a social scientist. The last three response categories were suggested spontaneously, repeatedly, and emphatically by those interviewed. In an evaluative, if not a quantitative sense, I am inclined to pay special attention to such respondent insistence. Second, this question brought out a significant difference among the activists upon what may be the most important political perception of How the diners feel they were served will determine their future appetites (the actual nutritive value in politics is often of less consequence than the aftertaste).

Most noteworthy in Table 1-5 are the drastic differences in perceptions depending upon position. The accompanying condensed frequency table makes this clear. Both labor legislators and rank and file Democratic legislators consider the labor-party relationship to have been at least "satisfactory." The labor executive board members, using the post-1958 distinction which they interjected, are split in virtually the opposite direction. Yet these participants are looking at the same reality, the same labor-party interactions. Whether the interactions were acceptable or not obviously depended upon one's position, one's role in the situation. all: how well has the labor-party relationship gone? From a theoretical perspective, if the various sets of participants perceive differently the satisfactions accruing from their relations they are likely to have difficulty cooperating a some not-too-far distant point in time, es pecially if one set is actually dissatisfied Furthermore, it is the perception that count Furthermore, the labor legislators have th perceptions connected with the party role, n those of the labor role. The findings suppo the Wahlke group's hypothesis of the predon nance of a distinctive legislative role.

## III. CROSS-PRESSURES ON LABOR LEGISL

The concept of cross-pressures has a history in the literature, primarily in v studies.[13] Although withdrawal is the main response of voters to cross-pressures, this is, as Robert Lane noted, "only one of several means of solving the conflict problem."[14] Another is "identification with one of the conflicting reference groups (*sometimes because of frustration in the other*)."[15] David Truman, in applying the cross-pressure concept to the internal politics of interest groups, observed that "*felt conflicts of this sort are painful.*"[16] Truman later implied that legislative parties, as "mediate groups," shared many typical group characteristics.[17]

For the Rhode Island project, the question was as follows: even if there is a dominant legislative role, is it reasonable to expect no measurable consequences of dual pulls on the loyalties of labor legislators? Labor legislators would be prime prospects because the process through which they adapt themselves to the legislative role could well be accompanied by feelings of being cross-pressured. On the other hand, such tensions in labor legislators are not self-evident; conceivably they could adopt the Assembly-member role without strain. If they did have difficulties as a consequence of dual membership, what would be expected are feelings of bitterness or frustration toward one, the other, or both affiliations. Voters may withdraw when experiencing cross-pressures, but state legislators, by definition relatively highly involved in public life, do not have such an option.

During the interviews, questions were posed about instances of labor-party conflict in Rhode Island, because legislative cross-pressures would be most likely to be felt when labor legislators were not subject to complementary labor and party demands. In assessing these disputes, labor legislators said they acted much as rank and file Democratic legislators did. The labor legislators, however, offered a remarkable series of unsolicited additional responses. Seven expressed discontent with organized labor; three revealed similar sentiments about the Democratic party. Thus, two-thirds of the dual membership legislators volunteered feelings which I interpret as highly suggestive of cross-pressures on them. Their responses are not likely to occur by chance; of fifteen rank and file Democratic legislators, only two expressed discontent with labor and one with the party. Comparing these distributions on the Fisher Exact Probability Test shows a difference significant at the .025 level.

What the labor legislators feel is mirrored in selected quotes from the protocols. Speaking of the fact that his conferences with labor officials are very rare, a labor legislator said, "There's no direct pipeline. They know how I feel. I don't always agree with union leadership." Another labor legislator, after describing his close cooperation with AFL leaders, recalled that "over the years I had my quarrels with some labor leaders, particularly some from the CIO." A different labor legislator told of a traumatic experience early in his Assembly career:

> I can remember when I first came here. I had a run-in with [a prominent CIO leader]. He threatened to beat me unless I went along and Roberts [the govenor] arranged for him to apologize.

Finally another labor legislator volunteered:

> Labor expected too much of me; they thought I was going to get everything through the Labor Committee for them because I was a labor man. I was abused many times by labor leaders because of my independence.

In a similar vein, but with a different focus, a few labor legislators expressed uneasy feelings about their legislative party. One said:

> The House [sic] had elected more and more conservative Democrats. There are not real liberals in the House any more. Liberalization of the labor laws has diminished because of fear of losing industry. It's afraid to make improvements. We're not a labor state now even if we were ten or fifteen years ago.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has reported the results of a pilot project on three aspects of state legislative processes. The Rhode Island data on labor representation seem to generate three hypotheses for testing by those concerned with group representation in general in stage legislatures: (1) such representation will be useful primarily because associates will transmit information for the group to other legislators; (2) group association will be superceded by a distinctive legislative role in structuring the individual legislator's perceptions of events and relationships; and (3) group-associated legislators will be subject to cross-pressures.

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[13] See Paul Lazarsfeld *et al. The People's Choice* (New York; Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), Chapter Six; and Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 86–88.

[14] *Political Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 203.

[15] *Ibid.* Italics added.

[16] *The Governmental Process* (New York: pf, 1951), p. 162. Italics added.

*The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, ), p. 95.

# REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE TYPES: A RESEARCH NOTE

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As part of their state legislative research project, Professors Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson subjected Edmund Burke's classical phrasing of the dilemma of representation to an empirical examination.[1] Burke postulated the style of representation in terms of either-or: the legislator is either a mere spokesman for his constituents or he represents them as he believes best. The 4-state survey findings did not bear Burke out; rather, they disclosed a trichotomy, three major representational role types, with a classification of "Politico" appearing along with "Delegate" and "Trustee." The Politico expresses an overlap of both orientations, so that representative types can be conceived of along a continuum, rather than constituting two polar positions, with the Politico placed toward the mid-point. In numerical frequency, as well, the Politico type was also found to fall between the other two. Left to be determined is the universality of the 4-state formulation of representational roles.

Over the last decade I have periodically observed the evolution of legislatures functioning in the American-administered regions of the Pacific. Here are to be found a number of under-developed societies, or to employ a more informative description, distinctive cultures in transitional status adapting introduced political forms to customary political practices. These traditional practices are fundamentally premised upon the resolving of differences through the reaching of consensus for taking political action.[2] In 1956, when the Marshall Islands Congress in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands[3] was intensively studied, and in 1958 when the *Fono* (Legislature) of American Samoa was the focus for similar research, both were advisory bicameral legislatures, with lawmaking power legally residing in the executive. Both were patterned upon the model of American bodies on the mainland United States, although each incorporated nuances peculiar to its respective area. For purposes of considering representational roles, only reference to the lower houses in each is pertinent, as members of Samoa's Senate are chosen *Fa's Samoa* (by traditional ways) while the upper house in the Marshalls was nominally composed of hereditary *Iroij* and *Leiroj* (male and female nobles).[4] However, American Samoa's Representatives, as in the United States, are elected by universal adult suffrage, while the Assemblymen who sat in the 1956 Marshallese Congress owed their selection to a number of electoral devices, frequently secret election but also indirect choice by vote of the atoll councils which in turn were usually composed of *alabs* (the senior heads of families) residing on the atoll. To complete this brief sketch of the political settings of these Pacific Island areas, it need only be added that at that time neither knew political parties, and formalized pressure organizations were only just beginning to appear.

After the publication of the Wahlke survey, the 1956 and 1958 field notes were re-examined within the frame of representation there formulated, and the legislators of these two American outposts were found to fit both taxonomically and in corresponding numerical rank order within the representational roles of Trustee, Politico, and Delegate. Indeed, the same continuum could be reconstructed, with their replies nicely evidencing the lack of sharpness between the roles:

*Trustee*: The Marshallese legislator who categorically stated he had received no instructions from his home atoll, that he could use his own discretion in the deliberations of the Marshallese Congress, and that he was not bound to act as the atoll council might instruct him.

*Politico*: The Marshallese legislator who stated he could use his own discretion and did not have to follow the views of his atoll council, bu who then immediately qualified it by adding "but not always."

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[1] John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962), 267 ff; also see "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, 53 (September, 1959), at p. 742.

[2] See Norman Meller, "Three American Legislative Bodies in the Pacific," in Roland W. Force, (ed.), *Induced Political Change in the Pacific* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1965).

[3] The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is divided into six administrative districts, of which the Marshalls comprise the easternmost. This archipelago of but 70 square miles of land, habited by 18,200 people, is scattered over some 180,000 square miles of ocean.

[4] In 1960 the Marshallese Congress was co verted into a unicameral body, with *Iroij* *Leiroj* enjoying life membership.

*Delegate* (shading over to Politico): "If there is [sic] any decided matters [that is, decided at the county *fono* meeting called pursuant to *Fa'a Samoan* custom] which I am against, I can say right there that I am against it. But, if my people insist, then it is my duty to bring it up before the *Fono*. If the *Fono* is not in favor of it, I will not fight for it."

*Delegate* (a Samoan): "If the people ask me something which I don't approve of introducing, I let it be determined by the number of villages which request it. My county consists of five villages, and if three villages think that a certain matter must be brought to the *Fono*, then I have to, even though I do not agree . . . . "

Unfortunately, due to data having been gathered in some cases through interpreters and also questionnaire responses requiring translation, representational role orientations for all members of these two legislative bodies could not be delineated.[5]

The Wahlke study, in seeking an explanation for the different representative role orientations, and their numerical distribution, suggested "it is likely . . . that the representative has become less and less a Delegate and more and more a Trustee as the business of government has become more and more intricate and technical as well as less locally centered."[6] It was therefore to be expected that in the areas of "simple" government, like Samoa or the Marshall Islands, the Delegate component would loom larger, if not predominate over the Trustee. In fact, the reverse was true, but this finding was hardly conclusive, suffering from the disadvantage of being based upon the manipulation of data amassed without prior formulation of the existence of trichotomous representational roles and the drafting of specific probes to test them.

The convening of the First Congress of Micronesia[7] for the whole Trust Territory in July of 1965 provided the opportunity for pursuing the tentative conclusion that these three representational roles apply equally as well to beginning as to established legislatures, and to amass further data on the hypothesis that they derive from the very nature of the legislative process. As a bicameral legislating body, its members elected by secret ballot,[8] the new Congress is comparable in composition and function to the four state legislatures previously surveyed. It thus also afforded opportunity for extending research beyond mere replication to determine whether the representative's own role perception was consonant with the role he believed his constituents thought he ought observe. In the attempt to avoid the pitfall of evoking merely formal responses designed to please the interviewer—always a danger in Micronesia, and as suggested subsequently, possibly constituting a methodological inadequacy of the whole trichotomous representational role formulation—questionnaires posing the handling of a specific problem viewed from different dimensions were completed by the Congressmen-elect in the opening morning of a pre-session training workshop under the instructions that they were thereby helping to structure the balance of the training.[9]

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA

| Representational Roles | Own Role (32 members) | Constituents' View of Role (29 members) | 4 State Legislatures (from Wahlke Study) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trustee | 69% | 55% | 63% |
| Politico | 25 | 14 | 23 |
| Delegate | 6 | 31 | 14 |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

All twelve members of the House of Delegates and twenty-one members of the General Assembly replied to the inquiries concerning their and their constituents' views on representational roles, and all but one Assemblyman also commented on the effect upon role conception of personal or party[10] program promises to support an issue.[11] The responses clearly demonstrated that the Congressmen-elect were, if anything, more Trustee- and less Delegate-oriented than the average of the four state legislatures surveyed.

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[5] The 17 utilizable replies from the 42-member Marshallese House and the 13 responsive Samoan Representatives of the 16 interviewed (17-member House) provided a coverage which compares well with that reported for California in the State Legislative Research Project.

[6] *The Legislative System*, p. 281.

[7] Established by Secretary of Interior order 2882, dated September 28, 1964.

[8] In some areas, due to illiteracy, a "whisper" vote was employed.

[9] See Norman Meller, "Trust Territory," *East-West Center Today*, 6 (January-February, 1966), p. 9.

[10] Different parties ran candidates in two of the six districts.

[11] However, in a few cases replies classed as "Other," which did not fit any category, had to be eliminated.

Nothing was found to substantiate the hypothesis that the Trustee representational role evolves with novelty or complexity of government. Even the Wahlke group's findings on Tennessee did not bear it out, and to explain this the authors added "it may be that 'complexity' is a function of perception, regardless of the real situation."[12] To the Micronesians the Trust Territory government and its problems appear highly intricate and technical, simple as they may seem to an American observer. Expanding government in the Trust Territory will continue to remain relatively complex, and although the Trustee's role may partially shift to that of the Politico with greater political sophistication in the area, it is difficult to conceive of a marked expansion of the Delegate role at the expense of the Trustee.

The largest single group of Micronesian Congressmen (thirteen) saw their representational role of Trustee paralleling that expected of them by their constituents, which well coincides with political reality encountered in many parts of the far-flung Trust Territory where representatives tend to be chosen for their ability to face problems beyond their constituents' ken. Only one member viewed his own role and that projected by his constituents as being a Delgate. Significantly, over half of the Micronesian legislators (fifteen of twenty-nine) indicated their role conceptualizations did not accord with those of their constituents. In part this was due to a Congressman holding to the role of Trustee while stating his constituents considered him a Politico or Delegate. But, in addition, other Congressmen voluntarily limited the scope of their roles, adopting that of Politico or even Delegate while recognizing that their constituents expected performance as a Trustee. As stated by one Delegate:

> (legislator's role) "I feel that such matter should be put into full [consideration before the Congress] since it is the desire of the people—the majority—for such law to be passed. I therefore will do my best . . ." to introduce and support the measure.
>
> (constituents' view of role) "The voters in my district place the responsibility on me to make the wise decision . . . . they expect me to put every effort to help the people . . . "
>
> (effect of personal or party promise) "there is no difference . . . . the voters of my district choose their representatives from those that they put their entire trust upon as their leaders."

Half of the Congressmen (sixteen) concurred with the Delegate quoted above in believing neither a personal promise on their part when they ran for office nor a pledge to a political party program made any difference in how they ought to conduct themselves. However, an equal number disagreed with them or entirely avoided the issue by giving a non-responsive reply (deliberately, I believe). All representational role types were found divided over the moral issue inherent in the question. It would appear that this whole area of personal and party commitment as it applies to legislative role warrants further inquiry.

Coding the responses so as to fit them neatly within the trichotomous categories posited was difficult. Frequently, befitting the consenus societies of Oceania, reference was made to the judgment of fellow legislators in resolving the dilemma of representation. In view of the sense of solidarity generally engendered by membership in a legislative body, and the strength of legislative norms in determining action, this mention by Micronesian legislators of peer judgment suggests positing the values of the individual legislator, legislative norms, and constituent instructions as the three major referents for the legislator. The Politico type then becomes a catch-all for the representative who refuses to commit himself to any conceptual category.

Finally, there remains a suspicion that the Politico representational role is of entirely different nature than the Trustee and Delegate types originally projected by Burke. The polar roles are ideal types, acknowledged, legitimate, safe to disclose. The Politico role constitutes nothing more than a description of what a legislator does when he fails to follow a recognized norm. This he may be reluctant to disclose, if indeed he is cognizant that his behavior

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN TRUK DISTRICT LEGISLATURE (26 REPLIES)

| Representational Role | Own Role | Constituents' View of Role |
|---|---|---|
| Trustee | 46% | 8% |
| Politico | 31 | — |
| Delegate | 19 | 77 |
| Other | 4 | 15 |
| | 100% | 100% |

---

[12] *The Legislative System*, p. 282.

does not comply with sanctioned representational roles. An illustration is provided by the replies of Truk District[13] legislators to the same representational questions asked a month after they were posed to the members-elect of the Congress of Micronesia. An added factor contributing to this distribution of replies was an informal session conducted some time previously by a Trust Territory administrator in which he had stressed the right of the constituent in a democratic system to expect his elected representative to follow the constituents' instructions. Not alone does the Truk District legislator's expressed response to the view of representation held by his constituents conform to this norm, but his own stated representational role perception appears to reflect this, as well.

The same reluctance to reveal non-compliance with accepted norms was earlier revealed in the 1958 interviews in American Samoa when the legislators reported transmitting to the center of government viewpoints expressed at village and county *fonos* composed of *matais* (holders of titles granted by their families) and, similarly, in post-session meetings orally informing these constituents of legislative decisions and proposed Administration actions. Parenthetically it may be added that such servicing of the communication function of legislative bodies is not synonymous with adopting a Delegate-type representative role. Queries directed to other sources revealed that in fact the practices of Samoan Representatives varied and local *fonos* were not being called in all districts reported by the legislators. Tradition required holding such *fonos* bracketing the regular legislative session, and the Samoan legislators had responded in terms of accepted behavior and past practice, rather than volunteering information regarding their current flaunting.

In Micronesia and Polynesia, where American-style legislatures with limited functions and restricted legislating capacity have been structured, a new political elite, both paralleling the chiefly elite and also comprised of those traditional leaders who have been able to make the adaptation, observe appropriate representative practices. In these transitional areas, constituent participation in self-government through introduced Western forms is more dependent upon the cues derived from the representative than would characterize more developed areas. Nevertheless, interviews revealed the same representative roles are replicated, and in corresponding rank relation, as found in the four American states surveyed by the state legislative research project. Moreover, these Pacific areas furnish the additional note that legislator specification of their role perceptions may constitute but a formal nod to legitimated roles, and that the latter may not in fact conform with role behavior. All this suggests further consideration of the nature of the three representational role types posited, and particularly that attention be turned to verifying verbalization through observed performance.

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[13] The Truk District, which comprises the mid-zone of the Carolinas, is the most heavily populated of all districts in the Trust Territory (24,500), and embraces the smallest land area.

# COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

Lewis A. Froman, Jr. ("Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics," this Review, Dec. 1966, pp. 952–962) seeks to make generalizations about the relationships between state constitutions and the strength of the interest groups in the various states. Froman proposes to relate one independent variable, the strength of pressure groups in the various states, to four dependent variables: 1. Length of Constitution, 2. Number of Amendments Proposed, 3. Number of Amendments Adopted, 4. Percentage of Amendments Adopted. The measure of pressure group strength which simply classifies state pressure groups as strong, moderate, or weak, comes unaltered from a book called *American State Legislatures* edited by Belle Zeller and published by Crowell in 1954. The gathering of the judgments is exclusively described in one paragraph on page 192 of the book: "In order to secure a comprehensive and accurate picture of the political situation in all state legislatures for the biennium 1949–51 a questionnaire was sent to two or more competent persons in each state, including political scientists specializing in legislation, political parties, or state government, directors of governmental or adminstrative research agencies or bureaus, legislative officers and politicians. At least one reply was received from each of the forty-eight states—in most cases two or three."

Although I cannot see any commanding reason why we should, let us for purposes of discussion concede the accuracy of these judgments. This raises at least two very serious questions about the interpretation of these judgments. The authors of *American State Legislatures* were explicitly trying "to secure a comprehensive and accurate picture of the political situation in all state legislatures for the biennium 1949–51," but Froman relates these judgments to constitutions whose length, in the overwhelming proportion of the cases, was effectively determined in the nineteenth—and in some cases the eighteenth—century. (See the table in *The Book of the States*, 1964–65, p. 12) Froman nowhere shows us the effective dates of the constitutions with which he is dealing. A glance over the table will show that of Froman's forty-five cases thirty-five have constitutions written before 1900 and forty have constitutions written before 1913. I do find it "unduly unrealistic" (in spite of Froman's assurances) to assume that strength of pressure groups in states is stable over periods of time like those involved here, especially given the vast social and economic changes which occurred in these periods.

The second point is that the respondents do not indicate, when rating pressure group strength, the direction in which the strength, where present, is exerted. Among the twenty-four states said to have strong pressure groups are ten of the eleven states of the old confederacy, seven western states, plus Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Only one, Maine, is east of the Alleghenies and north of the Mason-Dixon line. Only one, Michigan, could reasonably be perceived as being dominated by liberal pressure groups. I am suggesting, in short, that when the Zeller Committee's respondents indicated the presence of strong pressure groups in their respective states, it is quite likely that they were thinking of conservative ones. If this is so, even in part, considerable doubt is cast on Froman's positive relationship interpretation.

Froman summarizes the information presented in the table with respect to length of constitution by simply telling us that for twenty-four cases described as strong the average length of constitution is 33,233, for fourteen "moderates" the average length is 17,985, and for seven "weaks" 14,828. No mention is made of the fact that the range for "strongs" is 8,220–227,000, for the "moderates" 4,840–45,000, and for the "weaks" 6,750–40,000. The coefficient of correlation supporting the proposition "The stronger the interest groups, the greater the length of the state constitution" is .36—interpreted from a purely statistical point of view, good enough to explain no more than 12% of the variance. I doubt that pressure group strength in the 1949–51 biennium has anything whatever to do with length of constitution and a coefficient of correlation of .36 doesn't persuade me. Clearly, in order to establish any meaningful connection we would have to know when and under what circumstances the constitutions attained their respective lengths. Froman never says a word about the circumstances or dates in any state whatever. Let me only mention a few of the more obvious ones.

Louisiana, of course, has the longest constitution. By itself, its 227,000 words inflate the "strong" average by about 40%. Louisiana's French legal tradition obviously makes it an orange among apples, but Froman makes no attempt to control for it—he doesn't even mention it. Neither is there any mention of Alabama's (80,000 words) or California's (70,000 words) constitutional peculiarities which result in the unusual length of their constitutions.

Froman's generalization makes perhaps even less sense at the other end of the scale. Seven of the smallest eight (including New Hampshire) and eleven of the smallest fourteen constitutions belong to states admitted to the union before the presidency of Andrew Jackson. It may be that the shortness of these constitutions has rather more to do with the Constitution of the United States, something over 7,000 words in length, than with pressure group strength in 1950. I would likewise not be surprised to discover that the length of the constitutions of the former confederate states had something to do with the writing and rewriting which resulted from the Reconstruction Era. (Check the dates at which constitutions were adopted for these states.) One must also wonder how Froman would explain the fact that Missouri with its weak pressure groups managed in 1945—a time to which the judgments of the 1949–51 biennium would quite likely be relevant—to write the fifth longest constitution of 40,000 words. Once the alleged relationship between length of constitution and pressure group strength is dismissed, then the remaining contentions are insignificant. Consider propositions 2–3 and 5–10 listed in the summary on page 961. I submit that these relationships are a function not of pressure group strength as Froman contends but simply of the fact of long constitutions and of things that long constitutions are likely to involve, e.g., more elected officials, more necessity for amendment, easier amending procedures, etc.

The strongest thing that Froman says in the entire article is put in the second paragraph of the second column on page 957: "It is interesting to note that both strength of interest groups and length of constitution have an independent effect on the number of amendments adopted. When each is held constant the relationship with the other and number of amendments adopted is attenuated but still present." In the Statistical Appendix on page 962 we find the following phrase, ". . . the relationship between interest group strength and number of constitutional amendments adopted, with length of constitution held constant is .19." Adequate in a raw statistical sense to account for 4% of the variance.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON
*University of Toronto*

TO THE EDITOR:

For the benefit of readers who may not remember my original article, or for those who do remember it but, like its pained author, find it unrecognizable in Professor Thorson's critique, let me offer a few brief words of reminder. The article contains thirteen propositions, relating three independent variables (strength of interest groups, length of constitution, and difficulty in amending the constitution) to nine dependent variables (length of constitution, number of proposed amendments, number of amendments which are adopted, difficulty in amending the constitution, number of state elected officials, number of state agencies with elected officials, method of selection of state public utility commissions, method of selection of state courts of last resort, and length of terms of judges on state courts of last resort. Evidence from a variety of sources, some good, some not-so-good, is offered in support of these propositions, along with an overall interpretation of the results.

Thorson addresses very little of this in his communication. Rather, he has a theory of his own to propound. He submits no evidence in support of this theory, and seems irked that I did not supply much evidence in support of it in my original article. But now that we have been made aware of his theory, perhaps it can be subjected to critical evaluation. Among its major propositions are:

(1) The present length of a state constitution is determined by its antiquity.

(2) When "experts" think of interest groups, they think only of conservative ones.

(3) The French legal tradition makes for long constitutions.

(4) Alabama and California have "constitutional peculiarities."

(5) Long constitutions are likely to involve more elected officials, more necessity for amendment, easier amending procedures, etc.

Let us work backward. My original article discusses and gives evidence on relations between length of constitutions and (a) number of amendments adopted and (b) ease of amendment. I am pleased Mr. Thorson is willing to include my observations in his new, original theory. With respect to number of elected officials, the evidence seems to show that there is no relationship: length of constitution and number of elected officials are correlated .03. I offer this as a further contribution to the Thorson theory. "Necessity for amendment" and "etc." as dependent variables, I daresay, must await further specification from minds more supple than my own.

Proposition 4 has a sharp, intuitive appeal to readers of the daily newspapers; I am not disposed to dispute it.

Proposition 3 will probably excite chauvinistic protests from the French. But I urge Professor Thorson to hold fast to the findings of value-free empirical social science that he submits on this point. It is interesting to observe, in passing, that the present French constitution is approximately the same length as that of the United States.

Proposition 2 would make an excellent MA thesis; perhaps Professor Thorson would like to try his hand at it.

Finally, Proposition 1. I am uncertain as to the meaning assigned to this proposition by Thorson. If he means that the *Book of the States* gives the lengths of state constitutions at the times of adoption, then he is incorrect. The lengths, as reported in my article, incorporate amendments since the dates of adoption. If Thorson means that different historical periods produce constitutions of different lengths, then he may or may not be correct—data on the original lengths of the fifty state constitutions would help solve that question. To then draw the conclusion that present lengths of state constitutions are determined by past lengths would then require an analysis of the number of words added or subtracted since the dates of adoption. By implication, however, Thorson assumes that the present constitutions are now either approximately the same lengths as when adopted, or that all have changed length at similar rates. Given the data presented in my original article, neither assumption is warranted.

It is no doubt appealing to make reference to the influence of history on contemporary institutions. When one has no data from which to argue such allusions may seem especially tempting. But just as it is not entirely bootless to study the forces that presently shape the contemporary U. S. Congress, the Presidency, and the Court, so, I think it fair to say, is it interesting to study the living constitutions of the fifty states and their relations with other contemporary phenomena.

Lewis A. Froman, Jr.
*University of California, Irvine*

To the Editor:

I am consulting the traditionalist firm of Mendelson, Roche & Tresolini on the feasibility of taking legal action against the Review for the libellous accusations against me published in the March 1967 issue.

It is clear that the research in question was conducted solely for the purpose of placing me on the periphery of the whole field of public law. Department chairmen have been known to read the Review. They are now informed by Fig. 4, p. 122, that I am as far away from "rationality" and "values" as one can get. *Science*, not the author, would seem to have certified me as the least rational and most unprincipled member of the field. This is now said to be my "ideological position in small space." That this was meant to shrink my position in financial space strikes me as obvious and culpable. Science will soon prove that I *am* rational and principled; I am preparing a behavioral study now towards this end.

Theodore L. Becker
*University of Hawaii*

To the Editor:

In the March 1967 edition of the Review, Duane Lockard makes the following statement in his review of Jacob and Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis:* "Indeed the author who has the greatest difficult in the present volume is the one who writes on interest groups; he devotes much of his space to the Almond and Verba survey research findings in attitudes about interest groups which do not allow for any significant comparative state analysis at all."

This statement is domonstrably erroneous. The essay is 40 full pages in length (excluding references). Of these 40 pages, four discuss the Almond and Verba findings. Therefore, since 10 percent of the space is devoted to the Almond-Verba findings, Lockard's statement is in error, unless one assumes that the word "much" means something substantially different than either common sense or a dictionary definition.

Harmon Zeigler
*University of Oregon*

# BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

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# BOOK REVIEWS

*Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification.* By Gerhard E. Lenski. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966. Pp 495. $8.50.)

There is something majestic in the analysis of human societies across time and space. It is the splendor of global and historical perspective that makes the works of a Comte, a Spencer, a Pareto or a Weber lasting and ever stimulating monuments of inquiry into the social ways of mankind. Their daring willingness and exemplary ability to mobilize contemporary knowledge of history and geography, of politics and economics, for sociological synthesis and endow it with theoretical significance made for a genre of writing at once truly civilized and truly scientific. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, this genre still awes the modern social scientist who aspires to being civilized and scientific. But it is a genre that few modern social scientists care to practice. The explosion of social science knowledge, both cause and consequence of the scientific division of labor in the modern university, seems to have an intimidating effect on the contemporary analyst of human societies who seeks universal validity for his theoretical constructions. The few who are still inclined to practice the art of global analysis do not really offer a rich intellectual fare. What they provide is largely a kind of empirically disembodied theoretical framework, global in aspiration, to be sure, but grossly neglectful of the rich diversity of human experience. I do not wish to minimize their efforts or achievements. But I prefer something else.

Although it is modestly subtitled "A Theory of Social Stratification," Gerhard Lenski's *Power and Privilege* is a far-ranging and profound inquiry into the causes and effects of human inequality as well as into the foundations and consequences of political and economic power. Of the book's thirteen chapters, eight are devoted to the structure and dynamics of distributive systems in hunting and gathering societies, in simple and advanced horticultural societies, in agrarian societies and in industrial societies. In a *tour de force* of sweeping scholarship Lenski guides us through the centuries to the most remote corners of the earth. The Northern Maidu Indians of California, the Sirono of eastern Bolivia, the Arunta of Australia, the Roro of New Guinea, the Yoruba of Nigeria, the Ankole of Uganda, the Mayas, the Aztecs and the Incas, the Greeks and the Romans, the Chinese and the Japanese, Ottoman Turkey, Czarist Russia, medieval and modern Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States—all of these and many more societies provide the data for Lenski's analysis of stratification around the world. If, in what follows, I sound unduly abstract, it is because I must limit myself to a discussion of Lenski's theory and method of inquiry. It is all the more important to emphasize, therefore, that even if one were to find fault with his theory and method, the great bulk of Lenski's book is a fascinating empirical account of human experience concerning the classical question of "who gets what and why?"

There are two theories in Lenski's book—the theory with which he began and the theory which evolved in the course of his investigations. Not that they are totally different. Rather, the "final" theory is largely a modification of the initial theory. This is as it should be. Lenski's candor is admirable:

> The high degree of support for the theory was not completely unexpected because of the manner in which the theory was constructed. Despite some appearances to the contrary, the theory presented in the early chapters was not a simple exercise in deductive logic. Rather, it represented the end product of an already extensive process of both induction and deduction. In a sense, the theory was designed to fit the facts, or at least those facts with which I was familiar when I began writing this volume. However, the theory with which I began writing was not the same that I had taught ten years previously. On the contrary, over the course of that decade I constantly shifted and modified my theoretical position to try to get a better fit between theory and data. In the process I found myself shifting from what was basically a functionalist position to what I have called a synthetic or synthesizing position. In other words, I found an increasing need to incorporate hypotheses and postulates which had little or no part in the functionalist tradition, yet without wholly abandoning the latter (p. 435).

Methodological absolutists will undoubtedly dissent from this mode of theory construction. But I am quite convinced that in the present state of the social sciences premature (and often pretentious) theoretical closure is the surest way to some sort of neo-scholasticism. The social scientist, it seems to me, is at his best if he is sensitive to the open-endedness of all current theories and maintains a healthy respect for those facts that do not fit his particular working theory of the moment. Lenski's work exemplifies the soundness of this position. It takes the kind of truly cross-cultural analysis that he undertook to abuse us of the intellectual Olympianism implicit in much current "pure" theory.

The central problem of Lenski's theory is the phenomenon of human inequality. What moved him to tackle the problem, apart from its intrinsic importance, was the diversity of "explanations" that have been offered for social inequality through the ages, and especially his dissatisfaction with those two major contemporary approaches which go under the name of "functionalist" and "conflict" theories. Behind these alternate formulations lie more basic issues predicated on differing behavioral assumptions about the nature of man and society as well as their interrelations. Although Lenski accepts, for working purposes, the assumption that "societies, like individuals, are basically self-seeking units" (p. 42), the assumption does not become an ideological straitjacket. But more about the basic issues later on.

What of the initial theory itself? It consists of two postulates, two derivative "laws," two major hypotheses and a central proposition, as well as of a variety of auxiliary hypotheses and a good deal of supportive explication. Assuming the self-seeking nature of man, the first postulate states that "power alone governs the distribution of rewards." But as selfish interests can only be satisfied through cooperation, it is a second postulate that "men's selfish interests compel them to remain members of society and to share in the division of labor." The first law of distribution follows: "men will share the product of their labors to the extent required to insure the survival and continued productivity of those others whose actions are necessary or beneficial to themselves." But this law says nothing about the distribution of societal surplus goods and services. Again assuming self-interest and short supply of surplus values, there will be conflict over control of the surplus. Defining power, with Weber, "as the probability of persons or groups carrying out their will even when opposed by others," the second law of distribution follows: "power will determine the distribution of nearly all of the surplus possessed by a society" (all quotes on p. 44). This second law, in turn, points to the critical relationship between the two chief variables, power and privilege:

> If privilege is defined as possession or control of a portion of the surplus produced by a society, then it follows that *privilege is largely a function of power, and to a very limited degree, a function of altruism*. This means that to explain most of the distribution of privilege in a society, we have but to determine the distribution of power (p. 45).

Lenski then introduces two hypotheses: first, "in the simplest societies, or those which are technologically most primitive, the goods and services available will be distributed wholly, or largely, on the basis of need"; and second, "with technological advance, an increasing proportion of the goods and services available to a society will be distributed on the basis of power" (p. 46).

At this point Lenski warns against a general theory of distribution or stratification that would be universally applicable. Just as the economist eschews a single general theory of market behavior and takes account of the existence of different kinds of market (perfect competition, monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and so on), Lenski recommends the same approach for a theory of stratification. He argues, therefore, that if the two laws of distribution and the two hypotheses are valid, then "the nature of distributive systems will vary greatly, depending on the degree of technological advance in the societies involved" (p. 47).

I cannot possibly summarize here the whole of Lenski's explication of his theory. Suffice it to say that by classifying societies in terms of their technologies, he is in fact controlling, wholly or partly, many other relevant variables. Moreover, he frankly acknowledges the possibility of second-order variations that may be due to the physical environment, the "military participation ratio," within-society technological variations, or "political cycles" that make for different degrees of constitutional legitimacy. To deal with these, Lenski is prepared to rely on inductive logic in order to formulate both causal and descriptive generalizations. In further explicating his theory, he has also much to say about force and its transformation into social power, the rule of right, the varieties of institutionalized power and the reactions of classes to the ongoing system of distribution.

Lenski's view of stratification is multidimensional—that is, there may be a political class system, a property class system, an occupational class system, or an ethnic class system, and so on, all of which may constitute a particular distributive system. Class systems differ in importance, complexity, span, shape, degree of mobility, degree of hostility and degree of institutionalization. In view of the great variety of class systems in different societies, Lenski does not underestimate the difficulties involved in comparing highly diverse distributive systems. But he does not hesitate to propose meaningful, if rough, comparisons between distributive systems in terms of their degree of inequality, their rate of vertical mobility and their degree of class hostility. In summary, then, Lenski's theory predicts that "variations in technology will be the most important single determinant of variations in distributive systems" (p. 90). But this does not preclude other factors from also being considered as possible sources of variations in stratification. Indeed, "one of the most important concerns in the analysis which follows will be the identification of these factors and the determination of the magnitude of their influence" (p. 90).

In this summary of Lenski's initial theory I have neglected to mention the great care taken in the definition of the concepts that represent the variables in the hypotheses whose interrelations constitute the theory. In many respects, Lenski's book is a model of theory construction that is highly instructive. In reformulating problems and concepts for empirical inquiry, he demonstrates the utility of two techniques: first, the technique of transforming categorical concepts into variable concepts; and second, the technique of breaking down compound concepts into their constituent elements. This strategy of theorizing is mandatory, it seems to me, if comparative analysis of dozens of societies is to have the theoretical payoffs that one hopes for in the crucible of empirical research.

Where does Lenski's test of his initial theory come out? In general, theory and evidence corresponded reasonably well, but modifications and changes were necessary. In the first place, the study of advanced horticultural and agrarian societies showed that the relationship between technology and political organization is more complex than expected:

> In these societies one finds significant variations in level of political development associated with apparently limited variations in technology. This suggests that we must think of the level of technological advance either as a *necessary*, but not sufficient, cause of political advance, or as the generator of a "threshold effect," whereby a limited advance in technology causes (or makes possible) a major advance in political organization. Perhaps both apply .... This has significant consequences for the distributive process because the level of political development is clearly a major determinant of the character of distributive systems (pp. 435–36).

Second, Lenski came to the conclusion that a sharper analytic distinction must be made between the concepts of "technology" and "economy." He found that "economic variations which occur independently of technological variations appear to have effects on distributive systems comparable to those produced by political variations" (p. 436), possibly as a result of the influence of different environmental factors.

Third, especially in the more advanced societies, ideology seems to have more of an impact than anticipated: "The importance of ideology was seen most clearly in the somewhat unexpected halting, and possible reversal, of the trend toward increasing social inequality, so pronounced in the evolution from hunting and gathering to agrarian societies." It had been predicted that the degree of inequality would vary directly with the size of a society's surplus, though the hypothesis had been qualified for democratic societies with an egalitarian or socialistic ideology. The evidence "strongly suggests that the average level of inequality in the most advanced industrial societies is no greater than that in the average advanced agrarian society, and probably less" (p. 437).

Fourth, Lenski found that in the more advanced societies variations in the personal attributes of political leaders have a greater impact on distribution than expected, particularly when constitutional government is at low ebb: "Though there are obviously limits to the influence which the personal factor can exert, they are not so narrow as to make it trivial. Though the variable involved is essentially nonsociological in character, sociological theories must find a place for it" (p. 438).

There are other modifications of the original theory. For instance, type of polity seems to have an effect on the size of the surplus: "The creation and preservation of an economic surplus in agrarian societies would probably have been impossible without an authoritarian, undemocratic, and exploitative political system" (p. 440). Other changes of the initial model involved the separation of certain variables from a cluster of factors originally labeled "constitutionalism," such as "degree of external threat," which was found to be linked with variations in type of polity, at least in advanced horticultural societies. Similarly, "rate of economic development" seems to be linked with variations in distribution: "Specifically, a high rate of economic development appeared to be linked with a greater willingness on the part of the dominant classes to make sacrifices in *relative* terms, i.e., in their share of the gross national product, in order to insure increases in absolute terms" (p. 440).

Finally, Lenski returns to the eight issues that have divided functional and conflict theorists, "conservatives" and "radicals." He finds that on three of the eight issues (the nature of man, the inevitability of inequality, and the conception of class) his final theory leans heavily in the conservative direction; on two issues (the nature of society and the degree to which inequality makes for conflict) it leans heavily in the radical direction. On the three remaining issues (the degree to which inequality is maintained by coercion, the question of how rights and privileges are acquired, and the nature of the state and the law), the final theory "involves a complex mixture of elements in both traditions: strongly conservative with respect to economically and technologically backward societies, and radical with respect to more advanced societies. In summary, it is *an extremely complex mixture of elements from these two older traditions, yet at the same time unique and different*" (p. 443).

In conclusion, I cannot do better than quote Lenski's own assessment of what I think is a masterpiece of comparative social analysis. Referring to the transformation of his theory from its initial to its final formulation, he writes:

> These changes direct attention to what has proven a highly rewarding feature of the methodology of our analysis: the practice of constantly alternating the processes of induction and deduction. . . . This is not done often enough in contemporary sociology, with the result that the fit between theory and data is often poor or unclear. By constantly comparing theory and data, and, when necessary, modifying the theory to conform to the data, cumulative growth and development are achieved. The possibility of this is further enhanced by working with an open theoretical system which permits the addition of new variables and the elimination or modification of old ones. As a consequence, a considerable number of important insights have emerged which were by no means obvious at the start of the analysis (p. 440).

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*Elections and the Political Order.* BY ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER, AND DONALD E. STOKES. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966. Pp. ix, 385. $8.75.)

Anyone who needs reassurance about the cumulative nature of political science as a discipline need only compare this book with the pioneering work on electoral behavior by Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates (*The People's Choice*, 1944) or with the present authors' own early work (*The Voter Decides*, 1954). The theoretical focus of these studies was on the explanation of the individual's decision-making process. Although they were concerned with voting behavior in general rather than with the description of particular elections, the data for the first study came from a single county and both were confined to single elections in the United States. In fact, then, they remained largely descriptive and particularistic.

The theoretical focus of the present work is considerably broader. Taking advantage of the series of election studies that has now been accumulated, the authors undertake to deal with the vote as a collective event, to use each election as a unit of analysis in a universe of elections, and to examine the functions of elections in the total political system.

In the first two parts of the book—"The Flow of the Vote" and "Voting and the Party System"—the first two of these commitments are realized with impressive success. Here the pervasive emphasis is on the importance of party identification as a stabilizing factor in the American political system. Indeed, one of the two major substantive contributions of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center team to political science centers on party identification as an autonomous factor in the explanation of political behavior. The flow of the vote through time (because they think in terms of spatial configurations, the authors would say "across" time) and the importance of this flow for the American party system are elucidated thoroughly and, in some cases, brilliantly.

In the course of this analysis, the authors demolish by example—without fanfare and with great finesse and patient understanding—the old charge that the "behavioral approach" is somehow inherently "anti-historical." The authors would probably be the first to agree that the earliest systematic studies of electoral behavior were largely a-historical but their use of different samplings of public opinion through the last twenty years contributes greatly to our understanding of American political history. Without direct data on mass attitudes, preceding generations of historians and political scientists were forced to employ collective events, *e.g.*, legislative enactments or election outcomes, to draw inferences about individual attitudes. The authors demonstrate convincingly that this downward flow of inference from collective event to individual opinions can be spectacularly erroneous. And their findings on the flow of the vote over the last twenty years suggest that some of the facile interpretations of nineteenth century elections need careful revision.

In this line of analysis lies the second major substantive contribution of the Michigan Survey Research Center—the rarity with which ideologically structured opinions are found at the mass level. In the third part of the book—"Comparative Political Analysis"—the implications of this finding are extended to France. As is so often the case when direct factual data replace inference, we discover that previously accepted interpretations of French politics as reflecting a highly politicized electorate are flatly wrong. The multi-party system had once been thought of as intensifying political interest by affording voters parties that more exactly matched their own preferences; instead the French voter finds the large number of parties confusing and he typically argues that fewer parties would be helpful. But this does not mean that a multi-party system is always associated with lower levels of politicization. A companion article on Norway finds party identification to be comparable to that in the United States (even with the requirement that weak no less than strong identifiers in Norway say they "*wholeheartedly* support one special party"). Unfortunately, the article on Norway does not include data on political involvement or political socialization to permit a comparison with those for France. But had the data been presented, they would apparently have differed greatly: in discussing French socialization the authors say that "responses to a similar question in the Norwegian multi-party system look like our American results, and not like the French" (p. 281).

Why the difference in the response of the French and Norwegians to their multi-party system? The authors only incidentally address this question in the suggestion that the difference stems from a break-down of the socialization process in the French family. One reason why this important question is not frontally attacked is perhaps that each of the relevant chapters was written as a separate article with its own theoretical focus. But a more important reason may lie in the nature of the authors' data and the difficulty of their third task—the examination of the function of elections in the total political system. They propose to reverse the direction of inference and to elucidate collective events from data on mass attitudes. But in demonstrating that the lack of "fit" between collective outcomes and mass attitudes weakens the effort to infer from the former to the latter, do they not also expose the difficulty of inferring from mass attitudes to collective outcomes? Whether for this or for other reasons, the authors' broad question of the functions of elections for total political systems is never really confronted. The book offers so much of value that this lament would not be called for if the title of the book and the promise in the introduction to relate their findings to "the sweeping institutional complexes of politics" did not create the expectation that this problem would be central to the work.

The last part of the book—"Institutional Analysis"—successfully links popular attitudes to the attitudes and votes of Congressmen. Here the authors accomplish the difficult feat of linkage with which the late Professor V. O. Key was concerned but for which he never had appropriate data. With the line of analysis begun in this article, the authors may be on their way to a successful confrontation of the broader functions of elections for the political order. By the introduction of historical, comparative, and institutional dimensions into the study of elections, they have already contributed richly to our understanding of the electoral process. If they can carry the analysis through to the outputs of the political system, we shall be even more heavily in their debt.

Fourteen of the sixteen chapters in this volume have appeared elsewhere in the same or in modified form. In addition to the listed authors Gudmund R. Iversen and Henry Valen are each co-authors of one article and Georges Dupeux is co-author of two articles. The work is a credit to all of these people. Because they are operating with common concepts and a common body of data, the book has a unity that lifts it above the category of another book of readings.

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*Bedrohung und Bewährung: Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise.* By Kurt L. Shell. (Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965. Schriften des Instituts für politische Wissenschaft, Band 19. Pp. xvi, 480. DM 36,-.)

On the 13th of August in 1961, one of the most spectacular political events of the postwar world took place. Shortly after one o'clock in the morning members of the East German People's Police, People's Army, and militia systematically sealed off the border between East and West Berlin, and began to build the 27-mile long wall that would separate the people in the two halves of the city. Anyone in the West who read the newspapers had known that something was afoot. No one, however, knew exactly what Ulbricht had planned. That the Wall shocked and outraged the West, and particularly the two and a quarter million West Berliners, is a fact well known to us all. That it also changed the character of the political struggle in Germany and in Europe as a whole is a less well-known, but doubtless more important, fact of modern life.

Kurt L. Shell's study is largely the story of the Wall itself, how West Berliners reacted to it and to the policies of the Allied Powers, and, above all, how the city's leadership was able at least partially to resolve the many dilemmas it faced. Methodologically, it rests upon a contextual analysis of the press, interviews with Berlin leaders and other participants in the crisis, an opinion survey in West Berlin and West Germany, and the personal experience of the author, who, at the time of the crisis, was performing research at the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft of the Free University of Berlin. Substantively, it is a narrative description of the day-to-day struggles and incidents that altogether made up the "Berlin crisis" of 1961–62.

The building of the Wall posed a series of dilemmas for West Berlin's political leadership. On the one hand, these men were responsible to the stunned electorate, to people who wanted "action, not words." On the other hand, Mayor Willy Brandt and his co-workers were also responsible to the commandants of the American, British, and French forces that protect the city, men who, after consultation with their governments, refused to take any action so long as Allied rights in the city remained untouched by the East German moves. To respond to the understandable outrage of the people without at the same time encouraging them to storm the Wall, to explain the Allied position without giving the citizens an impression either that the Berlin leadership agreed with it wholeheartedly or that their "protectors" had let them down, proved a difficult task. Equally problematic was the longer-ranged task of maintaining the very viability of the city. If the dramatic element of the Wall were stressed, might not the city fathers scare away potential visitors and investors, not to speak of some of the more jittery West Berliners? How could the city express to the world its continued indignation without giving comfort to those who have claimed that West Berlin is a troublemaker, an anomaly that must somehow be normalized before it sparks a new war? How could the city maintain high standards of civil liberties and at the same time prevent an influx of propagandists from the East or the spread of subversive sentiments? How could the city follow a firm policy of nonrecognition of the East without jeopardizing its concurrent efforts to build bridges between East and West Berliners. These are but a few of the problems of political leadership that Shell investigates.

But Shell's study also goes beyond this focus on political leadership in a crisis. It tells in rich detail the story of those events that splashed across the headlines of the world's press in 1961 and 1962—the confrontation of Soviet and American tanks at "Checkpoint Charlie," for instance, or the Berliners' reaction to the death of Peter Fechter, shot while trying to flee East Berlin and left to bleed to death on a narrow strip of no-man's land in the East. It tells about events that are less well known and understood outside the city too: the boycott by West Berliners of the East-Berlin-controlled elevated railway; the wearying negotiations leading up to the first agreement, in late 1963, that permitted some West Berliners to visit relatives in the East during the Christmas holidays; the efforts made in Berlin and Bonn to ease economic pressures on the city. The real heroes of the story are the West Berliners themselves. Their high morale, continued confidence in the willingness of the Western Allies to support the city, and their genuine concern mixed with characteristic Berliner humor provided nourishment for the city's leadership at crucial points between the onset of the crisis in the summer of 1961 and the fall of 1962, when the consequences of the Cuban missile crisis apparently relieved the pressure on Berlin.

Until additional documents are released and the principal actors have seen themselves free to discuss their own and others' behavior, Shell's study will doubtless remain the standard work on the Berlin crisis of 1961–1962, *viewed from the perspective of West Berlin*. The author has something to say about other perspectives as well—for instance, he corrects the popular image that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had done nothing but continue "politics as usual" in the 1961 parliamentary election after Brandt broke off his campaign tour to return to Berlin. But comprehensive studies focusing upon the role of the Berlin crisis in alliance politics in both West and East remain to be written. As a careful analysis of the consequences of and reactions to a contemporary event, however, Shell's book is outstanding.

Students of systematic politics and political behavior will nonetheless not be completely happy with the book. Shell's description of it as a "decision-making study" (p. xiv) is inaccurate. Although we are told about what decisions were made and what factors may have contributed to them, key questions are left unanswered. What are the normal political decision-making processes in Berlin and how was the sequence of decisions in the Berlin crisis exceptional? How were the various decisions—such as that by Brandt to write an angry letter to President Kennedy or that to close the West Berlin offices of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED)—actually reached? What role did public opinion and interest group activity play in these decisions? Which advisors were consulted and which ignored? What alternatives were considered? Shell provides some of the basic material for a study of decision processes in Berlin, but his book, whatever its other merits, is not that study.

Equally disappointing is his use of the wealth of public opinion data he gathered through sample surveys in West Berlin and West Germany in April and May 1962. For one thing, it is questionable how accurately a survey taken eight or nine months after a crisis will reflect sentiments felt at the time of that event. (This would be the case particularly for West Germans, who were not so directly involved with the Wall and its consequences, and for whom the half-life periods of memory would be fairly short; a survey by the Institut für Demoskopie five years after the event revealed that only 56 per cent of West Germans could remember what happened on the 13th of August 1961!) But there is little point in wishing that Shell had been able to initiate his inquiry on the morning of that famous Sunday in August 1961. Second, and more relevant, there are extremely few time-series data for comparisons. If we are to believe that the Wall created a crisis and hence an exceptional situation, we need information about the norms in Berliners' imagery. Shell's data on pre-Wall images and attitudes are too sparse for comparative purposes. Third, although the idea of conducting surveys concurrently in West Berlin and West Germany is extremely good, Shell fails to realize its potential. Quite a few of the 97 tables in Chapter 4 compare the responses of the two populations, frequently broken down into demographic subgroups. The absence of any tests of significance, however, leaves the reader wondering whether the differences or similarities between their responses are statistically significant or attributable merely to sampling error. Finally, alas, the 116-page chapter reporting the survey results is needlessly dull. One reason for this is that, since he did not use statistical tests of significance, Shell was apparently unable to determine which groupbreaks were relevant, and hence reported many superfluous and uninteresting figures which, at best, belong in an appendix. Another and more basic reason seems to be the fact that Shell had no underlying conception that would enable him to differentiate between important and unimportant findings and to integrate the former into a meaningful whole. Despite these faults, Shell's data, particularly in their punchcard form, will be of immense value to other political scientists interested either in the Berlin crisis or human behavior in crisis situations.

One final critical point: Shell is doubtless not to blame for the fact that, throughout the book, the East German Democratic Republic (DDR), as well as its official organs, are always referred to in quotation marks or preceded by the phrase "so-called," implying that these agencies do not "legally" exist. The decision, I would guess, stemmed from those who supported the research and the publication of the book. In my view, however, scholarly monographs are not an appropriate place for petty "Cold-War" propaganda of this sort.

That Shell has not slain all the dragons with one book should not detract from the value of the study he did write. It is thorough, well-informed, and in some places gripping. Its forthcoming publication in English will give it the wide audience it deserves.

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*Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs.* BY MARION J. LEVY, JR. (Princeton, N. J.; Princeton University Press, 1966. 2 Vol. Pp. xx, 855. $22.50.)

A giant book raising innumerable problems, often an exasperating book, yet important and likely to be much referred to by writers on comparative politics and administration: such is the work under review. Marion Levy, Princeton sociologist, is well known for his neo-Parsonian structural-functional framework as expounded in *The Structure of Society* (Princeton University Press, 1952). For many years he has also carefully studied China and Japan. He uses them here as his primary examples, augmented by many American and some European references, to illustrate propositions about the broad changes in social structure which he calls "modernization." The basic categories of his analysis will be familiar to readers of the earlier book. They are re-presented, with some modifications, as a comprehensive framework for the analysis of structural changes in societies undergoing modernization.

Fundamentally, he argues, all modernized societies, ranging from the U.S.A. to the

U.S.S.R., have more in common with each other than they do with any nonmodernized society, and despite the wide range of variation among nonmodernized societies, they all have more in common with each other than they do with any modernized society. Modernization Levy defines in terms of the increasing use of "inanimate sources of power and/or tools" to multiply the effect of human effort. In short, Levy's concept of modernization embraces the consequences of the industrial revolution, but he rejects the word "industrialization" because he wants to include the technical revolution in agriculture and he prefers a broader term.

Levy hypothesizes that modernized societies are characterized by increasing specialization of component units which become correspondingly interdependent, by a more universalistic ethic, growing centralization, more generalized media of exchange and the use of markets, increasing use of bureaucracy and a persistent though changing role for families. Relationships among persons in a modernized society tend to be characterized by increasing rationality, universalism, functional specificity, and avoidance. However, he notes the persistence of traditionalism, particularism, functional diffuseness and intimacy, prevalent characteristics of relationships in nonmodernized societies. He also points to the existence, in embryo, of the modern aspects of relationships even in nonmodernized societies. Thus he seeks to distinguish his treatment of these aspects as "polarities" from the binary treatment of "pattern variables" by Parsons.

Throughout the work Levy relies heavily on these relationship aspects, which he calls the cognitive, membership criteria, substantive definition and affective aspects, adding also goal orientation (individualistic-responsible) and stratification (hierarchical-nonhierarchical) aspects. In the second part of the book he applies them to an analysis of aspects of any society, which he identifies as role differentiation, solidarity, economic allocation, political allocation, and integration and expression. Political allocation, which interests us particularly here, is defined as "the distribution of power over and responsibility for the actions of the various members of the social systems concerned. . ." (p. 181). Power and responsibility are the key concepts; the way they are used and particularly the extent to which they are balanced, are central to Levy's analysis.

The analytic aspects (which are universally found in all societies, according to Levy) apply to a range of organizational contexts or concrete structures (which need not be found everywhere). However, he finds kinship and family organizations to be universal and governments to be almost ubiquitous. A government, he says, is "a predominantly politically oriented organization considered by its members and the other members of the society to be the organization in terms of which the general problems of order as a whole for the society. . . are handled" (p. 436). Other organizations include markets, armed forces, churches, schools, "predominantly recreationally oriented organizations," etc. Levy insists on calling a government "a predominantly politically oriented organization" rather than a "political organization" because he stresses its multifunctional role, as he does of all organizations. In Part III, which takes up most of the second volume, he examines variations in organizational forms as they relate to the various aspects of relationships and societies which are associated with modernization. The work closes with a fourth part dealing, in summary, with the main lines of variation in societies and with modernization and stability as major problem foci of international affairs.

Critics will undoubtedly attack the book for its phlegmatic and often apodictical style, for its high level of abstractness and its sweeping generalizations, and for the paucity of concrete illustrations drawn from other than American, Chinese and Japanese materials. Despite some validity in these charges, I find the book an important contribution, even if largely a re-statement and expansion of *The Structure of Society* as applied to the problems of social change and modernization.

Criticisms which concern me more are matters of substance, matters which require an extended essay rather than a brief review. For example, by appropriating the word "modernization" for industrialization, Levy makes it more difficult to deal with other important concepts often meant by this word, and blocks comparisons with the work of other writers on "modernization" (in a different sense). His use of the word "organization" for any concrete social structure, such as a market, is at the opposite pole from those, like Theodore Caplow, who restrict the word to what is often called "formal organization" or "complex organization."

By using the word "structure" quite often to mean an "analytic structure," and then not using the word structure for an "organization" or "concrete structure," the unwary reader is likely to regard such aspects of society as "political allocation" or "role differentiation" as "structures" rather than the concrete structures, such as "governments."

This may seem like a terminological quibble, but it underlies one of the most profound misunderstandings in contemporary political science, a misunderstanding which manifests itself sharply in the gulf between "traditional" comparative government and modernistic "comparative politics." The attack on the "institutional approach" has been accompanied by a rejection (or misunderstanding) of the need for a clearcut structural analysis (in the concrete, not the analytic, sense). The re-interpretation of structural-functionalism in political science has been largely in terms of "functional" categories. But these functions are carried out by abstract, disembodied entities all too often defined, tautologically, in terms of the functions they allegedly perform. The substitution of the term "political system" for government or state is a conspicuous example.

Levy's analysis is clear in pointing to concrete structures like the family and government "in terms of" which—to use one of his pet phrases—the political and other aspects are carried out. But his own typology of governments and of "associated units" fails to provide a useful framework for structural analysis. He classifies governments in terms of his own neo-Weberian categories as "predominantly particularistic, charismatic, and universalistic" and as local, feudal, and national, but rejects other distinctions sometimes used in the classification of governments. However, I find Levy's own distinctions to be equally nonstructural. His first set of terms refers to the basis of legitimacy of government, not intrinsic concrete structures, and his second set points essentially to the territorial domain of governments. If one had an appropriate typology of governmental structures, then one might hypothesize about the conditions under which they could govern "national" domains, or sustain "universalistic" norms in the recruitment of governmental leaders.

Other characteristics which Levy relates to government seem unsatisfactory to me. For example, he discusses increasing centralization and the problem of democratic versus authoritarian government without distinguishing between territorial and functional distributions of power. What is crucial in modernized governments is not so much the territorial distribution as the functional. Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have power distributions which are somewhat centralized territorially, but much more importantly, power in the U.S.A. tends to be functionally dispersed, whereas in the U.S.S.R., through the coordinating role of the Communist Party, it tends to be functionally concentrated. Although problems of territorial centralization and localization are critical for "relatively unmodernized societies," it is the problems of functional concentration and dispersal which are critical for the modernized. Since modern authoritarianism is associated especially with the concentration, not the centralization, of power, Levy's discussion of this subject also misses fire. The reason, of course, is his exclusive concern to distinguish the modernized from the unmodernized, not to make distinctions between different modernized societies.

But Levy's approach not only lacks good criteria for distinguishing between modern societies; it also—and this is even more damaging—lacks categories for the distinctive marks of those societies which are neither "relatively modernized" nor "relatively unmodernized." These marks of the intermediate or transitional society are, in my view, quite distinctive. I call them "prismatic" but the reader may have a better word for them. The qualities of a "prismatic" system are no more equivalent, by definition, to those of a transitional society than is, for example, a "parliamentary" system equivalent to "British," although in both cases, the indicated system may be found in the designated society. Levy's failure to develop such intermediate categories means that, although he speaks of his relationship aspects as polarities, he gives us no convenient way of identifying the traits of a relationship which is not, for example, just "somewhat particularistic" or "somewhat universalistic" but distinctively intermediate between these poles.

By combining a mode of viewing intermediate characteristics with a more precise typology of governments, he would have been able to describe more exactly the changing roles of political parties, bureaucracies, and armies, in the process of modernization. For example, he speaks of armed force organizations as "the most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control" (p. 603). In my judgment, however, armed forces assert a dominant role in "modernizing" societies only in the presence of a power vacuum created by the failure of other "predominantly politically oriented" organizations, such as political parties, legislative bodies, and courts, to exercise power effectively by imposing responsibility on the armed forces. Thus the very conditions which bring armed forces into power are the imbalances in which stability and control have been undermined. Nor can an armed force, as a ruling circle, readily create the conditions for effective re-establishment of modernization since the price that must be paid is the conquest of power by new organizations which are not armed. Those who exercise irresponsible power are almost always reluctant to surrender control and become responsible public servants.

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*1787: The Grand Convention.* BY CLINTON ROSSITER. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. 443. $7.95.)

"There are risks in telling a twice-told tale," a reviewer has written in discussing another book on the Constitutional Convention, and the risks lie in the pitfall of reworking old materials without fresh insight. Professor Rossiter has nót departed from the old materials, and his insights are not novel. But he has succeeded in presenting the Convention in an interesting and significant light.

On first impression it seems that the book might more aptly be titled *The Grand and Not-So-Grand Founding Fathers.* Rossiter devotes a major portion of his work to excellent capsulated biographies of the Framers, as they were both before and after the Convention, and to the political principles they represented as individuals and as a collective group at Philadelphia. The Framers emerge as neither demigods nor conniving, self-interested politicos conspiring against the creed of the Revolution. Rossiter prefers to view them as very human figures who were sent to Philadelphia, some because of their exemplary leadership talents, some because of their political perspicacity, and a few for reasons Rossiter admits he cannot fathom.

In presenting the Framers cloaked in their human foibles, Rossiter removes them from their pedestals as individuals while leaving them elevated as a collective group. As individuals, he labels several of the Founders as mere "ciphers," some as "visibles," and others as "inexplicable disappointments" at the Convention. Upon completion of their work at Philadelphia, Rossiter relates, some of the Framers went on to achieve greatness in the Republic, some to die in penury and drunkenness, and a few to fall to the ignominy of treason.

Gathered in "the archtype of the constituent assembly," the Framers were an outstanding group possessing collective and complementary wisdom, in Rossiter's view, but they were not unique. "The Republic had in reserve at least one team, and perhaps two, that would have been no less eminent and capable than the team actually chosen" (p. 150), and Rossiter opines that if the composition of the Convention had been different and notables such as Jefferson, Adams, and Patrick Henry had been included, "the Constitution would have read almost exactly as it does" (p. 253). The basis for this assertion is that the eminent men of the day shared a "consensus" of political and constitutional thought, an insight not original with Rossiter, and that they concurred both on the necessity of strengthening the Union and on the republican principles that this alteration should reflect.

An interesting perspective on the events at Philadelphia begins to form when Rossiter turns from the Convention itself to its finished product and the consequences of its deliberations. Though Rossiter does not intend it, the impression is fostered that the actions of the Founders, while not irrelevant, were certainly secondary in determining the character of the Union. As Rossiter discusses the document's aspects that have had greatest impact on American history, one is left with the impression that the Framers either hedged in deciding, failed to consider, or blundered in formulating significant sections of their work. The Founders "refused stubbornly," Rossiter notes, to think about the emergence of political parties, and they would have opposed such a development if they had thought it imminent. On substantive phrases such as "executive power," "general welfare," "commerce . . . among the states," and "necessary and proper," Rossiter suggests that "the Framers themselves were not sure what they meant by some of their neatest phrases" (p. 259–60). In several cases these phrases were inserted without full consideration of their implications. The manner of electing the President, by Rossiter's narrative, was patched together in the closing days by delegates who had been "running around in circles" on the problem, and the form they devised survived only two elections before being altered "beyond recognition." The question of judicial review was raised but not specifically answered, according to Rossiter, until Hamilton asserted the power of the Court to invalidate laws in *Federalist #78* and thus "put the last stone in place in the foundation of 1787" (p. 315). On the issue of slavery, Rossiter suggests (perhaps correctly) that the Framers struck the best bargain they could get and then left the issue to be resolved by later generations. Rossiter finally asserts that it was men such as Hamilton, Jefferson, Marshall, and Washington who "brought the Constitution to life" through their post-Convention efforts, settled much of its ambiguity on their own terms, and answered the crucial question of whether a nation could function under the document.

When this enumeration of post-Convention contributions is completed, one ponders why the Founding Fathers, as Rossiter presents them, are worthy of praise. The provisions of the Constitution that have been expanded to make it a viable document represent "postponed and evaded decisions" to Rossiter, "that were the consequence of dissension or apprehension or lack of imagination among the Framers" (p. 263). Even the unique "invention" of federalism Rossiter suggests was little more than "the result of an ill-tempered struggle for power" among the Founders, that fortuitously, but incidentally, reflected the realities of the American political situation (p. 192–94). One is left with the impression that praise for forming the Union was earned more by Washington in signing the Bank Bill, Hamilton in *Federalist #78,* and Marshall in *Gibbons v. Ogden* than by the Founding Fathers. Rossiter insists in his first chapter that the Convention is the primary event in American history and all else is secondary, but his subsequent chapters come close to presenting a contrary case.

Nonetheless, *1787: The Grand Convention* taken in its entirety is a well-executed survey of the Convention, the ratification, and the early years of the Republic. Rossiter has approached his subject with obvious affection and enthusiasm that the reader will doubtless find infectious.

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*Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: an Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin.* By Charles B. McLane. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 563. $12.50.)

Charles McLane, Professor at Dartmouth College, has written an exhaustive, penetrating, and lucid study of Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia through 1953. Although not written for the general reader, since it presumes a general knowledge of the history of communism in that area, the book breaks new ground in terms of the completeness of its survey and in its success in tying down more closely a number of factual points which were in doubt before. McLane's book therefore complements the work done by others before him (particularly that by Beloff, Brimmell, Kennedy, Thornton, and Trager *et al*) as well as serves as a sequel to his own previous work on Soviet policy toward the Chinese Communists. Two particular features are, first, that McLane apparently used almost all of the Soviet sources on the subject available in the West, and, second, that the author conducted a large number of interviews in Southeast Asia with governmental officials and current and ex-Communist leaders. Those features lend a degree of authority to the results which will not easily be overcome by subsequent research.

McLane surveys the history of Soviet Southeast Asian policy from its beginning in Lenin's pronouncements on the "Eastern" question through the twists and turns of the Comintern period and on through the time of Stalin's death near the end of the Cominform period. His method is the inductive-historical one of allowing the evidence istelf to determine both his hypotheses and conclusions. To his credit, he sketches just enough of the histories of the indigenous parties to allow the reader to match Soviet policy turns with changes in the local picture. The conclusions are two fold: on the one hand, Soviet policy toward this area was never of primary concern to Russian Communists, and stood distinctly second to more important policy matters with regard to Europe. This conclusion stands despite a much greater degree of Soviet interest, knowledge, and involvement in Southeast Asia than was apparent previous to McLane's work. On the other hand, despite the Soviet proclivity to treat first the fostering of Communist parties in the area and then relations with those parties as subordinate to its greater national and ideological interest in European affairs, McLane concludes that whatever the Russians did (or did not) do in the area was always central to the development of communism there, that local parties depended to a very great degree on Soviet directives, and that in particular the influence of local conditions on party strength and policy was only half the story, the other half being the necessity of obtaining some guidance from the Soviet Union. "Their strength was impressive; their morale was high. They awaited only a sign from Moscow." Since Soviet guidance was absent for long periods of time (such as during the war), the local parties were, in McLane's opinion, forced to rely on whatever they considered the best substitute—such as directives from the metropolitan parties or contact with occasional Soviet visitors or returnees from the Soviet Union. Southeast Asian Communist parties supposedly were mere instrumentalities of Soviet policy there, which was, in turn, a tool serving Soviet European policy.

I believe that McLane overstates the real influence of the Soviet Union on the activities of the parties operating in Southeast Asia. While it is true that in the very early stages of party formation dependence on the Soviet Union was probably very great, as time went on the necessity to come to terms with local conditions became more and more crucial. If most of the parties in the area were unable to come up with a winning policy, the cause was a combination of inexperience, colonial repression, and doctrinal rigidity flowing directly from the Communist propensity to look at reality with heavily tinted glasses; Soviet policy could influence these factors only peripherally. And what Communist successes there were (i.e., Indochina) stemmed not from correct learning from the Soviet Union but from a mastery of those same problems and from close attention to local circumstances.

A methodological problem arises over the question of how one determines Soviet policy during these (sometimes lengthy) periods when there was a relatively complete absence of official pronouncements. McLane assumes that there *always is* a policy and that if one looks hard enough one can always *find* it. Thus, if official spokesmen are silent, the Soviet press, especially Soviet orientalists, must be consulted; if that is of little help, foreign parties, especially metropolitan parties, should be referred to; and if the latter are of no avail, then one must look at the actions of the local parties themselves. Thus, in McLane's model, all levels contribute to, and make up, the generic term Soviet policy. The trouble with such an approach is that it tends to lump the activities of all these levels under the rubric of Soviet (i.e., Moscow's) policy, making them all into dependent variables. But that is not the case: in reality as one moves further away from the level of official pronouncement and closer to the local level, the propensity to independent behavior becomes more pronounced. At the local level itself, parties may in fact be quite independent of Soviet policy. And, in fact, in those periods when the Soviet Union is officially silent, the local parties *do* act independently. (That is how some of them managed to come to power.) The point is that often there may be *no* Soviet policy and that one should not then have to go looking for it.

Despite these aberrations, McLane's work remains a significant contribution to the literature of both Southeast Asian communism and Soviet foreign policy.

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*Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.* BY DOUGLAS PIKE. (MIT Press, 1966. Pp. 490.)

The medium exerts more influence than the message: the organizational structure outperforms the theory or ideology it carries. Political organization is more critical than military: the organization of the Viet Cong, National Liberation Front, and North Vietnam, poses far more danger to South Vietnam and to us than guerrilla warfare. But even within the less important military sector, organization does more than ideology can to justify Communism's way to man. Motivation derives from effective organization and professional competence more than from philosophy, theory, and ideology. Lenin's organizational lessons, via Ho Chi Minh, accomplish far more than Marx's ideological pedagogy, at least in Vietnam.

Such represent the main message of Douglas Pike's impressive new book. Our enemy in Vietnam constitutes an organizational juggernaut. The organizational weapon represents the most formidable one in his arsenal. Capable cadres and specific structure mold the masses. Enmeshing men in the structure shapes their consciousness and their actions and defines their deeds. Hanoi holds helpless helots in its hands by the strings of organization.

The National Liberation Front (NLF) first created a paper network of village associations and then fleshed it out with reality. Tireless effort from 1959 to 1962 resulted in a tight apparatus of control. A Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee exercise control over three interzonal headquarters, seven zones (six regions and Saigon-Cholon), and thirty province committees (leaving thirteen South Vietnamese provinces without such organizations), down to the basic unit for the hamlet embracing one to seven three-man cells. Some 35,000 persons, half of them from North Vietnam, staff this structure.

The Secretariat includes five sections: personnel recruitment; liaison with subordinate organizations; agitation and propaganda; military proselyting aimed at destroying South Vietnam government armed forces by encouraging defection and desertion; and headquarters administration. Pike stresses the agitprop as most significant of all. He points out the important face-to-face contact element in this operation, and also illustrates how a neutral peasant gets drawn into the Viet Cong. The apparently innocuous first minor step of participation, in a demonstration or just going to a meeting, leads to further steps, and the coils tighten as the involvement escalates. The individual act rapidly becomes a group act, and then the individual loses his autonomy. The Viet Cong recruited large numbers of peasants in the intense organizational campaign of

1959–1962. Widespread disenchantment began in 1962 and grew along with increasing Viet Cong coercion and intimidation in 1963. Many of the individual peasants wanted to withdraw, but the web of control prohibited this, and they had to continue to render support, now involuntarily.

This analysis calls to mind the similar argument of Mu Fu-sheng (*The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers*), which indicates the way simple participation in a public meeting involves the individual in surrender of his own will. In Pike's words, "Once momentum in the group was developed, the group itself tended to restrict freedom of expression to the sentiments acceptable to the NLF-created group norms. The individual became submerged, the group became the unit, and great social pressure was brought to bear against the deviant. . . . " Pike concludes generally that the Chinese rather than the Russian model of communication and control guided the NLF.

The author insists that most observers vastly overrate the importance of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam; he stresses civilian organization as far more significant. While stressing the importance of organization and denigrating the importance of ideology, even his own statements suggest a more complex interrelationship than Pike admits. He refers to NLF "totality as a social revolution." He indicates it demands drastic changes in institutions, new property relations, new forms of production, and new legal and political systems. It would recruit leaders from different social strata, and would fundamentally change the educational system and the religion. He suggests that this differentiates the NLF from the Viet Minh, the present war from the war against the French. In a sense, he presents the earlier Vietnam war as organization plus nationalism, and this one as organization plus Communist ideology. Perhaps the effectiveness of the medium does depend on the message: with the same organization, nationalism obtained better results than Communism.

Concerning the question of NLF ties to North Vietnam, evaluation of which often turns out to be a key element differentiating hawks and doves, Pike assigns the NLF to Hanoi less categorically than P. J. Honey does, although briefly referring to, and indicating general agreement with, Honey's postion. Pike's conclusion runs, "The NLF was not an independent, indigenous organization as it asserted. But neither was it simply a hammer in the hand of the long arm of the DRV [North Vietnam]." He does say that the NLF program from the first, "projected a social construction program of such scope and ambition that of necessity it must have been created in Hanoi and imported." But he indicates definite phases in North Vietnamese manipulation: the "Northern takeover phase" began in mid-1963; led to an open split in the NLF Central Committee between the original "more indigenous elements from the South" and newly-arrived Northern cadres in 1964; and by the end of 1965 cadres from North Vietnam managed the NLF "even down to the village level." Presentation of considerable evidence in increasing control of the NLF by Hanoi implicitly challenges Harrison Salisbury's suggestion that the NLF continues to grow increasingly independent of Hanoi the longer it operates.

The NLF formulates various alternate victory scenarios. They include a possible military ending, with third-stage regular unit military success; a social ending, involving a general uprising, relying as much or more on South Vietnamese rebellion as on regular military activity; and a political infiltration and takeover ending, after a negotiated settlement. The Southern NLF-element tends to favor the general uprising, and the Northern element the military. Increased Northern influence in the NLF means increased militarization of the conflict. The NLF, and North Vietnam, believe that a South Vietnam neutralized through negotiations would leave a virtual political vacuum there, easy to capitalize on and exploit, since American military strength would no longer deter NLF political aggression.

Ngo Dinh Diem fell November 1, 1963. Pike indicts Diem: "The Diem Government had no national policy or even official attitude toward the NLF's struggle movement, nor was there any systematic effort at the district and village operational levels to develop techniques designed either to head off a struggle movement as it was being launched or to blunt it once underway. The posture of the Diem government was to pretend it did not exist or, if forced to take notice, to characterize it as an insignificant and ineffectual Communist effort to create disorder." Diem's fall resulted in improvement, in that NLF support decreased greatly; and near-disaster, in that virtual anarchy raged in the countryside.

Pike differentiates the first (French) and second (U.S.) Vietnam wars. He considers the first one, the Viet Minh war, to have been anticolonial, clearly nationalistic, and of nearly equal appeal to all Vietnamese in all parts of the country, North, Central, and South. The second war, with North Vietnam calling for reunification, lacks the effective nationalistic and patriotic appeal to the South. He assesses the Viet Minh war against the French as nationalistic, and the present one as ideological.

Hate, according to Pike, summarizes the NLF in a single word. He finds in this a close analogy to Chinese Communism.

The source of this kind of book involves the problem of official influence and the possible diversion from objective scholarship. The author has served six years in Vietnam as a USIA official, since October 1960, and he wrote the book while on temporary leave at MIT in 1964–1965. He claims, "I wrote without instruction, mandate, or proscription. No one in or out of the government ever told me, or 'suggested' to me, what to put in or leave out." The internal evidence provides no reason to doubt this assertion.

In conclusion, this indispensable book on the Viet Cong must be counted among the very best on any aspect of contemporary Vietnam.

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*Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics.* BY JOEL COLTON. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. xvi, 512. $10.00.)

*Léon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik Band I: 1872 bis 1934.* BY GILBERT ZIEBURA. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1963. Pp. ix, 526.)

In 1965 the French Political Science Association convened a meeting for the purpose of discussing Léon Blum's political role during the thirties. It was rightly felt that in present-day France far too little study was devoted to thought and action of one of the few outstanding personalities of the Third Republic during the inter-war years. Hence it is not surprising that the first two scholarly studies dealing with Léon Blum are due to an American and a German author (after a thoughtful essay on Blum by a British historian had appeared in James Joll's *Three Intellectuals in Politics*).

Solid, comprehensive and brilliant though both the works by Colton and Ziebura are, they leave the political scientist somewhat unsatisfied. Professor Colton's work is a political biography in the best tradition viewing with felicity French history between 1914 and 1950 through the prism of the life of a "humanist" whose great personal qualities proved to be fatal flaws in his career as a political leader. Professor Ziebura proposes to furnish the sorely needed theoretical analysis of the development which European social democracy has undergone since the First World War. To him the figure of Léon Blum, however carefully he has scrutinized his words and deeds, only provides a "*Demonstrationsobjekt.*" But his study breaks off in 1934 just before the movement which was to bring Blum to the Premiership came into being. The decisive eras of socialist excercise of power in both the Third and the Fourth Republic are therefore not yet dealt with in the initial volume of a work of quite extraordinary sweep. Hence the hoped for theoretical insights cannot emerge even though suggestive hints abound.

For all their difference in perspective and in scope the two books provide a largely concordant picture of the man and the events through which he lived. Both authors convey their admiration for the lucid style and logical mind of an apostle of social justice and fraternity, but they also admit that his contribution to political philosophy and socialist thought was neither original nor forceful. They agree that Léon Blum during periods when antisemitism was rampant in France had found an exemplary equation between his Jewishness and his complete assimilation into French culture. They correctly see consistency between the man of letters and *fin-de-siècle* esthete, the highly gifted administrative lawyer and the party leader. But both works also leave no doubt that it is far from unjust to identify Léon Blum with the shortcomings and the ultimate failure of his party and thereby of an important branch of European social democracy.

His unending and seemingly hairsplitting discussions of the conditions under which socialism might control the country's government, the distinctions he made between the "exercise of power" and the "conquest of power" have laid Blum open to the reproach that he was a sterile doctrinaire, unsuited to gain and hold that political power about which he disserted so much. Certainly he was a man who by temperament and predilection was incapable of divesting action from thought. It is also true that in the present age of decisionism the socialist concept for which the existing bourgeois state is merely a transitory phenomenon never evoked much ardor for the defense and the perfection of republican institutions.

But instead of being rigid and doctrinaire, Blum's "doctrine" was in fact infinitely malleable and designed to serve a political purpose. That purpose was to hold together a party which from its beginnings never had the organization, the membership and the trade union support characteristic of other European labor parties. Jaurès' mantle fell on Blum's shoulders about the time of the post-war communist split (which Professor Ziebura describes in superb and quite behaviorist fashion). Since the split, the loss of many segments of the working class, the wide gap that existed between the orientation and interests of party militants and of representatives in parliament, the ideological fractioning of the organization at all levels, made it appear at times doubtful whether the SFIO would ever qualify for a share in governmental power. To preserve the party as a political instrument was the task which Léon Blum assigned to himself during the inter-war years and which he had to resume after his return from captivity. His daily editorials, his massive and at times bewilderingly subjective orations before party gatherings as well as his speeches in the Chamber of Deputies all served ultimately the same end: to provide a platform acceptable to the disparate elements in the party he led.

In the midst of the First World War the Councillor of State Léon Blum had expressed in a lucid *Letter about the Reform of Government* his anxiety about the future of a parliamentary regime which was devoid of modern disciplined parties. Yet in the years that followed, he was never able to make his own party into an organization of the kind he considered indispensable for the satisfactory working of the system. The relatively high degree of voting discipline in the parliamentary group had to be paid for by constant maneuvering leading to the immobilism which the Socialists shared with all other French parties and to those exercises in dialectics by its leader which have been taken as evidence of doctrinairism. His efforts did not prevent frequent splits in the parliamentary group under circumstances quite similar to those General de Gaulle was to experience during his brief tenure as a party leader after 1947. Blum's final failure became apparent in 1940 (to himself not less than to others) when after the capitulation and under the pressure applied by Laval, his party broke into pieces—events that are painstakingly recorded by Professor Colton.

When during his captivity he mused about the reasons for such failure, Blum had the intellectual courage to admit (in his *For all Mankind*) that given the absence of a valid party system a regime based on the separation of balanced powers was more suitable for France than the representative traditions of the past. But after his return to Paris, as soon as the reality of French politics was gripping him once more, all his republican instincts condemned the early constitutional proposals of de Gaulle. He saw nothing in him but the bonapartist and "pretender," sensing moreover quite accurately that in a regime presided over by de Gaulle, powers might be separate but never balanced.

If Blum emerges from these books as a tragic figure, this is also due to the fact that he was miscast in the very role he considered his own. He always regarded himself as the ideal conciliator, as particularly suited to seek and build consensus, in his own party, in the French nation and ultimately in the concert of nations. Yet instead of unity he produced antagonism. His eloquence and sophistication repulsed rather than attracted the working class, at least in the urban centers of mass industries. Those who have watched him in such encounters recognized easily in him the type of bourgeois socialist leader whom Robert Michels has described so aptly. Ironically he impressed his judges far more as a defendant in Vichy's Riom trial than he did the Parisian workers when he tried to woo them during the heydays of the Popular Front. The attempts he made, both before and after the war, to form a cabinet of national unity in the face of grave dangers came to naught. His endeavors aggravated distrust from all sides. That *he* would want to become a symbol of national cohesion was enough to arouse a more fervent hatred of Frenchmen for Frenchmen.

Professor Colton's book discusses competently and at length the sources of Blum's errors in the field of foreign affairs. As a journalistic observer, as party leader and as Prime Minister he often misjudged events when he viewed them with a blind faith in the ultimate triumph of reason and measured them by the yardstick of his commitment to pacifism. Perhaps it would be fair to admit that here the legacy of Jean Jaurès for whom Blum felt uncritical admiration, weighed heavily. The attempted synthesis of patriotism and internationalism, however beautifully the earthy prose of Jaurès had expressed it, proved quite unsuitable to deal with the realities of the Ruhr Occupation and of Bolshevism, of the Spanish Civil War and of the rise of totalitarianism in Central and Southern Europe.

The study of decision-making by the Popular Front Government, which the sequel to Professor Ziebura's volume promises to furnish, will undoubtedly be fascinating. But will he not have to stress how narrowly confined Blum's freedom of maneuver was by international events which he would have been unable to control even if he had understood them better?

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*Education and Economic Development.* EDITED BY ARNOLD C. ANDERSON AND MARY JEAN BOWMAN. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. x, 436.)

*Education and Nation-Building in Africa.* EDITED BY GRAY L. COWAN, JAMES O'CONNELL AND DAVID G. SCANLON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. x, 403. $7.50.)

*Education in Nigeria.* EDITED BY OKECHUKWU IKEJIANI. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. xix, 234. $6.00.)

Few subjects, if any, are as important for developing countries, and especially for the independent African states, as the relation of education both to economic development and to nation-building. No people have expected more from formal education than do Africans, as the able historical and analytical introduction and carefully selected excerpts from documents and speeches in *Education and Nation-Building in Africa* so amply confirm. But in no part of the world have formal educational institutions fewer "supportive roots and branches in families and jobs," as Mary Jean Bowman points out in her penetrating and thought-provoking contribution, "From Guilds to Infant Training Industries," to the 1963 Conference in Chicago on The Role of Education in the Early Stages of Development.

If there is one particular lesson to be drawn from the outstanding series of interdisciplinary papers, edited by her and her husband, C. Arnold Anderson, both of the Comparative Education Center of the University of Chicago, it is that formal education, economic opportunities, and training-on-the-job are all essential and interrelated ingredients for broad scale economic development. Basic education—the three Rs—are, especially in Africa, essential for breaking out of tribal modes of life, for building a sense of human dignity among people whom history and stereotypes have all too often condemned to roles of subordination, and for opening the way to adopt and be adaptable to institutions and discoveries. But as the wealth of historical and analytical material in *Education and Economic Development* makes clear, formal education, whether of an academic or technical type, cannot of itself, and should not be expected to produce either agricultural or industrial incentives and skills. Only training that demonstrably results in economic returns can have such an impact, and this training can ordinarily be better provided on the job than isolated from it in the classroom.

These lessons, drawn from experience of development in early stages of economic growth in Great Britain, Sweden, Russia, and the United States, as well as countries still in early stages of development cast significant light on the much disputed question of how useful widespread basic general education and especially literacy are in the constant effort of developing countries to satisfy "the revolution of rising aspiration." The emphasis on "academic" rather than technical education in developing countries is frequently harshly criticized as being a mere apeing of the standards of former colonial masters, without relevance to the hard task of building economies that can support such aspirations as universal literacy, rising standards of living, and external representation. But in the early stages of growth, especially in a colonial setting, most of the jobs that offer important returns are clerical ones. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is training for such opportunities that attracts the most able. Only as internal growth and external aid stimulate the production, and sometimes the processing of raw materials and primary products, and nationalistic aspirations insist on a proportion of local employment at higher and higher levels, do new opportunities attract local talent into new kinds of training.

That African-controlled states expect education to do more than aid economic development is highlighted by the association of education and nation-building in the title of the book edited by L. Gray Cowan, James O'Connell and David G. Scanlon. Confronted by internal ethnic divisions, reinforced by distinctive languages and mores, the leaders of Africa's new states look to education to break down the barriers between their peoples and provide some overriding sense of mutual responsibility and pride. Yet, as American experience also documents, education, especially at the higher levels, often reinforces differences, rather than overriding them. Areas with particular opportunities, either through the siting of administrative centers or the possession of particular resources, tend to be those where secondary schools and universities are established. These institutions, unless with boarding facilities, are inevitably more accessible to the local ethnic group, which may also enjoy the advantages of better primary schools and an inherited predisposition towards work and adaptation. That the energetic Ibo people were formerly to be found in all Nigeria's universities was not a mark that these institutions had successfully overbridged ethnic divisions—though to some degree this process was at work in the student bodies—, but chiefly a reflection of the significant economic role played by Ibos outside their ethnic base and especially in the North. Particularly devastating therefore, for the possibility of building Nigeria's huge population—probably one-sixth that of all Africa—into at least a rudimentary nation were the violent ethnic riots in 1966 that decimated and drove the Ibos from the North and forced a vast movement of population back to the regions of origin.

The work that deals exclusively with Nigerian education, and is edited by Dr. O. Ikejiani, does not overlook the danger to its development of a jealous and divisive ethnicity but appears to place more emphasis on what is seen as discrimination in the earlier stages of Nigerian education, particularly at the university level, in favor of expatriates as compared to native Nigerians. Some at least of this emphasis appears to be the result of what the editor himself experienced at the University of Ibadan, a story recounted in some detail in his chapter on "Nigerian universities" which should be read jointly with Dr. Mellanby's *The Birth of Nigeria's University.* What is most disappointing about *Education in Nigeria*, however, is the degree to which it deals in generalities and pious aspirations rather than getting to grips, as *Education and Economic Development* does so admirably, with the issue of how to implement aspirations.

In sum, two of these books—*Education and Economic Development* and *Education and Nation-Building in Africa*—should be required reading for anyone concerned with these vital subjects. Particular attention should be given to the former book which provides a remarkable range of material of an interdisciplinary character which is by far the most illuminating and stimulating this reviewer has encountered. One can only hope that all its essays and the thoughtful introductions to them will be widely read and duly taken into account by aid-receiving and aid-giving states and, indeed, by all those to whom the future of the developing countries is a matter of genuine concern.

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*Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association.* BY LOUIS GALAMBOS. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 329. $7.50.)

Nobody in his right mind wants unrestrained competition, at least not for himself. Society will not tolerate the consequences of vigorous price competition in large segments of the economy, once production has become roundabout, mechanized, with heavy overhead costs. But it took us a good many generations to work out a suitably contradictory body of myths and a set of institutions that would mitigate competition and yet leave administration in the hands of decentralized, nominally private business enterprise. Nor is the end of the argument anywhere in sight today, with a government policy of vigorous inflation in search of full employment paired with guide lines and threats of price freeze, materials allocation, and restraints on capital movement. We are no nearer to a coherent and rational statement of trade regulation policy than were the contending forces when N.R.A. was launched. But we have made some basic choices of policy direction. This book, as a case study, explores in detail one strand in that record.

The author distinguishes three major phases in the development of industrial association in the cotton textile industry. During the last half of the 19th century, "dinner clubs" afforded opportunity for discussion of price, technology, legislative reform, labor unions, buyers, regional competition. Manufacturer members were themselves Rulers of America, sat in Congress and state legislatures, hobnobbed with the mighty, and took action directly on policy issues they could agree on. They could not agree on prices or production controls.

A second period, 1900 to 1924, was characterized by "service associations," regional and then national in scope, with long tenure staff and both initiative and execution in the association's own personnel. A wide range of expedients were explored to restrain the destructive force of competition and to rescue a periodically very sick industry, in New England a chronically dying industry. There were efforts at cooperative advertising and research. A sustained effort was made to get uniform accounting and to teach manufacturers enough cost accounting so they would not unwittingly sell below cost. World War I showed the virtues of standardized products. Product groups tentatively used "open price" policy to steady prices on declining demand. This was a period, toward its close, when Hoover in the Department of Commerce afforded encouragement to trade association initiative.

The Cotton Textile Institute, established in 1926, was a "policy shaping association," which finally approached, but did not achieve, the role of a full fledged cartel. By the time of the Great Depression, the CTI was well advanced in a program of circulating data on output, inventories, unfilled orders, costs and prices. Some product groups were trying for production quotas. All data were filed with the Department of Commerce and FTC; and in 1927 the Department of Justice allowed "emergency curtailment" of output. CTI got White House support for curtailing night shifts in the name of labor reform. But compliance was always poor. It was exceedingly hard to get 80% to sign up, to say nothing of obey. Voluntary efforts were explored to the fullest, without any perceptible success in stabilized prices or profits.

N.R.A. was the logical sequel in this line of trade policy. CTI drew up and pretty much administered for itself the first N.R.A. code, which included control over machine hours per week. At the very end of N.R.A., the trade association executives, not the member manufacturers, were designated to plan and administer production quotas in advance of market collapse. This would have at last reached the full stature of a cartel. But N.R.A. itself died a quick death from political contradictions in the New Deal, the Court's decision, and the hostility of many trade associations and entrepreneurs, who distrusted the pattern of regulation. With the fall of N.R.A., the CTI rapidly lost control of trade policy; voluntary controls collapsed as they always had before. The "policy shaping association" became once more a service association, lobbying for the industry in Washington. The implacable logic of the cartel had been rejected.

The author recounts the tale in meticulous detail, based on careful research in primary sources. This is a valuable type of scholarship, allowing the author to question and correct many a broad generalization circulated by more popular and more politically oriented writers. Particularly is this welcome as a corrective to the attribution of paramount power to trade and peak associations, so favored by Brady and others operating with Marxian stereotypes. The author advances an "institutional approach" to the history of political economy, as a corrective to "progressive and reform history." There is merit in this way of examining the organizational revolution of our times.

It is by no means clear, however, that we have now chosen, post N.R.A., a definite course, using the giant corporation and oligopoly to stabilize price and profit and yet to preserve competition and a chance for innovation. The author sees this compromise as "economically and socially preferable to the guild-government condominium." So it may be. But the search for a policy is concerned not merely with the ideological convenience of covering oligopoly with a decent bit of antitrust, nor with the institutional adjustments of monopolistic competition to White House guide lines. There is also a struggle for power between business management élite and intellectual-governmental élites for control of economic decisions. Trade policy can hardly escape being a principal arena for competition between these, our present competitors for prestige, power and pay-off. The larger political forces are somewhat muted in this narrative of trade policy.

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# NOTES

## POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY

*Comparative Politics and Political Theory. Essays Written in Honor of Charles Baskervill Robson.* ED. BY EDWARD L. PINNEY, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 215. $6.00.)

The device of a "festschrift" not to commemorate but to honor a living teacher and colleague approaching his official retirement is particularly pleasing and appropriate in the case of "Pat" Robson. The thirteen students and friends who collaborated to produce this volume will be applauded by every one who ever came under the influence of his personality during forty years of stimulating teaching and constructive contribution to political science. The nine essays composing it are less a testimonial to the unity and integration of the discipline than to its richness of content and catholicity of points of departure. To this reviewer, at least, the editor perceptively conveys a great deal of Robson's pedagogical conviction by arranging the authors' original, scholarly efforts so as "to present the major dimensions of comparative politics: normative, conceptual, institutional, behavioral and methodological . . . " and to suggest that "the study of political science is ultimately the study of political theory."

It is perhaps instructive to proceed by cavilling at editor Pinney's five-fold categorization of the dimensions of comparative politics (political science?), and the way he classifies the essays. The distinction between 'normative' and 'conceptual' is not made clear, nor is that between 'behavioral' and 'methodological.' Accepting the five categories rather than three for purposes of elaboration, however, I would have placed McCleery's fresh discussion (a la Weldon) of the relation between *equality* as an ideal, evaluative criterion and *power* as an empirical variable for "factual" political analysis, under the heading of 'the conceptual dimension,' whereas Alan Grimes' presentation of "the ideological orientation" (sociological-determinist theory of knowledge) is *par excellence* an example of the 'normative' perspective toward politics. Lester Milbrath's program of research into political beliefs is a model of how the 'behaviorist' connects previous research findings with ongoing and projected investigation, which with respect both to style and method belongs with Matthews and Prothro's report on "Negro Participation in the South: An Overview." Further, I would have considered Cleaveland and Dawson's review of the evolution of top-level national security organization in Britain and the U.S., in the light of changing military technology and the requirements of strategic and budgetary planning, an admirable case of 'institutional' analysis and therefore properly grouped with Gil and Martz' survey of recent developments toward regional economic integration in Latin-America, and with Taylor Cole's discussion of federalism in West Germany.

The conceptual ambiguity and index instability of analytical categories in political theory and comparative politics have been commented upon many times, and I do not raise the problem here in order to reflect invidiously on the state of the discipline or the quality of research in the volume under review. Contrariwise, it seems to me that the progress of the discipline consists precisely in the ways old questions are reformulated and fresh insights revealed by just such processes of symbolic transformation as are exhibited in most of the papers herein. As a matter of research procedure, however, there is a significant lesson and contrast between the rigorous, systematic method whereby Goldrich goes about determining the extent to which his categories for reporting political orientations among Costa Rican and Panamanian students are distorted by their cultural predispositions ("response sets"), and the way that Hughes and Pinney, after rejecting the Goldhamer-Shils-Parsons categories of cognition, cathexis and evaluation (pp. 68–69), drag them in extraneously to "explain" (pp. 95–96): (a) variations in the meaning of 'political culture' and (b) varieties of cultural behavior observably existing in India, without establishing to any perceptible degree the extent to which these categories are *evidence* for propositions asserted about the ambiguities and uncertainties in the Indian pattern of political development.

As a teacher, Robson must be chuckling over the variations among his intellectual progeny, whose high conceptual abilities take such different modes of "operationalization."—AVERY LEISERSON, *New Delhi Centre for Study of Developing Societies.*

*Behavior in Public Places.* BY ERVING GOFFMAN. (New York: The Free Press, 1963. Pp. 248. $2.45, paper.)

In this book Erving Goffman continues the analysis of social interaction he began in the minor classic, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Goffman has brought to sociology a freshness and perception unique among practitioners in that field, and for this reason one anticipates eagerly the journey into Goffman's sociological world. It is therefore especially regrettable to report that *Behavior in Public Places* is an unsatisfying book. Major reasons for its lack of success spring, paradoxically, from both the strengths and weaknesses of Goffman's vision.

What Goffman does for us in this book is to dissect meticulously and imaginatively that portion of human behavior which requires rules to regulate interaction. Such behavior is regularly found in places which are "open," *i.e.*, "freely accessible to members of that community" (p. 9), or in social "occasions" to which individual participants owe obligations. Examples of the latter are cocktail parties and funerals. In many of these situations actors are previously either unknown to each other or only minimally acquainted. Goffman specifically excludes from consideration interaction among those well known to each other in entirely private, non-visible circumstances. However, he does consider the obligations of friends and lovers to social gatherings of which they are part. Broadly characterized, the book presents an inquiry into the rules governing the more formal aspects of social interaction—a kind of anatomical sociology of etiquette.

Goffman's major premise is that such face-to-face interactions and the occasions of which they are a part embody rules which have their own logic regardless of whether behavior occurs in a board room, an army headquarters, or a public street. The author claims that our definitions of mental illness are derived in many cases from our desire to protect such interaction from transgressors of these rules. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of his brilliant examples are drawn from observed behavior of the "mentally ill" and from the examples adduced by writers of etiquette manuals.

The book is replete with acute observations—sometimes bitingly ironical—of the way in which such rules are observed, subverted or manipulated. Thus, Goffman discusses conditions under which individuals need to pay close attention to what others are doing, as well as conditions under which involvement may be witheld or withdrawn. He also analyzes the legitimacy of "side-involvements" (such as doodling in the classroom), the process of getting acquainted, and the ways in which social gatherings adjust their foci of involvement to meet demands put upon them. Perhaps his most arresting insight involves the major role played by "civil inattention" in the structuring of social relations and the definition of personal identity. "Civil inattention" is that studied ignoring of those whom we don't know which we practice in public places. Thus, for example, we employ "civil inattention" when we stare at the floor or out a window while waiting with a stranger for an elevator. According to Goffman, were we not to practice such avoidance of interaction, we would implicitly suggest that there was something "funny" about the object of our attention. By so doing, we would reduce him to the level of a specimen. Thus, our self-respect requires that strangers ignore us in public places. As can be seen by this description, Goffman's implied conclusion is that we gain knowledge of ourselves almost entirely by the reaction of others to our behavior. "Civil inattention" is only one of the unspoken but widely shared rules of public behavior which the author uncovers.

Why, then, is the book disappointing? First, Goffman's concern with existant rules governing interaction is purchased by the exclusion of considerations involving the growth, flourishing and decay of such rules. The book lacks sufficient consideration of the dynamic changes in rules which alter interaction. Furthermore, though Goffman specifically notes that the same behavior may be more or less appropriate in different contexts, he does not systematically consider reasons why such shifts in evaluation occur. Therefore, the conclusions of the book exist in a curiously static, disembodied form.

The origin of Goffman's static perspective becomes apparent when one re-examines the major premise of his argument. We may grant that there are common properties of interactions in different institutional contexts; yet what produces change in social life are the motivations, the content, and the outcomes of such interactions. Each of these three aspects is much more closely regulated by quite diverse institutional norms than is the process of interaction itself, which proceeds along lines which Goffman so ably describes. Institutional diversity, in short, is a major cause of social change. Goffman describes for us only the frosting on the cake of social life, not its filling.

It is perhaps for these reasons that Goffman's formulations have had somewhat less impact on the main body of sociology than one might have expected. Yet it remains true that, with sufficient effort, some of Goffman's formulations can be applied to studies of bargaining, small groups, and decision-making—all of which are relevant to the political scientist. However, Goffman's unwillingness to consider possible relations between his conclusions and other problems in the social sciences and his invention of terms which are frequently obscure and occasionally unnecessary for his analysis do not aid the process of translation. This reader remains unconvinced that all the fine distinctions and the abstruse terminology exemplified by the following terms—"involvement shields," "engagements," "occasions," "gatherings," "face work," "situations," "situation at large"—are entirely necessary for Goffman's purposes. Goffman himself does not use some of these terms ("copresence," for example) much after he defines them. His arguments are quite intelligible without some of these terms. It is, of course, true that science proceeds by giving names to new or newly discovered phenomena. However, such new terms are justified only by the extent to which they aid comprehension, not by the extent to which they confuse it.

None of these *caveats*, however, is intended to belittle the importance of the book's contributions to the sociology of everyday life. Goffman remains our most inventive navigator in these familiar, yet uncharted waters. One anticipates the application of his considerable talents to fields potentially more challenging and ultimately more significant.—RICHARD M. MERELMAN, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

*The Radical Papers.* ED. BY IRVING HOWE. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. vi, 378. $5.95.)

*How to Argue with a Conservative.* BY NEIL STAEBLER AND DOUGLAS ROSS. (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1965. Pp. xiv, 203. $4.95.)

In a well-known essay included in *The Radical Papers* Bayard Rustin argues that the civil rights movement must shift from protest to politics because equality for the Negro cannot be achieved within the framework of existing social institutions. Radical changes are in order, and they can only be accomplished through the exercise of political power. The Negro must join with a coalition of progressive forces—trade unionists, liberals, religious groups—which will eventually become the effective political majority (pp. 344–345). With some small differences, Rustin's coalition strategy is endorsed in the essays by Michael Harrington and Emanuel Geltman and Stanley R. Plastrik. Their hope is that a new grouping of radical political forces will not only deal effectively with the challenges posed by Negro inequality, the poor, automation, and a deteriorating physical environment, but will gradually transform the private enterprise system from within, to the point where economic resources will be used in a positive way to improve the human quality of American life through democratic socialism.

The coalition proposal is the most cogent defense of the notion that major political change can be achieved in the United States, and is typical of the gradualism of the "radicals" represented in this collection (a significant exception is the essay by Tom Hayden, "The Politics of the Movement"). Other essays in *The Radical Papers*, however, raise serious doubts about the possibility of a radical coalition, primarily because its proposed recruits appear singularly unsuited or unwilling to join up. Harvey Swados and Paul Jacobs both portray a labor movement grown increasingly conservative and static, with little interest in fundamental social change (pp. 238-239, 262–263). Harrington himself points out that the "new poor" are presently demoralized and psychologically unequipped to sustain a mass political movement. He attributes this mood to the shortage of dignified blue collar jobs which once provided a chance for escape from poverty, and advocates self-organization of the poor through their own institutions (pp. 127 ff.). But how can such organizational efforts succeed so long as apathy persists? And how can apathy be dispelled until (in the terms of Harrington's argument) there is some hope that organization will lead to substantial changes in economic opportunities? Could not the infusion of a substantially increased level of welfare funds—or even direct subsidy of individual incomes, as through the proposed negative income tax—smother present discontent without any substantial threat to the established system? George Lichtheim, in his contribution, holds that it is more likely that men will choose a higher level of material consumption rather than sacrifice it for more equality, less competitiveness, and the socialist humanist deal (pp. 69–70).

The shortcomings of the coalition strategy do not mean that the radical critique of American society is necessarily incorrect, or without value. The issues raised in *The Radical Papers* about the relatively high level of inequality and economic favoritism in the United States, about the serious dimensions of current social problems and the challenge they pose to traditional values and institutions, about the unsatisfying nature of work, about the paradox of private affluence and public decay, about the inadequacies of social welfare in basic areas such as medical care and retirement, about the cold war mentality and its effect upon foreign policy, about the quality of our lives and its relationship to the private enterprise economy —surely consideration of these issues is crucial to understanding the shape of American politics and society today.

The value of the critique offered by *The Radical Papers* is made quite clear when it is contrasted to the conventional liberal approach articulated in *How to Argue with a Conservative*. In providing a set of counter-arguments to the conservative line, Staebler and Ross often seek to out-flank the conservative by insisting that modern liberalism is a more sophisticated way to maintain the private enterprise system (pp. 70–73, 76–78, 129–133), traditional values and institutions (p. 200), and American cold war predominance (pp. 156–160), with little questioning of underlying premises or problems. The book resembles a debate between old (laissez-faire) and new (limited government intervention) liberals, with both sides sharing the same basic values, but differing on the most effective means of realizing them, given contemporary socioeconomic conditions. The radical would insist that both positions are now outmoded, or at least ignore important social developments, and that the modern liberal is as out of touch with fundamental problems as the conservative.

The assumptions which pervade *How to Argue with a Conservative* are that no substantial changes are required in American capitalism, that liberal welfare state policies have been a genuine success and need only be perfected in a gradual way, that American society offers a high level of psychic satisfactions, that the aim of our foreign policy is to counter-act an expansionist "Sino-Soviet bloc" (pp. 155–156) through a mixture of social reforms and military measures. Such a viewpoint may enable someone to argue with a conservative that the liberal approach is the most effective way of sustaining the status quo. It is unlikely to lead to any serious consideration of the problems and prospects of American society.—PAUL LEARY, *Dartmouth College*

*John Dewey*. By RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 213. $3.95.)

This volume in the "Great American Thinkers" series will be found useful by the beginning professional student of philosophy as well as by more mature scholars in other fields. In the whole history of American philosophy, Dewey's place of eminence and encyclopedic breadth is securely established. In our own century, Dewey's preeminence in American thought has not been seriously challenged, although in the last decade or so there has been some decline of interest in his work. By contrast, his reputation abroad and the interest in his work have remained on a persistently high level, partly perhaps because he is considered abroad as the most characteristic American thinker of the last hundred years. Since Hegel, there has been no world figure in philosophy matching Dewey's range of major interests, such as logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, esthetics, religion, education, and politics.

While the author is by no means a blind worshipper of Dewey—in fact, toward the end of the book he points to some serious shortcomings—he nevertheless accepts the fundamentals of Dewey's thought. Considered throughout much of his life a radical positivist, Dewey is increasingly seen as occupying a middle position between the traditional quest for metaphysical certainty and the more recent extremes of logical positivism and linguistic analysis. Contrary to these two fashionable trends in recent philosophy, Dewey would have "abhorred the new dogma," the author writes, "that the ethical philosopher's task is essentially completed when he has sympathetically and accurately described the complex ways in which we argue and reason about moral issues" (p. 175). Dewey was a "confessed moralist" (p. 174), not in the sense of dogmatic sermonizing, but in his conviction that the chief task of philosophy and the philosopher is to criticize and reconstruct human experience and behavior. Unlike traditional metaphysicans and moralists, however, who lay down specific norms and values, Dewey sought to discover "those procedures that provide us with the most enlightened and intelligent values" (pp. 122–123). The complex relations between scientific inquiry and formulation of ends and values occupied Dewey's mind throughout much of his life, but just as he rejected the traditional views of eternally valid truth, divinely revealed or rationally arrived at, he was unwilling to accept the newer dogma that there is no relation between the growth of knowledge about the nature of man and moral ends and values. Dewey held high hopes for the impact of the social sciences on the process of civilizing society. For a time, it seemed that the approach of the "policy sciences" in political science and economics, for example, would gradually bridge the gap between theory and practice. Yet more recently, the author argues, as the social sciences have developed, the dichotomy between theory and practice has widened rather than narrowed. As a result, the author says, "the crisis resulting from the divorce between scientific inquiry and knowledge and its application to our moral and social problems is even greater today than when Dewey lived" (p. 181).

Since Reinhold Niebuhr has exercised an enormous influence on American political theorists in the last two decades, Bernstein's comments on the relations of existentialism—particularly its religious version—to Dewey are of considerable interest. The author concedes that Dewey's analysis of the self is the weakest part in his entire philosophy, and that his basically optimistic outlook markedly differs from the "tragic sense" inherent in existentialism. Yet, in the last analysis, the author rightly observes, "the labels of 'optimism' and 'pessimism' are irrelevant to assessing Dewey's outlook. The greater our awareness of the alienation that affects so much of man's life, the greater the challenge to make intelligence effective" (p. 177). While Dewey's philosophy may lack the intellectual fireworks, dazzle, and glamour of some recently fashionable philosophical "isms," his "sane, piecemeal approach to reconstruction of human experience" (*ibid.*) will continue to prove the more effective and realistic method of moving forward through intelligent action.

It is one of the oddities of the present state of the social sciences in general, and of political science in particular, that derivative fashions of thought persist more stubbornly than their original sources. At the very time when the dogmas of logical positivism and linguistic analysis—not to speak of existentialism—are losing their grip on philosophers, social scientists still cling to them in a desperate search for "scientific certainty." Bernstein's brief introduction into the various facets of Dewey's thought may help social scientists feeling intellectually lost and bewildered to rediscover a sense of orientation and direction closely linked to the classical direction of the western liberal and scientific outlook. —WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

*Thorstein Veblen.* BY DOUGLAS F. DOWD. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 205. $3.95.)

In several respects, this little work is one of the most readable of the many analyses of Veblen's influence on modern economic theory. After describing Veblen's unsuccessful university career and his two marriages, Dowd devotes four chapters to his theories of American capitalism, his economic theory, his more interesting and important judgments and predictions, and Dowd's evaluation of these against relevant historical events and processes. His book concludes with an examination of the main components of Veblen's theory in order to illuminate its strengths and weaknesses. An appendix contains selections from Veblen's *The Higher Learning,* and a rather good bibliography (pp. 191–195), divided into Veblen's books, books about Veblen, and "Books in the Tradition of Veblen."

There are, however, two puzzling aspects of Dowd's handling of this great theoretician. In the first place, while he treats Veblen in a masterly way, he makes hardly any attempt to build his treatment on the numerous other critical evaluations of this great thinker—and there have been many of them as certified to by Dowd's "Books about Veblen" (p. 193)—not to speak of the many, many articles published in recent years. Secondly, Dowd limits himself almost entirely to the economic aspects of Veblen's theories (possibly because he is Professor of Economics at Cornell University), although Veblen's conspicuous influence has persisted and continues today not only in economics but also in sociology and history. In fact, history and sociology are not even listed in Dowd's index, although Veblen's technological evolutionism has been much less influential than his incisive and ironic depiction of leisure class behavior and of the competitive emulation of that class by most of the rest of society. It is true that Veblen's theory of the leisure class is handled by Dowd, but Veblen's impact on several aspects of a social-action theory, especially in the field of political sociology, could have been more definitely pointed out. From the beginning, Veblen's economics was more than analysis of economic phenomena: it included higher learning, science and civilization, political economy, and stratification. Even his interests in economic phenomena included many issues that fell outside the sphere of traditional economics; in fact, Veblen was developing a form of social-action theory which, in many respects, bears comparison with that of Max Weber.

In short, then, Dowd's coverage of Veblen's life and theories is satisfactory, but it should have indicated in a subtitle that its focus is mainly on economic theories.—JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, *University of Bridgeport.*

*Contemporary French Political Thought.* BY ROY PIERCE. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 276. $5.75.)

Professor Pierce's study of Mounier, Simone Weil, Camus, Sartre, de Jouvenel, and Raymond Aron deserves two cheers. All French buffs in this discipline, whether occupied with the speculative or the empirical aspects of French political culture, will welcome its appearance. Students will find it a useful guide to an otherwise roundabout excursion. And because of the notable cohesiveness of the French intellectual spirit, the book will very likely appeal to still wider tastes. Instinctively, this is the kind of work one is hungry for.

The author is similarly to be commended for clarity of expression, a certain taut elegance, a knowledgeable and obviously painstaking weighing of diverse materials and themes. There is no teasing about with paradox, no ellipsis or digression, no aestheticism. On the other hand, except in the essay on Sartre, there is a considerable fund of detached sympathy for the subjects. The topics chosen for treatment are well blocked out, and, where possible, circumstantial and intellectual relationships of the political thinkers are indicated.

Unfortunately the book is unsatisfying at the level where it needs most to be justified. It is less a work about traditions or contexts of thought—despite its introductory chapters—than about six thinkers, some directly, some rather more obliquely concerned with political theorizing. Professor Pierce's *dramatis personae* must be his own and are no doubt popular ones. Still, one may wonder if Camus really has more to say about politics than, for example, Georges Burdeau, or why, since Marxism is a locus of concentration for all these writers except de Jouvenel, we cannot see a French Communist (perhaps Henri Lefebvre) at work, just in the interests of the debate.

The deeper problem is the analytical conception. Pierce gives bits of political orientation, biographical information about his personnel, fragments of milieu. They are *à propos*, but do not create a truly unified frame of discourse. The three pre-war "traditions"—Alain, Maurras, Marxism—are suspect. Do they refer to qualities of political thought? Premises of society? We are not sure. Do they implicate politics as played under the Third Republic? If so, where can one really place Poincaré, Tardieu, Daladier—even Blum? What about Sorel, Péguy, "solidarisme," Bonapartism, technocracy? If one is to explain thinkers by the continuity (or, as here, discontinuity) of tradition, one must see the tradition as the complex thing it is. Pierce's triad can and does help to explain the collapse of politics in 1940, but it is inadequate as a tool for locating the political ideas with which he chiefly deals. After the particular essays, which furnish the bulk of the writing, we are not reassured by the re-entry of the "tradition" theme in a two-page reprise (pp. 253–54). At best we have a definition *a contrario*, with both thinkers and tradition somewhat arbitrarily chosen.

Correctly fastening on the war and Resistance as a major watershed, Pierce fails to do justice to the depth of the French social schism that was a second determinant. If many French writers tend to sentimentalize this situation, Americans often ignore its force. This, I think, leads especially to the treatment of Sartre as a disembodied thinker who has devised "an analytical scheme which desperately needs help if it is to be of any use to anyone except writers with a penchant for unresolved dilemmas" (p. 151). Of course, philosophy—political philosophy, too—deals precisely with unresolved dilemmas. And Sartre's own *praxis* is too well known to need defense: twenty per cent of French youth admits to being under his spell. They must see something more tangible in his dialectics than Professor Pierce. The Sartre essay is, in fact, by far the weakest. Picking and choosing from a philosopher in development is not always the surest way to grasp him. A close, coherent exposition of the *Question de méthode* would have dissipated some of the problems found so vexing.

Space precludes further particular comment. In general, the Aron and Weil (was this cult-figure, who thought the New Deal worse than fascism, really a superior political thinker?) essays are highly intelligent. All others, except the Sartre, have moments of real illumination. But throughout, the discourse is at an ambivalent level woven between the raw material of politics and political philosophy, losing some of the insights of each. Regarding the latter, I was much struck by the continual absence of a name: Kant. Not only did the spirit of Kantian legalism penetrate the Third Republic tradition, but, on the higher plane of ideas, one sees a perpetual dialogue between Kant and the modern French thinkers. Mounier's personalism, Weil's regulative utopia and "Hobbesian" psychology, Camus's rebellion (Kant said in *Religion Beyond the Limits of Mere Reason* that man, knowing the moral law, can never be an absolute rebel), Sartre's attack on "idealism" and his interpretations of capitalism, Aron's "usage régulatif" of determinism are all in some way inspired from this source. Only de Jouvenel, who studied law and not German philosophy, is basically unaffected. Aron, too, having overcome his German studies, assimilated America, and clung to Montesquieu, is chiefly outside the question. But the vision of an ethical commonwealth without the *a priori* assurance of the moral law has affected French political philosophy deeply. Another point, highly relevant to Kant, is the deep suspicion of legalism in the tradition Pierce describes. Except for de Jouvenel, who laments that "the law has lost its soul" (p. 190), ethics, will, revolution, or the absorption of law by sociology have become the critical tools of political reparation. That, surely, is a significant bond of the "new tradition" on which one would have been glad to have the author's insights.

Finally, the array of comparisons at the end seems to me a perplexing tic-tac-toe because the matrix—whether as concrete society or as a fretwork of ideas—is not designed to hold them. This is a book to be read with profit for fundamental reliability and special exegetical skills, but it does not fulfill the promises of its title.—GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, *Harvard University*.

*Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time*. BY KARL LOEWENSTEIN. (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 104. $2.00.)

This little volume is a very much needed attempt to bring the modern student of politics closer to the sources of Max Weber's political ideas while presenting them in the context of political developments since Weber's time. It has always been a source of dismay to this reviewer that Weber's political ideas scattered among his many writings have not yet found their way into an English collected edition. A German one exists since 1958 when Mohr Verlag published Weber's *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* which Professor Loewenstein uses for giving us this admirable interpretation of Weber's thinking on the more practical aspects of politics and their significance for our time. It seems necessary to make this distinction between Weber's practical and theoretical analysis of politics in view of the often stated criticism of his ideas as contributing further to the glorification of the state and state-controlled violence. On the theoretical side Weber dealt carefully with the antinomies that as he saw it, dominated politics: the difficulty of reconciling action oriented to an ethic of ultimate ends with one that emphasizes an ethic of responsibility, the tensions created by the insistence on absolute morality over against the demands of a limiting reality. It is in his practical analysis of politics, however, that Weber most often ran afoul of the views of even his admirers. This was because in this practical approach he reflected the political temper of the Wilhemine empire and wrote, almost journalistically as Loewenstein points out, on his hopes and fears for a Germany burdened with the task of preserving Western continental culture against the onslaught of bureaucratism from the East and the technological functionalism of the Anglo-American countries. The particular merit of Loewenstein's approach is that he is able to single out the more lasting and universal qualities of Weber's political ideas and show, in his own words, "where the scholar has eclipsed the politician."

Loewenstein recognized that much of the confusion over Weber's role as a practical political analyst derived from his undisguised espousal of nationalism as the necessary premise for a realistic approach to politics. Whether he was designing an executive more responsive to popular pressures, denouncing the injustice of an unequal, indirect electoral system, or recommending a viable parliamentarism as a bulwark against an expanding and arrogant bureaucracy and as a training ground for a responsible political leadership, Weber was motivated by his desire to create a German unity that would forsake the purely imperial ambitions of Bismarck for a Germany that could maintain its place within the mainstream of traditional Western European culture. Once this cultural nationalism is accounted for and recognized as an almost inevitable byproduct of the temper of the time (to which even Thomas Mann and others were not immune) Loewenstein is able to present Weber's valuable insights concerning the need for continuous recruitment of political leadership, the advisability of using the techniques of direct democracy as a means of resolving conflict between the highest organs of government, and his warning that even the most democratic parties cannot avoid assuming the characteristics of rigid bureaucratic organizations embroiled in jealously competing with each other for the spoils of political power.

Weber honored the right of the practical politician to engage in compromise to resolve conflict—yet he was equally insistent that the scholar's task was not to glorify these compromises for their own sake but to reveal clearly why the need for them arose, how they could be best accomplished, and what consequences could be expected to follow. But it is in his concept of political leadership not by the demos but for the demos that Weber's "realistic" counsel has raised the greatest doubts and triggered heated controversy.

For Weber the real political leader, i.e., the professional, did not make his living off politics but dedicated himself to the pursuit of politics for its own sake. Not ordinary ambition but the desire to lead, ethically and even heroically, to accomplish in fact the impossible would represent his sole motivation. In other words, Weber disdained the tedious practicality of *Realpolitik* which most of the time simply meant swimming with the tide, but favored instead the dedication of the true visionary to his task: to attempt the impossible in order to achieve the possible. This position has to be clearly understood if one is to avoid the trap of regarding Weber as an advocate of dictatorial plebiscitarianism. That Weber's introduction of a popularly elected President into the Weimar Constitution inevitably paved the way for Hitler represents an obvious misreading of a provision which was specifically designed to create a political leader who had the confidence of the people and could be removed by legal means: The Caesaristic leader is not an inevitable outgrowth of the plebiscitary leader though a plebiscitary leader can create the climate for the successful assumption of dictatorial powers. Weber, however, according to Loewenstein, had simply too much confidence in the limitations of a constitutional order to regard this as a serious danger. Loewenstein also engages in a much needed reexamination of Weber's concept of charismatic leadership, correctly segregating that concept from the political sphere where it is lately used quite indiscriminately, emphasizing instead its primarily religious meaning and much greater usefulness in the analysis of social and mass psychological phenomena.

It is true that many of Weber's political insights have become the self-evident truths of today but this fact in no way impairs the enduring aspects of his political thinking. Of these his insistence that the reality of power does not absolve the holders of power from responsibility and who therefore must bring to their tasks the "faculty of contemplating reality with serenity and composure," can hardly ever lose its value to political leaders.

Modern liberals understandably act suspicious when first confronted with Weber's "liberalism" steeped as it is in the context of the German nation state. But as Karl Jaspers noted, "human dignity and Germany's position in world affairs were Weber's concern, not one without the other." Loewenstein's little volume provides further evidence of the essential honesty and truthfulness with which Weber regarded the political phenomena of his time and that for Weber the quest for scientific objectivity was not to be confused with scientific indifference to human responsibility. This is advice which still can be profitably heeded by modern political scientists.—H. P. SECHER, *Western Reserve University.*

*Constructive Typology and Social Theory.* By JOHN C. MCKINNEY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xiii, 250. $5.00.)

Political scientists familiar with sociology and with methodological problems, in particular, should find Professor McKinney's book of considerable interest because he has written the most extensive discussion yet on social science typologies and "typologizing." As a leading student of such matters, McKinney's views are obviously informed and thoughtful.

An extended analysis of the nature of typologies is the focal point of the book but there is much more in the way of both methodological discourse and substantive theory. McKinney offers a typology of typologies, critiques of most of the better-known types, an examination of types as they are related to various research tools and theory, a reasoned and reasonable defense of their utility or functions in furthering sociological inquiry, and, finally, some suggestions for the codification of typological procedures. At times the discussion takes McKinney somewhat away from the specifics of "constructive typologies" as he prefers to call types but the apparent irrelevance of the commentary is more than made up for by the inherent worth of the observations.

Interest on the part of some political scientists is apt to wane somewhat when they discover that this is a book written for sociologists, primarily, rather than social scientists, generally. One finds no references to the "grand tradition" of typologies in political philosophy nor to contemporary usages in political science. The typologies of political systems elaborated by Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu among others are not mentioned nor are the types of such contemporary luminaries as Almond, and Friedrich and Brzezinski. Lasswell's typology of political man, Duverger's political parties, Down's rational model of democracy, Key's types of elections, e.g., are neither mentioned nor discussed. Specific critiques of these efforts in political science would have enhanced the meaningfulness of McKinney's conceptions for political science. Of course, the inclusion of illustrations from other fields than sociology would have enlarged the volume considerably and perhaps not added to its value for sociologists. Perhaps some enterprising political scientist will take up the challenge.

In any event, McKinney is surely right that all of the social sciences have employed and continue to employ typological practices, and he is probably right that they cannot be avoided entirely even if one's predilections run toward other approaches and techniques of research and/or theory building. Yet, most of the discussion is cast in terms more familiar to sociologists and most of the case-studies were produced by sociologists. Typologies in psychology and anthropology are less prominent while those in economics and political science, as noted above, are absent. Two questions arise in this connection: Has sociology spawned more typologies and relied more upon their use than the other social or behavioral sciences? If so, why? Could an answer to this second question be that the early synthesizing tradition in sociology required some economical means for handling so great and varied data?

Of particular interest to this reviewer was McKinney's exceedingly brief reference to deductive model-building and constructive typology. Apparently he feels that they have something in common (pp. 4; 82–85), but the discussion is too cryptic to be certain. He asserts that "types" and "systems" can be models but most are not. The renowned typologies of sociology (Weber, Sorokin, Parsons, Becker, Redfield, and others) do not enable strictly controlled logical deductions of behavioral theorems from limited sets of formal axioms. Perhaps, they could be converted but no one, to my knowledge, has made the attempt. I mention this matter of models and typologies because both sociology and political science are, as McKinney recognizes, experimenting rather more frequently with formal deductive models. I am inclined to believe that these models will prove more useful than most typologies in political science. Whether this may be so in sociology I do not pretend to know although the recent work of Homans, Coleman, Mills and Gamson is exciting and highly relevant to the study of politics. McKinney is more impressed by the achievements of constructive typologies.

Let it be said in concluding these observations that Professor McKinney has tackled an important methodological problem and done so with a balanced judgment. He clearly favors the further development of constructive typologies and begins such an effort in the final chapter with some advice on the codification of typological procedures. Behaviorally-inclined political scientists will be disappointed in this chapter if they expect a handbook of techniques on how to typologize. This is a book on methodology and not a research handbook. Hopefully, someone will one day provide detailed instructions that can be taught to students. In the meanwhile, political scientists who have a strong penchant for general methodology or typing political systems will find this volume interesting and rewarding. Professor McKinney has thought about and successfully engaged in his own constructive typologizing.—William C. Mitchell, *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.*

*Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War* (2nd Ed.). By Sigmund Neumann. (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 402. $7.50.)

This is essentially a new printing of the late Sigmund Neumann's study of the "total state in a world at war," as the book's subject-matter was described in the sub-title of the original edition published in 1942. Although it has been equipped with a preface by Hans Kohn, a new sub-title, and a supplement to the original bibliography, the text is republished without alteration. Had Professor Neumann lived to rework it or add a substantial epilogue on postwar developments, the value of the book would of course have been enhanced. But nevertheless, this is a classic in comparative politics, and its republication is very much to be welcomed by teachers and students of the subject. It is available in a paper-cover edition.

*Permanent Revolution* was one of the seminal works of the school of thought now generally known as the theory of totalitarianism. In a series of chapters with titles like "The Leader," "The Amorphous Masses Emerge" and "The Impact of Permanent War," it formulated empirical generalizations about the phenomenon of "modern dictatorship," as Neumann liked to describe the single-party systems of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia. It also filled in the picture with a mass of vivid descriptive detail particularly pertinent to the cases of modern dictatorship with which the author seems to have been most directly familiar—Germany and Italy. Indeed, although many of the generalizations were broadly applicable to communism too, the book, as its author underlined in the introduction, was more than anything else a study of fascism.

Not only does it remain one of the most readable and informative general interpretations of the modern single-party system, especially in its fascist version; in some ways it holds up rather better than other widely read books of its genre. Neumann, for example, was virtually alone among theorists of totalitarianism in stressing the key importance of the dictator himself in the motivation of totalitarian politics. Instead of starting with the ideology as the motivational mainspring, he began with a consideration of the leader of the dictatorial system, whom he characterized as "its beginning, its moving spirit, its fate," and suggested the hypothesis that the totalitarian leader is "a *marginal man* of a marginal group." His emphasis on the role of the dictator appears to have been both sound and prophetic in the light of all that is now known—but was not known at the time of writing—about the effect of the personalities of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini upon the political behavior of their respective totalitarian systems.

A second respect in which the study holds up well is its pervasive concern with the dynamism of the total state. Neumann does not slight the importance of structural aspects, first of all the totalitarian party. But for him the essence of totalitarianism lies in its "boundless dynamics." Totalitarianism's first aim, as he puts it in the introduction, is to perpetuate and to institutionalize revolution, to make it permanent. But in Neumann's image of it, the total state is pursuing not so much the politics of permanent revolution as the politics of permanent war. "The dictatorial regimes," he says, "are governments at war, originating in war, aiming at war, thriving on war." And the elaboration of this theme, with special reference to the prewar fascist states, is a salient achievement of the book. Whether it was Neumann who first coined the suggestive phrase "garrison state," I do not know; but it appears here, and the discussion of the topic still reads with interest.

Taking the position that the dynamics of totalitarianism were dynamics of permanent war, Neumann found it natural to work the consideration of foreign policy and international relations into his study of the total state, and ignored the unfortunate dichotomy of internal and external politics. Indeed, he included belligerence in world politics as a major element in the very definition of modern totalitarianism, and his concluding chapter was appropriately entitled "Definition from Without: Dictatorship in International Politics." It gave a lucid survey of international politics in Europe during the interwar period as affected by the dictatorial dynamics of permanent war.

Political science in our time is moving beyond the old theory of totalitarianism into a more flexible comparative politics of modern authoritarian systems. We have learned—at any rate we are learning—that no modern single-party state is so totalitarian as to extinguish the politics of faction inside the one party. We are trying to build conceptual schemes that make room for the single-party system in its nationalist as well as its communist and fascist variants; to explore not only the common characteristics of these polities but also the significant differences between the various types; to look at modern authoritarianism in relation to the dynamics of modernization as well as the dynamics of war and revolution; and much else besides.

Rereading *Permanent Revolution* today, one feels that its author, if he were still among us, would have been in the forefront of this work.—ROBERT C. TUCKER, *Princeton University.*

*Marxism and Alienation: A Symposium.* ED. BY HERBERT APTHEKER. (New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. 158. $4.00.)

This is a particularly elusive series of essays to review. Under the auspices of The American Institute for Marxist Studies, seven scholars have contributed to the discussion of alienation in modern American society. Yet it is not really the diversity of contributions to the symposium, ranging in concern from "The Artistic Expression of Alienation" by Sidney Frankelstein to "Alienation and Socialism" by Miklos Almasi, that presents the major barrier to an informed criticism. The difficulty, I believe, lies in the internal logic of the collection and the modes of political conceptualization they express. Consider with due care the following characteristics of this collection.

*The ideological consistency*

Every selection not only begins with Marxist premises, as one would expect in this symposium, but there are a series of internal interpretations of Marx and Marxism reflecting, less an exposition of Marxist thought, than an "insider's knowledge" of what Marx meant in numerous, not always specified, passages. There is no mention that "alienation" might not be a useful way to view American society, even for Marxists, but that intensely conveyed assumption is acted upon as if its existence was somehow ordained. Gaylord C. LeRoy, whose introductory essay on "The Concept of Alienation: An Attempt at a Definition," does at least raise the question of alienation's function in explaining reality. But, on balance it is a vain attempt, because the questions are never really relevant to the subsequent contributors for whom, one must assume, the problems of American society are very great and naturally "explained" by selective attention to Marxist literature. Even on Marxist terms, one misses the subtle interpretation of an Erich Fromm, a Herbert Marcuse, or indeed, a George Luckacs whose influence pervades several of the essays.

*Conceptual diffusion*

If major ideological premises are self-evident then it is not very important to define a concept, much less operationalize it, with any consistency or clarity. Here, again, Mr. LeRoy raises our expectations about the quality of political discourse to follow. "The difficulty with the concept of alienation is that it is *too* useful—it explains, in a way, too much" (p. 1). But unless I have badly misread this book, nowhere in the ensuing six essays could I uncover a clue as to what behavior did *not* connote alienation in American society. Mr. LeRoy notwithstanding, stories of crime and the machinations of a ruling elite, the low status of Negroes and workers, and the high status of political leaders and industrialists, all are related to the oceanic void of alienation that, in the present case, engulfs the contributors to this collection. Alienation has an *a priori* existence and urgency, any social, psychological, or economic factor is subsumed under the all-embracing rubric, therefore any node of a concept from human relationships to political powerlessness is excluded.

If there is a unifying concept in these essays it is a philosophical mood of existential pessimism, but style is not conceptualization in behavioral terms or any other one might select. Since "alienation" is a key intellectual (and emotional?) term in the prevailing belief system *everyone* knows what it means, therefore the task is never to see its relationship to specific links between power and man in American society. Rather the task is to show how, in fact, alienation pervades all aspects of American life. And in this bill of indictments the evidential base of critical thought is also impaired.

*Evidence as stylized rhetoric*

"Soon you begin to see that a term that explains so much actually explains very little." It is Mr. LeRoy speaking again about the diffuse uses of alienation I have already noted. But, in the key sentence that follows, "The way to establish a measure of precision in our thinking is to look at the history of the term" (p. 2). Now it would be exceedingly dogmatic to deny the relevance of historical evidence in enlightening our understanding of so critical a term as alienation in modern thought. The significance here, and in the subsequent essays, is that *no* systematic evidence is needed in unraveling the complex and subtle influences of personal dislocation on politics. Since the basic texts of Marx have been posited, in a scant eight pages, one need only refer to that, and all that stands behind it in an influential Western intellectual tradition, to *avoid* looking at evidence in some systematic way.

Moreover, the telltale phrase, "as is well known," performs the important function of maintaining congruence between specific examples of depersonalization and their political significance. There is a tribal rite within these pages, and, no doubt due to the limitations of the reviewer, one must wonder what contribution is being made to even those American college students who attempt to relate to this closed circle of internal criticism and internal scholarship.

Three generations of social science have not made a dent in the mode of political thought before us and perhaps one utility of this book in the classroom would be to read it alongside, say, Robert Lane's *Political Ideology* (especially chapters 23, 24 on epistemology) to test some propositions about political conceptualization and its functions.

But is this all we can say about these contributions? Are the labors of men attempting in the words of the sponsoring A.I.M.S. to "help bring Marxist thought into the forum of reasonable debate to produce a meaningful dialogue among Marxist and non-Marxist scholars and writers" to be treated as so much 'agit-prop' telling the beads of a self-fulfilling prophesy of diffuse disintegration? I think not, and my reasoning extends beyond the contributions of Marxist thought, even in the diluted case before us, to the enrichment of our political comprehension.

I found Sidney Finkelstein's "The Artistic Expression of Alienation" and Howard D. Langford's "The Imagery of Alienation" most valuable. They share three related characteristics that distinguish them in this setting. First, the writing style is lively and cogent. Second, these essays contain the fewest political and historical references (justifications?) for the points they are making. I think it important to note that their authors are artists to whom the expressive act and its creation, not political diatribes, are the core of the matter. Finkelstein's account of *avant-garde* art as an exasperated style of intellectual work is meaningfully related; close to the personal experiences of their author. In Langford, I find an informed literary critique, based on Nathanael West's novelette *Miss Lonelyhearts*, pertinent to the uses of literature in relating the supposed alienation of contemporary man. Both of these men are reflecting on their craft, as artist and writer, not as political ideologists, and this impact on work styles is importantly relevant to a sociology of intellectuals in post-modern America.

It is the reference to the sociology of intellectuals that leads to the third difference between these contributions and the rest of the book. Cultural alienation, the disassociation of man and his self-expression in art and literature, has seemed to me the most effective subject to which intellectuals might direct themselves. It is this concern, and this approach, rather than an explicit interest in politics or power relations, that animate the sureness of content to which I referred. These men are craftsman and, so they tell us, conditions of modern life have divorced them from their publics, as reflected in their artistic efforts. The consequences of political (and other) acts on human sensibility, not an explicit focus on political maladies, has been a contribution of literary and artistic expression to understanding our present condition. In these pages the legacy of the humanities is more fruitful than an abstracted Marx linked to a hodgepodge of power elites and criminal acts in the modern society.

In addition, the careful reader may find other themes that inform his political understanding. One idea, expressed in at least two essays, is that the disassociation between private man and his political role are potentially greatest, not among the poor and neglected, but among those who occupy the critical roles in the power system. The reference is to dehumanization with profound political consequences in that "role strains" become so great that political leaders may behave totally within the confines of their "official" status, and the apparatus of power and bureaucracy defines not only who they are but the only "rational" basis of human conduct. To my knowledge this idea (placed in the form of testable propositions) has not received much attention, except, of course, in the latter sections of C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite.*

Yet, beyond the nourishment of critics and humanists, there is potentiality in examining the extent to which definitions of political reality, and their consequences, are functions of the divorce between public man (as fulltime Secretary of Defense or administrator) and his private concerns. Lasswell once observed that political scientists steer clear of critical studies involving professional elites (people like us? people we would like to be?) and confine too much attention to more middling mortals. Indeed, without the alienation premise as a intellectual cover, these insights in a Marxist symposium might enrich the boundaries of other studies using other methodologies.—EDGAR LITT, *University of California, Berkeley.*

*Morality and the Law.* BY SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 247. $5.00.)

Does the law have any moral connotations whatsoever? Professor Stumpf poses the age-old question and then proceeds to answer it in a resounding affirmative. He builds his case by dealing with, among others, such tough areas as the Soviet Union and the international community, and he argues that all systems of political organization must, in the final analysis, construct and operate legal systems on a moral foundation. Moreover, he attempts to prove that even such avowed positivists as Austin, Bentham and Hobbes conceived of law as something more than simply commands of the sovereign, that even for them the law contained an essence springing from the nature of man and of society. The study is both a defense of the natural law tradition, albeit in modern dress, and an attack on the notion that law has no real connection with moral values.

The first chapter of the study deals with the moral element in judicial opinions, particularly those of the United States Supreme Court. Stumpf argues that law has always "been shaped to fit the contours of moral conviction," that the law "has never been able to dissociate itself fully from the notion that there is a difference between an arbitrary command and a law." His evidence for this is a very brief allusion to the classical and medieval periods and to Justice Cardozo's assertion that today's judges respond to a "moral urge." Stumpf suggests that the judge in the present day, however, has often attempted to adhere to the concept that the law has no real concern for moral and ethical values, or at least to the view that if there is a moral base for law, it must be infused in the law by the legislature and not by the judge. But a more profound influence on the American judge is the modern philosopher, whether it be Whitehead ("The conception of the universe as evolving subject to fixed eternal laws regulating all behavior should be abandoned.") or John Dewey ("The sanctification of . . . universal principles as methods of thinking is the chief obstacle to . . . social advance by means of law."). No matter how hard a judge may try, however, he cannot eliminate subjective judgments, values, or a moral element from his decisions.

But the moral element in law in Stumpf's view is universal, and is an integral part of those very systems that loudly disclaim it. The Soviets produced a society, for example, dedicated to the abolition of the rule of law in the traditional sense. Theoretically the dictatorship of the proletariat is its own source of authority without constitutional or statutory limitation. This follows from the Marxian idea that law is the reflection of the material order by the mind of man. Since all law is the law of the ruling economic class and contains within it no *a priori* principles, the mind is not free to create rules of human behavior, only to transform the material forces which impinge upon it into conscious formulations of rules. The consequences of this Marxist theory of the source of law are significant, says Stumpf, for when law is viewed not as the embodiment of justice but as a reflection of the material interests of the dominant class, it is reduced to the naked force of that class, and it cannot embody anything permanent. But the Soviets have not practiced what they preach. Not only have they not been able to eliminate law from their system, they have actually used the law for moral ends, for creating a moral consciousness. Law in Russia is no longer simply a power mechanism; it is "viewed as a moral vehicle which should be respected because of its intrinsic moral content." It is to be obeyed not because it is the command of the sovereign but because of the moral ends—fulfillment of norms of socialist law—it is seeking to achieve. Ideology has not only become respectable but has assumed the ethical characteristic of "ought." Even though law and morality are tied together in Soviet law, this does not mean, Stumpf tells us, that Soviet law as a legal system is under any moral restraint since the validity of law is still conditioned upon the consent of the Communist party. However, the very fact of the revival of Soviet law indicates that man's nature requires more than a command of the sovereign; it requires reasons for the command.

Probably the most interesting essays in the study are those dealing with Austin, Bentham and Hobbes. The distinction between law and morals has been a powerful influence on jurisprudence ever since Austin's time, says Stumpf, but men have always been uneasy about it. While almost all of the Austinian legal theory is found in the three concepts of sovereign, command and sanction and suggests in the abstract that the sovereign is a "morally indifferent entity," Austin is, in Stumpf's view, far from considering law in such arbitrary terms since he sees law as a corrective of evil proceeding from a "good" which in Austin's words is "bottomed in the common nature of man." And even Bentham whose contempt for natural law was unequivocal was much concerned over law reflecting the "good" of the community when he urged that in order for law to be complete, its commands must take into account the moral concerns of society. Hobbes, too, insisted that law and morality have the same content and that the obligatory force of law was to be found in morality. Hobbes speaks of "natural reason" throughout his discourses, and although he once said that there can be "no unjust laws," he did not deny, says Stumpf, that sovereigns could give erroneous interpretations of natural law. Sovereigns can err, said Hobbes, and their acts of authority are not equivalent to morality. Fitting Hobbes into the natural law tradition depends upon one's definition of natural law, and the author is quite aware of this when he suggests that it is not necessary to say that a known set of unchanging, absolute values exists in order to have a viable theory of natural law: it is important only to agree that human nature has a permanence from which one can—as Hobbes did—derive certain natural laws. And this returns us to the central point of this study: that law is a matter of thought or consciousness, that it represents the capacity of man to transcend himself and to look at his social organization objectively. In spite of the "high degree of analytic imprecision in most natural law discourse" and "the difficulties of epistemological relativism" there is a nagging persistence that moral ends cannot be separated from law. We must conclude then that no organized legal system is ever completely positivistic and, we might add, no individual is totally a positivist.

Professor Stumpf has produced a creative and imaginative book. It adds a new dimension to the growing body of literature that is attempting to capture the idealism and morality of a great tradition in political and legal theory, that of natural law. Professor Stumpf is persuasive, not dogmatic; analytical, not autocratic; learned, not shallow. Each chapter, incidentally, is a neat, self-contained essay, but the study has a systematic unity and wholeness because the author never loses sight of his noble theme.—ROBERT J. STEAMER, *Lake Forest College.*

*The Real World of Democracy.* BY C. B. MACPHERSON. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. Pp. 67. $2.00.)

*Human Aims in Modern Perspective.* BY D. W. GOTSHALK. (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 122. $4.00.)

Scholarly observers of the human condition often aspire to assist in straightening out the mess in view. Some offer a modest clarification of the situation from a new perspective; the bolder may present plans for a comprehensive redirection of human life. These books are examples of the two types. C. B. Macpherson's *Real World of Democracy* is the modest and successful essay. D. W. Gotshalk's *Human Aims in Modern Perspective,* immodestly subtitled *Outlines of a General Theory of Value,* is not so satisfactory.

Professor Macpherson's book, the text of the Massey lectures delivered in 1965 for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, is a minor intellectual delight. There is a skillful analysis of the historical meanings of "democracy" and of their implications. The claims of liberal, communist, and developing states to be "democratic" are examined (and, incidentally, validated). But there is a broader theme running through this academic exercise. Although the democratic imperative is a general one, the "liberal" model of western systems does not preempt the category of "democracy." The liberal democratic form is, in fact, likely to become outmoded, for the conditions accounting for its appeal are disappearing. Liberal democracy is a response to the "dilemma of scarcity," a condition of limited production in relation to unlimited desires. The production of abundance is now foreseeable, and we can now understand that the source of unlimited desire is not human nature itself but rather the inability to produce abundance. Professor Macpherson concludes that "in the world from now on, power and influence will depend on moral advantage." To conserve their moral stature and power, liberal democracies must undertake "nothing less than massive aid, which will enable the poor nations to lift themselves to recognizable human equality."

Reading Macpherson's book is very much like discussing the political condition of the world with an amiable and clever friend in one's study. If the analysis is no breakthrough, nonetheless is it stimulating and satisfying. Traditional references and contemporary data are combined in just the right proportions. The argument is sharp and systematic; the prose is clear; the assertions challenge one to debate points with the author from time to time. If two hours of scholarly discussion in one's study are worthwhile, so is this book.

D. W. Gotshalk's theme is more ambitious by far. He essays not only to place human aims in a modern perspective but to suggest how we must reorient our approaches to public policy to give humanism a "scientific" framework. The book is disappointing because the aims which government is to implement, the specific features of our reorientation, are left either vague or for future determination. Both the underlying analysis of human nature and the prescriptions offered bear a resemblance to the philosophy of John Dewey. Political scientists' reactions to Gotshalk are likely to be the same as their reactions to Dewey—lukewarm and puzzled.

Gotshalk's argument proceeds from the idea of a tension between man's causal position—his ability to manipulate his environment—and his telic position—the sense of, or need for, a direction in life. The latter, as expressed in acquisitive and creative impulses in human nature, have typically been at the service of the former. Consequently, man has greatly improved his power to go somewhere, but has really very little idea of where he should go or why. Acquisitivity [sic] and creativity are said to be modes of self-determinacy, the basic telic trait. Professor Gotshalk pleads for "the progressive articulation of the telic nature of the human being," articulation in pragmatic spheres, where we have been doing pretty well, and in reflective areas—"fine arts, theoretical science, philosophy, and personal and social life of ethical quality"—where we have generally fallen behind.

This is a book by a philosopher apparently written for philosophers. The political scientist is likely to be confused when the author insists (pp. 28–29) that he is not committing the Naturalistic Fallacy of determining what ought to be from what is. Even granting Gotshalk's assumption that Nature is "value saturated," political theorists have been so often warned against implying "ought" from "is" that they will likely find his argument that man's telic nature should be progressively articulated without a convincing foundation. On the other hand, it appeals as a reasonable, common-sensical idea, which may not really need such an elaborate philosophical rationale to commend it.

The more specific the recommendations in this book become, the more disappointing they are. To assert that "the minimum procedure that seems appropriate to government under the proposed aims would be a combination of detailed, expert empirical inquiry and elementary nonpartisan democracy" is no noticeable advance on ideas long ago presented by democratic theorists. To show, in this frame of reference, what a world political institution could do, does not lead any further toward establishing one when the problem is not so much its desirability as the obstacles to its institution. A political scientist reading this book will be exasperated rather than stimulated. He will find no answers here, nor even very interesting questions.—Delos D. Hughes, *Washington and Lee University.*

*Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920.* Ed. by Howard Brotz. (New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. 608. $12.50.)

Mr. Brotz' anthology is based on the idea that there were "two poles of thought" among Negroes between the Civil War and the period immediately following World War I. "On the one hand, those voices which clearly projected civil assimilation as the goal of Negro aspirations and which thought through what this aim would entail; and on the other hand, those nationalist and separatist voices which despaired of having a dignified future in a bi-racial society." The record must be strained beyond the point of credibility to have it bear out that primary tensions in social and political thought among Negroes have been divided altogether (or even mainly) between those who would emigrate and those who would assimilate.

Another weakness in the Brotz attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of Negro thought from 1850 to 1920 is inherent in any effort to place in proper perspective the political and social thought of legal and extralegal slaves. It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, attitudes among the Negro masses on social and political matters. For example, it may very well have been that, had modern polling techniques been available, a significant number of illiterate slaves (once the proposition had been effectively explained) would have expressed views in favor of emigration rather than assimilation. There seems to have been little in American civilization that would have warranted hope among slaves, and among the majority of so-called "free Negroes." Yet, there is no indication that Brotz was concerned with this facet of the problem.

Rather, Mr. Brotz is critical of Delany; Marcus Garvey, the pioneer Pan African Nationalist; Edward Blyden; and others whom he lists as emigrationists. He is also critical of DuBois' "spirit of resentment," as Brotz labels DuBois' reaction to the status quo. His heroes among those whose ideas and writings make up the anthology are Frederick Douglass and Booker T. Washington; he considers them "practical" and "commonsensical."

It may be that Brotz, in his eagerness to establish a dichotomy between emigrationists (implicitly "bad guys") and assimilationists ("good guys"), overlooked some vital features of social and political thought, not only among Negroes, but also among many other "out groups," at numerous levels of separation from the mainstream. Representatives of "out groups" react to the status quo, and their place in it, in a variety of ways. For instance, all the multiple and mutually antagonistic approaches to the problems of workers and trade unionism in the 1930's and 1940's probably contributed to improving living standards and the status of workers.

Similarly in contemporary America, if only "practical," "commonsensical" men such as Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King, Whitney Young, Lester Granger, and their type were reacting, the problem would soon be "settled." (And it may be of relevance to note that ten years or so ago the "commonsensical" men of today were "radical.") There may be room not only for DuBois, Delany, Marcus Garvey, and others who are not "commonsensical"; there may also be legitimate and positive places for Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X, Bayard Rustin, Leroi Jones, and the entire spectrum.

It is not to be forgotten that the Congress, the Federal Courts, and the president, with approval of a wide range of influential private citizens and private groups, have combined to expand the constitution considerably beyond what was *advocated* by "radicals" such as DuBois, Vito Marcantonio, Henry Wallace, and Paul Robeson less than two decades ago. And while at that time the non-"commonsensical" "radicals" were villified, their contributions to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Brown Decision in 1954, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 may not be insignificant.

Criticism can also be easily directed toward the author's implicit assumption that folk thought is not relevant to an anthology of political and social thought. Certainly the men included in the anthology would indicate that by standards of the masses of Negroes in their respective times, they were among the "privileged." Men in "privileged" positions may not always be able accurately to interpret folk needs and folk thought. In the contemporary world, it could very well be that one of the characteristics of "protest" is that self-appointed "Negro leaders" from among Franklin Frazier's *Black Bourgeoisie* often do not accurately convey folk thought. This gap between the "Black Bourgeoisie" and the folk may be the basic reason that Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael are able to attract great followings among urban masses.

Probably the principal virtue of *Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920* is that it focuses on one of the deep-rooted human problems, and, in addition to maintaining focus on the centuries-old problem, aids in keeping alive a basis for dialogue. And as Brotz suggests in his analysis, many facets of the problem as it existed in the nineteenth and early twentiety centuries exist today. One problem that remains constant is, "is color prejudice of such a magnitude and of such a fixed character that the Negro was (is) not assimilable?"

Mr. Brotz' rhetorical question leads into another: "Would assimilation make much difference in the lives of the masses of Negroes?" Mass poverty; widespread unemployment in the greatest era of "prosperity" in history; ghetto living, with all that it connotes in terms of human suffering; and reputable statistics suggesting that since

1850 the gap in income and standard of living between Negroes and other American citizens has widened, suggest a negative answer, notwithstanding Brotz' view of assimilation as being "commonsensical."—ADOLPH REED, *Arkansas A.M. and N. College and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

*The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine From Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution.* BY W. B. GWYN. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1965. Pp. vii, 159. $3.00, paper.)

Urging that contemporary constitutional theorists should clearly understand the evolution of the separation of powers, Gwyn sets out to fill the gap he perceives in their knowledge. In his view, most modern political scientists have erred both by restricting their attention to one version of the doctrine and by failing to trace its origins behind Montesquieu and Locke. Its real roots lie in the turbulent politics of Stuart England. Moreover, it took five distinct forms during its development. Gwyn's aim is to disentangle them. For this he deserves praise, as he does on two other counts—first for extensive examination of seventeenth century sources, and second for including explicit criticisms of the work of other recent scholars. It is refreshing to find an author who does not write in an amiable vacuum of charity for all and criticism for none.

For three reasons, however, the book is less successful than it might have been.

First, the organization is inadequate—notwithstanding the author's prefatory justifications. Could not the chapters have been arranged to highlight rather than to camouflage the doctrine's five versions? The reader will find it unduly difficult to discover who first said what, when, where.

Second, he will not be helped by the persistent lack of narrative focus. At times the author seems to be writing an essay in the history of ideas. At other times he seems more interested in the effects of ideas upon Stuart politics. Often the link is only unsophisticated, interstitial explanation. For example, the author observes that it is difficult to fathom how the norm of separate Governmental and Parliamentary spheres of authority could have grown by the 1650's out of the early seventeenth century assumption of shared legislative, executive, and judicial functions. His 'explanation' does not really explain: "So marvelous are the simplifying and abstracting powers of the human intellect" (p. 30). On other occasions erudite analyses of minor seventeenth century thinkers are interrupted with out-of-place comments like: "Because latter day conservatives have placed the rule of law and the separation of powers in their ideological arsenals, the modern radical need not conclude that they are necessarily inconsistent with his own political outlook" (p. 60). Such intrusions are the odder inasmuch as the author expressly eschews "the mixing of exposition, criticism, and construction within the covers of a single book" (p. 127). I get the impression that he is straining anxiously—and needlessly—to convince the reader of the importance of his subject. Furthermore, while many of the author's assessments of scholarly disputes are relevant and useful (though unnecessarily hard to follow since they sprawl between the text and the footnotes without apparent rhyme or reason), many are not. For example, I fail to see how the exposition of Algernon Sydney's views is helped by sidetracking the reader's attention while Merle Fainsod is dragged over the coals for using "an 18th century view of human nature" in the first edition of *How Russia Is Ruled* (p. 23n). And *particularly*, when the paragraph which Gwyn attacks has been deleted from later editions. A considerable number of Gwyn's strictures strike me as equally gratuitous. Some of them are worth articulating—but in another place.

Third, it would be sheer kindness to call his style 'Baroque.' Granted the extreme burden which it imposes on the reader, there is something comic about Gwyn's assessment of English translations of Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois.* None is "completely adequate . . . although Thomas Nugent's translation . . . is not without its felicities" (p. 100n). Unfortunately, Gwyn's style *is* without its felicities.

In sum, Gwyn has his hands on interesting material but he has not yet subdued it. Perhaps the most fitting judgment is his own comment about Locke's *Second Treatise.* "It cannot be said that the Treatise, written and revised over a period of years, is a model of clear exposition" (p. 71).—A. E. KEIR NASH, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

## AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Public Administration and Democracy: Essays Honoring Paul H. Appleby.* ED. BY ROSCOE C. MARTIN. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 355. $7.95.)

The book may be regarded in two ways, as a deliberate effort by selected scholars to honor a man, or as a selected sample of the thinking of the second and third generations of students of public administration. For the most part, the authors are men who came on the scene in the 20's or 30's, and lived with "the depression," World War II, and the protracted Cold War which followed. They witnessed and/or participated in the coming of "big democracy" to use Appleby's term, and they reflect concern with the kinds of problems that preoccupied their generation of public administrators, more economic than cultural.

The essays deal with important questions, not trivialities, with questions that matter, and are of importance to more than an academic audience. The editor, Roscoe Martin, starts the volume with a compendious bibliographical essay on Paul Appleby. After that come four blocs of essays on The Field of Administration (Appleby, Waldo, Redford); The Processes of Public Administration (Burkhead, Gross, Mosher, Birkhead); Public Administration and People (Gross, Macmahon, Thompson); International Public Administration (Caldwell, Stone, Emmerich); and Some Enduring Concerns, i.e. ethics, responsibility, and democracy (Bailey, Egger, Appleby).

Roughly speaking, the authors are clinicians who employ that method with great perceptiveness. They are trained observers who know whereof they speak from close contact with government both inside and out, and they demonstrate what can be done (by experts) with the clinical approach.

The book has the merit of style, ranging from good to elegant. The reader is grateful. No jargon, and no lack of ability to communicate. Dean Bailey's essay on "Ethics in the Public Service" is a delight to read for how it is said as well as for its solid content. And Rowland Egger, in his literate, sophisticated, and discriminating treatment of "Responsibility in Administration," demonstrates what can be done with the English language to excite the mind. There are other authors here for whose latest remarks the initiated are always listening. Pick your own favorites.

The authors, although limited in space, have something to say that is worth considering. It is fair to call the essays thoughtful, at points even wise, and always perceptive. If the reader is equally thoughtful he will find much wisdom in these essays, the fruit of experience and understanding, and he will also find much to question and perhaps challenge. The essay on "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society," for example, bothered the reviewer for its bland assertion of facts which are not documented, for historical comparisons unsupported by longitudinal data, and for generalizations that would be more acceptable if restricted to specified circumstances. But this perhaps results more from limitation of space than from reluctance to be precise. All in all, including this essay, the book has much to offer serious students of public administration. The more they bring to the study, the more rewarding they will find it.—George A. Graham, *The Brookings Institution.*

*Boston: The Job Ahead.* By Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 120. $3.95.)

This little volume consists of some twelve articles appearing as advertisements in the Boston newspapers during the period 1962–1965. They were the brainchild of a public spirited Boston banker who seems to have hoped that the mayoralty of John Collins might be a period of significant civic progress. The articles deal with "The Power to Govern," "The City and the Suburbs," "The Tax Tangle," "Traffic and Transit," "Freight," "Time Again for Enterprise," "Which Way Downtown?," "Housing," "Schools," "Youth," "Law and Order," and "Beauty in the City."

The authors take strong issue with the current fashion to view the city as in crisis. They regard the municipal achievement on the whole as impressive. What is called for is a sober evaluation of costs and benefits, a marginal improvement of a tolerable situation rather than a crash program to avert disaster. They reject the cynicism of an alarmist posture designed mainly to panic the public into ill-considered acceptance of urban quack medicine. The articles were written before trouble overtook Roxbury. Despite the jacket blurb's claim for the general relevance of the volume, the size of the Negro population makes Boston far from typical. The lack of acute concern for race relations can be explained in this way.

Despite their sanguine attitude on the city and its accomplishments, Meyerson and Banfield do not opt for the status quo. There is a "job ahead" and those who have worked at it would consider it a big one. The authors are for a state solution to the metropolitan problems as they envisage them: transportation, real estate taxation, water supply and sewage disposal, air pollution control, and major outdoor recreation areas. In their view "The Governor should be the chief executive in metropolitan area matters—but not in purely municipal matters—both for the Boston area and for all Massachusetts." They make the suggestion that "One of the things the state might do is to assess property and collect taxes, turning the revenue over to local governments to spend. The state would establish a basic tax rate sufficient to provide adequate levels of service throughout the metropolitan area. Those localities wanting to provide themselves with more than this minimum adequate level of service could levy an additional tax which the state would collect for them." These are no small steps. In the advertisements the authors were unable to outline how they might be taken.

In the article on housing, the authors conclude "The consumer is the key to the situation: if he spends more for housing, the situation will improve fundamentally; if he does not it probably will not improve fundamentally." They do support rent supplements and deplore federal coddling of inefficient builders.

Boston's schools they find in poor shape in an otherwise well run city. Their despair of improvement leads them to suggest that "the city should make a tuition grant, with suitable public safeguards, to the parents of any Boston child who goes to a private school." Competition among schools as they see it would improve matters and break the salary bind where "a kindergarten teacher may be paid more than a high school mathematics teacher—and this although mathematics teachers are in very short supply as compared with kindergarten teachers."

In "Time Again for Enterprise," the authors recount how faced with disaster Boston pioneered the China trade, again faced with disaster it turned to woolens and shoes, more recently to electronics, and now with electronics peaking it needs new help from its creative leaders to keep an environment that will attract and hold this talent. This is a major reason for civic betterment. Despite Boston's problems Meyerson and Banfield say "there is no reason for croaking, then; those whose duty it is to carry forward society need not despair. If they carry it forward in the future as well as they have in the past, the commercial and industrial development of the area will flourish."

Meyerson and Banfield are of the school of liberal individualists who largely reduce citizenship to consumership. Their most potent remedy for social problems is the restoration of competition and the market. The *deus ex machina* that keeps society from becoming a mere market place with every individual maximizing his private satisfaction is the unexplained duty of the saving aristocratic remnant. This is not the crude theory of Thomas Nixon Carver but that of Joseph Schumpeter. It is an honorable philosophy but one that scarcely suffices. A city needs citizens as well as consumers, statesmen as well as businessmen aristocrats. It is doubtful that liberal individualism is a sufficient faith for Urban America.—NORTON LONG, *Brandeis University*.

*Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County Consolidation*. BY BRETT W. HAWKINS. (Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 162. $5.00.)

The defeat time and again of proposals to create metropolitan governments in urban areas so as to bring about a rational solution to the problems of inadequate services, overlapping jurisdictions, government fragmentation, archaic government structures and the diffusion of government responsibility has confounded the proponents of metropolitan reform. These metrophiles simply should have won if for no other reason than they are on the wavelength of history. These same metropolitan reformers are also the bearers of legitimacy who have established the values of progress, economy and efficiency which, they insisted, could be achieved only by an areawide metropolitan government. Representing an alignment of power, wealth, altruism and education, they embraced such diverse interests as the downtown business groups, the areawide newspapers, the planners, the academics and the dogooders. Moreover, they were fighting waste, inefficiency and those forces of evil—the politicians and the bureaucrats. And yet they lost their battle just about everywhere but in Miami and Nashville.

In the case of Nashville, the charter for a metropolitan government was initially defeated in 1958 despite the support of the Mayor, the metropolitan newspapers, the Nashville Chamber of Commerce, the Nashville Trade and Labor Council, the League of Women Voters, P.T.A. groups and, allegedly, the County Judge (Chairman of the County Government). With such an array of The Good and The Brave, the pro-Metro forces should have been able to overcome the demons of hell itself. Yet at the last moment the charter opponents, concentrating their efforts on the voters outside of Nashville, showed their disdain for reason and enlightenment and appealed instead to fear—fear of higher taxes, fear of city slickers, fear of dictatorship, and most importantly, the fear of losing power. It was this last named fear that prompted the constables, the deputy sheriffs and the employees of the county's private subscription fire, police, and garbage-collection units to take to the streets to alert the citizens of the danger of invasion.

The central city under the tutelage of its strong mayor voted 3 to 2 in favor of a metropolitan government, and the remainder of the county cast approximately the reverse ratio, a 2 to 3 vote. It may be worth noting that the only 3 districts outside the city that supported the 1958 charter contained the wealthier communities in Davidson County, and the two wards within the city that voted against the charter were predominently Negro.

In 1962 the voters again went to the polls but this time they reversed themselves in favor of a metropolitan charter. What happened between 1958 and 1962 to change a typically tired high-level educational campaign about the virtues of Metro into a blood-and-guts political battle is interestingly related by Professor Bret Hawkins. After the 1958 defeat, the City of Nashville annexed some 50 square miles and approximately 87,000 persons from the unincorporated areas of the county, increasing the population of the city to about 253,000 and reducing that of the county outside of Nashville, including 6 incorporated areas, to about 147,000. The city fathers of Nashville, somewhat tired of providing free services to residents outside of the city, also imposed a $10 green sticker tax on all motor vehicles using the streets of Nashville for 30 days or more. Anguished cries of taxation without representation were heard from the residents outside of Nashville. A vital factor which had been missing from the 1958 election was now remedied with the emergence of the Mayor of Nashville as the arch villain responsible for both horrendous acts, annexation and the motor vehicle tax. The purification rites that Scott Greer speaks of in his *Metropolitics* could now be performed and the demons exorcized.

The Mayor of Nashville, about the strongest supporter of metropolitan government in 1958, was considered at that time the front runner for the position of the mayor of the new proposed government. With his chances rapidly dwindling after 1958, the mayor in 1962 became the strongest opponent of the charter. On the other hand, the County Judge (Chairman), at best a reluctant supporter of the charter in 1958, became an ardent advocate of Metro in 1962 when it appeared that his chances were excellent for being elected its first mayor. Moreover, the charter's provision for the continued election of the county tax assessor and county trustee (tax collector) helped to win over a significant number of county employees to the pro-Metro camp. By the inclusion of fire and police functions in the urban rather than the countywide general service district, the private firemen and policemen who had opposed the charter in 1958 no longer felt their jobs were put in jeopardy, and in 1962 endorsed the charter. (I do wish that Mr. Hawkins had some more details on the charter or had included a copy of the charter in the appendix. In general, there might have been a more extensive use of documentation.)

The new alignments, a grass roots door-to-door campaign of the traditional pro-Metro forces, a much greater involvement of the political professionals, the acquisition of an arch villain plus the still unhealed scars borne by a large part of the electorate as a result of the motor vehicle tax and annexation, and the fear of annexation by the unincorporated areas, combined to provide the required majorities for a metropolitan Nashville government both inside and outside the city of Nashville. The Mayor of Nashville was able to carry the votes of the "old city" (the city prior to annexation) but he lost out to the overwhelming pro-Metro vote of the annexed areas. The unincorporated areas likewise were responsible for the Metro victory in the Davidson County area outside of Nashville.

Although the Nashville experience like that of Dade County (Greater Miami) may provide a number of valuable lessons for other metropolitan areas, the fact remains that the victories in both cases were due to rather atypical and unique circumstances. The Hawkins book, despite the limitations of a local case study, makes another fine contribution to the literature of metropolitan reform.—Edward Sofen, *University of Miami.*

*Urban Renewal and American Cities.* By Scott Greer. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Pp. xiii, 201. $1.95.)

Fully the first two thirds of Scott Greer's critical review of urban renewal consists of uninspired but lucid exposition: first, of the history of housing legislation from 1937 to the 1961 Act; and second, of relationships between local urban renewal authorities on the one hand and an array of local, state, and Federal agencies and political participants on the other. The remaining third shifts mood dramatically, revealing Greer at his best—as an imaginative creator and manipulator of social and economic theory, a skilled synthesizer, a persuasive proponent, and even for a few brief passages as a poet of sorts.

The exposition sections trace the shift in housing legislation emphasis from depression concern about the physical environment of the poor, and the personal and societal pathology presumably flowing from "substandard" housing, to present preoccupation with nonresidential demolition and reconstruction in central business districts. The 1961 Housing Act, with its "workable program" requirement, represents Congress's best attempt to date to delineate objectives and set directions. Greer, however, effectively devastates the legislation's pretentions about being definitive. First of all, there is simply too much loose language. Beyond that, variations in administration at the local level have been extraordinary, particularly in the area of code enforcement (one segment of the workable program package). Assumptions about the psychological and economic attractiveness of rehabilitation and conservation efforts have been nearly discredited by actual experience.

None of this is news to those who have a professional interest in or commitment to urban affairs. The exposition I have been describing is distinctly elementary, suitable for introductory college courses dealing in part or whole with this subject area, or even the highest two grades of high school. And for ninety pages, when he deals with LPA relationships, Greer inexusably lapses into quotation-stringing of the breeziest sort, as a way, this reviewer felt, of "watering the pig." In brief, midstream in *Urban Renewal and American Cities* one cannot help wondering how this effort warrants inclusion in a publisher's series entitled "advanced studies in political science."

As I have indicated, however, the book redeems itself. Greer turns in the later chapters to a skillfull manipulation of demographic and market theory, demonstrating the interaction of human and structural ecology in producing the problems urban renewal is supposed to cure. His summary of this interaction, pp. 162–4, is brilliant. Appropriate to his stated policy concern, Greer ends with a consideration of goals—those of the urban renewal program, and his own—and the implications they raise for corrective action. The irony of these decades of evolving housing policy is sharp: where once the hope was to improve the life conditions of the poor through public building, now liberals find themselves in the defensive position of trying to minimize injury to the poor traceable to public building policy: a decline in inexpensive housing, overcrowding due to a decline in housing units generally in the central city (although quite the opposite in the metropolis), the social trauma of racial and ethnic residential successions, the personal trauma of relocation, the forcing of higher proportional allocation of limited income to housing.

To move again to the offense, Greer surveys a wealth of possible tactics and programs: rent subsidy, forty-year mortgages, exploitation of positive attitudes toward housing for the elderly, provision (somehow) of means for rapid leapfrogging by Negroes to prevent ghetto-producing invasions, and others. His survey is far too brief and casual to form any sort of agenda. More seriously, there is no political prognosis for most of what is suggested.

Nor can one say much for the political, as distinct from social and economic, diagnosis throughout the book. The simple political information in the first two thirds of the book is not subjected, as are the social and economic data, to a later theoretical refocusing. No work of this type should leave the reader asking how Congress could be so ignorant or malevolent. An incisive analysis of Congressional and local legislative decision-making, of the interplay of private investors with administrators, of the poor as a segment of the electorate, and similar crucial parts of the puzzle, should have been in order. Most of the time there is no analysis; sometimes it is there, but imperfect. For example: Greer suggests that the shift in emphasis from residential areas to the central business district reflects the interests of private investors, urban aesthetes, and a general public who are impressed by new skyscrapers. But doesn't an adequate analysis require some mention of active opposition to residential proposals by certain classes of organized poor in designated renewal areas—opposition helping to force LPAs into less controversial types of clearance and construction (uninhabited areas; areas of small, marginal businesses; etc.)?

Finally, since *Urban Renewal and American Cities* is an open appeal to a set of substantive social values centering on empathy with the poor, one might have hoped Greer would also tackle a discussion of the fundamental procedural political values that always seem to play such a central part in urban renewal: the determination of public or majority interest, consideration of passionate minorities, the choice between short-term damage to lives as against long-term benefit to, say, descendants of those injured. (He does address himself, as his final plea, to the immorality of acting without sufficient information.) Most of these political questions—of political analysis and political philosophy—remain unsettled, unfocused, or unraised.—BRADBURY SEASHOLES, *Tufts University*.

*How To Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory*. BY STEPHEN C. SHADEGG. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. 205. $5.00.)

In writing this book Stephen Shadegg set out "to offer to those seriously interested in political action an understanding of campaign management, campaign techniques and procedures." To that end he lays down rules for a wide range of campaign activities: formulating strategy, using polls, developing issues, presenting candidates to the voters, organizing headquarters' staffs, creating "cell groups," canvassing, and using the various media of communication.

The result is a book of very considerable interest to the student of politics. What Shadegg has to say is free of cant. A number of the tactics and strategems he advocates, if not original with him, are in any case new to the literature on campaigning. His discussion of what campaigners should do is more illuminating than most because it is informed by some very general notions of how voters may be expected to think and to act.

In addition the book casts doubt on the prevailing interpretation of Senator Barry Goldwater's strategy in his 1964 presidential campaign. In that campaign the Senator attacked "the regimented society," "handouts," and "unwarranted intervention in our private economic lives," while remaining almost entirely silent about the future of existing programs for social welfare. In this sense his appeal was the most conservative of any Republican candidate in recent years. Analysts have almost universally assumed that Goldwater did as he did in the belief that large numbers of conservatives who had failed to vote for "me-too" candidates of the Republican Party would turn out to vote for him in 1964, a belief for which there was hardly more to be said before than after the election. Now, although Mr. Shadegg served as Goldwater's manager in his campaigns for the Senate in 1952 and 1958 and as a consultant to the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee when the Senator was its Chairman, belief in a "hidden" conservative vote finds no place whatsoever among his strategic doctrines. If the adviser shows no sign of having taken that idea seriously, is it so certain that the advisee did? That question is all the more to the point because Shadegg, a conservative interested in electing conservatives, does espouse a principle of strategy which makes reasonable most of what the Republicans did in 1964. He advises campaigners to appeal to "indifferent" voters because "The segment of the population which is least interested in politics decides the outcome of most elections." These least interested voters "act more from emotion than reason" and will "frequently respond to the careful development of a difference between candidates which has no valid bearing upon their competence." Such voters have little attachment to political philosophies; indeed, "a voter can be persuaded to give his ballot to a candidate whose philosophy is opposed to the cherished notions of the voter." From these premises one might easily have reasoned, in the circumstances of 1964, that a conservative appeal would put ardor into the efforts of Republican activists while not alienating the great mass of voters who are largely indifferent to issues of policy. The votes of these latter could be won by personal attacks on President Johnson, alarums about moral decay, and talk of crime in the streets.

One final comment. Like Shadegg, leading students of voting behavior have assigned a decisive role in elections to the indifferent and uninformed voter. They, and he, may have exaggerated that role. It is possible that many voters have shown themselves indifferent to issues of policy in those elections most thoroughly analyzed because the candidates in those elections in fact took very similar positions on policy issues. It could also be that many voters who have no awareness of policy issues nonetheless take their cues for voting from those who are aware of them. It is important to know whether, and in what way, Shadegg's strategic assumptions need qualification, not just for the sake of those who want to win elections, but because, in the words of V. O. Key,

> The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. . . . Even the most discriminating popular judgment can reflect only ambiguity, uncertainty, or even foolishness if those are the qualities of the input into the echo chamber.

STANLEY KELLEY, JR., *Princeton University.*

*Kennedy Campaigning: The System and the Style as Practiced by Senator Edward Kennedy.* BY MURRAY B. LEVIN. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 313. $5.95.)

For some purposes this is an interesting book. The main body, consisting of the first four chapters, describes in detail the Edward Kennedy-Edward McCormack convention and primary fight for the 1962 Democratic Senatorial nomination in Massachusetts. A large portion of these four chapters reports excerpts from interviews which the author had with convention delegates, campaign managers, aides, and the like. Some emphasis is placed on the strategies and tactics of the candidates and how they used or misused their resources. The major factors in Edward Kennedy's victories according to Professor Levin were that he was the President's brother (which helped him at the convention) and a member of the charismatic Kennedy family (which helped him in the primary). But the reporting by the author is a good deal more detailed than simply this, and those interested should consult the text.

The fifth chapter, somewhat out of context in the book, discusses campaign financing, ways in which Massachusetts' candidates either circumvent the law or violate the law, and the difficulties in enforcing laws to regulate contributions and expenditures.

The sixth and last chapter relies heavily on Daniel J. Boorstin's *The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream* as a framework to interpret what went before. Central to Professor Levin's interpretation is the "pseudo-event" or staged impression. Appearances become reality and what is presented to the voter is the result of a carefully drawn portrait painted by those managing the campaign and candidate. Unfortunately the theoretical underpinnings of this interpretation are not explored (e.g., George Herbert Mead, Erving Goffman), and the implication is that this is something new in American politics. (My own view is that impression management has been going on for as long as the drama could be used as a metaphor for human conduct, and the problem has been raised early, *cf.*, Plato's *Republic.*) It may be that the Kennedys are more adept at it than others, but since this study covers a single campaign no comparative data are analyzed.

Clearly, in the first five chapters, the reporting is of a very high quality. It is, by and large, the kind of political reporting one wishes journalists would engage in. There are no stupid statements, staged confrontations of ideals with reality, or silly notions of what politics is or should be. Professor Levin is obviously a man who knows better.

The book, however, is undoubtedly not addressed primarily to a scholarly audience. The topic is a single event, and the writing appears designed for the intelligent layman. As a case study it is rich in descriptive detail but, even for case studies, weak in generalization. As a book which will appeal primarily to laymen there is no jargon, few footnotes, some repetition, few insights, and little analysis. For what it is, however, it is done well, and it would be a mistake to judge it from other points of view.—Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *University of California, Irvine.*

*George Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy.* By Norman L. Zucker. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966. Pp. 186. $5.00.)

In *George W. Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy* Professor Norman Zucker has not attempted to write a definitive biography of the well known Nebraska Senator. In this slim volume the details of Norris' life are sketched only very cursorily, and the author provides no insight at all into such important matters as his personality or his relationships with other people. Norris, the man, does not come through in these pages. While one cannot be abolutely sure of the purpose Professor Zucker intended the book to serve (there is no hint of a statement of purpose in the form of an introduction or preface), it is most aptly described, I think, as a short intellectual biography which attempts to chart the main currents of Norris' political ideas and trace their application in various of the policy stands he took throughout his long tenure in Congress. Taken as such, *George W. Norris* provides a number of interesting insights into one manifestation of the Progressive Mind.

Norris, like most other Progressives, Professor Zucker shows, had the sort of simple faith in "the people" that dictated an equally simple institutional system for the conduct of democratic politics. There should be, in effect, only "the people" and their representatives elected by a simple majority—and as little as possible in between. As befits a notorious maverick, he consistently abhorred the influence of parties in politics, holding that of all the "evils in government, the greatest is partisanship." At no time, as Professor Zucker shows, did Norris ever perceive that parties might serve to maximize popular control over the political process. Rather, he seemed to feel that something like a public will existed in and of itself, that would only be diluted or perverted by the intervention of party. Ever the moralist in politics, Norris elevated civil service to a near-absolute principle—even for the highest offices at the national level; only by eliminating the possibilities for material reward in politics, he felt, could the insidious force of party be eliminated. His preference for simplicity and directness in the political process led him from time to time to advocate abolition of the electoral college and creation of unicameral state legislatures. The same sentiments prompted the Senator to support various judicial reforms ranging from abolition of all federal courts below the Supreme Court to a rule requiring a two thirds majority for a court to declare laws of Congress unconstitutional.

As an advocate of what Professor Zucker calls—without explaining it very precisely—"economic democracy," Norris did battle throughout his long tenure in the Senate with the institutions of large capitalism, which, he thought, tended to crush the little man. Not only did he approve of considerable governmental regulation of large producing units and of a stiff progressive tax policy; he consistently advocated plans for government ownership of railroads, shipping facilities, and electric generating equipment that would strike many liberals as radical even today. Always an agrarian (he accepted, unquestioned, all of the Jeffersonian maxims relating to the virtues of the bucolic and the hideousness of cities), Norris advocated governmental aid to the farmer long before the New Deal. Yet, despite his agrarianism and the overwhelmingly rural nature of his constituency, he remained throughout his career a strong advocate of collective bargaining for the industrial worker. His greatest legacy, however, Professor Zucker argues, was T.V.A. Norris, more than any other individual, deserves credit for defeating Henry Ford's powerful bid to take over the government's facilities at Muscle Shoals in the name of "private enterprise" and for the final emergence of T.V.A. As usual, in fact, the Senator wanted to go further to ensure the public development of all river valleys in the nation, but had to accept what he could get.

In the area of foreign affairs, it seems, Norris, as many another moralist from the interior, was least at home. Although he was not, properly speaking, a consistent isolationist, he never rose above a simple devil theory of profit as the cause of war. Having voted on this ground against entrance to World War I, he entertained the same kind of doubts about the movement of the United States toward entrance into World War II, but reluctantly advocated aiding the Allies on the ground that Hitler's Germany presented a threat to democracy throughout the world. While he theoretically supported international organization, he opposed U. S. entrance to the League of

Nations on the ground that the Versailles Treaty and the plan for the League offended his sense of justice (i.e., contained elements of power politics).

In general, Professor Zucker argues, Senator Norris was not a particularly deep thinker, but rather "an emotional liberal" with "an abiding and passionate devotion to the concerns of his fellow men."

Undoubtedly some readers will find themselves annoyed with this volume. Whatever may be the virtue of the methodological self-consciousness now prevalent among American political scientists, there is little of it here. Professor Zucker writes plainly, with no aspirations toward scientific explanation, and he obviously lays no claim to "value neutralism." For the student of Progressivism, however, there is a good deal of solid, if not brilliant, material here.—W. WAYNE SHANNON, *Louisiana State University.*

*Cornbelt Rebellion: The Farmers' Holiday Association.* BY JOHN L. SHOVER. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 239. $5.95.)

The period of the Great Depression and the early years of the New Deal were characterized by protest and violent clashes, as well as by innovative social and economic legislation. Although the conflicts between labor and industry are well known, the Midwestern protests by farmers against the forces of the market place and lending establishments have received less attention.

This is an account of the brief organizational and ideological life of the Farmers' Holiday Association. Growing out of the depression and operating chiefly in the corn-hog and dairy regions west of the Mississippi River, the Association drew its membership chiefly from among owner operators and had little in common with the tenant-oriented, rural groups of the South. All however were characterized as "radical," in contrast to more established farmers' organizations. The Farmers' Holiday Association's economic objective, a governmental guaranteed cost of production to farmers, was borrowed from the Farmers Union which also provided it with leaders and members. Its tactic to achieve this goal, the strike, was not unique among farmers, but the Farmers' Holiday Association made the greatest use of it until it was revised in the same area by the National Farmers' Organization in the late 1950's.

During its brief existence, the attention of the news media and public officials focused upon the Farmers' Holiday Association because of scattered acts of violence on picket lines and sporadic incidents of sabotage. Neither were condoned by the Association's officers, but they aided as well as hindered the organization. The focus upon violence seems to have led to an exaggerated evaluation of the organization's political and economic power. This hastened the response of state legislatures in Nebraska, Iowa and Minnesota, which enacted moratorium laws that slowed down the rate of foreclosures on mortgage delinquent farms. Washington also overrated the organization's threats at times, but its chief response was to undercut the movement by adopting an inflationary policy. On the other hand, the violence of a few, credited to the Association, lost that body much of the sympathy which a wider public had granted it in its early days.

Attracting little attention were the fairly successful conciliatory efforts of the Association, which brought together debtor and creditor to negotiate mortgage settlements which avoided foreclosure. For this needed function, it did not claim credit from its friends, and its foes gave it none.

Problems of organization and leadership are given some attention by the author and could have been given more. At a time when means of communications were less developed and skill in organizing less widely distributed and professionalized, the efforts of a few men to create and guide an organization over a wide area deserve notice. Leadership in the Farmers' Holiday Association was personal. Not only were the tasks of collecting dues not routinized, but neither were the development and dissemination of policy. Top leadership saw the strike as a means of securing political action to guarantee cost of production; the rank and file and their local leaders saw it as a means of securing immediate price increases. Lacking a commonly understood goal within the Association, top leaders saw local members turn to unauthorized violence in frustration or melt away when economic conditions improved.

Of interest to students of politics is the role of the Communist Party in the agrarian protests of the 1930's. Once alert to the situation, Party leaders determined to publicize Party-guided demands for rural relief and to attempt to lead farmers in the direction of Party goals. Despite some early successes, Party fortunes declined once the leaders of the Farmers' Holiday Association were alerted to its challenge and its position was publicized. Ultimately the Party's agrarian movement merged into the Farmers' Holiday Association but by that time the latter was of no significance as a farmers' protest organization.

Like other economic protest movements, the Farmers' Holiday Association disintegrated once a measure of prosperity had been restored. Among its more active leaders, a few remained with the Left, a few others found common cause with the Right. Most became inactive.

The author has written an interesting narrative of a major protest movement of the 1930's. It would have been more complete had he included the roles and actions of other farm organizations and leaders which opposed the Farmers' Holiday association and its methods.—WILLIAM J. BLOCK, *North Carolina State University.*

*Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization.* BY ROBERT J. MORGAN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 399. $8.00.)

*Governing Soil Conservation,* by Robert J. Morgan, is an excellent study of the national effort to carry on a nationwide soil conservation program through the agency of independent special-purpose districts, a study doubly useful because it is written on several planes. It will provide interesting and rewarding reading for at least three quite different professional groups: the political scientist, concerned with the political and administrative problems and possibilities of national governance through local instruments; the agricultural economist and the conservationist, concerned with achievement of conservation goals; and finally, those professional and lay workers in soil conservation directly concerned in the administration of the soil conservation district program.

For the political scientist, this study offers a slice of the governmental process. It is a case study of an important effort to meet one of the great unresolved problems of a national government administering a continental democratic society, which holds as one of its basic assumptions the proposition that individual initiative and freedom can best be served through the mechanism of local self-government.

In analyzing the Soil Conservation Service-local conservation district partnership as a device for bringing local government into the formulation and carrying out of a national soil conservation program, Mr. Morgan explores such a wide range of problems as the capacity of the district and its lay supervisors to develop conservation policy; the effectiveness of the district in obtaining voluntary complicance and in enforcing regulations; the representative nature of district governing boards; alternative geographical bases for district organization; the potentialities of the district as a general purpose local unit for coordinating or administering federal agricultural programs; the tangled web of local, state, and national inter-agency relationships which has shaped the conservation program and influenced its effectiveness; the district's impact upon the power structure in agriculture.

Many of the problems Mr. Morgan explores relate particularly to the administration of a national program in a rural environment. The district is undoubtedly a spiritual heir of the old Populist-Progressive traditions of a by-gone America. Nevertheless, the analysis of the federal-local partnership in soil conservation perhaps can provide insight and information applicable in developing devices for local participation in the new urban-based programs of an industrial society.

Because the preservation-restoration of our natural resources is one of the central needs of this urban society, Mr. Morgan's book also will have direct interest and value for the students of agriculture and resource conservation concerned with the national need for a conservation program and administration whose effectiveness is commensurate with the conservation job ahead. Published under the auspices of Resources for the Future, this careful and detailed study of how the program has worked provided a needed objective evaluation of the operation of the program in the light of its accomplishments.

Finally, Mr. Morgan's book will be of particular interest to many of those who have been working directly in the soil conservation district program. His scholarly historical account of the development of the program and his comprehensive survey of the differing ways in which the district program is presently organized in the various states and sections make his study a valuable source book for those interested in discovering how the program in which they are participating has developed over the years and how it operates in other states and sections.—W. ROBERT PARKS, *Iowa State University.*

*The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy.* BY LOUIS L. GERSON. (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1964. Pp. xxvii, 325. $6.00.)

In several respects, this book is of exceptional interest to the political scientist. It is a study of hyphenated Americans—immigrants and their descendants who couple their American nationality with that of their land of origin. Prof. Gerson, himself a naturalized American, sets forth perceptively the elements which induce these ethnic Americans to respond to the pressures both of their ancestral lands and of the American politicians who exploit the nationality vote to maintain political power bases. Further, the study points out that nationality groups, from time to time, represent divisive forces which have impact on the rational formulation of national policy, especially foreign policy.

Prof. Gerson's inquiry covers the period from 1890 to 1956, with particular regard to the influence of ethnic groups on national problems which emerged during and following the two world wars. The book describes the exploitation of the nationality groups during the 1920 presidential election by the Republican party—which encouraged the discontents and disappointments of ethnic Americans opposed to the Treaty of Versailles, or which had resisted America's entry into the war, or whose loyalty had been questioned. As the author reminds us, these ethnic groups were an important factor in contributing of the confused "mandate" of 1920. The vote also convinced the nationality groups of their political power. One of the ironies of this moment in history was that their self-consciousness had been developed during World War I as a matter of national policy by the Office of Public Information, which had proclaimed ethnic "days" and generated an ethnic nationalism that these groups had not possessed heretofore.

The author traces the role of ethnic nationalism on events leading up to World War II. By now the nationality groups were better organized and, in different ways and for different reasons, were able to identify the national interest with that of their ancestral lands. And during the Second World War the loyalties of the hyphenated Americans, as during World War I, were of serious concern to the government. Again federal agencies classified certain nationality groups as "patriotic" or "subversive"; alien registration laws were imposed; aliens and naturalized citizens were placed under continual surveillance. At the same time, the government was attempting to achieve support for the war effort among these groups with confused or divided loyalties. On the other hand, as the author notes, the two political parties were making self-seeking appeals to the divergent aims of nationality groups, each concerned with the future of its native lands and potentially in conflict with developing U. S. national policy.

The political power of the ethnic Americans seems to be most clearly evident in the author's description of the presidential election of 1948, in particular the role of the Nationalities Division of the Democratic party. The Truman victory led to the establishment in 1951 of an Ethnics Origins Division by the Republican National Committee in an effort to bid for twenty-eight million nationality votes in seventeen key industrial states. In its appeal for the hyphenated vote, the Republicans adopted a liberation policy for "captive peoples." While this appeal to ethnic groups brought immediate political gains, as Prof. Gerson correctly notes, the pursuance of the nationality vote certainly blurred the future development of viable foreign policies.

What is the future of the ethnic vote? The author tells us that the growing involvement of the U. S. in world affairs means that ethnic groups will have greater influence on foreign policy, although conflicting aims may neutralize the positions of various nationality organizations. He further notes that the "balanced ticket" is becoming more widespread in state and national politics even though there is a lack of reliable information on the abilities of ethnic and political leaders to deliver the foreign nationality vote. To overcome the culpability of politicians in terms of excesses and irresponsibilities, Prof. Gerson proposes a gentlemen's agreement between the parties not to make promises which cannot and will not be fulfilled. From the standpoint of foreign policy, this would doubtless be welcomed by the State Department. As for the other major problem, ethnic political assimilation, the author believes this process would be speeded up if both parties would eliminate their nationalities division and thus, hopefully, bring to an end this ethnic isolationism.

The study underlines the need for further attention to the future political roles of these hyphenated Americans and their organizations. For instance, what effect does the Assembly of Captive European Nations have on the Congressional relations of the State Department? What is the state of political assimilation of third- and fourth-generation Americans? What is the political role of the foreign language press? The author has provided an illuminating start on a political facet of our society that is not too widely acknowledged in much of the current literature.—George C. Betts, *Kent State University.*

*Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers.* By Edward S. Flash. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. vii., 382. $8.95.)

This book needed to be written, but it is only a beginning. For its quality it deserves praise; for its quality it also deserves serious and probing criticism.

Professor Flash has attempted to record the history of the Council of Economic Advisers at two levels. The first level is orthodox history. It is a history of major actions and embroilments of the agency since its establishment by the Employment Act of 1946. Here he follows in the footsteps of the Advisers from their respective antecedent careers and training through to the commitments they helped bring the Federal government to accept. Flash's theme is the relation between knowledge and power, and this hovers over his history throughout, although he does not bring it down from hovering to explicit application as often as he should. However, one still gets the clear impression from the chronicle, if not always directly from the author, that the knowledge-power relationship through most of CEA's history displayed almost none of the characteristics of the Weberian bureaucratic model in which special knowledge is a base for direct exercise of power upon public policy. Rather, the knowledge-power relationship followed much more closely the model of "Continental Classroom." CEA, despite the extraordinary quality and reputation for expertise of its members, seemed never to possess or exercise much direct power. But still, it often seemed doggedly to shape the directions in which the truly powerful sought to exercise their power. However appealing Keynesian economics is to economists, it required strenuous effort and translation before it became the established ideology and technology of government.

The second level of professor Flash's history is his effort to provide the details of the decision-making process underlying his history of the agency. In a sense his book is a chronicle within a chronicle. He thus, for example, not only attempts to capture CEA's role vis-à-vis the other agency participants in developing NSC 68 and its applications; he also attempts to provide us with a case-study of the internal life of CEA under Keyserling that brought about the particular effort CEA made. Likewise for many other key decisions in the life of CEA, including, perhaps most usefully and with special savor, the ultimate triumph of Keynes by and through the development of tax cut thinking under Kennedy and, less in detail, the development of new values in the lodging of discretionary fiscal power in the President.

Inevitably the book comes up short. But the way it comes up short should be instructive for us all. In its care for detail and loyalty to full and just accounts of men, motivations and efforts, the author deprives us too often of his considered and explicit professional judgements and speculations. Only a man as familiar with the Council as Professor Flash can give us trustworthy judgements, and can place the Council in proper relation to the whole context of American government and modern bureaucratic power. Care for detail, though extraordinarily useful detail, has made the book too behavioristic. As with the early behaviorists in other fields, the author proceeded to collect every observation and datum on the assumption that ultimately the facts will fall into some kind of meaningful pattern. So with Professor Flash's book. It has presented us the parts without the corpus. (And the parts are complete except for the unfortunate omission of the entire Saulnier period, 1956–61).

The giveaway to the reader, and perhaps the beginning of error for the author, is his initial definition of power: "political power is concerned with responsibility for accomplishment and progress, for welfare and survival" (p. 2). This is the beginning of encapsulation by prevailing fashions in liberal ideology and the end of the urge for searching inquiry into the meaning of the Council, the impact of it and its new techniques and technology on the entire apparatus of decision-making, and into the revolution of relationships between government and private life in this country. For example, it is clear from the data on the Fed-Treasury dispute that CEA had almost no impact on the decision-making apparatus, and especially that the CEA has made no contribution to "rationalization of power" in government. The data also make clear an enormous impact of CEA thinking upon government intervention and upon the new uses of government power. This is attested to by the elevation of GNP as an official concept and an official responsibility. It is attested to by "system thinking" implied by GNP, by introduction in government of the notion of the "built-in stabilizers," and by the development and redevelopment of many specific techniques of manipulating the environment of economic conduct without touching the economic actors themselves. It is attested to in an ultimate way in Kennedy's 1962 requests for three new and vastly important requests for discretionary power in the chief executive. But these extremely significant indexes are left as mere facts in the chronicle and we are deprived of Professor Flash's judgment as to whether these facts have the significance as indexes that they seem to the less informed reader to have.

As a result of this permissive and non-evaluative framework, the author doomed himself to conclusions that are rather more accurately called summaries, summaries indeed that are comparable to the many-page tabularization of "findings" in Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee's appendix in *Voting*. Thus in the last, concluding chapters, the author finds himself pretty much held to an appendix of summaries on the very narrowest and least instructive aspects of the subject: the conditions of performance, what interferes with or facilitates presidential friendship, and how to characterize advice. Professor Flash holds himself modestly to such concluding judgements as " . . . each Council's convictions and conduct will . . . continue uniquely to initiate, facilitate and rationalize economic policy formulation for its own particular administration." He, perhaps deliberately, deprives us of warranted assessments and speculations and theories on the substance and significance of those rationalizations in terms of their place and the place of the Council in the larger system. The subject deserves more than one book, and Professor Flash is one of the few scholars up to the task.—THEODORE LOWI, *University of Chicago.*

*Federal Tax Policy.* By Joseph A. Pechman. (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xxi, 321. $2.45, paper.)

Dr. Pechman has written an extremely informative book about one of the most intricate and pervasive aspects of American political economy. His *Federal Tax Policy* adds understanding rather than fuel to the controversy over "who pays."

As one of the Brookings series of Studies of Government Finance, Pechman's book admirably fulfills its educational purpose. It responds to and encourages the growing public interest in economic affairs in much the same way as do such government documents as the President's annual *Economic Report* and the publications of the Joint Economic Committee. In providing a comprehensive survey of federal economic policy, taxation, and the making of tax policy, Pechman describes the nature as well as the problems of individual and corporation income taxes, consumption taxes, payroll taxes, estate and gift taxes, and state and local taxes. The text is well complemented by charts, tables, and appendices including an historical summary and extensive bibliographical notes.

The book's significance lies not alone in its description of tax policy but also in its emphases upon taxation as a "major instrument of social and economic policy" and upon equity as a primary basis for properly allocating the tax burden. It is within the framework of these principles that Pechman considers such phenomena as the automatic and discretionary aspects of taxes as economic stabilizers; the impact of taxes on low income; and the relationships between the level and structure of taxes, between individual and corporation income taxes as the major sources of federal revenue, and between taxes of different public jurisdictions.

Pechman's emphases are natural consequences of the post-war development of Keynesian full-employment policy and of his own long-standing concern about the erosion of the tax base. He has himself contributed much to the acceptance of growth and potential as tenets of economic policy, an evolution that started with the passage of the employment Act of 1946 and matured with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1964. Indeed, as a consultant to both the Treasury Department and the Council of Economic Advisers, Pechman participated in the development of the original tax proposals submitted to the Congress by President Kennedy in January 1963. The significance of full-employment policy for tax policy is clearly evident in the first two chapters and then is frequently applied throughout the book. The concern for greater equity as a counter to unwarranted special privilege is a thread woven most strongly through the discussion of individual income taxes but is also present in the discussions of other taxes and of the tax legislative process.

The reader cannot miss the underlying conclusion that the existing structure of federal taxes and the prospects of structural reform are functions of political as well as economic invention. It is, in fact, Pechman's careful balancing of fact and value throughout the book that contributes so much to its success as an analysis of modern tax policy.—Edward S. Flash, Jr., *Cornell University.*

*Political Parties in the United States.* By Allan P. Sindler. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 111.)

*The Democratic Party in American Politics.* By Ralph M. Goldman. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. 152. $1.50.)

*Presidential Leadership.* By Erwin C. Hargrove. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. v, 153.)

*Interest Groups and Lobbying.* By Abraham Holtzman. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. v, 154. $1.50, paper)

These four books are parts of two of the new series which apparently are geared to lower division students. Sindler's *Political Parties in the United States* is an analytical and evaluative treatment of the American party systems. However, to the author's credit, the discussion often goes beyond domestic sources to what can be said about parties in general. These achievements depend upon an approach set out as a rather loose functionalism in the first chapter. Competitive two-party systems serve democratizing functions most efficiently; therefore such systems are the answer to the question, " . . . what kind of party system best implements the American political system?"

Although functional thinking often seems to lead researchers to implicit normative conclusions, usually in favor of the *status quo*, Sindler avoids this error. Thus, finding that a particular structure performs some valuable function may result in statements that changing the structure would impair the performance of that function. That this type of statement does not depend entirely upon empirical findings becomes obvious when we note that alternative structures may perform the same function. Sindler does not confuse normative and empirical statements: rather he attempts to compare the effects of structures alternative to two-party competition, and second, when he is normative, he is explicitly so.

In Chapter Two he examines the literature on party competition in America to compare the effects of the alternatives—one-party bi-factional and multi-factional systems, and nonpartisan systems. As most of this body of literature would indicate, all of these alternatives as democratizing structures are wanting. The third chapter compares two-partyism with multi-partyism and briefly analyzes the role of minor parties in the U. S.

The last two chapters describe the characteristics of parties and consider the arguments of defenders and the responsible party critics of the American parties. Although Sindler analyzes the discontinuities in the arguments, he shows that a similar causal sequence, from the distribution of social-economic interests in the society, to party characteristics, to governmental policy enactments can be found in both. The book concludes that, although the outcome is uncertain, the nationalizing tendencies in American society may move the parties in the direction desired by responsible party advocates.

A second book about political parties, *The Democratic Party in American Politics*, summarizes the history of the nation's majority party from the beginning of the Republic to the present administration. The chapters of the book set out a brokerage theory of politics; trace local party organizations from the patriotic societies, to city and rural machines, to reform clubs; analyze historical patterns at the state level; describe the period of Democratic ascendancy from Jefferson to the Civil War; evaluate the fortunes of the presidential party from the Civil War to the Depression: trace the relative importance of the Congressional wing from 1835 to the present; show the dominance of the Presidential party from the New Deal to the present; and postulate future trends.

Except for the first chapter, the book is descriptive history. What theory exists is the transactional metaphor in which political leaders are viewed as brokers trading in material, decisional, and positional currencies. In the other sections of the work, the author, Ralph M. Goldman, holds to this metaphor only to varying degrees. At times students of parties might quibble with some of the statements in this book, such as, "However, approximately 90 per cent of the voters consider themselves middle class in the United States" and, from 1964 voting data, "From its former position as the most Democratic section of the country, the South has become the least Democratic."

In the final chapter the author sees several trends in store for the Democratic party. One is the participation of the Democratic party in international party alliances. This activity would certainly be a novel but a necessary one the author feels, concluding, "The world is our precinct." In general, this book can be used as background material for students with weak preparation in party history.

In *Presidential Leadership* Erwin C. Hargrove examines the careers of six presidents to develop relationships between political psychology and presidential roles. The book utilizes a biographical approach, with a chapter devoted to each of the six cases. Out of biographical detail the author abstracts qualitative generalizations which are encompassed by a model of personality. This model is composed of the following categories: personal needs, mental traits, values and ideology, and the unity between these in each personality. Hargrove evaluates presidential roles in terms of leadership of public opinion, legislative leadership, and administrative leadership. Three presidents—the two Roosevelts and Wilson, are "presidents of action," while the remaining three —Taft, Hoover, and Eisenhower, are "presidents of restraint." The concluding chapter summarizes the book and in addition briefly examines three additional action presidents—Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson.

In general, the action presidents have had a more reformist and progressive ideology, and greater need for power. These factors led them to develop political and manipulative mental skills. The effects of these personalities therefore have been to enlarge the power and responsibility of the Presidency. The author wonders, then, if the Presidency has not become an uncomfortable office for conservative leaders. He hopes not.

Students of politics who feel that political theories must recognize that government is a form of social control will find this book less than satisfying. It treats personality as an independent variable and makes no attempt to generalize about the effect of situational factors on personality and roles. These additional factors would not be inappropriate for the theoretical purposes of the book. For what do personality variables tell us that values and attitudes by themselves do not? Isn't it that personality gives us insight into the mix of values and skills and that therefore leaders in roughly similar situations have different impacts due to their different personalities? The stimulus-organism-response model has exactly these implications. However, this book does show that biographical materials are a neglected source of social science data and that biographical research need not be theoryless.

Of these four books, Abraham Holtzman's *Interests Groups and Lobbying* provides the best integration of previous research and original materials.

Teachers who have encountered student impatience with overly formal theories will welcome the first chapter of the book. It is a thorough yet unpretentious statement of the current view of interest groups and lobbying based upon previous work by scholars like Truman, Key, Odegard, Schattschneider and Holtzman's own research. The second chapters deals with factors which relate to interest group effectiveness. The discussion portrays the roles of division of labor and oligarchy within organizations and the potential for a group's opponents to use the legitimizing democratic creed against it. Other factors discussed are organizational cohesion, structure, and multiple memberships. Separate chapters are devoted to the relationships between interest groups and legislators, the executive, the judiciary, and the grass roots. The third chapter takes a comparative approach, analyzing the different patterns of lobbying in three democratic systems —Great Britain, Italy, and the United States. In general the importance of the executive in Great Britain, the importance of the bureaucracy and the presence of a multi-party legislature in Italy, and the fragmented power centers in the United States tend to influence the focus of interest group activity. Holtzman does an impressive job in very few pages.—CHARLES F. CNUDDE, *University of California at Irvine.*

*The Lobbyists.* BY JAMES DEAKIN. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966. Pp. v, 309. $5.00.)

The politically oriented journalist has much to offer the political scientist. Always close to the scene of action, with access to both official and private decision-makers, the competent journalist can become a perceptive observer and commentator. He develops a "feel" for the political, notes changes in style and mood, learns the character of those political actors with whom he associates, pinpoints and assesses their interrelationships.

James Deakin, who has built a reputation as a Washington correspondent for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, should have produced a better book. *The Lobbyists* is disappointing in many respects, but all the more so because its author failed to capitalize upon his peculiar advantages. His is not a perceptive, analytical study that reflects his observance of lobbyists at work. Rather it is a hodge-podge of lobbying history, shallow character studies of lobbyists, sensational incidents of lobbying, and rather naive generalizations together with some sound data on lobbyists, much of which has appeared elsewhere.

If one wishes to learn about lobbyists in the nation's capital, Milbrath's *The Washington Lobbyists* is a worthwhile book, and one that Deakin quotes. If one desires the sort of picture that Deakin is interested in portraying, Schriftgiesser and Crawford have already painted it. On the other hand, one who has perused Bauer, Pool and Dexter's *American Business and Public Policy; The Politics of Foreign Trade*, would read Deakin with great incredulity for the two describe different worlds, although they purport to discuss the same one—the relationship of American business and its lobbyists with the Congress.

I have stressed business groups and their lobbyists because these are the ones with whom Deakin appears to be really concerned. Despite a chapter on Labor, and some additional references thereto as well as a few other groups, his real concern is over the perversion of government by business lobbyists. This shows up in Deakin's general orientation toward interest groups and lobbying, in the examples he cites, and in his typology (sic) of lobbyists.

Lobbyists for interest groups, as Deakin calls them to the reader's attention, are to be seen as continually battling against proposals to advance the general welfare. They fight legislation to make cities decent, to expand educational opportunities, and to afford economic opportunities to the disadvantaged. They work at blocking consumer protection, medicare for the aged, and auto safety regulation.

Do all lobbyists oppose the general welfare? At times the author recognizes that some work in its behalf—but they are either weak or, if influential, few in number and often divided. Who are these "public interest" lobbyists? The author defines them as those "non-profit lobbyists" who assert the greatest good for the greatest number principle as against those who insist that the public interest equals the sum of the private interests. The latter, claims Deakin, are known as "profit or status quo lobbyists."

The two kinds of interest groups which most often lobby for the "over-all public interest" are labor organizations and citizens' groups. Whom to include in the latter category may puzzle the reader. No matter, what is clear is that labor is more often battling for the public's interest or, rather, that business is most often opposed. Business has plenty of money; money counts in lobbying—legislators like it or need it for reelection purposes; and grass roots lobbying and public relations campaigns require ample finances. Well financed business groups lobby the Congress successfully and on a tremendous scale. Apparently the author had never examined Bauer, Pool and Dexter's data and conclusions that much of business lobbying is weak, poorly financed and ineffective.

Despite its failings, *The Lobbyists* does have some relevance for the political scientist. First of all, it reports cases where business lobbying was well organized, heavily financed, and effective. Although Bauer, Pool and Dexter concede that theirs is a study in one policy area, during one period of time, and that some evidence points to contrary conclusions, the impact of their book is to downgrade the emphasis upon money, organization and the influence of interest groups and lobbying. Additional evidence to the contrary provides a corrective for a more balanced point of view.

*The Lobbyists* also includes a number of items which might profitably be explored by political scientists. Deakin cites extensively from recent legislative investigations of lobbyists for foreign businesses and countries. Since inter-country relationships have traditionally been conducted by executives and through official channels, the strategy and tactics of foreign countries lobbying in the Congress to affect American domestic and international policies merit serious investigation. A second topic deserving additional study concerns political party-interest group relations. The book indicates that our national parties sometimes subsidize private interest groups. The case in point is the National Council of Senior Citizens which, according to Deakin, received one-third of its budget during a recent period from the Democratic Party and the A. F. of L.

Not only does Deakin call our attention to such phenomena, but he attempts, also, in a mixture of sophistication and naïveté, to grapple with the problem of regulating lobbying within the context of the political system. Unfortunately, his book as a whole adds very little to our understanding of lobbying or lobbyists, misses completely some of the new aspects of lobbying in Washington, D. C., and will most likely mislead the general reader to whom it is obviously addressed.—Abraham Holtzman, *North Carolina State University at Raleigh.*

*The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and The Policy Process.* By Demetrios Caraley. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 345. $8.95.)

Demetrios Caraley is Associate Professor of Government at Barnard College. His book is another in the expanding series of studies on defense policy sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. There is a foreword by William T. R. Fox.

According to Mr. Caraley, his purpose is twofold: to describe the controversy over military unification from 1943 to 1947, and "to contribute to the understanding of how conflict develops and becomes resolved more generally as part of the policy process in excutive branch and congressional politics." Mr. Caraley's research has been exhaustive. Much of the material is new. The papers of General Lauris Norstad and Clark Clifford, to which Mr. Caraley had access, throw new light on the unification struggle—as do the numerous interviews with leading congressional personalities which Mr. Caraley reports.

The organization of the book conforms to Mr. Caraley's purpose. The first two chapters (Part I) describe the genesis of the issue. Chapters 3 and 4 (Part II) extract the goals of the War Department and the Navy for independent analysis. Part III describes the resolution of the conflict; Part IV, the determinants of legislative behavior; and Part V contains conclusions concerning conflict and the policy process. Schematically, this makes a tidy outline. Mr. Caraley sets out the bare bones of controversy, then adds flesh in terms of analysis. Doubtless this contributes to the scholarly rigor of the study, and affords the political scientist an interesting and well-articulated conceptual scheme for examining the policy process.

Mr. Caraley treats the unification controversy with admirable depth and precision. No one, for example, has detailed so thoroughly the public relations campaigns waged by the participants, nor their lobbying efforts in Congress. The fact that the competitors in the struggle were broad-based coalitions rather than monolithic military services is carefully documented. Indeed, after Mr. Caraley's study, one feels that there is little left to be said about the controversy surrounding the creation of the Department of Defense.

Professor Caraley is at his best when he discusses the motives and actions of the principal participants. The dominant (but not controlling) influence of President Truman comes across nicely, as do the roles of Secretary Forrestal and the principal military negotiators (Norstad and Sherman). Congressman Clair Hoffman emerges as a significant figure in the final legislation. The possible effects of competing unification proposals are handled deftly. Mr. Caraley's substantive conclusions are judicious. His final chapter capsules the development of U. S. military policy since 1949, and raises pertinent questions concerning the limitations of political foresight. In many respects, the unification of 1947 was no better and no worse than the system it replaced. And the same has been true ever since. As Caraley reminds us: " . . . with a few . . . exceptions . . . the real . . . differences over defense organization have not . . . concerned technical proposals . . . (but) . . . the critical issue of how influence . . . is to be distributed . . . " (p. 283). In short, a question of power.

Professor Caraley writes crisply. This is particularly true when he discusses specifics. It is in his theoretical treatment of conflict that his presentation is weakest. For then, like Bentham, his language sometimes "darkens knowledge." Consider the following:

"Since political conflict has been defined as a kind of interactivity in which one actor promotes and another actor obstructs or interferes with the adoption of some proposed course of governmental action, its development requires the existence of two actors with incentives for mutual opposition. . . . these incentives can be based on any combination of "pure goal conflict," "goal incompatibility," and "means-end disagreement." Pure goal conflict consists of the goal or goals directly sought to be furthered by the first actor and one or more goals of the second actor being mutually exclusive. Goal incompatibility consists of the goals of the first and second actors not being mutually exclusive by definition but of the second actor's perceptions of reality being such that he expects the proposal in question to bring about a particular empirical situation where, in fact, the advancement of the first actor's goals would be at the expense of his own. Means-end disagreement consists, finally, of the two actors possessing different perceptions of reality and thus disagreeing over the effectiveness of a proposal for furthering goals that they both share" (pp. 247–8).

An unrelated objection—for which Mr. Caraley is in no way responsible—concerns the practice of university presses to place footnotes at the end of the book, instead of at the bottom of the page. This is particularly distressing in studies such as Mr. Caraley's where considerable substantive material has been relegated to footnotes. It is not a question of selectivity; it is a question of access.

I do not mean to be hard on this book. Professor Carley has provided a meticulously documented study of military unification. What he says about conflict in general is interesting, but tends to detract from the central themes of unification and policy development. (This is probably a methodoological quibble.) Mr. Caraley has written a fine book. It deserves wide circulation.—JEAN EDWARD SMITH, *University of Toronto.*

*Vermont State Government and Administration: An Historical and Descriptive Study of the Living Past.* BY ANDREW E. NUQUIST AND EDITH W. NUQUIST. (Burlington, Vermont: Government Research Center, University of Vermont, 1966. Pp. xiv, 644. $9.00.)

This book as the authors acknowledge in the preface "Originally was to be one of the series of parallel studies of the governments of the then existing forty-eight states and was to be issued by Thomas Y. Crowell & Company." However, fewer than twenty of the volumes were actually issued under the Crowell publication series.

Virtually the same outline as was suggested by the editor of the American Commonwealth Series, Dr. W. Brooke Graves, was followed by Professor Nuquist and his co-author Edith Nuquist. The only chapter *not* included was the final chapter which in the Commonwealth Series made suggestions as to the future development of state government and administration in the particular state covered in the volume. Probably the reason that the traditional final chapter was not included lies in the fact that in the Vermont study many of the chapters' final paragraphs make suggestions as to what may be the future developments in this particular area.

As would be expected from the sub-title a great deal of historical material is included. In the case of Vermont this is probably easily justified, since its state government's roots are nearly as old as any of the states. It is quite possible that readers not intensely interested in Vermont's historical development may feel on occasion that this aspect of the functional development is too detailed.

Some students of state government may be surprised and possibly disappointed that the authors apparently see no reason to suggest abandonment of the large bi-cameral state legislature in Vermont. Likewise state administration students will find no indication that the role of the chief executive, which in Vermont has been exceedingly weak, should be changed.

The statistical tables that are presented are quite adequate. Very little use is made of systems analysis, flow charts, or diagrams that might assist in demonstrating relationships and areas of responsibility. The over-all style is good. The book is very readable—terms where the least bit complex are defined. Unlike a majority of books published in the field of political science in this decade no use is made of the behavioristic approach.

Because of the paper thickness used in publication this book appears to be a volume of more than 900 pages but in reality it is only 574 pages of textual material plus documentation. The forty-five pages of footnotes demonstrate the care with which the book has been researched.—RUSSELL M. ROSS, *State University of Iowa.*

## COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

*Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches.* BY H. V. WISEMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 254. $6.00.)

Reading this book is a depressing experience. In part, the depression is caused by the book itself, in part by the body of work with which the book deals.

Mr. Wiseman attempts to summarize and give order to some of the leading contemporary systems theorists in the field of comparative politics. This is a major intellectual task and would be an important contribution if done successfully. He also attempts a more modest task: that of providing useful summaries of significant works for students beginning the study of political systems. As he points out, these works are scattered in scholarly journals or in the first and last chapters of large expensive books. The more modest task would also be useful. The book doesn't succeed on the first task and is only partially successful on the second.

The book contains a series of relatively straightforward synopses of general works in comparative politics. If one wants a *précis* of Almond's introductory chapter to the *Politics of the Developing Areas* or Coleman's conclusion to that book, of Lipset's first two chapters of *Political Man*, of Easton's *World Politics* article, and so forth, and so forth, this is the place to find it. The summaries are rather wooden in quality—more or less what one would expect of a rather hard-working and competent graduate student with a literal mind. At times the literalness leads to confusion, as when the author seems to mix up the concept of integration in the Parsonian sense with the problem of integration of American Negroes into the larger society (pp. 8–9). But in general the summaries are not inaccurate. One can predict that the book will receive much attention before comprehensive examinations.

There is some cross-reference among the authors summarized and at times the parallel summaries are quite useful and even illuminating. The chapter on typologies of political systems—though some confusion is created by the introduction of extraneous material—does summarize side-by-side a variety of the current typologies from Riggs, to Shils, to Almond, to Eisenstadt, to Binder, to Weber. It makes one's head spin and one wishes Mr. Wiseman had provided the synthesis for which they cry out. On the other hand, it is quite useful to have all these together. It is easier to locate the similarities and differences. But, in general, we have parallel discussions of the various authors with almost no attempt to synthesize among them, nor any real attempt to be critical of any of them. Whatever criticism is contained in the book consists of summaries of other people's critiques of some of the works discussed within it.

The selection of works to summarize is pretty good; many of the leading contemporary theorists are included. In addition, we get summaries of chapters on politics from some introductory sociology texts. If a student of political science wanted a quick introduction to functional analysis, he might go to an introductory text in sociology. Or he might go to Mr. Wiseman's book which summarizes a chapter on the subject from such an introductory textbook.

The faults of this book, however, are not all attributable to Mr. Wiseman. His summaries are fairly competent and bring out some of the weaknesses in the literature he summarizes. One thing that strikes the reader is the chaotic number of terms used. And the chaos is heightened because the various conceptual schemes and theoretical structures are not diametrically opposed to each other. Rather they are often closely parallel and partially overlap. They are different enough so that they do not easily cumulate. Yet, they are not so different that one can easily describe how they differ and reasonably choose among them on some legitimate criterion. And too much of the writing consists of elaborate conceptualizations while too little consists of propositions about the relationships among variables that would allow one to develop testable hypotheses.

To return to my first theme, perhaps the depth of my depression results from the combination of the works summarized and the book that does the summarization. These theoretical works do have great potential and one faintly senses within them that common paradigm about which everyone talks these days but which no one has produced. However, this book, which is perhaps the first to attempt to put all of these works together, does not get us closer to that paradigm. Wiseman ends appropriately by summarizing a general article on trends in comparative politics from a general reader in contemporary political science.—SIDNEY VERBA, *Stanford University.*

*Left in the Centre: The Independent Labour Party, 1893–1940.* BY ROBERT E. DOWSE. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 231. $6.95.)

In this admirable study, Mr Dowse seeks to explain the reasons for the decline of the I.L.P. during the interwar years. It is not in personal influence or the choice of wrong tactics that he finds the causes, but rather in the "logic of the situation." The I.L.P. had taken a leading part in founding the Labour Party and had continued to influence its course during the years before the first World War. In those days the I.L.P. had had a mission: to convert Labour to socialism, and a function: to provide the party with a constituency organization.

In 1918 both mission and function were destroyed. The new constitution of the Labour Party provided for individual membership and so for local branches. New declarations of policy and program at last committed it to "common ownership" and the "Socialist Commonwealth." These two steps sealed the fate of the I.L.P., although it struggled on for another fourteen years in a futile search for purpose until disaffiliation precipitated its final, rapid plunge into nullity.

This seems to me a convincing explanation, so convincing indeed, that I cannot help asking why the leaders of the I.L.P. themselves did not draw the obvious conclusion, instead of waiting on events. One answer might be that the I.L.P. performed a representative role for some sections of the Labour Movement—for instance, the Scots, or middle class socialist intellectuals. Mr. Dowse, however, has deliberately refrained from analyzing the social base of the party, confining his study to "policy and activity on the national level." This is entirely defensible. Still, even within these limitations, he could have done more to examine the reasons for the I.L.P.'s surprising survival, which is at least as much of a puzzle as its decline.

With this question in mind as one follows Mr. Dowse's detailed chronology of the party's ideological wanderings, one cannot fail to be struck once again by the importance of sheer organizational inertia in political behavior. From nationalization to guild socialism to the "living wage" to the "revolutionary" policies of the Thirties, the I.L.P. program is a kind of palimpsest of the successive leftish fads of the interwar years. The underlying dynamic derives not from socialist conscience or economic conditions, but from the needs of organizational survival.

Such a search for "program material" by organizations that have achieved their original aims can be healthy. One defense of the two party system, for instance, is that it tends to ensure that there will always be a body of men who are moved by their situation as the opposition to offer an alternative way of governing. Similarly, the small political organization in the course of its search for new programs sometimes lights on ideas that refresh and enlighten a major party.

At times Mr. Dowse suggests that the I.L.P. came close to performing this service for the Labour Party in the Twenties and Thirties. Beneath the "fey leftism" of its proposals, he finds it moving towards "a unified theory of political and social change." Although the outlines of this theory never appear in Mr. Dowse's account, his meaning is clear: the I.L.P. had the answer to the problems of the Labour Party, but the Labour Party refused to listen. As a result, Labour failed to acquire that "wider strategy of politics" which would have saved it from the mistakes that have led to "the miserable results of sixty years' work." In short, the I.L.P. did again find a mission. And the cause of its futility lay not with itself or the situation, but with the choice made by the Labour Party.

This line of argument does not fit well with the situational analysis. That approach finds—I think correctly—that the I.L.P., having had a great part in creating Labour's orthodoxy of 1918, continued to share that orthodoxy. It disagreed over tactics, but until the break in 1932, retained it faith in parliamentary democracy. It pushed an underconsumptionist analysis of unemployment, but, so far as one can tell from Mr. Dowse's account, hardly went beyond ideas long familiar in socialist economics. If it had a function in the Labour Party, it was merely that of the "ginger group" which worked to keep the party true to the commitments of its own orthodoxy. I doubt that the I.L.P. had more to offer. Nor do I believe that the results of Labour's sixty years' work have been as miserable as Mr. Dowse seems to think.—Samuel H. Beer, *Harvard University.*

*Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Refrom.* By Frank Smallwood. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Pp. xi. 324. $6.00, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

The 1959–64 session of the British Parliament was not without its dramas, to say the least, but possibly the most controversial legislation it tackled was the London Government Act of 1963. It was the highly charged, sometimes even stirring, debates on this issue which also established the parliamentary reputation of the Opposition's chief spokesman, Michael Stewart, and played its part in hastening the convalescence of the Labour Party, still a little battered after the internecine conflict over nuclear disarmament and clause four, and grateful for an issue which had the support of most of its members and a strong moral overtone as well. The London Act may also have hastened the death of Lord Morrison, possibly the bitterest opponent of the Act, who died symbolically within days of the extinction of his beloved London County Council.

This book is a full account of the origins of the London Act including an appraisal of the Herbert Report on which it was based, the government's maneuvers before the Bill was presented to the House, and the long drawn out struggle of parties and pressure groups both inside and outside Parliament before the new local government structure came into being. Professor Smallwood even treats his readers to a potted history of the metropolis, managing in the process to go one better than most British local councils, never shy about their antecedents, by beginning his story in the Stone Age.

This book is a remarkable achievement. Not only has the author fashioned his facts into a coherent and readable narrative that impels the reader smoothly along the fascinating path from intention to action, but he has mastered the grotesque complexities of English local government which were nowhere more complex than in Greater London. He also displays a thorough grasp of the texture of London politics and the nuances of British political practice. As befits an outside observer Professor Smallwood is detached and always fair. Very little surely remains to be said on this massive change in London local government which for the first time attempts to clothe

the sprawling body of a major world city in a twentieth century administrative suit. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the reform of urban government.

Two criticisms must be made. In trying to reduce the reform process almost entirely to a conflict between competing groups seeking to further their own interests, a distortion has crept in. It is not merely that groups cannot always know what their own interests are, but that there *was* an element of genuine debate going on which transcended individual group interest about the relationships between area and function, about the competing demands of human geography and functional efficiency, about the respective roles of national and local government. It is possibly this distortion which makes Professor Smallwood's appraisal of the Herbert Commission's report a little hazy at times.

He rightly points out the report's concern not to overplay the functional efficiency card and quotes approvingly its contention that 'local government properly so called seeks to give outward form to the inward unity of the living community.' But what are the inward unities of a vast urban agglomeration? Are they superior or prior to the unities created by existing local government boundaries? In other words, are these unities very much more than Luther Gulick's 'institutional personality . . . seeking to perpetuate itself?' If they are, the report shows very little evidence of it and one suspects that much of its argument on this score, and Professor Smallwood's corroborating support drawn from American studies, are really a defense of a two tier system. This is clearly a central question which lies at the heart of the London reform, precisely because it cuts across the secular trend towards unitary government for major cities. Does then the London scheme mark a turning point in the evolution of city government, or is it an aberration? One would have liked to hear more from the author on this point.

A second criticism of this excellent study is that it tends to strain too hard to assimilate the London reform struggle to American experience. Whereas in the reform process in the United States ultimate power rests with those who can muster the maximum public support, in Britain the final say lies with the Cabinet. Professor Smallwood is of course well aware of this fundamental difference, nevertheless his preoccupation with the Sayre and Kaufman pressure group model appears to have distracted his attention away from the lineup of forces within the Whitehall departments and, more decisively, within the Cabinet itself. After all, local government reorganization has a very low priority on any British government's agenda, and despite the obvious attractions that extinguishing the Labour dominated L.C.C. had for the Inner London Conservatives, there was strong opposition to the reform from outer London Conservatives. Moreover, by the summer of 1962 disturbing cracks were appearing in conservative support nationally. A vast upheaval in the local government of the captial city was manifestly not a vote winner.

Why then the reform? The answer may well lie in the composition of the cabinet which at this time was extremely interesting. No less than six members, most of them powerful figures in their own right, and a few forceful and highly articulate, had been very closely connected with inner London Conservative politics. Two of them, Sir Henry Brook and Geoffrey Rippon, had endured the frustrations of leading the Conservative minority on the London County Council. Two others, Ian McLeod and Enoch Powell, had previously both been organizational directors of the London Conservative machine, the London Municipal Society. Sir John Hare was a member of the executive committee of the Society and the Minister responsible for the London Act, Sir Keith Joseph had been an elected member of the City of London Common Council. Here was a formidable coalition indeed.

It could be that it was this purely fortuitous conjunction of political leaders that had more to do with the final arrival of the London Government Act on the Statute Book than anything else.—L. J. SHARPE, *Nuffield College, Oxford.*

*Relative Deprivation and Social Justice.* BY W. G. RUNCIMAN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 338. $6.50.)

"Relative deprivation" is evidently a familiar concept among sociologists, whether American or British (like Runciman), but it may be less well-known among political scientists. I became aware of the concept only just before reading Runciman's book, and then only because a colleague from our university's sociology department used the language of relative deprivation to persuade a faculty meeting that selecting draftees by lottery would introduce a new unfair discrimination. He argued that some middle-class youths, now deferred to attend college, would be deprived, by lottery, of their educational expectations, and so suffer more than the proletarian youths, without such expectations, when they are drafted at age 18. The argument may not be convincing, but it provides a good introduction to the complexities of relative deprivation and so to this book.

Runciman's subtitle, "A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century England," is a useful summary statement of his subject-matter. Because the book is entirely about Britain, Runciman's findings may be of limited interest even to those political scientists concerned with the relevance of social attitudes to politics unless they are also British specialists. Much of the author's theorizing, however, should interest anyone with a philosophical turn of mind.

The book has three different aspects. First is a social and political history of the British class structure and of attitudes toward class between 1918 and 1962. Second is a substantial report of the findings of a 1962 survey of British class attitudes, including those revealing a sense of relative deprivation. The findings are based on careful field work and sophisticated analysis. They represent the author's main empirical contribution. The third aspect of the book, while labeled "Conclusions," is really a bold theoretical excursion into the realm of values associated with social justice. There is even an effort to define social justice in such a way as to have a standard for deciding which public policy is most nearly right in its effects on class and status. Here, as elsewhere in his work, Runciman consistently distinguishes between inequality of class and the much more subtle matter of status inequality. Still more emphatically does he distinguish actual status inequality from a sense of status inequality (that is, a sense of being deprived of status). The latter, Runciman believes, has been growing while the former declined. The point can be made more clearly by quoting the author's prime example: "A manual worker who thinks of himself as 'middle-class' will be likelier than one who thinks of himself as 'working-class' to feel relatively deprived of status; and this relative deprivation is likely to be of an 'egoistic' kind" (p. 168).

Among Runciman's empirical chapters, one will especially catch the attention of the political scientist studying Britain. It is the chapter on "The Working-Class Conservatives," and is one of several recent analyses of the persistent one third of British manual workers who vote Conservative rather than Labour. The author convincingly confirms the suspected positive relation between self-rated middle-class status (among manual workers) and Conservative voting, and he specifically refutes the view that this relation can be explained away as a function of income.—LEON D. EPSTEIN, *University of Wisconsin.*

*The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present.* BY GERHARD RITTER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 233. $6.00.)

*Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow.* BY PETER H. MERKL. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 366. $7.50.)

*Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem.* BY FREDERICK H. HARTMANN. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Pp. x, 181. $4.95.)

The eminent German historian Gerhard Ritter in *The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present* (a revised version of *Europe and the German Question* published in 1948) deals primarily with the era from Luther to World War I, and only devotes a few pages to the turbulent and calm years since then. His purpose is not to write another "definitive" history (that he hopes to do in the future), but to answer the sweeping indictments of Germany made by some historians after the Nazi catastrophe. In his attempt to redress the balance, he scores some points, but probably not enough to convince the hardened skeptic or the emotionally-involved critic.

Professor Ritter argues his case through an argumentative rather than a narrative exposition of crucial events: the Lutheran gospel of obedience could not be blamed for the victory of Nazism; Frederick the Great was an enlightened ruler, not a despot ruling a militaristic Prussia; Bismarck was an honest broker in disputes between the great powers, and secured peace by a balanced system of alliances; political anti-semitism did not exist on any large scale before Hitler; the advocates of pan-Germanism and racism were in a minority, but blurred the image of Germany in other countries. Ritter maintains that many developments—such as imperialism, aggressive nationalism, and the rise of one-party totalitarian states—were not peculiarly German, but in evidence elsewhere too. What then were the specific factors which caused the rise of Hitler? The harsh Versailles treaty, the mistrust of parliamentarianism, the quest for equality among the great powers, the need for self-assertion, and the economic catastrophe—these to him were the most important. Ritter does not deny that Hitler had the support of the masses, and during the period of military successes "was certainly admired by a substantial majority as a national hero" (p. 196). Indeed, he puts some blame on the "mass man" who was more concerned with material prosperity than with individual liberty, and on the French revolution which nourished an egalitarianism that too easily could lead to dictatorship.

Needless to say, these arguments reflecting a "conservative" bias are designed to provoke discussion and reflection. But the author weakens his case with such sweeping statements as: "Except for Hitler, none of us (the Germans) were eager for war, let alone conquest" (p. 203), or, the Soviet Union has become the "world's greatest military power" (p. 203). On the other hand, most readers will concur with Ritter's conclusion: The will to maintain the constitution of the Federal Republic "can be sustained only if the new democracy proves itself by its achievements—especially in times of crises . . ." (p. 204).

For a logical sequel to the Ritter volume the reader might turn to *Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow* by Professor Peter H. Merkl. The author also deals with the "undigested" past but concentrates in two-thirds of the book on the evolution of the Federal Republic. An expatriate of Germany and now political science professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Merkl likewise contends that German history does not run in a straight line from Luther to Bismarck to Hitler. Rather he contends that Hitler's coming to power was due "chiefly to his demagogic and strategic abilities and to the criminal stupidity of the men who conspired to have him appointed Chancellor" (p. 334). Such an explanation leaves out too many other causal factors, many of which, however, are cited in an earlier chapter, "How Could It Happen?"

Other chapters deal with materials quite familiar to the West German specialist: an introductory history, the postwar economic "miracle," the new society, Americanization, party and political developments, and the future of German democracy. In several chapters dealing with controversial matters, the author lets four actors, representing a West German Christian Democrat, a West German Socialist, a British conservative, and an American liberal, voice contradictory opinions. This dramatic technique is most effective in arousing a high emotional pitch and in highlighting divergent ways in which history can be interpreted. To this reviewer the author overemphasizes the theme of modernization by arguing that Germany has undergone a painful adolescent period of sickness and rebellion. True, he cites certain obstacles to full modernization, such as the passivity of the German voter and his lack of civic consciousness, but he seems too optimistic when he asserts that the Federal Republic is within reach of democratic maturity due to changes in her economy and society. Can a commitment to democracy be measured by the possession of automobiles and refrigerators? Notwithstanding disagreements which are bound to arise, the author has made an able contribution to a controversial subject matter.

Professor Frederick H. Hartmann in *Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem* provides the general reader with an overview of the numerous diplomatic attempts made by the four powers to settle one of the key issues in the Cold War, and with the reactions of the West Germans, especially of the political parties. The study is based primarily on documents, including a few West German public opinion polls. It would have been of interest if personal interviews had been undertaken in West Germany and East Berlin to supplement the documentary material gathered primarily in Bonn. Then more comprehensive answers could have been given to the question of how Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain view reunification, and the intensity of their feelings.

The author does not refrain from putting some of the blame for the lack of progress in reunification on the West with its rigidity towards constructive Soviet proposals. In conclusion, he demolishes the argument that the Germans do not really want reunification, and warns that unless East and West find a peaceful solution it is not inevitable that the West Germans will always act with restraint.

Although this slim volume offers few new insights to the specialist, it might prove useful as a general summation to any reader.—Gerard Braunthal, *University of Massachusetts.*

*Berlin—Bestand und Möglichkeiten.* By Dietrich Storbeck. (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964. Dortmunder Schriften zur Sozialforschung, 27. Pp. 168. DM 18.50.)

Storbeck's analysis of population trends in Berlin from 1939 to 1959 bears an important implication for the study of political communities: the basic stability of population structure in the face of different types of diversity. By 1946, due primarily to wartime evacuations and damage but also to the changing postwar function of the city, Berlin lost more than a quarter of its population. Division among the Occupying Powers, the currency reform of 1948, and the subsequent Blockade broke Berlin's remaining 3.3 million inhabitants into two cities, separated at first by political obstacles and then, after the 13th of August 1961, by a wall of concrete and barbed wire. These developments notwithstanding, Berlin in 1959 had essentially the same population structure that had characterized the city two decades earlier. There was, moreover, despite a decade of separate development, little to distinguish West Berlin from East Berlin in this regard. There were changes, to be sure, such as a loss of population, its "aging," its movement to the suburbs, and its shift to new types of occupations, but by and large both halves of the city were moving in the same direction.

Storbeck's most important conclusion is that this commonness of structure determines the future possibilities for the development of East and West Berlin and the likelihood of their reunification. Thus far its persistence has preserved the city's homogeneity and thereby the preconditions for reconsolidation. There is no reason to expect that future external influences, however different they may be in East and West Berlin, will change these basic conditions significantly. He goes on to discuss measures that the West German government could take to support and reinforce the ability of the city to withstand such external influences—measures that could not only help to relieve current difficulties but also to strengthen Berlin's auspicious role as a spur to reunification.

The study itself shows how much can be gained from a careful examination of population statistics. Its framework is the changing character of Berlin and the city's evolving function for Germany as a whole. Moving from differences between 1939 and 1959, to differences between East and West Berlin, to changes among the 20 individual boroughs that comprise Greater Berlin, and finally to the relationship between Berlin and its environment, Storbeck casts a searching light upon the structure and development of the population in terms of residential, age, and occupational patterns. An appendix of 17 tables and seven charts, as well as a valuable bibliography on Berlin's population movements, supplements the analysis.

Unfortunately, however, the study also shows how sterile an examination of population trends is in the absence of sound theory and other relevant information. For one thing, the assumption underlying the main conclusion noted above is left unexamined. To what extent is integration facilitated or hindered by structural differences of the type that Storbeck studied? If separate developments in East and West Berlin had been two or three times as extensive as they in fact were, how would this affect current chances for and the ultimate effects of the city's reunification? Would complementary rather than homogeneous structural patterns be the more likely to lead to effective re-union?

Second, Storbeck's criteria of structural stability are surely less than exhaustive. Though some aspects of the Berlin population have remained fairly constant or have changed to an almost equal degree in East and West, others have not. Slowly but surely, for instance, East and West Berliners are developing perspectives and styles of life that differ in crucial respects as far as any future reunification is concerned. If the Humpty-Dumpty of a single German national consciousness ultimately breaks on the Berlin Wall, then it will take more than a large dosage of Storbeck's structural homogeneity to put the city back together again.

Third, Storbeck ignores other psychological aspects of population movements as well. The willingness of the Berlin population to withstand pressures produced by the city's division and exposed position, he rightly points out, preceded and did not follow West German efforts to support this willingness. Storbeck sees this phenomenon primarily as a consequence of a general tendency toward inertia in population movements. Such a view underestimates the key role played by the Berliners' morale. West Berliners, for instance, take seriously assurances by the Western Allies that they will defend the city's freedom. Should it appear to them that these same Western Allies were about to throw West Berlin to the communist wolves, then we can expect highly significant population shifts. In recent polls, about half of the West Berliners say that they would want to leave the city in the event that the Allied troops depart. The basic stability of population structure in the face of different types of diversity may be important. But it alone does not account for the persistence of West Berliners.

Finally, and most important, if we grant Storbeck's argument about the basic stability of Berlin's population structure, then we must pay special attention to any changes that emerge. Structural changes, I would argue, proceed exponentially. Though they may start small, once they begin to snowball they will be hard to stop, let alone reverse. To take a simple example, both populations have become "overaged" compared to prewar Berlin, but the trend has advanced more rapidly in West than in East Berlin: In 1939, 15.1 per cent of Berliners were 15 years of age or under, a percentage that increased to 15.4 per cent in East Berlin in 1959 (19.4% in December 1964) and that dropped to 12.5% in West Berlin (13.7% in 1964); the proportion of people 50 years of age or older grew from 28.6 per cent in 1939 to 44.1 per cent in East Berlin in 1959 (39.3% in 1964) and to 43.8 per cent in West Berlin (45.3% in 1964). It seems needless to add that this trend, already beginning to have serious effects, is one of the greatest worries of West Berlin officials.

The value of Storbeck's study is twofold. First, he does present useful data showing the extent of structural stability in the Berlin population, East and West. Second, and more important, his interpretation of the consequences of the trends he uncovers, although not very helpful by itself, provokes the reader to do some serious thinking about the structural aspects of political communities.—RICHARD L. MERRITT, *Yale University.*

*Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848–1849.* BY P. H. NOYES. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 434. $10.00.)

The rich stores of historical records still available for the study of the revolutionary years 1848–1849 in Germany are currently being used to reexamine the cultural, social and economic forces which shaped the political behavior manifested most conspicuously in the futilities of the Frankfurt Assembly. An important emphasis in this reappraisal is that the workers who were a major source of the potentially revolutionary unrest were the artisans trained in the guilds who were being threatened by the use of machines, the factory system and the growing competition incident to liberalization of the mediaeval restraints upon employment and trade.

It is with the "working class" in this sense that the book here under review is concerned. At the outset the author presents a dilemma stated in the form of the propositions that "social discontent must find some organized outlet before it can be felt politically. . . . Yet organization . . . can undermine a revolution as well . . . separating the organized expression from its base in mass movements" (pp. 3–4). He proceeds then to demonstrate that this is what happened in Germany by detailed accounts of the development and the distinegration of working class revolutionary associations in 1948–1949.

The basis of the social discontent manifested in demonstrations and riots, Noyes finds in hardships which impinged most grievously upon the handicraftsmen in the proliferating urban centers where the skills of the artisan class no longer provided either economic security or a dignified position in the social order. From the artisans came leaders and organizational impulses derived from the traditions of the guilds. Attempts to form networks of workingmen's associations revealed the conflicts of interests separating the master craftsmen, the poor journeymen, the factory workers and the unskilled day laborers. Neither the romantic glorification of the medieval guilds nor the hesitant use of a socialist vocabulary could provide an ideological orientation conducive to concerted political action. The petitions and programs emanating from workers' associations served only to highlight the gulf between their inchoate aspirations and the economic liberalism of the entrepreneurial and academic elite represented in the Frankfurt Assembly.

Noyes' work commands attention from political scientists as a case study of the interplay of personal, cultural, social and economic forces in relation to political events over a short but critical time period. It might be commended primarily for the insights it supplies for an understanding of the labor movement and socialist politics in subsequent German history. A more adventurous impulse might lead to speculation as to its value for the comparative analysis of revolutionary movements in societies now in stages of development somewhat similar to that of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Perhaps, however, its greatest service to political science might be as an incitement to exploit the data contained in historical records through the application of the methods and techniques of behavioral research.

Noyes points out that "a revolution lifts the lid off society, allowing a glimpse, not normally available, of lower social strata." The records which preserve the details of this "glimpse" for the scrutiny of present-day scholars include voluminous proceedings of many working class congresses, the files of numerous local and regional newspapers, and several thousands of petitions representing a cross-section of the demands generating the abortive revolution. While Noyes has made revealing and convincing use of the data contained in these records, their very richness and multiplicity compelled him to be selective. With a theoretical approach refined along the lines of current behavioral methodology and with the techniques for the cumulation and manipulation of data available through the use of computers and statistical analysis, the provocative insights of historians such as Noyes could be transformed into testable propositions of more comprehensive relevance for comparative studies. Conversely, the exploitation of data preserved in many readily accessible depositories of historical records could give behavioral studies a perspective in time not otherwise attainable. Should not the historians and the behavioral scientists of the world unite in an enterprise in which they have only their respective shackles to lose?— CHARLES B. ROBSON, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

*The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West.* BY WELLES HANGEN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. ix, 231, vii. $5.95.)

In the past, the scant attention which the West paid to East Germany was understandable, even if not quite excusable. As long as the self-styled German Democratic Republic gave signs of being little more than an artificial and highly impermanent political entity and its Communist leadership a mere pawn of Moscow, Western political writers found little to excite their interest. Now, however, developments such as the Communist regime's apparent political consolidation, East Germany's economic reforms and growing economic potential and the first indications of genuine self-assertion on the part of its rulers, have significantly altered all previous calculations. One result has been that some Western political commentators, first and foremost in West Germany, have felt obliged to subject East Germany to closer scrutiny and, incidentally, often to criticize some of the basic assumptions of the Federal Republic's policy on reunifictaion in the bargain. To this new body of Western literature on

East Germany, one must now add Welles Hangen's *The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West.*

Mr. Hangen, a seasoned newspaper reporter and well-known NBC correspondent, has skillfully interwoven first-hand observations and conversations on the spot during a dozen or so personal visits to East Germany with analytical points gleaned from his reading of the serious Western literature on East Germany. His book does not purport to be a political history of the East German regime or a comprehensive study of all aspects of East German society, much less a systematic examination of various policy alternatives for the West. His purpose is rather to present "a collection of vignettes of East German life," so as "to describe East Germany as it actually is." Writing with real verve, Hangen has turned out an eminently readable journalistic account which should go far in disabusing otherwise uninitiated readers of many badly dated clichés.

This is not, however, to say that Hangen's treatment is uniformly satisfactory even within the limits which he sets for himself. For one thing, some of his best reportage, doubtless quite fresh when first written around the specific developments to which he himself was close witness, now seems slightly stale. This is true, for example, of his otherwise excellent description of the new economic system which has become more complicated in practice and more problematic in outcome than Hangen would have it. Then, too, he often gives opinion as proven fact—most notably at the very outset of the book which dramatically depicts the suicide in December 1965 of East Germany's chief planner, Erich Apel, as an act of defiant protest against the exploitative Russians, a version of the event which enjoyed instantaneous popularity in the West but one that, alas, remains uncorroborated. And if Hangen's reliance on reportorial techniques sometimes makes for potential inaccuracy, his use of the journalistic idiom can also be misleading. One case in point is the chapter on Walter Ulbricht, a brief and basically unobjectionable sketch of the East German leader's career, unfortunately entitled "The Last Apparatchik." While it is true that in many ways Ulbricht personifies the last of his particular breed of German Communist functionary, it hardly follows that he is "the last apparatchik" or that "the age of the apparatchik is drawing to a close in East Germany." Facile formulations of this sort are all too frequent throughout the book and the worst of it is that they are meant to buttress Hangen's most provocative contention, namely, that East Germany is well on the road to its own brand of national communism.

For Hangen it is precisely the growth of national self-consciousness both within the ruling elite and the population at large that constitutes East Germany's most significant challenge. While he does not examine the nature of the threat to the Soviet Union at any real depth, he is openly critical of official Western policy which has neglected East Germany on legalistic grounds and ends up advocating a "direct approach by Bonn to the DDR" along lines now increasingly favored by many West Germans themselves. A more balanced discussion might have paused to consider the real hazards as well as the seeming promise in any such unilateral West German approach to its East German rival. The developments in East Germany which Hangen has described as a "muted revolution" may indeed call for a revision of Western policy. But it would be well to bear in mind that East Germany's self-assertion seems almost certain to make a durable political settlement in Germany and therefore in Europe as a whole more rather than less difficult. This, more than anything else, really constitutes "East Germany's challenge to Russia and the West."—MELVIN CROAN, *Harvard University.*

*The New Class Divided: Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism.* BY ALBERT PARRY. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. xvi, 364. $8.95.)

The argument presented in this book can be summarized as follows: In the course of its economic development, Soviet society is producing an ever more numerous and powerful scientific-technical elite, whose values directly conflict with the Party's. At the same time, the Party is weakened by ideological erosion and the lack of scientific and managerial expertise. The result is that the Party is in retreat before the technical elite and will eventually give way to it in a manner not specified. This Professor Parry sees as a great hope for the future, because in contrast to the Party, composed for the most part of "zealots" and "functionaries," the scientific elite is rational (i.e., non-ideological), peace-loving, pro-Western, and concerned about social justice and equality.

There are many serious objections one could raise against this neat and simple view of Soviet elites. The growth in size and importance of a scientific-technical elite is an observable fact, but reading the Soviet press and interviewing a few Soviet defectors and American visitors—which is basically Professor Parry's methodology—simply cannot yield the assurance that this elite is separate from, and opposed to, the Party, or that "most technocrats of the Soviet Union do not really believe in Marx." Furthermore, there is no reason to accept Professor Parry's assumption that the scientific-technical elite has a common political viewpoint and could act as a cohesive opposition to the solidly entrenched and well-organized Party. Professor Parry repeatedly refers to the Party and the elite as two separate entities, even though he admits at one point that engineers "are six or seven times as numerous on the Party rolls as men and women of any other occupation" and that "thousands of engineers [are being drafted] into the network of full-time Party functionaries." He tries to preserve this separation by stating that "real [?] scientists, engineers, and managers may be . . . Communist Party members, but they are this reluctantly, mechanically, automatically." He argues that one loses the title of "real" engineer or scientist when one enters the Party and pursues a Party career, despite prior education and training. Thus "neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin is a genuine engineer, economist, or manager" despite the fact that they both received technical education and training.

This leads to one of the central conceptual difficulties of the Parry thesis. If we acknowledge that the Party remains, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the supreme institution of political power in the Soviet Union, it would seem that any future scientist-politician would become less of a scientist, and more of a Party "functionary," as he rose through the years to the top decision-making organs of the Party. Thus he would not be much different from the present-day Brezhnevs and Kosygins in values or background.

Actually Professor Parry is not clear on how the scientific elite will come to power, but he seems to feel that it will displace the Party rather than infiltrate it. In fact, he seems to think that even at present it is not necessary to rise to the top of the Party in order to achieve political power. Thus he advances the novel and preposterous thesis that Soviet missile scientists are kept anonymous because "once identified and praised, they could 'go places,' politically." The chief reason for this secrecy, he concludes, is that "the Party fears that once revealed and publicized these true geniuses of the new rocket age may yet want political plums."

Another problem with this thesis is that in numerous digressive chapters (on Peter Kapitsa, acceptance of Einstein's theories, use of computers, Soviet acceptance of cybernetics and Mendelian genetics, etc.) Professor Parry describes how in recent years the Party has shown remarkable flexibility in moving away from dogmatic and unscientific positions toward accommodation with the scientific community. He views this as a struggle in which the Party is retreating before the onslaughts of the scientific elite, but an equally tenable case can be made for the thesis that the Party gains strength and support by such demonstrations of adaptability. It should be added that since the Party is becoming a Party of former engineers—if not "genuine" engineers—it may prove itself more receptive to the needs of practicing scientists than other governments (such as our own) with non-engineering orientations.

Finally, a very strong objection must be made to Professor Parry's assertions of certainty, based upon a methodology that could at best lead only to tentative hypotheses. Use of the Soviet press is a standard technique of Sovietology, but it is hardly to be considered a source of accurate information on conditions in Soviet society. Professor Parry's documentation consists largely of feuilletons and articles of social criticism from the daily press, but there is no way of knowing whether the evils described occur rarely or frequently in actual Soviet life, or whether the articles are exaggerated or even concocted by Soviet journalists eager to make the moral lesson clear to even the dullest Soviet reader. Of course, if a theme is repeated frequently, one may justifiably suppose that the problem is relatively widespread, but from such a technique one never derives more than a *supposition*. Professor Parry, obviously not feeling bound by such considerations, and not, apparently, having been in the Soviet Union in recent years, draws sweeping conclusions from materials which were *intended* to show the *negative* side of society. Thus he decides that Soviet society "is a greedy, truculent society," and that "men and women fight up the stairs [of social status] grubbily and often desperately." He refers to a "caste system" in Soviet society even though his own "evidence" indicates that education and achievement are the primary indicators of social status.

Illustrations of Professor Parry's cavalier attitude toward standards of evidence abound, but one example would certainly be his statement that "with much astonishment, foreign observers reach the conclusion that the Soviet chasms between class and class are greater, sharper, in fact and in feeling, than such phenomena are in the non-Soviet world." Who are these "foreign observers"? One is a Polish woman reporting her observations of invading Soviet troops in Hungary in 1944–45; the only other mentioned is Mrs. Brooks Atkinson, recording her recollections of a ten-month stay in Moscow in 1945–46. With all due respect to these ladies, if Professor Parry could not find better substantiation of his dubious viewpoint, he should have excised it from the manuscript, and he would have been well-advised to eliminate much else as well.—JEROME M. GILISON, *Johns Hopkins University.*

*Comintern and Peasant in East-Europe 1919–1930.* BY GEORGE D. JACKSON. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 339. $8.50.)

Popular belief, which sometimes even penetrates professional writings, supposes that the successes of a communist sponsored revolution are due to the powerful appeal of Marxism to the masses. In reality communist ideology is necessary only for welding together the small group of hard core professional revolutionaries, who through application of correct tactics explore the existing social dynamics. Marx addressed himself to the urban proletariat and yet the communist struggle for hegemony of political power was never victorious in the industrialized parts of the world. The communist revolutionary effort fell on fertile soil without exception in the traditional agricultural peasant societies experiencing some degree of modernization, which produced dislocation of the social fabric and created "the revolution of expectation." The communist victory depends not on the appeal of Marx, Engels or even Lenin to the illiterate masses, but on the painstaking organization and political mobilization of the peasants. Indeed any other popular oriented ideology of social revolution combined with skillful tactics might have resulted in the same outcome as communism.

The model of the peasant oriented communist revolution was not originated, Professor Jackson argues, during the Russian revolution of 1917 or even in the battles of the Russian Civil War, but was forged in the experience of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe in the period between 1919 and 1930.

> One can discern in the international Communist movement during the 1920's a distinct "peasantist" phase during which the peasant masses almost succeeded in replacing the industrial workers as the expected source of recruits for the regiments of the 'proletarian' revolution. Many who today extol the originality of Mao Tse-tung's peasantism forget that his idea took shape in this decade when the role of the peasant in revolution was being exalted. In many ways the "peasantism" of the 1920's foreshadows the policies of communism in underdeveloped countries today (p. 51).

The originators of the model were those connected with the Krestintern, (Peasant International) constituted at the First International Peasant Conference held in Moscow in 1923. The delegates to the Conference included such prominent international communists as Eugene Varga from Hungary, M. P. Gorov from Bulgaria, Ursulo Galvan of Mexico, W. H. Green from the United States, Sen Katayama of Japan and our old friend Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) of Indo-China. Most of the active members of the Krestintern were drawn, however, from Eastern Europe with the actual running of the organization in the hands of the Polish communist, Tomasz Dąbal, who also provided in his speeches and articles most of the theoretical framework for the peasant oriented revolutionary model:

> In practice it is necessary for each Communist party to create a section for work in the country and to send some comrades as *missionaries for work among the peasants. These missionaries* must enter the existing vocational and political organizations of the peasants, win the confidence of the peasant masses, and strengthen their influence. These missionaries must be primarily of peasant origin (p. 68).

The model, to which Zinoviev and Bukharin added their intellectual brilliancy and their authority, called for organization, mobilization and politization of the peasant masses by tactical employment of the slogan "workers and peasants government." Peasants could be won for cooperation with the communist sponsored movement only "by supporting their concrete and immediate demands": land distribution without payment by the peasants and without compensation to the landlords; drastic reduction in taxes, which were only used for the benefit of the urban bourgeoisie and the militarists; fight against high prices of manufactured goods brought about by exploitation by the native capitalists and foreign imperialists; and finally a campaign against war, which enriched the native and foreign exploiters with the blood of peasant armies. The communist party was to stress the demands of national liberation from foreign exploitation and also if applicable the right of national self-determination for various minority groups.

The communists were to infiltrate the peasant parties, peasant organizations, rural cooperative societies, capture their leadership, and establish a broad popular front in support of peasants' and workers' demands. The front was to be always firmly controlled from inside by the invisible hand of the communist party. The Yugoslav party called for the creation of embryonic workers' and peasants' soviets (local councils) which eventually would mushroom into a pyramid of national government.

The irony of the model was that although conceived in the 1920's and designed primarily for East-Central Europe it had to wait for the fruitful soil of China and South East Asia at least twenty years later to bear the sweet fruit of success. With the exception of Yugoslavia where it was eventually brilliantly applied by Tito, elsewhere in East-Central Europe it met with complete failure. In East-Central Europe the communists were too late. The peasants were already mobilized by their own peasant parties. The nations were flushed with their newly achieved liberation and optimistic as to their future. Land reform was the proclaimed goal of all the governments. The existing social and economic stresses began to split the East-Central European societies not until the 30's. By then the Soviet leadership was consolidated in Stalin's firm hand and peasantism was turned to forceful collectivisation and industrialization.

Professor Jackson's book reads like the primer of the communist revolution in Vietnam. Some historians may be disturbed by his extensive use of secondary sources, but to a political scientist he provides the intellectually delightful missing link between Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. The book is an important contribution to the study of modern communist revolutionary tactics and practices.—JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ, *University of Kansas.*

*Protest in Tokyo; The Security Treaty Crisis.* BY GEORGE R. PACKARD, III, (Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 423. $9.00.)

Since World War II there has been a critical lack of detailed studies in English of Japanese politics. George Packard's study of the 1960 struggle to change, or prevent the change, to the ten year Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan is, therefore, warmly welcomed. It is regrettable that we do not have at least a dozen such studies about Japan which the recent American ambassador, Edwin Reischauer, rightly characterizes as "one of the biggest countries of the Modern World."

*Protest in Tokyo* is more than a study of the foreign policy decision-making process or the basic problem of Japan's foreign relations; it is a valuable study of the operation of the Japanese political process at the national level. Since the author personally interviewed many of the leading actors as well as carefully studied the available record of the crisis, the book is itself a source of basic information. It is also sufficiently detailed to permit the reader to go beyond some of the conclusions drawn by the author himself. The readable style makes the four hundred odd pages a pleasure to go through.

The early chapters cover the original security treaty of 1951, conservative party factions involved in treaty matters, the leftwing opposition parties and the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty, the series of aggravating internal political disputes, and the build-up of international tensions which combined to produce the explosion of demonstrations and student violence which startled the world in the spring of 1960. The high point of the story was the night of May 19th of that year when the Socialists, once again resorting to force to block the corridors of the Diet, were carried out bodily by the police. The conservatives who remained were therefore able to push through the treaty bills alone. The ensuing massive demonstrations, abetted by sensational newspaper treatment, only quieted after June 15th when students broke through the police barriers into the Diet Compound, killing a Tokyo University coed in the process. Fearing continued violence Prime Minister Kishi withdrew the invitation to President Eisenhower for a visit, for the sake of his protection, and agreed to resign after the new treaty went into effect.

Although the author's concluding assessment of the political importance of the multitude of events covered in the book is a little confusing, basic interpretations come through quite clearly in the text itself: the rise of nationalism among all segments of the politically active, the seemingly vicious conservative factional quarrels, the violent and emotional behavior of many of the leftwing groups, and especially the failure of even Japanese treaty supporters to "understand" the American idea of collective security which underlay the treaties. The new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan ratified in 1960 allowed for reductions in the size and number of U.S. Forces and bases in Japan. Simultaneously, Japan was encouraged to assume increasing responsibility in defense planning, exclusive of American administered Okinawa. Anti-war opposition groups objected to the relatively active role assigned Japan in the formulation of national security policy. Their campaign in 1960 was directed toward blocking the new treaty, with the hope that the old Security Treaty would remain in effect. The fuller provision for Japanese participation in determining movements and equipment of U.S. forces in the new treaty did not satisfy its opponents, who have subsequently supported only the most narrowly construed defensive arrangement with the U.S. Violent personal antagonism toward Kishi after May 19th, when the Diet ratified the Treaty, delayed immediate examination of Japan's defense needs. The Ikeda Government, which assumed power that July, promoted the subsequent development of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, enhanced significantly under Prime Minister Sato since 1964.

The author betrays the usual uneasiness of sensitive Americans in his conviction that anti-Americanism lies beneath the surface attitude evidenced in repeated public opinion polls which show the United States to be the most-liked of foreign countries (p. 349). The questionable assumption that a generalized and unreasoning emotional hostility towards Americans must be felt by Asians perhaps enables one to believe that reasonable Japanese would otherwise accept the advantages of the American containment policy toward Asia. That a significant proportion still fear American policy, as shown again the in consternation over escalation of the Vietnam War, suggests very few fully accept the collective security arrangements as they apply to Japan. (The book does come to grips with these basic underlying problems of the security treaty crisis and of current Japanese-American relations.)

However, as an eye witness of the treaty struggle and a resident of Japan in recent years, I have never experienced a generalized anti-American hostility. I think it much more likely that criticism of U.S. policy rests primarily upon dislike of specific elements of it rather than some sort of vague emotional resentment, even if justified.

The particularly unrestrained conservative factional quarreling is attributed mainly to the selfish ambition of Japanese parliamentarians which the Japanese themselves call the "ministerial disease." Still the betrayal of those whom Kishi promised to make his successors, as well as an unrestrainedly cavalier attitude towards party and Diet, were too Machiavellian for Japan even today. Kishi, therefore, seems to deserve more blame for the party disarray than he receives—he also provides a salutary lesson to his successors. Nor does such a judgment condone the provocation or excesses of the opposition parties. Rather than group dominance over individual members, it seems to have been group competition that weakened leadership and exaggerated party disunity, but it still failed to prevent, or else provoked, sudden and rather arbitrary actions which had better not have been undertaken. The old treaty would have remained if the new were given up or postponed as former Prime Minister Yoshida and the later Prime Minister Ikeda proposed with good reasoning.

Many Japanese politicians argue that inner party competition and a weak party president are desirable in Japan where group dominance exaggerates the danger of a strong leader. Such an argument is predicated on the belief that no decision is better than one which cannot command sufficient support—long a principle in American politics. If power is so corrupting in Japan, why give more of it to its leaders as the author seems to prefer? Such questions aside, the book is enormously valuable as a record both in coverage and depth.—FRANK LANGDON, *University of British Columbia.*

*The First Years of Yangyi Commune.* BY ISABEL AND DAVID CROOK. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited for the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1966. Pp. xiv, 288. $6.75.)

The authors are a British couple long resident in China, who are employed in language work by the Peking government. Their earlier volume *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn* (London, 1959) described a north China (Hopei) village to which they were sent by the Communists for a brief period in 1947–48 to study land reform. In this second book, the authors present materials they were permitted to gather during the summers of 1959 and 1960 when the village they had earlier studied was incorporated as a brigade of *Yangyi* commune, one of China's 75,000 such units.

Given this rare opportunity, how do a pair of Western researchers study a commune, even a small, mountainous one like *Yangyi* with some 37,000 people? Unfortunately, this book is innocent of methodology or rigorous analysis. There is not even a detailed and well-focused microstudy of the impact of communization on the Ten Mile Inn villagers whom the authors had previously studied. Instead, the field work seems to have consisted of haphazard visits with cadres and the gathering of heroic accounts furnished primarily by leaders in model brigades. The reader will sense that this is no ordinary commune. Its experienced Party cadres began work there in 1938 when *Yangyi* first became a Communist guerrilla base. In 1960 the commune edited and published a "philosophy" textbook. The commune has occasional visitors from Peking.

*The First Years of Yangyi Commune* will give the reader a sympathetic sketch of the founding of the commune, of its work organization during the Great Leap Forward, of the 'Rectification' campaign of 1959–60, of the problems created by apathy or over-enthusiasm or private interest as well as difficulties caused by bad weather. There are chapters devoted to land reformation efforts, to farm management, to industry, commerce, social services, and education, as well as to commune military matters. Attention is given to the role of women and youth, to art and literature, to the continuing class struggle in the countryside, and to leadership doctrine and techniques. But these aspects of the commune system have been more rigorously analyzed by Western social scientists using information of about the same reliability which has been gathered, obliquely, through second-hand sources. One such study is Franz Schurman's masterful *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1966).

For the specialist, this book will be a minor contribution to his reference shelf. For the general reader, unacquainted with the full flavor of the revolutionary romanticism with which those committed to the Peking government approach China's rural problems in 1958–1960, the book is highly recommended.—PAUL KOVENOCK, *University of Washington, Seattle.*

*The Economy of Communist China—An Introduction.* BY YUAN-LI WU. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. viii, 225. $6.00.)

This small, readable volume is designed to provide the non-specialist with an overview of the Mainland Chinese economy—not an easy task in this period of rapid and uncertain change. Besides offering a critical analysis of available data, it undertakes to evaluate economic performance in the light of political and other criteria. These are particularly useful objectives since recent monographs have tended to be either too technical or too narrowly focused to help the layman seeking a general understanding of Peking's economic achievements and failures.

The author, Professor Yuan-li Wu, has earned wide recognition for numerous previous studies of the Communist Chinese economy. He has made notable contributions in the compilation of data on individual economic sectors and particular industries such as steel. Happily, he is also a concise and lucid writer of prose, skills essential in communicating with the non-specialist.

The organization of the present work is simple and clear, proceeding from formal economic structure and plan to actual performance in the various sectors. Of the ten chapters comprising the book, the first four deal with national goals, the economy's decision-makers and planning process, allocative strategies, and income distribution. The following chapters assess the overall economic record (1949–64) including "fluctuations and growth," and sectoral performance in industry, agriculture, and the international economy. Finally, Dr. Wu offers an evaluation of the Communist Chinese economy as a model, respectively, of resource allocation, economic development, income distribution, and the "command economy."

For the political scientist, this study makes a useful contribution in its description of Chinese economic institutions and processes. The analysis of goals, planning procedures, and organs of implementation is enhanced by the presentation of several charts which take account of structural changes over the years. Nevertheless, those unfamiliar with the frustrating paucity of empirical data from the Mainland probably will feel a great sense of inadequacy about this description, particularly as it bears on the dynamics of the economic system. Moreover, one could wish for more information on the role of the Communist Party, as opposed to the administrative bureaucracy, in both the planning and execution of economic policies (e.g., the part played by the CCP regional bureaux).

Dr. Wu's assessments of Chinese economic performance strike this reviewer as being somewhat uneven in quality. His interpretations of pre-1960 developments, when data were relatively more plentiful, seem generally sound and occasionally afford new insights. (To be sure, his estimates of gain production appear to be significantly lower than those of many other authorities.) However, in describing the post-Great Leap period of "readjustment" (1961–65) Dr. Wu would seem to be open to points of serious disagreement. For example, his suggestion of a rapid industrial recovery in 1962 may exaggerate the case. Many would also feel that he fails to draw appropriate conclusions for industrial production and investment from his notably low estimates of agricultural output. Similarly, in the last chapter (unless there has been a misprint) he seems to find a substantial lessening of the annual rate of decline in per capita consumption during 1961–62, though acknowledging earlier that these were years of unprecedented disaster for the consumer.

As an introductory survey of the subject this volume exhibits both strengths and weaknesses. It pulls together in concise form an impressive body of useful information. These data are subjected to critical analysis, going well beyond the descriptive level that characterized earlier surveys, to seek explanations of why developments occurred as they did. The scope and depth of this inquiry, thus, are commendable. Its success, however, is severely limited by the still primitive state of our knowledge of the Chinese economy. One may question whether there has yet been sufficient empirical research or theoretical formulation to provide a solid foundation for a general survey of this nature.

In view of the large gaps in information and the heated controversy surrounding many important points of interpretation, any broad survey should be careful to identify significant areas of both ignorance and disagreement. While Dr. Wu does a reasonably good job of the former (e.g., a frank discussion of the difficulties of measuring industrial performance), he does not always reveal the full range of opinion, the extent of controversy, or the very tentative acceptance of certain assumptions and estimates. The addition of a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the relevant literature would have helped make up for this deficiency as well as generally enhancing the value of the book for students.—William F. Dorrill, *The Rand Corporation.*

*Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification.* By Irving Louis Horowitz. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 475. $8.50.)

The author characterizes this book as "a qualitative study of three worlds of development." The first is the world of the United States and its Western Allies, the second, of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc Allies, and the third, of the non-aligned, but variously committed nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It is "a study in sociological meanings—a causal and interpretive study" and is addressed to "those who have felt the impact of a system of false alternatives with respect to the 'East-West conflict'; and who are willing to forsake the security of both oversimplified ideologies and overcomplicated models." Furthermore, it is submitted "to all those who share my convictions in the worth of social science as an applied science."

The result is a rambling, disjointed treatise which lacks any rigorous system of approach or analysis. Terminology is vague and imprecise; sharp and clear definitions are not provided; distinctions, where needed, are not drawn; and, indeed, the very rationale for the "three worlds" approach is not fully justified. A wispy fog permeates the book; at times meaning is obscured; when it drifts away, flashes of brilliance appear; but the fog closes in and all is murky again.

Since the author undertakes an exploration of the development process and presumes to distinguish the different development processes in each of his worlds, an operational definition of development is required. The effort at definition on the first page of the Preface is distractingly obscure: ". . . we assume development in human relations to be an ongoing process of human interaction and the relationships between such interaction to advance registered in the technological means they employ at any given historical point, . . . " The next attempt at definition indicates what development excludes (pp. 25–6). It differs from industrialization, change, externally induced transformation, and growth in population or national wealth (although it is apparent at other places—e.g., pp. vii, 324, 335—that the author does not distinguish between development and growth, or is not careful in the use of terms). In contrast to these processes, development "implies" transformation in human relations, irrespective of the level of industrialization; a genuine break with tradition rather than change, which implies a continual adaptation; transformation for the good of the nation, whereas externally induced transformation often benefits the external nation; and new processes, whereas growth is simply a process of adaptation—hardly an operational set of variables.

Then, Chapter II is devoted to "Sociological and Ideological Conceptions of Development" and provides an excellent review of the literature on progress, change, and development from Heraclitos through Marx. The definition which emerges here is a variation of the often repudiated definition of development as Westernization: "those planned and unplanned activities which produce the social structures, technologies, and life styles found in the First and Second Worlds, or else the means for obtaining these advanced forms" (p. 60). Moreover, since development is viewed as an asynchronous process (i.e., political, economic, and social sectors of a nation do not advance at the same rate), the author contends it is extremely difficult to determine whether a nation is developing or stagnating. "Consequently, any judgment as to whether a nation rather than a sector is developing or stagnating, while not entirely arbitrary, ultimately rests on the technique the investigator sees fit to use." The method Horowitz chooses to use is not specified.

Finally (at p. 432), the author decides that development refers to "the level of complexity achieved by a social structure and to the degrees of alteration achieved by a social process. Full development refers to the ideal standards entertained in our perceptions of structures and processes."

In the index the author distinguishes between modernization and modernism, but that distinction becomes blurred in the text. However, the distinction between modernization (or modernism) and development lacks rigor and contributes little to understanding. The first delineation occurs late in the book (p. 306). What is called a "standard definition" of modernization is more a caricature than a definition and the author sees modernism (modernization?) often providing "the gloss of contemporaneity and of self-determination without its substance" (p. 307). Still further he says, "Modernization may be rapid, but development is still a slow and laborious process. The former is defined by industrialism while the latter must locate industrialism in an overall development scheme" (p. 391). In passing, one may also question whether there is an "instinct for modernization" (p. 308).

Horowitz is distinctive when he introduces the concept of "over-development"—"that social condition in which material wealth is maldistributed and the human skills available are not used to a maximum extent"; a society "in which failures at both the social and technical levels lead to breakdowns in production and in distribution and create a perennial crisis in the political institutions and educational establishments" (p. 70). These definitions have obvious infirmities. The term itself implies a terminal state of development which is apparently reached and then surpassed, whereas the author appears to be addressing himself to conditions which others have referred to as decay, negative development, or breakdowns in development.

Since the book is about the worlds of development, one might expect the three worlds to be defined in terms of their approaches to development. Indeed, "the designation Third World is a strategy for economic development" (p. 21). However, the author proceeds to identify the Third World as independent of both power centers, ex-colonial, and thoroughly dedicated to becoming industrialized, drawing its technology from the First World and its ideology from the Second World (p. 17). "The political posture in relation to the main power blocs is central to defining conditions of 'membership' in the world" (p. 22). Are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, South Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, and Guatemala in the Third World then? South Viet Nam and East Germany are specifically excluded. To add to the confusion, Appendix A, which presents a digest of factors defining the three worlds, is based largely on structural-functional characteristics.

The chapters on the First World discuss the United States only. They are fascinating, impressionistic accounts which give no systematic attention to development—how it started, involving whom, through what processes, and with what effects. The chapter on the Second World is no more effective an interpretation of a strategy for development, highlighted by an appendix on the transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism. In brief, these worlds are contrasted by seeing an economic basis to politics in the First and Second Worlds and a political basis to economics in most of the Third World (p. 390).

The book is littered with provocative and sometimes debatable assertions. "Africa . . . boasts the highest degree of political stability in the Third World" (p. 123). "The main fact about the mental set of developing man is that he uniformly blames his shortcomings, his failings, and his condition on society rather than on himself as in former times" (p. 291). " . . . [O]verdedication to development may actually work against its requirements" (p. 294). "The persistence of values of ascription once achievement standards are more or less realized may be indicative of the general state of normlessness in the advanced nations" (p. 347).

The book ends with a "model of models" listing propositions about the entire development process. Much greater effort at precision is apparent here, but the propositions do not grow logically out of the previous discussion in many cases and at times the definitions are different from those presented earlier.—Richard W. Gable, *University of California, Davis.*

*Morocco: Old Land, New Nation.* By Mark I. Cohen and Lorna Hahn. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. ix, 309. $6.50.)

This book begins with a high-speed swoop through history, slowing down as it comes to land in the second half of the twentieth century. The approach is chronological, reportorial, filled with all the important names and dates, although undocumented and somehow lacking in that sweep and depth of analysis which would bring it all to life and make it understandable. "Part II: New Nation" describes unity and security, politics and government, economy and society, and foreign affairs. A good deal of information is included under each heading, to the point where the economic section becomes simply encyclopedic. The political sections are more uneven, less disinterested, less dry in style; it is clear that for the authors the future of Morocco lies with the activist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), whose case is racily pleaded. In the process, the chronological treatment becomes abbreviated; the sections on security and on parts of foreign policy pay little attention to events of the last six years. Errors continue to appear: eighteen proper names are wrongly identified and eight Arabic words are used erroneously. The factual catalogue in the social and economic sections does not suffer from the same problem of slants and errors; it is straight-forward and complete.

Generally, the book is a useful reference work on Morocco's first independent decade, prefaced by an historical overview. The crying shame is that this is such a pallid objective compared to what the book could—and should—be. The biggest part of the gap comes from a nearly total absence of evaluation, integration, comparison, weighing, theorizing—in sum, analysis. The political section is a UNFP tract, in simplistic terms, in which the old King was wiley and his son is a sometime villain. But there is no real analysis of the UNFP position, program, source of power, cohesion, tactics, leadership, following—not a word, for example, on the important party congress of 1962—although there is, of course no corresponding analysis of the monarchy, either. The economic section is not tied into the political description in any way, and there is nothing on the governmental or decision-making process in any economic sector—the Safi complex, the economic plans, agrarian and industrial reform programs. Changes in the nature of the economy are stated, but the dynamics of change, the sources, the methods, and the weaknesses are nowhere evaluated. Population and school enrollment are going up, but there is so much drama, variation, and ramification beneath these simple rising curves—the politics of change in the school programs, the political and economic effects of urbanization and rural migration, for example—that are never even suggested in this book. Foreign policy is logically divided into decolonization, North African cooperation, Arab and African involvement, Communist and American relations. But the content of the sections is a necklace of dates; if Morocco has ever had any thought-out policies, they are never analysed as such and, if it has not, the conflicting pressures of such a situation are not analysed either.

When a unifying theme is hazarded, it is undermined by the subsequent discussion. In the beginning of the U. S.-Morocco section it is suggested several times that the U. S. was to suffer long for its short-sighted military base policy. By the end of the chapter, it turns out that America came out quite well and relations have been fine. In the beginning of the Unity-and-Security chapter, a good brief introduction suggests causes for weaknesses under the dual heading, ending on the foreboding note of problems to come. But according to the rest of the chapter, there have been no unity or security problems since 1959. It is noted that the Istiqlal has a good organization. But there is no discussion of party structure, program, or clientele, so that the real nature of the party remains a mystery.

Finally, there is a too-frequent tendency to describe by innuendo when further research is necessary. De Latour is "*supposedly* still loyal to the official French position" (p. 72), security forces are "*obviously* instructed for political reasons to hold their fire" (p. 102), the King "reacted to UNFP pressures *in his usual way*" (p. 131), election compilers, when uncertain, "*apparently* gave the Istiqlal the benefit of the doubt" (p. 130), the Communist Party "*vetoed* the new constitution," leading to "tactics reminiscent of those of the late United States Senator Joseph McCarthy" (pp. 139–40) (italics added in all cases). Sometimes emotion not only replaces scholarship in the political section; it does not even follow a consistent bias and obscures more complicated motivations.

There is so much work that can and needs to be done on Morocco, from updating, expanding, and deepening existing studies of political sociology and government structures and functions, to opening new case and comparative studies in socio-economic development, public administration, ethnic and religious bases of politics, political pluralism and monarchy, and foreign policy development. This book probably has its place but it misses its challenge.—I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, *New York University.*

*The Rise of Indonesian Communism.* BY RUTH McVEY. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 510. $10.00.)

*The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963.* BY DONALD HINDLEY. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 380. $8.50.)

Indonesian political development under Dutch colonialism and since independence is a fascinating subject for any political scientist. The lack of adequate field studies before 1945, when the Dutch discouraged native and foreign scholarship, and in the confused atmosphere of the Sukarno guided democracy, make these two books expecially welcome. The violent upheaval following the October 1965 Indonesian abortive coup, allegedly masterminded by the PKI, brought the anti-communist forces to power and reduced the PKI to its lowest ebb since 1927. Whether or not President Sukarno will remain an impotent figurehead, and the Indonesian Communists a defeated party, we should study the past record of the PKI to understand the strategy of Asian Communism and its conflict with Indonesian nationalism. The same conflict exists in Viet Nam and other Asian-African nations, but the outcome may not be the same.

Communism and nationalism in the ex-colonial states of Africa and Asia conflict after an initial period of cooperation. Even in the few Asian states with a Communist government, the force of nationalism has proven more powerful than the international bond of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Miss McVey's book concentrates on the beginnings of the Indonesian communist movement in the 1920's, mainly the 1921–1927 period before the PKI was suppressed. The McVey book is really an anatomy of revolutionary failure in which the PKI reflected Comintern confusion on stategy in colonial Asia and even more the divisions inside the Indonesian nationalist movement.

*The Rise of Indonesian Communism* begins with the World War I birth of the party as an off-shoot of the Netherlands Communist party, and continues chronologically and in great detail until the PKI abortive revolt in 1927. The rôle of Dutch communists, especially Sneevliet (later called Maring), as disillusioned colonialists helping the native activists to resist Dutch rule is a tale worth telling as Chalmers Johnson did in his *Instance of Treason.* Why did the expatriate Dutch turn against their own government when they saw the oppression of the Indonesians? How did they differ on tactics (Socialist vs. Communist) and antagonize their native comrades? Miss McVey's account of Sneevliet and his colleagues and such Indonesian comrades as Tan Malaka is dry, factual, and uninspired. Sneevliet and Tan Malaka, especially, deserve a more colorful treatment of inner motivation and psychological stresses. Willard Hanna, a postwar student of Indonesian affairs, gave my class a better analysis of Tan Malaka in ten minutes than Miss McVey provides in her chronological account.

The failure of the Marxist-oriented movement in the 1920's to make nationalism their primary goal caused them to alienate the strong Moslem and labor groups in Indonesia, despite periodic attempts of the PKI to work with those groups. "They did not take an Indonesian national state to be their supreme goal; this was left to a new generation of parties that arose only at the end of the period discussed in this volume" (p. 63). Many Dutch Communists felt that proletarian revolution was more important than mere political freedom for the Indonesians, who might succumb to a native capitalist class. Indonesians were more interested in national freedom than class warfare, but their foreign advisors were reluctant to give nationalism more than tactical lip-service. Miss McVey shows how the PKI attempted to work within other Indonesian groups ("the bloc within") then, when expelled by their non-Communist colleagues, to try an equally-unsuccessful "bloc above" strategy.

The ignorance of Russian and Comintern leaders about the actual situation in Indonesia, and their ideological orientation toward Europe and China, is graphically portrayed as a major communications gap in the relations of the Comintern with the Indonesian PKI. Personal rivalry among the Indonesian comrades was an even greater obstacle to united action. The climax of the PKI story in the 1920's was the rather hopeless attempt of a few PKI units to revolt. One is reminded of T.S. Eliot's phrase: "This is the way the world ends; not with a bang but a whimper." The PKI had been splintered and defeated both internally and in its alliances with other Indonesian groups: its minority Trotskyites' silly revolt merely gave the Dutch a chance to suppress all subversive groups for the remainder of the prewar period.

Donald Hindley's study of postwar Indonesian communism is far better written, but goes astray in its political predictions (e.g., "A communist rebellion is out of the question in the foreseeable future" (p. 301). The PKI emerged after 1945 in a better position and with better leadership than before the war, but Sukarno's nationalist party had won the anti-Dutch war and received major aid from wartime Japanese occupation forces. Hindley does not cover the 1945–1951 period, nor does Miss McVey's book explain the Indonesian nationalist movement from 1928 to 1945. George Kahin and others have covered this period to show how the anti-Communist Indonesian forces gained the upper hand in postwar politics, suppressing a PKI rebellion against the embattled nationalists in 1948.

*The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963* is also a chronological account of postwar PKI policies, with a brief historical preface. It concentrates on the 1951–1959 period (pp. 27–229) when party leader Aidit overcame the stigma of the 1948 revolt to amass over 2 million members and 21% of the 1955 parliamentary vote (27% in the 1957 national election). Aidit cultivated Sukarno's personal friendship; made the PKI a "lovable Communist party"; and built strong mass support through educational, labor, and even lower-rank military recruitment.

The best chapters deal with PKI political tactics under Sukarno's "guided democracy" after 1959. Sukarno brought some PKI leaders into advisory positions and claimed that Communism was one of the three pillars of Indonesian national policy. He cultivated Peking's friendship while curtailing the freedom of Chinese in Indonesia. Hindley does not analyze Sukarno's motives in trying to balance the PKI against the army, but implies that Bung Karno would control the PKI by neutralizing its influence. "This study makes no pretense to place the Aidit leadership's PKI in its international Communist setting (viii)"—but how can one understand the 1965 debacle in which the PKI was decimated without an understanding of its international setting?

The Hindley volume is excellent for a study of the internal PKI movement between 1951 and 1963, but in the aftermath of 1965 we may ask if Aidit's leadership was really so astute? Did Peking really direct the PKI to mount a coup against its own interests, or was the 1965 coup a general's plot to discredit the PKI (as Peking claims)? The motivation of rank-and-file Indonesians in joining the PKI or its front organizations before or after WWII remains an unanswered question, like the causes of the 1965 coup and its successful suppression.

It may never be possible to reconstruct the historic picture of the PKI in its prewar and postwar failures. One is led to conclude that Indonesian Communists are, after all, subject to the weaknesses of all Indonesians. Their 1927, 1948, and 1965 defeats indicate a victory of nationalism over communist internationalism, but the sources of Indonesian discontent on which the PKI rebuilt its fortunes in the past remain fertile ground for a future movement. Self-defeating strategy was the major cause of the PKI's past failures, but was the strategy devised by native leaders or their foreign comrades? The McVey and Hindley books provide us with much documentary evidence on the PKI, but not enough analysis of its nationalist opposition or its future potential within the complex Indonesian society.—Douglas Mendel, Jr. *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

*Democratic Innovations in Nepal.* By Bhuwan L. Joshi and Leo E. Rose. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 551. $10.75.)

Nepal, often called "the kingdom in the clouds," offers the visitor startling and sometimes exciting contrasts. Autos vie with water-buffalo carts and bicycles on the streets of Kathmandu. Radios blare from the bazaars while animals are sacrificed in religious ceremonies in the pagoda temples. An American-built electric ropeway carries freight over the southern mountains, while peasant women carry firewood on their backs from highland villages to the town bazaars. None of the contrasts is more interesting, however, than the events portrayed in this outstanding "case study in political acculturation."

Nepal is a unique laboratory of "modernization"—economic and social, as well as political. Till the "Revolution of 1950," Nepal was a replica of a repressive medieval feudalism. Isolated in an implausible terrain of high mountains and narrow valleys lived over 8,000,000 people (95 percent illiterate); most were landless peasants working on the lands of the rich landlord families. Complete political power was seized by a single family, the Ranas, in 1846. It created an hereditary premiership in its own ranks and relegated the Crown to a purely ceremonial role with practical confinement to the palace grounds.

Despite this powerful elite, about all that held the country together was its extreme isolation—and the popular veneration of the king. The Hindu faithful believed (and still believe) him to be the reincarnation of one of their major deities, Vishnu. He played a "legitimizing," not an actual, role in the "conspiratorial" politics of the period.

Our authors, one a Nepoli now teaching in this country, the other certainly the most informed American scholar about Nepal, trace this background in some detail. They analyze the forces which brought about the "revolution" of 1950 and trace the course of events which led to the elimination of Rana rule and restoration of governance by the Crown. Their account is both incisive and informative.

They divide the post-revolutionary period into three stages of development. The first saw the emergence of new personalities and experimentation with new political practices. This stage is divisible into "the search for constitutional democracy, 1951–1955" and "innovation in the 'interim' political system, 1955–59." It witnessed the growth of "agitational" instead of "conspiratorial" politics. Street parades and demonstrations, a proliferating party press, and pamphleteering superseded palace intrigue.

"Parties" formed around personalities. Ministries succeeded each pretty much as the king assessed the locus of preponderant influence among the contending groups. During this period, the Nepoli Congress Party, modeled in structure and program on the Indian Congress Party, emerged as the major democratically-oriented party grouping. At the same time, the Communist Party gained a foothold in the few urban centers and sought to attract the landless peasants. The other parties revolved primarily around personalities seeking leadership in the new Nepal

King Tribhuwan, who was on the throne in 1950, genuinely sought to convert the government into a constitutional monarchy on Western lines. His son, King Mahendra, who succeeded him in 1955, honored his father's commitment. He proceeded slowly but persistently toward the drafting of a constitution and the holding of elections for a national Parliament. Both were accomplished in 1958–59; the second stage, "experiment with parliamentary democracy, 1959–60," became a landmark in Nepali political life.

The Nepali Congress Party was returned overwhelmingly, winning 74 of 109 seats with 38 per cent of the vote. Most of the personal leaders of other party groups were defeated. The largest opposition group, the Ghorka Parishad, a strongly conservative group, won 19 seats with 17 per cent of the vote. The Communists gained four seats with seven percent of the vote.

Leadership of the Nepali Congress Party had been nurtured in the Indian Congress tradition. It proceeded to formulate a progressive legislative program—and to operate in the tradition of parliamentary government. Since the Constitution had left "exercise of the sovereign powers and prerogatives (including the executive power) vesting in us" to the Crown, the Cabinet's actual powers were unclear.

Opposition of the landed groups to the Nepali Congress program was acute. The defeated party leaders were also disaffected. "All these elements magnified the threat of the new political system to King Mahendra's innovation of a dynamic role for the Crown," and a clash of interests was "inevitable." Hence—the *coup* of December 15, 1960. The king arrested the Government, placed many leaders, including the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, B.P. Koirala, in jail; some are still confined.

The *coup* ushered in the third (and current) stage: "Panchayat Raj." All political parties were banned. Some "fundamental (civil) rights" were curtailed. The press was, in a sense, nationalized. A non-political system of government, based on a four-tier structure of councils from the village to the national level (directly elective only at the village level) was instituted. Its powers were consultative rather than elective. Administration was centralized even further, with greater control by central-government administrators over regional, district, and local officials. King Mahendra's concept of "a dynamic, authoritarian, politically oriented monarchy" was achieved.

This illuminating account of political events in Nepal since 1950 provides a backdrop for acute analysis of the country's many economic and social problems, domestic and international.

Our authors underline Nepal's extreme sensitiveness to involvement in the Cold War in the context of its almost total dependence on foreign aid for implementing internal development. Their account of these and related questions is thoroughly objective, but does not conceal the delicate issues involved in the country's future as a viable entity. Their scholarship is attested by their ten-page (only three in English) bibliography. They have given us a major contribution to available sources on Southeast Asia.—Phillips Bradley, *Berea College.*

*The Mexican Political System.* By L. Vincent Padgett. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. Pp. x, 244. $2.75.)

*Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano.* By Robert Paul Hillon. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 222. $6.00.)

Mexico is one of the Latin American countries that has consistently attracted the interest of U. S. political scientists in the last twenty years. L. Vincent Padgett's *The Mexican Political System* stands as one of the best available introductions to the subject.

In over 200 pages of compact chapters, the author has managed to include a lot of factual information which is required reading for those who want to know the basic elements of the Mexican polity. Padgett presents his findings in the conceptual framework of political inputs and outputs which has been developed, among others, by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman in their pioneer study on *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* He also gives due consideration in his work to the historical aspects of the subject.

His first chapter, "The Bases of Legitimacy," compresses the essential trends related to the "pantheon of heroes and events which legitimize the system," and it stands as an excellent starting point for the rest of the volume, which includes sections on parties and elections, labor and peasant organizations, the middle sector, and the presidency (the "inputs"); labor and agrarian policies, and modernization (the "outputs"). This last chapter is organized to deal with industrialization, transportation, commerce, education, modernization and marginalism, and the "participating Mexicans," that is to say, those who understand "that the present system is a complex mixture of legal, rational, and modern forms of administration and decision-making operating along with older traditional ways."

Padgett is at his best when summarizing the achievements of the Cárdenas' administration, the role of the President in Mexican politics, the influence of the industrial middle sector from the early 'forties onward, and the balance of the agrarian reform policies. He provides the reader with a clearer view of Mexico than the two previous books written by Robert E. Scott (*Mexican Politics in Transition*) and Frank Brandenburg (*The Making of Modern Mexico*), usually referred to as standard references in the field. Padgett, for example, is not so optimistic as Scott in his appraisal of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional,* and at the same time offers better evidence than Brandenburg's idea of the "Revolutionary Family" by concentrating instead on the "Revolutionary Coalition" (see his arguments in p. 34 and *passim*).

One serious gap in *The Mexican Political System* is the lack of detailed treatment of Mexican foreign affairs, which should have been greatly expanded because of the relationship they hold *vis-à-vis* domestic policies especially in the United States-Latin American context.

Balancing the pros and cons of the Mexican Revolution, the author closes his book with this warning, in reference to the Indian population: "There remains a Mexico which is not organized, which is politically quiescent, and which understands none of the new and peaceful ways of achieving goals. For this Mexico there is no middle ground between servile conformity and resort to force. This is the Mexico which must be incorporated into the modernizing national culture if violence in the countryside is not to disrupt the new way of life which is developing." Again, we find the problem of dual Latin American societies: the "many Mexicos," the "two Brazils."

Another way of getting a more accurate view of Mexican politics is well shown by Robert Paul Millon in his *Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano,* the same subject on which he based his doctoral dissertation for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

This is not an attempt at "personal" biography, but rather an intellectual and political analysis of one of the most interesting personalities in contemporary Mexico. The author deals with Lombardo's vast career as educator and administrator; leader in the national and international labor movements; author; founder, director and contributor to Mexican and foreign periodicals; political militant, first in the "Revolutionary Coalition" and later on (since 1948) in the *Partido Popular Socialista* of which he is at present Secretary-General.

Millon, through extensive research and personal interviews with Lombardo, demonstrates the usefulness of this type of biographic-political approach in Latin American studies. His comments on the role of nationalism in Lombardo's thought, and the stand of the latter as a *Mexican* Marxist are quite relevant to a better understanding of the position of the Leftist *intelligentsia* in Latin America.

The author's final conclusions are a good synthesis of the problems the Mexican Revolution is now facing, and of Lombardo's attempts to further its modernizing and transforming goals.—ALBERTO CIRIA, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

*The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement.* BY HARRY KANTOR. (Washington: Savile Books, 1966. Pp. v, 175. $6.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

This sympathetic treatment of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, originally written in 1953, has been brought up to date by the inclusion of an epilogue describing APRA's position in the present Peruvian political situation. The importance of studying Aprista ideology stems from the fact that not only is it an interesting attempt to reinterpret and modify European socialist thought so as to adapt it to Latin America's particular problems, but that to a large extent APRA can be considered as the model and source of ideological inspiration for sister parties such as Accion Democratica of Venezuela, Liberacion Nacional of Costa Rica, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario of Bolivia and the Paraguayan Febrerista Party. Therefore, Professor Kantor's work—the only one of its kind—becomes one of the necessary starting points for studying this class of parties.

Political theorists will find Aprista political thought both interesting and mystifying. In their attempt to emancipate themselves from European socialist thought and create an indigenous theory more applicable to Latin American realities these Peruvian thinkers achieved some notable successes—as well as some philosophical "howlers." One can applaud, for instance, their rejection of Lenin's interpretation of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism. The Aprista view, that Latin American capitalism was actually started by imperialist penetration, is much more in accord with the facts. Similarly, APRA's campaign for the economic integration of Latin America—begun during its earliest days—seems truly prophetic in retrospect, given contemporary attempts to achieve this through the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area.

At the same time, however, one has the feeling of entering a philosophical "fun-house" when introduced to Victor Raul Haya de la Torre's theory of "historical space-time." Obviously the Aprista leader was trying to emphasize the uniqueness of all human cultures, due to the peculiar historical development of each one. In this way it could be argued that European political theory would not fit in Latin America because an entirely different set of circumstances was present. However, the clarity of this thesis is obscured from the beginning by Haya's unfortunate insistence upon propping up his theory by trying to wed Einstein's concepts of relativity and space-time to a theory of cultural evolution. Perhaps such a fusion is possible, but in Haya's case the result is only confusion and a drift towards mysticism. In the end we are told that historical space-time is all the physical factors that make up a society and "something more which flows from the spirit of the people" (p. 32), or that is an "X" quality: "a certain 'rhythm,' or 'spirit' or 'collective consciousness' which each people develops as a result of all the experiences to which they are exposed" (p. 120). To me, at least, this is not very clear, and it hardly makes *aprismo* more respectable as an explanatory theory.

None of this is Professor Kantor's fault. He can't be held responsible for the shortcomings of his subject. However, there are some minor criticisms that can be made of the author's presentation. It is never quite clear, for example, whether or not APRA can be classified as a socialist movement. Professor Kantor does identify *aprismo* with democratic socialism on page 115, but elsewhere he likens it to the British Labour Party and the New Deal (p. 75). Apparently the Apristas do not consider themselves as socialists (p. 29), although they retain the Marxian dialectic as a conceptual tool, and prefer to label their economic program as "state capitalism" (p. 75). While this confusion may de due in large measure to the Apristas' own contradictory writings, a lengthier analysis might have helped to clarify the subject.

One final criticism concerns the author's identification with his subject. While it is generally refreshing in this era of value neutralism to find an author willing to display a strong ideological commitment—in this case democratic socialism—one wonders at times whether this does not interfere with the description. Out of the history of recent Peruvian political struggles the Apristas in this account somehow always emerge as honest and pure. Now, it simply isn't possible for any group in politics to be so angelic. For instance, when the author discusses the failure of the Aprista-supported reform government of Jose Bustamente (1945–1948) he lays all the blame for its downfall against the conservatives and Bustamente and absolves the Apristas entirely. Considerable debate has revolved around this event—Bustamente claiming that the Apristas wanted to dominate the government for their own ends and simply use him as a stooge, while the Apristas accuse Bustamente of ignoring their demands even though their votes had helped put him in office. Professor Kantor sides firmly with the

Apristas, saying that the crisis arose because the Apristas, "who held a majority in Congress," were blocked by the President, who had forgotten his political debt to them (p. 17). Yet, Professor Kantor's own reckoning on the preceding page the Apristas held only 18 of the 46 Senate seats and 48 of 101 seats in the Chamber of Deputies! Thus, while they may have been a majority within Bustamente's "Democratic Front" (18 out of 35 Senate seats, 48 of 73 in the Chamber), they were by no means a majority in either house of Congress. Presumably, then, Bustamente had to take other demands besides theirs into consideration. And in any case, as events were to show, the Apristas needed Bustamente just as much as he needed them. After all, they fell together.

These criticisms are not intended to suggest any fatal flaws in Professor Kantor's work. Overall, this presentation of APRA's ideology and program is strictly straightforward and factual. The study is deservedly a "classic" in the field of Latin American politics and is "must" reading for those interested in the political parties and political thought of that region.—Paul Lewis, *Louisiana State University.*

*Church and State in Latin America. A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations.* Rev. Ed. By J. Lloyd Mecham. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 465. $8.50.)

The appearance of the first edition of this work, a third of a century ago, represented a noteworthy step forward in the contentious study of the relations of the Latin American states and the Church. The only general work which treated the subject, *Church and State* became the standard source for generations of Latin Americanists. Its author's dispassionate analysis of even such bitter national politico-ecclesiastical experiences as that of Mexico justly won him the respect of the scholarly world not only in this country, but in Latin America as well.

In the present edition, the book follows basically the same organization that it did in the earlier version. That is, there are three broad introductory chapters treating the colonial background of church-state relations, their development through the independence period, and papal relations during that struggle. A country-by-country survey of the topic since their achievement of nationhood follows. Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil each are given a chapter and Mexico, two. Paraguay and Bolivia share a chapter, and the Caribbean and Central America are treated regionally.

Professor Mecham has manfully attempted to bring his book up to date with citations of materials which have appeared since 1934. Unfortunately, while they add to the extensive bibliographical apparatus, they do not substantively (perhaps with the exception of his chapters on Mexico) change the conclusions he drew thirty years ago. The author's approach remains legalistic.

Although Dr. Mecham views the actions of the church as differing in the various national experiences he studies, he does not draw the next conclusion—namely that in each Latin American country the church is a social institution. That is, that it is hardly monolithic in composition, but reflects regional, as well as social diversity in its leadership and in its component parts. In his concern for the legal solutions to the problems besetting relations between the civil and clerical governments, Mecham retains his profound respect for the written law as the highest expression of church-state modi vivendi. True, concordats, as well as constitutional provisions fixing the church's status in a national context, *are* important indices. But they are akin to the small portion of the iceberg visible above the surface of the sea: they reveal only a fraction of the whole.

Let us examine a case in point: Colombia. Mecham concludes (as he did in 1934) that " . . . the clergy regard the status established by the Concordat to be a model one. . . . " Quite the opposite is true. The thoughtful elements in the hierarchy, unwilling to remain pawns in the hands of ostensibly Catholic-but intrinsically self-seeking politicians like Laureano Gómez (1950–1953) and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953–1957), desire nothing more than divorce from their unhappy marriage to the Colombian State. The old values have changed, and a profound concern with the dynamics of social change has penetrated not merely the ranks of the lower clergy, but far up into the ecclesiastical establishment as well.

Space does not permit other such examples, nor some illustration of the many misspellings of Spanish names and incorrect source citations (carried over from the first edition) which careful checking could have eliminated.

This reviewer does not mean to imply that Professor Mecham has ignored the increasingly important role of Latin American Christian Democracy or that of the exponents of the New Wave within the various Latin American branches of the Church. He has incorporated them, but has superimposed these recent developments on a work which remains oriented and structured toward constitutional and formalistic history of the relations between Church and State. As such a history it remains without peer.—J. León Helguera, *Vanderbilt University.*

*Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity*. By Gerhard Masur. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. x, 278. $5.95.)

During the fall of 1962 Professor Gerhard Masur participated in a conference on "Ideas and Social Change in the Western Hemisphere" which met in Mexico City, sponsored by the International Society for the History of Ideas. This book, which attempts to trace the evolution of nationalism in Latin America from its beginnings to the present, grew out of that meeting.

Gerhard Masur is well known among Latin Americanists in this country and abroad for his biography of Simón Bolívar. In this new work, Professor Masur contends that nationalism is the ideology (at times he treats it as a movement) that has penetrated Latin American political and social thought in this century and "has acted as a catalyst for many of the social adjustments which have taken place." This is a logical view for a student of Bolivar to hold.

Recognizing that nationalism was first a European product, the writer seeks to isolate and define its Latin American variants in historic perspective. After a brief (and traditional) examination of the colonial experience, the writer considers the difficulties that have stood in the way of independence and the development of vital and effective nationhood. Masur describes how Latin American nationalism was "held together by personalities" and was often centered around the frustrations of trying to hold a community together in the face of internal difficulties and external pressures during the early years of independence. As a consequence nationalism in this part of the world became xenophobic (anti-North American in large part) and, according to Masur, "a by-product of the encounter with Western capitalism."

Against this background is traced the Mexican Revolution, Aprismo and the prospects of agrarian socialism in a large Indian society, the Bolivian National Revolution, the National Revolution in Brazil, the problems of "enigmatic" Argentina, and the Cuban Revolution. In the Mexican case the writer views the Revolution as "a slow and tortuous process of integration" by which "a society composed of superimposed levels had to be melted down and a new one forged." The impact of Aprismo and the "Indian Renaissance" of the Indian range is explored. The author underlines the weaknesses of the Bolivian Revolution in practice and explains the importance of the Indian in the "visionary nationalism" of the MNR. In the case of Brazil and Argentina primary attention is given to the complex development of the movements associated with Getúlio Vargas and Juan Perón. He draws parallels to Fascist and National Socialist movements in Europe and gives attention to the Latin American characteristics of these developments. Finally, in the case of Cuba, Masur probes the various aspects of the Castro Revolution in the context of Cuban nationalism which first appeared in its modern form in the 1920s.

Looking back on these movements the writer finds that nationalism south of the border first appeared as a "patriotism of regional coloring." Later it evolved into "a cultural and aristocratic nationalism" which in this century has "turned into a popular revolutionary nationalism." With this it is difficult to argue. The broad outlines of Latin American nationalism are drawn in this book, and this is a useful project in itself. Nevertheless there are generalizations in this work which raise questions in the mind of this reviewer. For example, we are told that "Marxism still has a large number of followers in Bolivia." There is the opinion that the Soviet Union "would be willing to pick up the tab" for Bolivian economic stability. Can we accept the idea that the Brazilian armed forces have across time been committed to "the cause of democracy"? Is it a fact that "the economic ills (of Brazil) are more apparent than real"? Certainly judgments of this sort are interesting topics for discussion, but they tend to disrupt an effort to describe systematically the evolution of Latin American nationalism.—Victor H. Gibean, Jr., *University of Alabama.*

*Latin America in Soviet Writings, A Bibliography, Volume I: 1917–1958, Volume II: 1959–1964.* Compiled by Leo Okinshevich, Ed. by Robert G. Carlton. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Vol. I, pp. xvii, 257; Vol. II, pp. xii, 311. Both volumes, $25; separately, $15 each.)

Upon examining a two volume bibliography of Soviet writings on Latin America prepared in the Library of Congress, the old proverb "It's an ill wind that blows nobody good" readily comes to mind. Surely it is to the establishment of a communist regime in Cuba that we are indebted for this handsome, comprehensive and elaborately organized bibliography. It would be ungrateful to reflect that a bibliography of Soviet writings on Western Europe or China might be more widely used. For the small number of scholars interested in Soviet policy in Latin America this bibliography is invaluable. It contains 8,688 references to books and articles on Latin America published in the Soviet Union from 1917 through 1964. Volume I (1917–1958) contains 3,831 of these entries and Volume II (1959–1964) contains 4,857. This great increase in output reflects, of course, enhanced Soviet interest in Latin America. A special research institute devoted to Latin American affairs was established in 1962 and its growing output compares in quality with Soviet academic writing on other parts of the world.

Since the volumes are organized by topic the scholar new to the subject can orient himself rapidly. The Author Index is particularly useful for those who wish to follow the work of a given writer. A check of books and articles known to the present writer reveals none missing and a perusal of titles uncovered items of interest which had escaped his notice. The bibliographer's nets were very fine indeed. For example even the *Uchenye zapiski,* i.e. collections of scholarly articles of institutes and the journals of universities are included to say nothing of the Soviet journal of poultry raising and the Soviet chess journal.

The non-specialist might not realize how much more useful such a bibliography is now than at an earlier time. Soviet professional writing, even on sensitive subjects, is much less constrained by the official position of the communist party than it once was. The Soviet scholar is now free (within limits) to develop theses which do not have, or do not yet have, official sanction. In the past a scholar working on an particular problem in Soviet studies reached the point of diminishing returns very quickly in the examination of the literature, for variety of view was rare indeed. Now, on the contrary, it is often rewarding to read books published in small editions or articles appearing in the less well known journals. To the scholar who wishes to exploit such opportunities, this bibliography is invaluable.

It is to be hoped that some means for keeping the bibliography up-to-date can be found. Is it too much to hope that similar bibliographies might be prepared for other areas?—HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN, *The School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D. C.*

*Guide to Latin American Studies.* ED. BY MARTIN SABLE. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966. Pp. 850. $25.)

*Master Directory for Latin America.* ED. BY MARTIN SABLE. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966. Pp. 438. $15.)

*Periodicals for Latin American Economic Development, Trade and Investment: An Annotated Bibliography.* COMPILED BY MARTIN SABLE. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965. $2.50.)

*Statistical Abstract of Latin America.* 1965 ed. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965. $8 to libraries; $6 to students, faculty.)

For specialists of Latin American politics and studies, the 1965 edition of *Statistical Abstract* is the most useful of these reference works, although the *Guide* also may serve the needs of the introductory student. The latter work attempts to be comprehensive in its listing of some 5,000 titles in English, Spanish, French, German, and Portuguese. Its compilation, however, is limited to selections from Boston and Los Angeles libraries. The *Master Directory* includes ten sub-directories with names and addresses of U. S., Western European, and Latin American institutions interested in Latin America. The *Periodicals* guide is a bibliography of 220 entries.—R.H.C.

## INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

*International Relations in the New Africa.* BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, A Spectrum Book, 1966. Pp. xi, 175. $5.95, cloth; $2.45, paper.)

I. William Zartman has written a useful survey, not of "international relations in the new Africa," but of the relations among the seventeen states of "Western Africa" stretching from Nigeria through the Maghreb. The geographical limitation rather surprisingly proves not to be a hindrance, since whatever is lost in comprehensive coverage of continental affairs is more than made up in detailed and precise analysis of an area that Zartman obviously knows well. The reader is rewarded with careful expositions not elsewhere equaled of the motivations behind ventures like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union of African States and the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, as well as of these organizations' subsequent vicissitudes.

After an historical presentation of how relations have developed among the seventeen states, Zartman analyzes the criteria for their foreign policies and the various limitations on their implementation, particularly as they affect the development of broader patterns of political and economic cooperation among African states. Zartman isolates five interrelated characteristics of the foreign relations of Western Africa: 1) The "non-territorial" and unintegrated nature of the states which makes foreign policy depend on the personal preferences (and often whims) of chiefs of state rather than on any national interest; 2) The lack of national power, in the sense that any state's capability of achieving any foreign policy goal is extremely limited, both because it lacks resources and because the foreign-policy making process is haphazard; 3) The substitution of ideology and symbolic statement for pragmatic analysis and implementation of foreign policy; 4) The "searching" and tentative quality of policies, particularly as regards problems of African unity, in which states seem to be working out their own identities through international interaction; 5) As a culmination of the others, the instability of alliances and patterns of hostility between African governments. Zartman concludes that Western Africa exhibits "a special type of international-relations system. Unlike the more traditional models of balance-of-power, hierarchical or supranational systems, the African system is one of mobile relations carried out within certain limits imposed by ideology and environment." Such characteristics of Western African interstate relations certainly can be generalized to most of the rest of the continent.

If the geographical restriction poses no problems, limiting the discussion to intra-African relations does distort some parts of Zartman's argument. On its first page the book states its assumption that "a state's primary area of interest in foreign relations is with its neighbors." This seems questionable in the case of most nations, and a dangerous assumption in the case of African states, most of which are economically highly dependent on the favor of non-African powers. While Zartman's African focus is a welcome antidote to analyses which explain all by the subtle action of "neo-colonialism" or "international communism," one cannot forget that Africa's mobile international relations take place in a world dominated by big, and sometimes bad world powers. This external reality sometimes intrudes harshly into intra-African politics; thus, Dahomey's and Upper Volta's withdrawal from the Mali Federation came in response more to French threats than to the Ivory Coast pressures that Zartman mentions. In a broader sense, the very freedom of African states to indulge in ideological and "searching" foreign policies results from the major world powers' tacit agreement not to disturb seriously the African international status quo for the moment. External events, like a dramatic collapse of the Soviet-American détente or a determined re-entry of Red China into African politics, could sharply restrict the African states' freedom to act as they wish even more than "the limits imposed by ideology and environment."

This reservation aside, Zartman has produced a valuable study of intra-African politics that is worthy of serious attention from both the Africanist and the student of international politics.—William J. Foltz, *Yale University.*

*The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects.* By Doudou Thiam. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xv, 134. $4.50.)

*False Start in Africa.* By René Dumont. Translated by Phyllis Nauts Ott. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 320. $7.00.)

These two books, both translations of earlier French publications, deal with important concerns for Africans and for scholars interested in underdeveloped nations. Doudou Thiam, the Foreign Minister of Senegal, discusses the international relations of new Black African states and seeks to delineate the major influences on the policies in this area. René Dumont, a French agronomist with wide experience in Africa, examines the barriers to African economic development and suggests some of the causes and remedies for these problems.

In *The Foreign Policy of African States* Thiam suggests that two basic ideologies—nationalism and socialism—are the prime factors in shaping the international politics of Black African nations. Nationalism has expressed itself in two forms: "micro-nationalism" which emphasizes the sovereignty of the separate states as they emerged from colonial rule and "macro-nationalism," or Pan-Africanism, which stresses broader geographical groupings and African unity. The Pan-African tendency serves as a factor of cohesion in relations with the outside world, and ultimately the nature of the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world will be largely determined by whether Africans' can unite or whether the present fragmentation remains. The other form of nationalism, which frequently clashes with the desire for African unity, comes to the fore in the relations between the African states themselves, and the interplay of the often contradictory motivations of the two nationalist concerns explains much of the international politics in Africa. The author examines the different approaches of various states toward wider cooperation and unity, and he assesses the progress made in this direction. Thiam emphasizes that the stronger inclination has clearly been toward protecting the sovereignty of the independent nations.

The second major influence on foreign policy in the view of the author is socialism. In the first section of his book, he describes the attraction of socialism to African leaders and explores the different conceptions of socialism African leaders have developed. He suggests that, although new forms of socialism will be created in Africa, the nature of the expression in a given country will incline it toward the principles of either the people's democracies or the Western democracies, and foreign policy will be influenced in the same direction. In the second part of his book, which examines specific international policies and events, the author establishes, in the opinion of this reader, that the urgent desire for economic development, with the consequent necessity of obtaining outside assistance, is a more general and fundamental influence on foreign policy than socialism, no matter how important an ideology socialism may be for domestic politics.

For a brief analysis of domestic and international factors affecting African foreign policies and an explanation of some of the international actions in contemporary Africa, this is a useful book. Its explanation of the determinants of policy and the application of this theory to actual practices, however, remains at a very general level and does not contribute much in the way of new analytical or factual knowledge. But when one remembers that the author is an important African leader and the book can be viewed as a significant revelation of his outlook and attitudes, then the value of the book is enhanced and respect increases for the calm, rather detached manner in which it is written.

Whereas Thiam's book presents a few broad explanatory theses documented briefly with examples which are incompletely analyzed, Dumont's *False Start in Africa* abounds with specific, detailed references without a sufficient theoretical framework to organize the multiplicity of facts into convincing generalizations. If one is seeking a catalog of mistakes and malpractices in African developmental efforts, this book is an ideal source. Dumont explores, and in many instances offers remedies for, the harmful results of colonial exploitation, the misguided programs of post-colonial aid projects, and the negative contributions made by the practices of many leaders of independent Africa. His targets range from the faulty use of land and machinery to international trade policies and the educational system, to mention only a very few of the multitude. His harsh criticisms are based, however, on a genuine concern for the welfare of the individual human beings who suffer from the wasted opportunities and on an underlying optimism that proper policies and actions can remove the hindrances to African development.

Many of his criticisms are directed at rather obvious targets—e.g., corruption, inflated benefits for elites, or squandering of public funds on prestige items—but much of his discussion, particularly of agricultural problems, will afford new insights to the non-specialist on the extremely difficult circumstances which must be confronted in this area. The concept of underdevelopment is given vivid, concrete meaning through his description of conditions in much of Africa.

Without denying the existence of the innumerable faults he cites, one can question his treatment of many of them. In many instances he discusses problems in complete isolation from the larger political and sociological context, and his analysis and prescriptions imply all kinds of assumptions which cannot always be granted. The causal factors in some of the problems may extend beyond those he mentions, and the ramifications of some of his reforms in areas beyond his specific target are unrealistically and dangerously ignored. The political mechanisms necessary to implement some of his suggestions might lead to consequences equally as undesirable as the original problem to be solved. This does not mean that reforms are not needed and should not be sought; rather, it indicates the need for a greater understanding of the complex relationship of the multiple factors which are involved in the modernization of underdeveloped societies. Especially in regard to agricultural matters Dumont contributes to this understanding; and perhaps much of the specific data which he furnishes on other problems might be useful to those constructing or testing broader and more systematic theories. In addition to this some of his suggestions are obviously informed by good sense and sound experience and should be given attention by those in responsible positions.—Charles S. Rooks, *Duke University*.

*The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration*. By Andrew M. Scott. (New York: Random House, 1965. Pp 186. $1.95.)

Scholars engaged in the study of international politics have recognized for a long time that formal relations among governments make up only a part—and not always the most important part—of the field of international relations. Of equal if not greater importance, quite often, are the informal relations between non-governmental and quasi-governmental institutions or the relations between the government of one country and the people of another. It is primarily with this last type of informal international relations (or "informal penetration") that Professor Scott is concerned in this book. Specifically the area of study is defined by Professor Scott as "the means by which agents or instruments of one country gain access to the population or processes of another . . . with or without the approval of the government of the second country" (p. 4). Such penetration can be overt or covert and it can be carried out for purposes of attack or defense.

It is a major thesis of this book that the rise in frequency and scope in informal penetration since World War I amounts to a veritable revolution in statecraft. It is claimed: (1) that massive informal penetration has become a distinguishing characteristic between the international politics before and after World War I; (2) that informal penetration has been important in changing the countries so affected; and (3) that informal penetration has reduced the territorial inviolability of nation states thus changing the functioning of the international system. The major reasons for the increase of informal penetration in modern international politics are said to be the growth in importance of public opinion, the development of strong ideological cleavages, the revolution in technology, the introduction of nuclear weaponry, and the economic dependence of underdeveloped countries on the developed nations.

The structure of the book is roughly as follows. Chapter One attempts to establish a theoretical framework within which to organize the mass of international behavior that would fall into the category of informal penetration. Portions of the theoretical framework serve as an organizing device for the discussion that follows. The next two chapters contain case studies of informal penetration. Soviet and Nazi experiences are used as illustrations of informal penetration for purposes of attack, while American experience is used as an illustration of penetration for defense. Chapter Four deals with the fundamental problem of why some nations seem more vulnerable to penetration than others. Chapter Five deals with penetration by international organizations. The final chapter appropriately is a discussion of the effect of informal penetration upon the international system.

The discussion of the practices of informal penetration by various nations and by international organizations seemed to me to contain little with which one would quibble, but they contained little in the way of new data or new theoretical insight. Of greater interest were the theoretical discussion in Chapter One, the discussion on disloyalty and ideology in Chapter Four, and the final chapter on the effects of informal penetration on the international system.

I certainly do not agree with the author on many points. For example, I accept the contention that informal penetration has increased greatly since World War I. But I would suggest that informal penetration was widespread before the War as well, though the forms of penetration may have varied to be sure. Nor do I think that penetration has affected the international system anywhere as much as Professor Scott says it does.

Such disagreements not withstanding, I found the chapters in question interesting and stimulating reading. The discussion of disloyalty and ideology in Chapter Four was thought provoking. Indeed the whole chapter contained a number of useful insights and interesting points. I only wished that the treatment of the problem were less brief. It is true, of course, that as Professor Scott points out little is known as yet about the process of political socialization. Yet unless I am very much mistaken we know more than is suggested in the chapter. Of course, lack of space may have been an important factor in setting limits to the discussion of the problem. For myself I would have much preferred drastic cuts in other places and more extensive discussion of this problem.—A. F. K. ORGANSKI, *University of Michigan.*

*Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy.* BY ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xiii, 205. $2.25.)

This is a delightful little book that does precisely what the author claims he attempted to do: "summarize the major themes that have guided the historic course of American diplomacy." It can be recommended highly as supplementary reading for courses in American diplomacy and for the informed public. It shows clearly that American foreign policy has traditionally been a mixture of ideals and concrete national interests supported by whatever rationalizations were necessary to justify the nation's behavior.

Especially well-done are the chapters on isolationism, the idea of mission, and manifest destiny—themes Ekirch traces from the colonial period and which he claims dominated American policy to 1850. Later they merged smoothly into such movements as imperialism and anti-foreignism.

Underlying all the forces discussed there has been, Ekirch claims, a steadily growing nationalism that, unfortunately, contained an excess of egoism and ethnocentrism. Quite often, the author asserts, this was a selfish and inhumane nationalism that claimed more rights for Americans than Americans were willing to allow others. Justifying their dispossession of the Indians, the seizures of foreign territory, or hostility to immigrants was, therefore, not much of a moral problem for most Americans. Consensus on both the rightness and righteousness of United States behavior appears to have been overwhelming.

Professor Ekirch gives the impression, however, that there has been no such overwhelming consensus supporting American behavior in the twentieth century. Drives for expansion abroad, peace and democracy, the renunciation of war, world leadership under arms, and containment of the communist movement have all been accompanied by far more disagreement and debate than seemed to prevail in the nineteenth century. One reason seems to be that the twentieth century has become an "age of dilemmas" not only for the United States but for all states struggling to cope with a myriad of new problems for which the old themes fail to provide answers. Another reason seems to be what Ekirch sees as the implacable determination of the United States to achieve and maintain global economic and political leadership in a world that has an almost equally implacable determination not to follow that leadership without at least some questioning by both Americans and foreigners. It is this relentless urge for leadership that the author sees as the mainspring for the policies of all our strong policy-makers from Theodore Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson. It was this urge, it is argued, that generated FDR's interventionism, although it was performed in the name of national defense and with, probably, an exaggerated fear of the threat to American security. The Truman Doctrine and the containment policy are described as responses to this urge also. Thus the cold war is interpreted as essentially a competition for leadership between the super-powers. While this rivalry is not condemned, the author seems to feel that American policy has been applied with more crudeness than has been necessary, especially in America's determination to maintain "peace by force."

Although Ekirch tends to be rather critical of American policy throughout history, his criticism is moderate and not carried to the point of spoiling the quite careful and competent level of scholarship that is sustained throughout the entire book. One is left with the impression that the author is just a bit sad that American society has never been quite as sophisticated as he wishes it had been, or that at least it would show more sign of becoming so.—Willard Range, *University of Georgia.*

*Annihilation and Utopia: The Principles of International Politics.* By Errol E. Harris. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. 331. $7.50.)

Technicians concerned primarily with national defense strategy probably will choose to ignore the challenge posed by Professor Harris' stimulating evaluation of contemporary problems of peace and security. For these technicians, who have engineered the theoretical analysis which constitutes the mainstream of American thought on national security policies, will find it difficult to extend this study serious consideration because it examines dimensions that resist quantitative expression and because it eschews consideration of war as a mechanical problem. Yet as Professor Kissinger has recently pointed out, explicitly and implicitly, in his anthology *Problems of National Strategy,* "national security policy is not primarily a technical problem, but a challenge to political understanding and, ultimately, to philosophical insight." What the author has sought to do in *Annihilation and Utopia* is to expand the constricted political horizons and relieve the philosophical poverty which so often in the past has been characteristic of the technician's approach.

This is not to suggest that all applications of quantitative techniques are cursed with congenital sterility; nor, I hasten to add, that Mr. Harris has succeeded in providing a formula for "instant" peace. Indeed his solution is both distant and, in the contemporary sense, utopian. For the author is convinced that current policies fail to offer *logical* methods with which to counter the present drift toward the certain annihilation of civilization, and that the only *realistic* and *responsible* means of guaranteeing human political survival lies in a federated world union.

To the author—a professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas—the nub of the current international predicament is that "for the first time in history, the nations find themselves in the dilemma that their means of self-defense are equally the means of self-destruction, and their attempts to preserve what they value most are liable to result only in the destruction of everything they hold most dear" (p. 27). Although he concludes from this premise that war is no longer capable of performing "any function as an instrument of policy," he believes that unilaterally renouncing the use of force would prove too tempting to "political gangsters" who would destroy that which we value most. However Mr. Harris insists that there is no need to defend civilization to the point of extinction or to place democracy at the mercy of unscrupulous adventurers, "so long as we can assume that men, by and large, are sensible enough to take national measures to meet the predicament in which the contemporary world flounders" (p. 22).

These problems of peace and security the author divides into three broad phases—Part I, "The State and War," Part II, "The Conditions of Peace," and Part III, "The Ideological Conflict." Under the initial topic he scrutinizes war as a social institution, sovereign authority and power, international law and organs, the use and control of force, and the moral implications of war. Here he argues persuasively that international organs are ineffectual because of the overemphasis on national sovereignty, that deterrence systems are "irrational and absurd" because thermonuclear war is an unacceptable risk, that 'pacifism proper is beyond the realm of politics and is in effect the abandonment of political methods altogether" (p. 132), and that disarmament is consequent upon, not a means to, international order and law. Moreover, he believes that these solitary programs are inherently contradictory. In Part II the author subjects to incisive analysis the myth of national self-determination, the philosophical and legal principles of world order, and the conditions and socio-political obstacles to a world community. He contends that, although "the obstacles and difficulties to world integration are real and formidable," it "is by no means established" that they are insuperable (p. 225). He acknowledges that the ideological conflict, discussed in Part III, is most challenging but refuses to believe that it warrants despair. Thus he analyzes the ideological antithesis, the relationship of democracy and communism to world order, and the possibility of reconciliation. By focusing on Marxist "humanism," Mr. Harris suggests that a resolution of ideological differences may lie in the apparent shift of communist thought toward Existentialism. However in a more pragmatic vein, he believes that "if both regimes [democracy and communism] could be brought under one world government by some international constitutional device [i.e., a federal system], neither need modify their fundamental beliefs" (p. 285).

To the reviewer Mr. Harris' cogent observations frequently suggest implications that carry beyond the author's consideration. For instance, is "war" today actually incapable of advancing national policies? Do nuclear devices pose the ultimate threat to civilization? Can a world government, sufficiently strong to provide international order, also guarantee that it will not fall victim to a new, higher form of fascism which would be equally repugnant to democracy and communism? Or if the supranational body should not possess such power, would it be able to prevent "civil" war? Can "fear" provoke the necessary development of human rationality? If mankind were motivated to sufficient rationality to create a viable world government, could they not make any one of several insitutions function to establish peace?

Answers to these and scores of other exceptions obviously depend on taking a long look at historical experience, human behavior, and political universals. And yet to be provoked to these questions, and subsequently to be stimulated to logical, realistic rejoinders, is in this reviewer's opinion the ultimate merit of this book. But readers should be forewarned that the author has not been gentle in his challenge: "Those who scoff at the idea [of world government] as unrealistic must face the question whether the alternatives are not both more ridiculous and finally disastrous."—Richard Dean Burns, *California State College, Los Angeles.*

*Doctrines of Imperialism.* By A. P. Thornton. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. 226. $5.95, cloth; $2.95 paper.)

*The Colonizer and the Colonized.* By Albert Memmi. Translated by Howard Greenfeld. Introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre (1957). (New York: The Orion Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 153. $4.50.)

Both of our authors, donnish historian of ideas and leftist intellectual of the French tradition, differing as widely in outlook as do their books in scope, are at one in believing that their present writings have relevance for contemporary world politics. As the subject is imperialism, this belief is at once true and untrue. True, because the war of words over this phenomenon rages unabated, with great, if uncalculable, effect on men's hearts, minds and actions. Yet the authors' hope is also in part unjustified, for there has been a crucial shift in the terms of the battle, from the former dispute over the desirability and justice of imperialism, to the present question of its historical meaning and consequences. And neither really comes to grips with the latter problem.

Thornton's accurately entitled book is an extension of his previous work, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies,* and, like the latter, is primarily a study in the history of ideas, of the explicit justifications for and attacks on imperialism, rather than an inquiry into the causes of the process. Thus, he defines imperialism in terms of the subjective human reaction to events, rather than the events themselves: "At its heart is the image of dominance, of power asserted" (p. 2). So broad is this that at one point he even describes society's impress on youth, women, and whatnot as forms of imperialism.

More telling, perhaps, is Thornton's observation, in the course of a catalogue of the various rationalizations offered by French, German, British, and Russian proponents of foreign acquisition, that all of the rhetoric was more than anything else an expression of rampant nationalism. Likewise suggestive is his portrayal of 9th to 12th Century Europe as an economically colonized area of "Asia" (principally the Moslem cultures). This is explicitly analogized to the relation of Europe to Africa in the 19th Century (p. 127). On this reading, the Crusades appear as a colonial rebellion against Asia's commercial dominance [but why? and why just then? Alas! no answer is offered]: the Crusades contain "the embryo of every species of European imperialism . . . afterwards."

The perspective from which this essay is launched is impressively urbane and detached, though for someone without Professor Thornton's broad historical acquaintance, the occasionally rather self-indulgent elegance of its writing is sometimes hard to follow. That it does not contribute to our understanding of the aspect of the imperialism question that has greatest contemporary significance—the controversy over the part played by imperialism in the economic development of capitalism, and its effect on current conditions in the Third world—is not in itself a criticism of the book, since this presumably was not its author's intent. But this fact does limit its usefulness for most political scientists.

Albert Memmi's short essay, written in an execrably choppy, elliptical style (the fault of the translation?) sets before us an account of what the author believes to be the inescapable tendencies of psychology and attitude that issue from the relationship of colonizer to colonized. His birth as a Tunisian Jew qualified him to comment; and his French education and associations with the French Left gave him access to that group, so that when in 1957 he announced his conclusion [no hope for reform or gradual solutions, such as assimilation; the necessity of a complete, revolutionary break with the past, including the cultural], it had, we are told, a considerable impact on the evolution of the attitude of the European Left toward the Algerian war. Its retrospective value is presumably enhanced by Memmi's successful prediction (only implicit, to be sure, for he stops short of saying so openly) that the Europeans would have to get out.

This American edition of Memmi's book is "dedicated to the American Negro, also colonized." And there are, indeed, obvious parallels between the colonial psychological stereotypes Memmi describes [Arab seen by European as lazy, shiftless, feckless; the victim's induced self-contempt and tacit acceptance of the all-powerful oppressor's values], and the well-known facts of American racial folklore. This sort of thing has been often noted (see, for instance, the much subtler and more powerful development of these themes in *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*). But the applicability of Memmi's Maghrebi experience to the situation of other disadvantaged groups is probably less than he imagines, especially in North and South America, where assimilation of the underdog into the dominant group—though perhaps not assured—seems still the most viable possibility, if only by reason of numbers. This little book will have scant interest for the political scientist, but, like the better known writings of Frantz Fanon, may provide a certain catharsis for the Hotspurs of the U. S. Negro movement.—JAMES W. ROBERTS, *University of Maine, Portland.*

*Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East.* BY DAVID HIRST. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 127. $6.00.)

There is hardly a topic pertaining to the Middle East whose discussion has been characterized by more fear, more anxiety, more dogmatism, and more downright ignorance on the part of the general public as well as some students of international affairs than Middle Eastern oil. Perhaps because of the global and regional political struggles within whose contexts it is ordinarily viewed, with all the emotional and ideological élan that these often entail, and perhaps because of an inadequate appreciation of the intricate workings of the international oil industry, Westerners and Middle Easterners alike have been guilty of the many erroneous generalizations about this highly complex subject. On the one hand many Middle Eastern nationalists tend to regard the oil companies in their midst as nothing more than instruments of western "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism," while, on the other, many Westerners look upon the Middle Eastern nationalists as irresponsible firebrands who, if given half a chance, would nationalize the oil companies and who might in a fit of spiteful frenzy deprive Western Europe of its most vital source of energy. Fortunately, however, a number of worthy books on Middle Eastern oil have appeared in recent years and one can only hope that they will help dispel some of these all too rampant misconceptions. To that end, the work of David Hirst, the Beirut correspondent of the *Guardian*, is a welcome addition.

*Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East* is divided into two parts. In the first part, Hirst seeks "to examine not merely Middle East public opinion on oil, in so far as that is regarded as separate and distinct from official government opinion, but all those views, regardless of their origin, which can be considered a significant contribution to Middle East opinion as a whole." In doing so Hirst eschews what might be termed the sociological approach mainly on the grounds that genuine freedom of expression as we know it in the West hardly exists in much of the Middle East, and partly because he feels that there are no sharply distinct opinions on oil beyond what may be broadly classified as informed and ill-informed. Instead, Hirst relies in the main on newspapers, official government positions, and the statements of prominent Middle Eastern personalities who are concerned with the subject of oil. So what emerges from Hirst's efforts is not really a study of public opinion, but a range of views which could be categorized as communist, nationalist and traditionalist.

The second part is devoted to two case studies aimed at demonstrating the behavior of Middle Eastern public opinion in two specific instances. The first deals with the negotiations between the Iraqi Government of General Kassem and the Iraqi Petroleum Company, while the second concentrates on the establishment and development of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Hirst feels that these two cases illustrate two opposing tendencies in the Middle East. On the one hand, the Iraqi-IPC negotiations show how one government attempted to use the "lower level" of public opinion to make political capital for the regime, while, on the other hand, OPEC has attempted to insulate oil from the masses and to appeal instead to the "higher level" of opinion. Just exactly who constitutes the "lower" and "higher" levels is not exactly clear.

Despite methodological difficulties, Hirst's work is perceptive and insightful. Though students of the Middle East might find little that is new in it, they may well be stimulated by it into doing further research into this exceedingly fascinating subject.—SAMIR N. ANABTAWI, *Vanderbilt University.*

*The United States and Japan.* ED. BY HERBERT PASSIN for the American Assembly. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. ix, 174. $3.95.)

During the Fall of 1965 in Tokyo, a number of American observers (including this reviewer) remarked on the changed style of Japanese-American relations. At the same time, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer was successfully closing out five years of dedicated effort to restore the "broken Japanese-American dialogue." Visiting American officials were obsessed with United States' commitments in Vietnam and more than a little impatient with what they called Japanese vacillation in arriving at a clearcut definition of Japan's international identity. Meanwhile, Premier Sato was warning Ambassador Reischauer that America should not take Japan for granted. Obviously Japanese-American relations had reached a turning point.

On October 28, 1965, seventy-one Americans gathered at Arden House, Harriman, New York, for the 28th American Assembly devoted to three days' discussion of the subject, "The United States and Japan." They had before them a set of background papers edited by Herbert Passin, Professor of Sociology, East Asian Institute, Columbia University. In a closing plenary session on October 31, the delegates approved a report of findings and recommendations. The preliminary papers, shaped by discussion and this final report, eventually became the publication reviewed.

The timing of the publication was appropriate: 1965 marked the twentieth anniversary of Japan's defeat and occupation by the United States; the year saw completion of a shift in Japan's status from hated enemy to important ally and also "from dependence to independence," to use a Japanese phrase. Looking to the future (between 1965 and 1970) several pressing problems were apparent: the Security Treaty, which soon comes up for reconsideration, American bases in Japan, and the status of Okinawa. These immediate issues, however, had to be viewed against a background of U. S.-Japanese relations stretching back over a long period.

Extreme fluctuation in images (described by Edward Seidensticker, Chap. 1)—held by Americans and by Japanese—are certainly as important as matters of the moment. Furthermore, all of the immediate issues have arisen out of "The legacy of the Occupation" (dealt with systematically by Robert Ward, Chap. 2), which continued "to set an important part of the agenda of current United States-Japanese relations." The full range of political issues (described by Lawrence Olson, Chap. 3) shows how deeply they are intertwined with domestic political conflicts. For example, several of the observers demonstrate that Americans will have to face up to the Okinawan problem (which the Japanese, Kinhide Mushakoji, call a potential "second Trieste") much sooner than we might like.

These background factors in turn help explain the first major finding of the American Assembly, namely, that there is a sharp difference in Japanese and American attitudes toward world responsibilities. Furthermore there is a genuine disparity of power. Although Japan is America's second trading partner (as William Lockwood, Chap. 4, points out), it accounts for only one-twelfth of American international trade; the U. S. is Japan's most important trade partner and accounts for one-third of Japan's world trade. "The result is that the two countries often look at the same event from opposite ends of the telescope."

The American Assembly also found that the two nations approach many situations from completely different premises. Illustrations include the respective Japanese and American attitudes toward mainland China on the one hand and Taiwan on the other. One author (Kinhide Mushakoji, Chap. 5) presented "The View from Japan" and brought out two important points: (1) the Sino-Soviet split shifts the world's crisis zone from Berlin to Asia; and (2) too much pressure for a commitment on the part of Japan and for an American alignment may seriously weaken Japan's internal stability.

As a matter of fact, it is rather strange that the final publication of *The United States and Japan* included only one description of Japanese attitudes by a Japanese. In addition to the Mushakoji piece, there was available the text of an address delivered to the American Assembly October 29, 1965 by Dr. Shigeharu Matsumoto, Director of the International House of Japan (later published, "The United States and Japan," *Japan Society Forum*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, January 2, 1966). The Matsumoto address underlined the fourth and final finding of the Assembly to the effect that, despite twenty years' close interaction, defective communication between Japan and the United States (often to the point of serious misconception) has led to a failure to develop understanding or easy social relationships.

In what the editor called "a timid, suborbital venture" ("The Future," Chap. 6), the volume closes with a probe into the atmosphere of the period 1965–1975. Many of the predictions by Herbert Passin, as well as recommendations by the Assembly, are being borne out in current developments: Japan should be (and is becoming) a more active participant in the international community; Japan should play (and is playing) an increasing role in aiding development in South and Southeast Asia; the United States and Japan should enter upon (and are indeed entering upon) negotiations looking to reducing the "American presence" in the form of military bases in Japan and, most immediate, to enlargement of the scope and improvement of the quality of Civil Administration in Okinawa. Assembly findings and the background papers in the published volume show clearly that U. S.-Japan cultural relations must extend "beyond polite conventions," although the task will be difficult in light of the disparate societies and language barrier.

Finally, by implication in the volume reviewed and explicitly stated in the Assembly recommendations, American observers would welcome a frank expression of opinions by Japanese in a counterpart of the volume, *The United States and Japan*.—ARDATH W. BURKS, *Rutgers—the State University*.

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*The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan.* BY STUART A. SCHEINGOLD. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. xiii, 331. $7.50.)

Unlike any of its international antecedents, the Court of Justice of the European Communities possesses unconditional compulsory jurisdiction, accepts complaints by individuals and common organs along with those of states, leaves no choice to the parties concerning the judges, or the legal principles to be applied in any particular case, and pronounces judgments with direct effect upon municipal legal structures and individuals in the member states. Unlike typical federal courts of general or constitutional jurisdiction, the European Court operates within a strictly circumscribed functional sphere and, in reviewing executive decisions, it is in principle barred from evaluating the underlying substantive policy criteria. Operating in a fluid setting which can at best be located somewhere on the continuum from the international to the federal, the European Court is naturally more vulnerable than traditional courts to conflict between the stabilizing "normative" and the evolutionary "political" judicial roles. The inherent function of the Court of Justice, to protect the system from disruption and to legitimize actions taken by political branches, clashes with the unfinished nature of the European Community and the concomitant requirement to judge present action in terms of unachieved but declared goals.

This is the "essential dilemma" underlying Scheingold's study of eleven major disputes settled by the European Court in the phase of its operation within the framework of the Coal and Steel Community. The Court must seek out the narrow path between the Scylla of "devitalizing the integrative process" by a too strict application of the law and the Charybdis of endangering the accomplishments by assuming excessive political burdens. Inherent in the situation is a threat to the court itself, since straying from the path could make it a "useless appendage," its decision simply disregarded.

Scheingold's cases are grouped by the degree of normative rigidity of the Court's action. From early strict interpretation he sees a movement to a "functional" attitude of allowing much freedom in pursuit of Community goals, finally moderated by a recognition of the unavoidable limitations in a partial integrative process. A uniform chapter outline presents in each case the relevant treaty provisions, the substantive or "political" background of the legal dispute, the arguments of the parties, the Court's reasoning and the consequences of its decision. While this method makes for monotonous reading, the selection of cases—apart from its intended purpose of demonstrating "the role which the court has assumed and the standards by which to judge its success"—reveals the nature of major conflicts of interest during the early years of the Coal and Steel Community, as well as how Community decisions have affected the firms and government policies in the member states.

Scheingold makes clear that he is not writing a legal manual and his discussion of structure and procedures is restricted to the essentials. Yet his evaluative statements in discussing individual cases are rather legalistic, and their significance in establishing criteria for judging the Court's political role is not always clear. His conclusions are political, as the entire book was apparently intended to be, but the chosen framework—the pre-Rome Treaty period—makes them inevitably somewhat less than vital. He seems to be most worried that the unfinished nature of the Coal and Steel Community and its narrow functional scope will divert to the court an excessive share of conflicts of interest, as an increasing number of claimants find the limited political-administrative structure incapable of satisfying them. In the Court's own activity he most fears the danger of too strict application of the Paris Treaty. He nevertheless recognizes that the High Authority, which has been in general excessively cautious, is unlikely to invite a restrictive censure. The Court's practice reveals in fact a predominantly liberal, "teleological" interpretation of Community law, often prodding the executive to more resolute integrative action rather than stultifying progress. In the end, therefore, the Court is vindicated, making in the author's view an impressive contribution to integration, both actively, by its case law, and passively by its indirect influence upon the Community bargaining process.

As it happens, the Court's liberal attitude has continued in the eight years since it acquired jurisdiction over the general Common Market, and if anything its stature has grown in the process despite recurrent threats to the integrity of the supranational executive. All this has in fact occurred while the twin evils of partial integration and a reluctant executive were relieved, at least in part, by the extension of Community scope to the general Common Market, whose Commission has proved to be more activist than the ECSC's High Authority. Consequently, *The Rule of Law in European Integration* should retain a historical value as an introduction to major politico-legal problems of the early period of European integration, and as a brave attempt, however limited, to include in the domain of political science a subject of study heretofore monopolized by strictly legal scholars. At the same time it draws attention to the need of additional work, expanding the political side of his analysis and amending it in the light of developments since the Rome Treaty.—GEORGE STAMBUK, *The George Washington University.*

*The United Nations Administrative Tribunal.* BY BYUNG CHUL KOH. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 176. $4.00.)

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal is a strong contender for the title of least known unit of the United Nations system. The United Nations Secretariat is plagued not only by problems of world peace but also by those mundane employer-employee relations problems which afflict every bureaucracy. Two institutions exist to deal with these labor relations disputes, the Joint Appeals Board and the Administrative Tribunal. The latter, a judicial organ, has been submitted to intensive study by Byung Chul Koh.

The author discusses employment security as a problem for the United Nations personnel system, sketches the historical roots of the Administrative Tribunal in the League of Nations and elsewhere, and describes in detail the structure and functions of the Tribunal. The author introduces the book with an explicit statement regarding what he intends to do, which is good, and an equally explicit statement of what he does not purport to do, which is better. An attempt is made to overcome, or at least to compensate for, the basic weakness in a case study approach by relating the specific case to more general questions of employment security in bureaucratic organizations.

This brief book contains more than most people will ever want to know about the Administrative Tribunal and will probably stand as the definitive work on that agency for several years. Most students of international politics and organization can postpone reading this book indefinitely without serious consequence. The value of the book lies in its usefulness to those with specialized interests in international administration and adjudication.—DAVID BALDWIN, *Dartmouth College.*

*The History of Treaties and International Politics.* BY MARIO TOSCANO. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 685. $13.50.)

This volume is not only a description of the sources of diplomatic history of the principal countries, but also an analysis of the relative value of these sources and of their content for the period of the two World Wars.

The author begins with a description of international relations as an academic discipline in Italy, France, Great Britain and the United States, indicating the tendency to broaden the study from an interpretation of treaties, other diplomatic documents and the memoirs of statesmen, to include economic, geographic, demographic, technological, legal, and cultural conditions and the immediate influence of domestic politics and public opinion upon decisions of governments on foreign policy. This tendency, especially prominent in the United States, is deplored by the author, if pushed too far, because it destroys the "autonomy" of the subject and identifies it with general history and the sociology of international relations (p. 11).

The book discusses the earlier collections of treaties and diplomatic documents going back to the fifteenth century, the reasons for secrecy and for publication, and the increasing abundance of such publication in private collections, and in official publications by states and international organizations. The importance, the character, and the availability of official and unofficial archives in the principal countries is also discussed.

The researcher in the field will profit by the author's careful assessment of the value of the various types of diplomatic documents, both formal and informal, and of memoirs and biographical materials. For the recent period he evaluates the "colored books" published by governments for propaganda purposes, the privately and officially published collections of documents, and the memoirs, letters and papers of statesmen from eighteen countries including the United States, most European countries and Turkey, China and Japan.

American readers will be especially interested in his discussion, often detailed, of memoirs and biographies of Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, Woodrow Wilson, Edward M. House, Robert Lansing, David Hunter Miller, James T. Shotwell, James W. Gerard, Hugh Gibson, and Henry White with reference to World War I; and of Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Admiral Wm. Leahy, Harry Hopkins, Charles G. Dawes, John G. Winant, William C. Bullitt, Joseph E. Davies, William E. Dodd, Hugh Wilson, Claude Bowers, Carlton Hayes, William Phillips, Joseph Grew, Robert Murphy, Henry L. Stimson, Edward Stettinus, Harry Truman, James T. Byrnes, Dwight Eisenhower, and others in reference to World War II.

The author's examination of memoir material from other countries is equally voluminous. He not only appraises the influence of the memoir writer and the value of his writings for understanding the international transactions in which he was engaged, but often narrates particular transactions and comments on the motives for decisions and their wisdom as indicated by subsequent history. Churchill's memoirs are appraised as of major importance for understanding the origin and conduct of both World Wars and of literary quality rivaled only by those of General DeGaulle (pp. 74, 495–497). He emphasizes Churchill's insistence on civilian dominance over the military, even on military decisions, and his efforts to treat Germany with moderation after its defeat and the Soviet Union with caution during the war. He comments on the importance of DeGaulle's memoirs though he finds grounds for criticizing their accuracy in Italian relations. They, however, make clear the often strained relations of "Free France" with the allies and its close relations with the Soviet Union and the communist French resistance after Soviet entry into the war (pp. 478–480). The eighteen pages devoted to the memoirs of Konoye, Shigemetsu, Togo and other Japanese statesmen (pp. 553–570) throw much light on diplomacy before Pearl Harbor and before Hiroshima in a manner not wholly a credit to the perceptions of the United States.

This well indexed volume will be of great value to students of international relations, diplomatic history, and the two World Wars, and the review of numerous memoirs cannot but interest many general readers.—QUINCY WRIGHT, *Rice University.*

*The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942.* BY BRYCE WOOD. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 519. $11.00.)

Bryce Wood combines a profound grasp of the fundamentals of international politics with firm understanding of the detailed realities of Latin American international relations. In consequence, this authoritative study deserves scrutiny alike by generalists in foreign policy and experts in Latin American affairs. The latter will discover new light on a vital period of conflicts and open warfare (1932–42) in South America marked by the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the Leticia dispute between Peru and Colombia and the Marañón conflict between Peru and Ecuador. The careful and painstaking original research underlying the author's study should provide a baseline for future inquiries and clear away much of the underbrush that has obscured the role of the principal Latin American states and those more remote from the conflicts, particularly the United States.

On another level, however, *The United States and Latin Latin American Wars* is a treatise of enduring values. It provides generalists with hard empirical data for analyzing and interpreting the larger issues in international affairs. It invites serious discussion of the relation between the pursuit of peace and of justice, the expression of solicitude or goodwill and the exercise of power, the blending of internationalism and national power in the building of multilateral structures, and the subtle connection between influence abroad and the alternatives of assertiveness or self-denial in the realm of force. Neither cynics nor utopians help us to grapple with such complexities. Policy-makers all too often surround policy formulations with an aura of sanctity that inhibits searching analysis. The virtue of Bryce Wood's latest volume (his earlier companion volume traced the origins and practice of "the Good Neighbor Policy") is its steadfast and fearless analysis of basic issues.

Those who took part in writing the scenario of international relations in Latin America over the past century and a half have much to tell us about the fundamental problems. The nineteenth century was the era of domination by Europe. In successive disputes, Latin American states customarily called on European governments or monarchs to arbitrate. After 1910, not a single European boundary dispute was settled by a European arbitrator. From 1914 to 1932, the prestige of the United States rose as Europe declined, and in the 1920's it is noteworthy that at a time when Washington was criticized for intervention, the states of South and Central America did not hesitate to call on the United

States as an impartial arbitrator. In the period that followed, the United States "was less concerned with stopping the fighting than with the avoidance of charges that Washington was exerting pressure on either belligerent" (p. 14). Wood observes: "In no comparable period following 1830 were there so many conflicts between states in the Americas. . . . " (Ibid.)

Throughout the period of the Good Neighbor, "the United States made no effort to hide its intention to refrain from using force in any way" (p. 359). Three elements dominated U. S. policy: a lasting concern for peace, a determination to avoid the use of force and an overwhelming desire to avoid Latin American resentment. The policy in Dean Acheson's phrase was predicated on "the renunciation of domination" and whereas this was calculated to maximize good will it also had the effect of minimizing our influence. In Bryce Wood's language: ". . . there was no reasonable alternative to a policy aimed at the cultivation of good will when coercion was renounced. The averting of anger against himself is the first objective of an empty-handed pacificator" (p. 365). In its appeals to Latin states, the Department of State stressed "theatricals" or the ceremonial recognition of states who signed armistices or treaties. Material pressures gave way to nonmaterial rewards. Leadership was "exercised by means no stronger than those of example, exhortation and unwearying helpfulness—in a word, solicitude" (p. 379).

Wood is scrupulously fair in crediting our diplomats and policy-makers with the strengths of a policy founded on restraint and good neighborliness. They espoused no selfish interests in the territorial disputes of South America. The disinterestedness of their objectives was matched by great probity in diplomacy and mediation. They profited from the "latent prestige of power, even though held in check. Coercion aside, the weight of the opinion of the government of the United States was greater than that of the other governments" (p. 375). But the point which Wood persists in making in comparing past and present with the era of the Good Neighbor is that the United States' influence on Latin American disputes declined during the years 1932–1942. He summarizes his views by noting the increase in "the ability of the United States to use its prestige as a great power more effectively behind the shield of the Organization of the American States than in the days when it refrained from unilateral coercion . . ." (p. 386).

Generalists will ponder for years to come the basic principles that derive from this superb study.—KENNETH W. THOMPSON, *Rockefeller Foundation.*

*American Support for Free Elections Abroad.* BY THEODORE PAUL WRIGHT, JR. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964. Pp. 184. $4.50.)

Professor Wright, in his book, *American Support for Free Elections Abroad*, sets out to investigate nine case studies of American intervention in foreign countries (primarily in Latin America) in support of free democratic elections. The author's central theme and purpose in this exhaustive case presentation is to demonstrate that United States policy in this area has been almost uniformly based on faulty assumptions.

Professor Wright points out that the American policy of supporting free elections typically grew out of a desire to achieve stability in the target country. The State Department decision-makers operated under the assumption that Latin American instability derived primarily from the activities of the losers of elections who had been cheated out of victory by electoral fraud or violence. Thus, American intervention in support of free and fair elections was seen as a way of ensuring the electoral victory of the legitimate majority and, therefore, as a guarantor of stability.

Wright shows this line of reasoning to be faulty in several respects. First, the absence of genuine continuing political parties in Middle America made analogies with North American experience quite spurious. Second, American policy-makers were very slow in recognizing that Latin American politicians saw elections in purely instrumental terms; no value was placed on free elections by any faction unless that faction stood to gain from such elections. Third, political instability did not result exclusively from the frustrations of losers of fraudulent elections, as the losers usually claimed, but rather from the ambitions of any group of "outs" which might revolt, claiming electoral fraud, regardless of the merits of their claims. For these reasons, therefore, U. S. intervention in favor of free and fair elections would not necessarily guarantee political stability at all.

Ironically, as Professor Wright points out, the American goal of government stability in the target countries has been achieved only where the policy of intervention in support of free elections has inadvertently boomeranged and led to the emergence of strong dictatorships, as in Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. As Wright points out, "Clearly there is something irrational about a policy which succeeds in its ultimate purpose, stability, only by failing in its ostensible immediate purpose—free elections." He concludes that the primary reason for the failure of the United States' policy was the total absence of the basic prerequisites of democracy in

Middle America. In such a situation, simple advocation of the mere forms of democracy was, of course, futile.

Doubtless, Professor Wright's book will take its place in the literature of international relations and may provide useful secondary source information and bibliography to students of American foreign policy. Its contributions lie in its narrative and interpretive treatment of the historical data of American policy *vis-à-vis* elections abroad. The narrative portions are presented in detail and the interpretation of the assumptions and results of the policy is persuasive.

The book, however, never quite escapes its very strong historical bias. In the author's choice of the case study approach, he neglects the theoretical dimensions of the problem and the place of the questions he asks in any larger theoretical framework. This shortcoming will prevent the book's attaining anything more than very modest significance.—DAVID W. ABBOTT, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.*

# REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

## I

At a meeting on April 7, 1967, the Executive Committee of the American Political Science Association considered questions that had been raised as a result of information in the press on February 19, 1967, and later, that Operations and Policy Research, Inc. (OPR) had received some funds from foundations said to have received funds from Central Intelligence Agency sources. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director of APSA, and Max M. Kampelman, Treasurer and Counsel of APSA, are President and Vice-President respectively of Operations and Policy Research, Inc. In the discussion that follows it should be kept in mind that the two officers of the Association do not hold parallel positions. As you doubtless know, the post of Executive Director of APSA is a full-time, appointive office. The Treasurer is nominated and elected annually, receives no pay, and must therefore be someone who donates his time to the Association.

On February 22, 1967, the President of APSA invited four past Presidents of APSA to serve as an *ad hoc* committee to inquire into (1) questions arising from the fact that Kirkpatrick and Kampelman hold office both in APSA and OPR, and (2) the broader and extremely complex problem of standards of behavior for all political scientists in their relationships with government agencies. This *ad hoc* committee consisted of:

Gabriel Almond, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Stanford University
R. Taylor Cole, Provost, Duke University
David B. Truman, Dean, Columbia College, Columbia University
C. Herman Pritchett, Department of Political Science, University of California at Santa Barbara (committee chairman)

The *ad hoc* committee reported to the President of APSA on March 30. At our meeting on April 7, we had that report before us, as well as letters and other communications from APSA members to various members of the Executive Committee.

We are announcing the results of our deliberations in this report, which, in letter form, is also being sent to every member of the Association.

As to the first problem, the members of the *ad hoc* committee found that:

1. The American Political Science Association has received no funds directly from any intelligence agency of the government, nor has it carried on any activities for any intelligence agency of government.

2. The Association has received no funds indirectly from any intelligence agency of government, with one possible exception. The Asia Foundation stated on March 21, 1967, that it had been the recipient of money from foundations named as conduits for CIA funds. The APSA has received grants from the Asia Foundation to finance memberships in the Association for a small number of Asian political scientists, subscriptions to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW for a few Asian libraries, and travel grants to the APSA Annual Meetings for a few Asian political scientists studying in this country. Most other social science associations received comparable grants from the Asia Foundation. In addition, a small number of fellowships have been financed for Asians to participate in the Congressional Fellowship program. All of these programs were approved by the governing bodies of the Association, completely under Association control, reported and advertised in the REVIEW, and widely known by our members.

3. All grants, gifts, donations, and other income of the APSA have been reported in full detail annually in the Treasurer's Report, which is made available to all members of the Association at the annual business meeting. An independent audit of the financial affairs of the Association has been made every year by an established auditing firm of high reputation and the audit report has been made available to all officers and Council members.

4. Operations and Policy Research, Inc. is a small non-profit research organization created in 1955 by a group of social scientists, lawyers, and businessmen. It is completely separate from the American Political Science Association both organizationally and in physical location. OPR is governed by a Board of Trustees and has always had a full-time Executive Director as its principal administrative officer. Since its creation, Evron M. Kirkpatrick has been President and Max M. Kampelman has been Vice-President of OPR. OPR has done work on grants from government, business, and foundations. As stated in press reports, OPR's foundation grants included, among others, grants from foundations reported to have received money from CIA. These grants supported unclassified research completely under OPR control and a large part of the research under these grants has been completed and

included in OPR's substantial list of open publications.

The *ad hoc* committee summed up its findings in these words:

> Nothing that has come to our attention lends the slightest credence to concern that any use might have been made of the APSA for intelligence purposes. There was at no time any connection between OPR and the Association. Kirkpatrick and Kampelman's work with OPR was conducted on their own time, required a minor part of their attention, violated no policy of the Association with respect to outside activities of its staff, and involved no conflict of interest with their responsibilities to the APSA. . . . In conclusion, we think it appropriate to acknowledge, on behalf of the membership of our organization, the great services which both Kirkpatrick and Kampelman have rendered to the American Political Science Association.

In addition to these findings of the *ad hoc* committee, the Executive Committee considered the variety of views expressed by various members of the Association as to the possible damage, if any, to research abroad resulting from the recent series of disclosures about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The members of the Executive Committee are probably as divided in their assessment of the extent of this damage as the members of the Association from whom they have heard. But they are united in their conviction that it would be inappropriate and unjust to respond to anxieties arising from these disclosures by condemning Kirkpatrick and Kampelman.

Upon full inquiry and reflection, therefore, the Executive Committee accepts and confirms the findings of the *ad hoc* committee and expresses the highest confidence in the conduct and motives of Kirkpatrick and Kampelman. Like the *ad hoc* committee, we wish to record our recognition of the dedication and service of these two men to the Association in the past and our full confidence in the value of their future services.

## II

As to the second and more general problem referred to above, members of the Association may recall that at the September 1966 meeting of the Council of the Association, a motion was unanimously adopted that the President appoint an *ad hoc* committee to report to the Executive Committee in time for the Executive Committee to report to the Council in September 1967 on criteria to be applied to the professional activities of political scientists (*APSR*, Dec. 1966, p. 1079). The four members of the *ad hoc* committee appointed in February felt (rightly, in our view) that their most urgent task was to inquire into the matters discussed in Part I, above. Consequently, the *ad hoc* committee was unable, in the time available to it, to pursue the second and more general question. The *ad hoc* committee concluded, however, that:

> The rapid development of political science research in the past decade or two gives the relationship between government and the profession a salience it has not had in the past. We share with you an appreciation of the complexity and difficulty of the many issues which are raised by this development. We therefore welcome the initiative that was taken at the September 1966 meeting of the Council of the Association to explore alternative ways of dealing with the problem, and advise the Association regarding a proper course of action in this area. But we recognize that before any constructive consensus can be achieved, a great deal of work by a specially constituted committee will be essential.

The Executive Committee also took note of the fact that on March 29, 1967, a panel appointed by President Johnson and headed by Undersecretary of State Katzenbach recommended that the future policy of the United States Government should be, among other things, as follows:

> No Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. . . . In the judgement of this committee, no programs currently would justify any exception to this policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there will never be a contingency in which overriding national security interests may require an exception—nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so.
>
> We therefore recommend that, in the event of such unusual contingencies, the interdepartmental review committee be permitted to make exceptions to the statement of policy, but only when overriding national security interests so require; only on a case-by-case basis; only where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable; and only when such exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. *In no event should any future exception be approved which involves any educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization.* (Emphasis added.)

In making the report public, President Johnson announced: "I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the Government to implement it fully." (*New York Times*, March 30, 1967)

Encouraging as it is, this action on the part of the government does not, we think, remove the obligation of the Association to consider the problems of professional standards, responsibilities, and conduct that moved the Council to adopt its resolution last September. The President of the Association has therefore appointed a new and larger committee to examine these questions. The members of this new Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities are:

Marver H. Bernstein (Chairman), Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Stephen K. Bailey, Dean, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, and President Elect, American Society for Public Administration

Samuel H. Beer, Department of Government, Harvard University

Manning J. Dauer, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Florida

David Fellman, Vilas Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin

Harold D. Lasswell, Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law & Political Science, Yale University

Jack W. Peltason, Vice-Chancellor, Academic Affairs, University of California at Irvine, and Chancellor Elect, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana

Wallace S. Sayre, Chairman, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University

Vernon Van Dyke, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, and President, Midwest Conference of Political Scientists

Aaron B. Wildavsky, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley

The Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities has been asked to examine various proposals contained in the recent correspondence from our members. Hence the Committee will consider such questions as these:

What in fact are the varieties of relationships between government agencies and political scientists? What are the principal viewpoints among our members as to legitimate and proper conduct? Are there standards to which all or most of our members adhere, aspire, or would like to have endorsed in some way?

Should the Association adopt a code of professional ethics? If so, what should the code contain? Should the code apply to all members of the Association or only to officers? Should there be two different codes, one for officers and one for members? Should different professional or personal conduct be demanded from the Executive Director or Managing Editor of the Review (both of whom are appointed and receive salaries from APSA) than from elected officers of the Association, none of whom receive salaries from APSA? Should different standards of professional conduct be required of the President and the President Elect? Is a code of ethics enforceable? If so, how? If not, what weight should be given to non-enforceability?

Are there ways of maintaining high standards that are preferable to a code of ethics? If so, what are these ways? Are they preferable to a code of ethics?

Should the Association adopt or recommend a rule of disclosure, obliging all practicing political scientists to reveal all their sources of support? All ties with government agencies, American or foreign? With business or trade union groups? All ties of any kind? How would such a rule operate? Should the Association keep a public register or file for recording such disclosures?

Would it be useful to prepare a set of case studies, illustrating some of the ethical and factual complexities of these problems, the kinds of personal decisions recommended by various political scientists or others, and the grounds of their recommendations? Would such case studies complement, or displace, a code of professional ethics?

The Committee is free to inquire into any other questions it believes are relevant to the problems of maintaining a high sense of professional standards and responsibilities. The Committee may, at its discretion, appoint subcommittees to study particular problems; it may hold hearings, undertake studies, and consult with other organizations working on similar problems. Any members of the Association may communicate their views and suggestions in writing to the chairman or to any other member of the Committee.

Because of the complexity and novelty of these questions, and the diversity of views among our members, we believe it would be a mistake to impose too brief a life or too short a deadline on the work of the Committee. If the Committee concludes that more time is necessary, it is free to continue its work beyond the next Annual Meeting in September. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the Committee will be able to report some of its recommendations to us in time for action next September by the Council and by the members at the business meeting of the Association.

At present our members hold a variety of views on these questions and favor a considerable diversity of proposals. Inconvenient as it may seem, this diversity should not be ignored or glossed over. Any action on professional standards that cannot command wide support among our members is, we feel, likely to be worse than futile.

Nonetheless, we believe that the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities will be able to formulate some recommendations that will command the overwhelming support of members of this Association, and will help to clarify and even to provide guidance in answering the more difficult and troublesome questions on which individual judgments may continue to differ.

For the Executive Committee:
Robert A. Dahl, President
Merle Fainsod, President Elect
Harry Eckstein
Heinz Eulau
Austin Ranney
Clinton Rossiter

## 1967 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1967–68

The 1967 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago. Professor Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, to be held at 4:30 P.M. Wednesday, September 6, in the Great Hall, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, the Nominating Committee (comprised of Gwendolen M. Carter, Northwestern University, Chairman; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; and Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California at Berkeley) will propose the following officers for 1967–68:

| | |
|---|---|
| President Elect: | David Easton, University of Chicago |
| Vice Presidents: | Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse University |
| | Harvey C. Mansfield, Columbia University |
| | Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana |
| Secretary: | Harvey Glickman, Haverford College |
| Treasurer: | Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D.C. |

Members of the Council for two years:

Holbert N. Carroll, University of Pittsburgh
Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona
Merle Kling, Washington University, St. Louis
Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University
Paul L. Puryear, Fisk University
Robert A. Scalapino, University of California, Berkeley
Glendon Schubert, University of North Carolina
Daniel Wit, Northern Illinois University

## PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1968 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1968 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Washington, D.C. at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, September 3–7. Early appointment of the Program Committee for the meeting makes it timely now to invite members of the Association to submit proposals for consideration as soon as convenient, and prior to September 1, 1967, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Members of the Committee are:

*Chairman*, Joseph La Palombara, Yale University
Public Administration, U. S.—Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse University
Comparative Administration—Ralph Braibanti, Duke University
International Politics & Organization—Inis L. Claude, Jr., University of Michigan
Political Science & Public Policy—Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina
American Government & Politics—Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester
Ideology and Political Science—Andrew Hacker, Cornell University
Historical Dimensions of Political Development—Robert T. Holt, University of Minnesota
Public Opinion and Representation—Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago
Urban Problems—Daniel P. Moynihan, Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University
Mathematics & Political Science—William H. Riker, University of Rochester
Comparative Politics—Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University
American Foreign Policy—Kenneth W. Thompson, The Rockefeller Foundation
Public Law and Judicial Processes—S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky
Political Theory—René Williamson, Louisiana State University

## NOTICE

## RESOLUTIONS AT ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with Article VIII of the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provision of the Constitution that:

> "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day Tuesday, September 5, 1967, in the Belmont Room, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

The *Handbook of Latin American Studies* invites members of the American Political Science Association to submit reprints of their current articles dealing with Latin America for possible review purposes in forthcoming volumes of this annual selected bibliography on the social sciences and humanities. Correspondence should be addressed to: The Editor, *Handbook of Latin American Studies*, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

A five-day special program, "Operations Research for Public Systems," will be presented at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from September 5 through September 9, 1967. General discussions of the methodology will be illustrated by area surveys and case studies from areas such as urban planning and municipal operation, public health, the judicial court system, public transportation, and educational systems. For further information, write to: Director of the Summer Session, Room E19-356, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

The International Studies Association will again sponsor a luncheon meeting at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. It will be held at 12:30 P.M. on Friday, September 8, and the room will be announced in the Final Program of the convention. At least one nationally prominent speaker will appear at the luncheon. It is requested that those planning to attend notify the ISA office (University of Denver, Denver, Colo. 80210) beforehand.

The sixty-third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9, 1967 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

## PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science will hold its regular sessions for contributed papers at the 134th annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 26–31, 1967, in New York. Sessions are held with the collaboration of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the A.A.A.S.

Political scientists interested in presenting a paper at these sessions are invited to forward titles and abstracts of 300 words to Donald P. Ray, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, not later than September 1st.

Papers should concern recently completed or well-advanced ongoing research in any of the fields of political science. Of perhaps especial interest would be studies on, for example, national politics in India, the "alliance gap" in American foreign relations, constitutional government in South Vietnam, political development in the U.S.S.R., and international relations in the Middle East.

Selected materials of the sessions will be published, and papers are eligible, upon nomination, for the $1000 Newcomb Cleveland Prize with bronze medal of the A.A.A.S. The annual meeting invariably receives extensive coverage by science writers from all media.

The Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, sponsored in collaboration with the comparative administration group of the American

Society for Public Administration and the committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, will hold an international conference at the Rockefeller Foundation's Villa Serbelloni, at Lake Como, July 17–22. The conference will deal with theoretical problems in administrative reform in developing states. The conference has been organized by Ralph Braibanti, Chairman of the Commonwealth-Studies Studies Center at Duke University and Joseph La Palombara and Fred Riggs, Honorary Chairman and presiding officer will be A. R. Cornelius, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Among political scientists reading papers or serving as discussants will be Carl J. Friedrich, Joseph La Palombara, W. H. Morris-Jones, Giovanni Sartori, Michel Crozier, Jose Abueva, Harold Lasswell, Brian Chapman, Ralph Braibanti, A. W. Singham, J. J. Spengler, Taylor Cole, W. J. M. Mackenzie, Fred W. Riggs, Samuel E. Finer, John D. Montgomery, Dwight Waldo, G. S. Sharma and Lucian Pye.

The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History will hold its Fifty-second Annual Meeting at the Voyager Inn, Greensboro, North Carolina on October 12-15, 1967. The Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina is the host institution. Those interested in proposing papers, or sessions, or other participation should contact the program chairman, Walter Fisher, Morgan State College, Coldspring Lane and Hillen Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21212.

## OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Escuala Latinoamericana de Ciencia Politica y Administracion Publica, located in Santiago, Chile, and supported by the Inter-Development Bank, UNESCO and the Ford Foundation, is training young faculty members from all over Latin America in modern political analysis, with particular emphasis on problems of methodology for empirical research. The director of the school is Horacio H. Godoy of Argentina. James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina and Robert L. Ayres, of the same institution, are currently visiting professor and assistant professor respectively in the school. Other U. S. professors who have joined the staff for varying periods are Arpad von Lazar, Vanderbilt University and Harold D. Lasswell of Yale.

Political scientists at the six New England state universities are collaborating in a comparative study of legislative behavior in New England. The study is sponsored by the New England Center for Continuing Education under the direction of Robert B. Dishman, assisted by Robert E. Craig, both of the University of New Hampshire. Participating are Karl A. Bosworth, Alvin E. Dozeman, I. Ridgway Davis and Everett Ladd from the University of Connecticut; Eugene Mawhinney, Dana R. Baggett, and Paul Dunham, University of Maine; George Goodwin, Jr., William C. Havard, Glen Gordon and David R. Mayhew, University of Massachusetts; Robert E. Spencer and John O. Stitely, University of Rhode Island; Rolf Haugin, Andrew E. Nuquist and Henry Brubaker, University of Vermont; Shirley Clark, Joseph P. Ford and Lawrence O'Connell, University of New Hampshire.

Applications are now being accepted for Fulbright-Hays appointments for university lecturing and advanced research abroad during 1968–69. It is expected that specialists in political science will receive appointments in about twenty countries. Under the Fulbright program, such specialists have this year been serving as lecturers in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Peru, and the Philippines, and they have in recent years held awards for research in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the Philippines.

The basic application requirements are: U. S. citizenship; a doctoral degree or equivalent status for research; college or university teaching experience for lecturing appointments; in some cases, proficiency in a foreign language.

For lecturing awards under the 1968–69 program, application before May 1, 1967 is strongly recommended. The deadline for research applications is June 1, 1967.

Application forms, a list of openings in political science, and details on the terms of awards for particular countries are available from the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20418.

Upon the invitation of the Political Science Department of the University of Illinois, 80 Illinois political scientists met on the Urbana campus of the University of Illinois on October 29, 1966, to discuss matters of current and common interest.

A summer seminar on cross-national urban politics, sponsored by the Comparative Urban Studies Committee of the Comparative Administration Group, The American Society for Public Administration, will be held at the University of North Carolina, July 19 to August 17. Frederic N.

Cleaveland and Robert T. Daland, UNC, will direct the seminar. Other participants will be Robert Alford, University of Wisconsin; Daniel Grant, Vanderbilt; William J. Hanna, American University; James Goyot, UCLA; Francine Rabinovitz, University of Florida; Frank Sherwood, University of Southern California; and Deil Wright, University of Iowa.

The Institute of Urban Research of the University of Connecticut has received a grant from the Municipal League to study the effects of reapportionment in Connecticut. Four political scientists, all from the University, will be associated with the study. They are Karl A. Bosworth, I. Ridgway Davis, Everett C. Ladd, Jr. and Alvin Dozeman.

Political scientists who have been in residence during all or part of 1966–67 at the East-West Center's Senior Specialists program in Hawaii are Remigio E. Agpalo, University of the Philippines; Narayan Deshpande, Nagpur University in India; William C. Johnstone, Jr., Johns Hopkins University; and Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania.

**Lucius Barker**, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, has accepted a position as research associate to the Chancellor of the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.

**David A. Bingham**, University of Arizona, has been appointed to the Board of Directors of the Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Inc.

**Ralph Braibanti**, Duke University, will spend part of the summer doing research at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London.

**Louise Brakeman**, Dension University, will be director of the Regional Council Center for International Students to be held at Chatham College in Pittsburgh during the summer.

**Archie D. Chelseth**, formerly administrative assistant with the Association of Minnesota Counties, has been appointed by Minnesota Governor Harold LeVander to the post of research director in the Office of the Governor.

**C. Walter Clark Jr.**, Drake University, has been awarded a Danforth Foundation teaching grant and will be on leave, 1967–68.

**Richard F. Crabbs** is on leave from Indiana University and is serving as dean of the Faculties at the American University in Cairo for the academic years 1966–68.

**John P. Crecine**, University of Michigan, will be spending the 1967–68 academic year in the Economics Department, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.

**Samuel J. Eldersveld**, University of Michigan, spent the month of February in India in connection with a research project.

**W. O. Farber**, University of South Dakota, served as secretary to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information at its Paris meeting, November 14–18.

**E. Feit**, University of Massachusetts, has been awarded a Mershon post-doctoral fellowship and will do research at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, during 1967–68.

**Joseph R. Fiszman**, University of Oregon, has been appointed to a three-year term to the Board of Editors of the *Western Political Science Quarterly*.

**Alona E. Evans**, Wellesley College, has been elected to the Board of Editors of the *American Journal of International Law*.

**Ivo K. Feierabend**, visiting associate professor of political science, and **Rosalind L. Feierabend**, visiting research psychologist, Washington University, St. Louis, have been awarded the 1966 sociopsychological $1000 prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. They have also received a research grant from the National Science Foundation.

**Herbert Garfinkel** has returned to Michigan State University from the Institute of Social Sciences at the Hague. He was a NATO visiting professor.

**Lawrence Graham** is on leave from the University of Texas and is serving as a public administration advisor to the program of the Institute of Public Administration in Lima, Peru.

**Barbara B. Green**, Wellesley College, will be on leave 1967–68. She had been named an associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

**Robert T. Golembiewski**, University of Georgia, has been chosen to receive the 1967 Best Book award of the American College of Hospital Administrators for his book *Men, Management, and Morality*.

**Rufus G. Hall**, University of Oklahoma, is serving as a consultant in the Foreign Service Institute, State Department, January-August, 1967.

**Iliya F. Harik** has spent the 1966–67 year on leave from Indiana University and has conducted research at the American Research Center in Egypt, Inc., located in Cairo.

**John J. Hooker**, the Catholic University of America, will be on sabbatical leave during 1967–68.

**Neal D. Houghton**, University of Arizona, attended a planning conference in Honolulu in February to work out a program for a forthcoming conference on "Engineering and the Building of Nations" to be held at Estes Park.

**George P. Jan**, University of South Dakota, will do research in the Far East during the fall term, under grants from the Social Science Foundation and the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

**George Jenkins**, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, is coordinator of the African Studies Commitee at UMW.

**Charles O. Jones**, University of Arizona, has been appointed a member of the Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel by the United States House of Representatives Speaker, John W. McCormack.

**Roger Kanet**, the University of Kansas, has been elected president of the Bi-State Conference for the Kansas-Missouri Area.

**Paul Kelso**, University of Arizona, was on sabbatical leave during spring quarter, 1967.

**Everett C. Ladd**, University of Connecticut, has received research grants from the National Science Foundation and the Social Science Research Council.

**Richard H. Leach**, Duke University, will be on sabbatical leave during the academic year 1967–68 as a Fulbright professor at the University of Amsterdam.

**Chae Jin Lee**, The University of Kansas, has received the Elizabeth M. Watkins faculty fellowship for research.

**Herman D. Lujan** and **Harold Riehm**, University of Kansas, have research grants from the Ford Foundation.

**Charles B. McLane**, Dartmouth College, read a paper in October at the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union, Munich.

**Douglas Mendel**, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, has been awarded a faculty research grant. He spent the summer of 1966 at Sophia University in Tokyo.

**John Norman**, Pace College, was appointed State Fact Finder and Mediator by the Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration.

**Fritz Nova**, Villanova University, will spend a sabbatical summer teaching at the *Hochschule fuer Politische Wissenschaften*, Munich. Currently he is a visiting research associate at the School of International Relations, Princeton University.

**Thomas Page**, University of Illinois-Urbana, has been elected chairman of the Advisory Board to the Illinois Department of Personnel, a bipartisan statutory body on which he serves by appointment by the Governor.

**Adolph Reed**, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has been a faculty fellow during 1966–67.

**Eugene Rossi**, Dickinson College, will replace K. R. Nilson as director of the College International Studies program in the fall.

**Alan H. Schechter**, Wellesley College, has received a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities for research during the summer of 1967.

**Edward V. Schten**, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University Extension, University of Wisconsin, is on a two-year leave of absence and is serving as an AID higher education advisor in Bogota, Colombia.

**Morton Schwartz**, University of California, is spending a sabbatical leave as an associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

**Sheldon W. Simon**, University of Kentucky, has been awarded a summer research associateship with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University.

**Currin V. Shields** has resumed his duties at the University of Arizona after a six months' sabbatical leave.

**Frank Smallwood**, Dartmouth College, read a paper at the annual Conference of the Canadian Federation of Mayors last June.

**John E. Stoner**, Indiana University and **Phillip C. Johnson**, Purdue University, have received grants and contracts from the Indiana State Highway Commission and the Bureau of Public Roads to design and implement a system for reporting and analyzing highway traffic accidents by electronic data process.

**Edward Taborsky**, University of Texas, is on spring and summer leave and is conducting research under grants from the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver and the University Research Institute of the University of Texas.

**Raymond Tanter**, Northwestern University, has a one-year appointment as assistant director, Behavioral Sciences Division, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Washington, D. C.

**James E. Underwood**, Union College, is in Washington, D. C. during 1966–67 as a Congressional Fellow.

**Guenter Weissberg**, Colby College, has been appointed to the senatorial appointment commission of the state of Maine.

**Claude E. Welch**, SUNY at Buffalo, attended a seminar sponsored by the Institute on Man and Science in Tunisia in March. He has also been named chairman of the Committee on Africa Studies of the Council on International Studies and World Affairs.

**York Y. Willbern**, Indiana University, has been on leave during 1966–67. During the spring quarter he taught at the American University in Beirut.

**Arthur M. Wilson**, Dartmouth College, will be a speaker at the Second International Congress on the Englightenment at St. Andrews Scotland, August 21–31.

**David Ziblatt**, Michigan State University received an award from the Western Political Science Association for the best dissertation completed in 1965 at a western University.

## STAFF CHANGES

### New Appointments

**Joel Aberach**, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

**Thomas Anton**, joint appointment as associate professor, Department of Political Science and School of Social Work, University of Michigan; formerly of University of Chicago.

**Lawrence R. Alschuler**, assistant professor, University of Hawaii.

**Jonathan S. Barker**, lecturer, University of Arizona.

**Thomas A. Baylis**, assistant professor, Duke University; formerly of the University of California at Berkeley.

**Jurij Borys**, associate professor, University of Calgary; formerly of University of Stockholm.

**Karl R. Braithwaite**, assistant professor, Duke University; formerly of University of Wisconsin.

**Thomas W. Casstevens**, assistant professor, Oakland University; formerly of the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

**Teh-Kuang Chang**, assistant professor, Ball State University.

**Samuel D. Cook**, associate professor, Duke University; formerly of Atlanta University.

**Richard C. Cortner**, associate professor, University of Arizona; formerly of University of Tennessee.

**Ralph E. Craig**, instructor, University of New Hampshire.

**John E. Crow**, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of University of Washington.

**William J. Daniels**, assistant professor, Union College.

**Alfred Diamant**, professor, Indiana University.

**Donald E. Epstein**, instructor, University of Connecticut.

**James Eisenstein**, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

**Frank Feigert**, instructor, Knox College; formerly of the University of Maryland.

**A. R. Field**, assistant professor, University of Calgary; formerly of San Fernando State College.

**Roy E. Feldman**, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 1, 1967.

**Lee J. Flynn**, assistant professor, Pomona College.

**Karl A. Friedman**, assistant professor, University of Calgary; formerly of St. Anthony's College, Oxford.

**Federico Gil**, Kennan professor of political science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

**Harvey R. Glasser**, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston,

**Robert D. Grey**, instructor, University of Connecticut, Hartford Branch.

**Kazimerz Gryzbowski**, adjunct professor, Duke University, 1967–68.

**Harold Guetzkow**, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making, Northwestern University.

**Donald R. Hall**, assistant professor, University of Arizona.

**John V. Hilberg**, instructor, University of Connecticut.

**Peter Kidman**, instructor, Westminster College.

**Samuel S. Kim**, assistant professor, Monmouth College (N. J.).

**John Kitos**, assistant professor, Allegheny College.

**Philip S. Kronenberg**, lecturer, Indiana University; formerly of University of Pittsburgh.

**Carl Lieberman**, instructor, University of Akron; formerly of the University of Pittsburgh.

**Julie K. McGuire**, assistant lecturer, University of Belfast, Ireland; formerly of University of Alaska.

**Donald E. Milsten**, instructor, University of Maryland, Baltimore County Campus.

**Ralph E. Mitchell**, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of Miami University (Ohio).

**Stephen R. Mitchell**, associate professor, University of Calgary; formerly of Washington State University.

**Harold Molineau**, instructor, University of Akron; formerly of American University.

**David P. Mozingo**, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of the Rand Corporation.

**Richard Muller**, instructor, Colgate University.

**Chester A. Newland**, professor, University Houston.

**David A. Nichols**, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

**Lawrence W. O'Connell**, instructor, University of New Hampshire.

**Victor Olorunsola**, assistant professor, California State College at Long Beach; formerly of University of Indiana.

**Daniel J. O'Neil**, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of University of Tennessee.

**Anthony Parel**, associate professor, University of Calgary.

**Edward Platt**, Indiana University of Pennsylvania.

**Edward A. Raymond**, assistant professor, University of Connecticut, Stamford Branch.

**Mavis M. Reeves**, lecturer, University of Maryland.

**Fred W. Riggs**, professor and member of the Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii.

**Frederick Rosen**, assistant professor, Franklin and Marshall College.

**John E. Rue**, associate professor, Oakland University; formerly of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.

**Stephen M. Sachs**, lecturer, South Bend-Mishawaka Regional Campus of Indiana University.

**Harriet Schiffer**, instructor, Temple Univversity.

**Alan L. Seltzer**, instructor, Oakland University; formerly of UCLA.

**Robert Sharlet**, assistant professor, Union College, September, 1967.

**Jean Spencer**, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

**Emil Starr**, associate professor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

**John A. Straayer**, assistant professor, Colorado State Univerity, September, 1967; formerly of University of Arizona.

**William F. Sturner**, assistant professor, Oakland University; formerly of the University of Detroit.

**Richard Szawlowski**, assistant professor, University of Calgary; formerly of the German Federal Institute of Sovietology, Bonn.

**David Tabb**, assistant professor, University of Hawaii.

**Kenneth Vines**, professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Tulane University.

**Dwight Waldo**, Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities, Syracuse University; formerly of the Institute of Governmental Research at the University of California at Berkeley.

**Meredith Watts**, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

**Leonard Weinberg**, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

**Edward Weisband**, instructor, New York, University, February, 1967.

**Howard R. Whitcomb**, instructor, Colgate University.

**William D. S. Witte**, dual appointment as associate professor of political science and philosophy, head of Department of Philosophy, Bradley University.

**Kyung Won Kim**, assistant professor, New York University.

**John H. Woodruff**, associate professor, University of New Hampshire; formerly of Boston University.

**John Woods**, assistant professor, University of Calgary.

**Robert D. Wrinkle**, assistant professor, Southwest Texas State College; formerly of University of Arizona.

### VISITING APPOINTMENTS

**Tocary Bastos**, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil: visiting scholar, Indiana University, 1967.

**Paul C. Bartholomew**, University of Notre Dame: professor, Northwestern University, summer 1967.

**Steven J. Brams**, Institute for Defense Analyses: assistant professor, University of Rochester, spring 1967.

**Alberto Ciria**, formerly of the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina: professor, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1966–67.

**Richard H. Cox**, SUNY at Buffalo: Chester W. Nimitz Professor of Social and Political Philosophy, U. S. Naval War College, 1967–68.

**Harry J. Friedman**, University of Hawaii: professor, University of the Philippines, 1967–68.

**Louis L. Gerson**, University of Connecticut: Fulbright professor, University of Bombay, India, 1966–67.

**Walter Goldstein**, Brooklyn College, CUNY; professor, New York University, 1966, and lecturer, School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1966–67.

**Donald R. Hall**, assistant professor, University of Arizona.

**George Jenkins**, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee: assistant professor, UCLA, summer 1967 and academic 1967–68.

**Misha D. Jezernik**, University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia: professor University of Hawaii, 1967–68.

**Kent Lloyd**, University of Southern California: assistant professor, University of Hawaii, spring term 1967.

**Glenn Paige**, Princeton University: visiting political scientist, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii, 1967–68.

**Roy Pierce**, University of Michigan: Stanford University, summer, 1966.

**Richard M. Richardson**, Western Michigan University: assistant professor, University of Hawaii, 1967–68.

Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, University of Bonn: NATO professor of political science, Duke University, fall term 1967.

Barbara Shockley, Bloomsburg State College: associate professor, Thiel College.

John Vanderzell, Franklin and Marshall College: lecturer, Bryn Mawr.

Irvin L. White, assistant professor: University of Arizona, 1967–68.

Violet Wurfel, North Carolina College: professor, University of Montana, summer term 1967.

### Other Appointments

Douglas Ashford; assistant director, Center for International Studies, Cornell University.

Alan Arian: chairman, Tel Aviv University.

James B. Christoph: chairman and professor, Indiana University, September 1967; *formerly* of the Ohio State University.

David R. Derge: associate dean of the faculties, Indiana University.

Robert B. Dishman: chairman, University of New Hampshire.

James R. Donoghue: director, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University Extension, University of Wisconsin.

John C. Eriksen: director of International Programs and professor-in-residence for 1966–67, University of Oklahoma, Munich Center.

Marshall Goldstein: chairman, University of Hawaii.

Murray Havens: University of Texas, associate professor and graduate advisor.

Ferrel Heady: academic vice president, University of New Mexico; formerly director of Institute of Public Administration and professor, University of Michigan.

Donald E. Bebbe: associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of South Dakota; July 1, 1967.

Samuel K. Gove: director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Urbana.

E. Burke Inlow: head, University of Calgary; reappointment for a five-year term.

Richard M. Johnson: vice chairman, SUNY at Buffalo.

John P. McCarthey: acting chairman, the Catholic University of America.

Richard Merritt: joint appointment as associate professor, Department of Political Science and the Institute of Communications Research, University of Illinois at Urbana, September, 1967.

Frank Jay Morino: chairman, Washington Square College, Department of Politics, New York University, September 1967.

Benjamin Nimer: acting chairman, George Washington University, spring, 1967.

Frank B. Pesci: director, Potomac campus, Prince George's Community College, Md.; formerly dean of academic affairs.

Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz: assistant director, Center for Slavic and Soviet Area Studies, University of Kansas.

Winston W. Riddick: assistant professor and acting director, Institute of Government Research, Louisiana State University.

Walter F. Scheffer: director, Graduate Program in Public Administration, University of Oklahoma.

Kalman Silvert: professor and director, Ibero-American program, New York University.

Glenn Snyder: acting chairman, Center for International Security and Conflict Studies, SUNY at Buffalo.

Victor Wen: professor and chairman, MAFAC Department, Defense Language Institute.

I. William Zartman: associate director, Center for International Studies, New York University, September 1967.

### Promotion (with new rank)

Allen Ballard, City College, CUNY: associate professor.

Curt F. Beck, University of Connecticut: professor.

David A. Bingham, University of Arizona: professor.

Kenneth A. Bode, Michigan State University: assistant professor.

John C. Buhner, Indiana University in Gary: associate professor.

FLORENCE CASEY, SUNY at Buffalo: assistant professor.

STEPHEN P. COHEN, University of Illinois at Urbana: assistant professor.

JAMES T. CROWN, New York University: professor.

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, University of Illinois at Urbana: assistant professor.

ALVIN DOZEMAN, University of Connecticut: assistant professor.

R. BARRY FARRELL, Northwestern University: professor.

AMIR FERDOWS, Indiana University in Jeffersonville: assistant professor.

JOSEPH R. FISZMAN, University of Oregon: associate professor and associate director, Institute for Comparative Experimental Research on Behavioral Systems.

BARBARA B. GREEN, Wellesley College: associate professor.

ROBERT W. HATTERY, Indiana University: associate professor.

ROBERT S. HIRSCHFIELD, Hunter College, City University of New York: professor.

CHARLES HOLLISTER, Bucknell University: professor.

GARY HOSKIN, SUNY at Buffalo: assistant professor.

CONRAD JOYNER, University of Arizona: professor.

CHARLES O. JONES, University of Arizona: professor.

THOMAS KARIS, City College, CUNY: professor.

ALLAN KORNBERG, Duke University: associate professor.

CHAN LIEN, University of Connecticut: assistant professor.

CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, University of Arizona: associate professor.

FRANK JAY MORENO, New York University: associate professor.

CHARLES R. NAEF, Colgate University: assistant professor.

CHARLES PARRISH, University of Texas: associate professor.

EDWARD T. ROWE, University of Connecticut: assistant professor.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, University of Pennsylvania: professor.

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HERBERT WEISS, New York University: associate professor.

ORION WHITE, University of Texas: associate professor.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, New York University: professor.

### RETIREMENTS

ARTHUR M. WILSON, Dartmouth College, will retire at the end of June, 1967.

### CORRECTION

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. was incorrectly listed in the March issue as being affiliated with Seton Hall University. He is affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania.

## IN MEMORIAM

HENRY PUGET died in Paris on 18 November at the age of 72. He was for many years and at the time of his death chairman of the Scientific Committee of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and the French member of its Executive Committee. Mr. Puget served in the Council of State for forty-five years. Important details were service in the cabinets of the Ministries of Finance and Air and as chairman of the Appeals Board of UNESCO. His intellectual interests were wide: local government, town planning, copyright, maritime law, atomic energy. Throughout his career he taught at the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Paris. He made important contributions to comparative law and administration through his leadership in IIAS and other international organs and through his publications.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
*Brooklyn College, City University of New York*

# Professional Placement Service at 1967 Annual Meeting

## (September 5-9, 1967)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Chicago meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U.S. Employment Service. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

*FOLLOW UP:* Orders and applications will be returned to the local Employment Service Office after the Annual Meeting. The office will determine if a satisfactory placement occurred and, if not, will make further recruitment or replacement efforts.

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Because of the success of past Tour-Seminar programs, the Association is offering another in its series of travel study opportunities during the summer of 1967, in Asia.

In addition to direct conversations with governmental leaders of the countries on the itinerary, Tour-Seminar participants will meet with members of the faculties of local universities, U.S. Foreign Service personnel, foreign press representatives, etc. Opportunity will be provided for a limited amount of personal research and sightseeing. The entire trip is being planned with the cooperation and support of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Information Service.

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## EXPENSES

The cost to Association members will be about $1645—substantially less than it would be for a similar trip arranged on an individual basis. Included in the fare will be round-trip tourist air transportation, first-class hotel accommodations, numerous meals, baggage handling, and airport transfers. (On the basis of past experience, participants can expect that the cost of this educational activity will be accepted as deductible expense on Federal tax returns.)

*For further information concerning this unique educational, research, and travel opportunity, write immediately to: APSA 1967 Asian Tour-Seminar, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. A brochure giving full details and reservation information will be mailed to you.*

# Notice

# Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

> "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 5, 1967, in the Belmont Room, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

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

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

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

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
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

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